Political parties have been recognized as essential to the e¢cient and proper functioning of democracy (see, for example, Schattschneider 1942, Duverger 1964, among many others). As such, they are expected to organize public opinion by o¤ering voters choices at elections and to provide enough cohesion to organize the work of legislative and executive branches. Since much of policymaking takes place within the parties rather than in the public domain, it is important to study the internal functioning of political parties. There has been, however, less agreement about whether it is necessary for parties to organize themselves in internally democratic ways (see Michels 1915, Kirchheimer 1966, Duverger 1964, Katz and Mair 2002). But even if views still di¤er on the absolute necessity of intra-partydemocracy, most politi- cal scientists agree that there are often sound and even self-interested reasons for parties to adopt more open decision-making processes (see Teorell 1999, Scarrow 1999, 2005, Hazan and Rahat 2010). This primarily refers to two main intra-party procedures: selecting party can- didates and de…ning policy positions. The literature has provided several formal arguments in favor of more democratic candidate selection methods, e.g., through primary elections (see Meirowitz 2005, Jackson et al. 2007, Adams and Merrill 2008, Serra 2011, Castanheira et al. 2012, among others). There is, however, no formal model, which provides a rationale for implementing more inclusive policy determination processes within the party, to the best of my knowledge. The present paper contributes to this line.
Whilst conceptualisations of intra-partydemocracy are useful, they should be carefully related to theories of democracy. An index which includes participation, competition, representation, responsiveness and transparency (Rahat and Shapira 2017) might be too broad, whilst another index which focuses only on inclusion of members in electing the leader and the candidates might be too narrow for an account of democratic practices. We already know that electoral authoritarianism co- exists with free elections (Schedler 2006). As the party elite are the agenda setters, the outcome of the electoral inclusion can be manipulated (Cross and Pilet 2015, Katz 2013). In fact, it was noticed early on (Katz and Mair, 1995) that giving members more rights is a sign of giving party leaders more autonomy, especially from the party’s middle ranks.
Yet democratic theorists maintain that parties’ internal functioning must conform to democratic practices because the quality of democracy in a state mirrors internal behaviour of parties. According to Mainwaring (1999:11), ‘the way political parties behave and carry out their activities affect such vital questions as the nature of, and citizens attitude to democracy, the level of accountability and quality of elections in a country.’ Hence, since Africa’s democratic renaissance, there have been calls for African parties to be internally democratic in order to promote democracy within society (Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Bratton 2012). Despite the prevailing analytical focus on Ghana’s democratization, including Lindberg’s (2003) empirical work on how legislators ascend to office through patrimonial relations, democratic practices within contemporary Ghanaian parties remain largely unexamined. Indeed, inter-party rather than intra-partydemocracy has been the subject of many scholarly works on democratization in Ghana.
No. We have learned very quickly that, if you are to succeed, winning by a small margin is in fact no victory at all. If you want to have a future, you always have to be respectful. Even after a controversial decision that may appear to be an either-or decision, you still have to keep in mind that you have to survive as an organization, even after that difficult decision is taken. You have to keep the dialogue going until even a small minority is at least somewhat satisfied with the decision. You can’t get rid of them. We have made a historic decision by relying on intra-partydemocracy, and it has been very convenient for me as the chairman. I don’t think the chairman should be the one to make the executive decisions in the party. I have a lot of responsibilities rather than privileges and prerogatives. Of course, it has happened that a certain decision was too much for some members, and they decided to leave because of it. It would be the same for me, in some cases. If I couldn’t accept a certain decision and if it were very important for me. Sure, we have some people in the party who would like to leave NATO. In the recent presidential election, a party poll showed most members supported Marek Hilšer in the first round of the vote. In the runoff round, the need to vote anti-Zeman was of course very strong. But still, there were 15 people who would vote for Zeman. Some media got in touch with me and asked why we don’t expel those members. And I just said “Look, we are a democratic party. And I may not like Zeman, or any other President, but we are a parliamentary democracy, not presidential. And the Pirate Party does not die if some members vote for Zeman or someone else. I think those attacks come from a lack of understanding of our party. Some people may be afraid of democracy.
This thesis will focus on party leadership elections, which are the possibilities of members of a political party to vote on their next party leader. Party leadership elections are one aspect of intra-partydemocracy. Intra-partydemocracy encompasses all measures taken to increase the influence of party members within a political party. Intra-partydemocracy, regarding leadership elections, is determined both by the influence the party members have in selecting the leader, as well as by who decides on the eligibility of candidates (Rahat & Hazan, 2010, p.31; Aylott & Bolin, 2017, 57). In this thesis, the focus will only be on the selectorate in leadership elections. The selectorate is the body in charge of selecting the party leader. In most cases, leadership elections are introduced by political parties themselves as a reaction to changes in society, but in some countries political parties are encouraged to change their internal democracy. Several changes in society result in an adaptation of leadership elections: a growing distrust in parties (Shomer & Lavi, 2018), the changing relationship between parties and the state (Wolkenstein, 2016), loss of party members or electoral defeat (Pennings & Hazan, 2001, p.269), or personalisation (Cross & Katz, 2013, p.115; Rahat & Shapira, 2017, p.86). Apart from being a reaction, leadership elections can also be implemented deliberately, to legitimize the political party or distinguish the it from others (Cross & Katz, 2013, p.133; Close, Kelbel & Van Haute, 2017, p.658).
The Danish case seems to support the argument that the formation of informal minority governments is the most attractive strategy for a highly institutionalized party. It was demonstrated that due to the formation of a formal minority government with the Liberal Party, a conflict within the SD parliamentary group developed. The leader of the SD group in parliament, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, resigned following the conclusion of the SD-V accord. It was furthermore shown that the lack of mechanisms for the diffusion of dissent within the SD forced Jorgensen to impose structural constraints on the day-to-day operation of the government. It was concluded that the failure of the party elites to neutralize the internal opposition - highlighted by the break-up of the coalition government by the SD - was translated into an inferior position in the bargaining plane. However, as long as the SD elites had formed informal alliances (i.e. 1975-1978, 1979-1982), no internal conflicts occured. Consequently, the party possessed relatively high level of bargaining power during the periods in which informal minority governments were formed.
The road towards the implementation of a federal state structure was long, difficult and painful, with long periods of very high government turnover and talks about a deep regime crisis. Yet after 1995 the tensions cooled down and for the first time since 1965 four parliaments and their government went to the very end of their four years term. The Belgian federation seemed to work. Yet, as from 2003 the identity politics resurfaced, leading to an increasing governmental instability. After the 2007 federal elections it took almost 200 days to put together a new coalition, which was only a transition government that needed to prepare further talks about state reform. The bank crisis of 2008 allowed for a temporary freezing of the conflict. But in 2010 early elections were called after the government had collapsed over the possible splitting along the language border of the central Brussels electoral constituency. In Flanders the reborn Flemish nationalist party N-VA polled just under 30% of the votes and became the largest party of the country. Talks to form a new government took over 500 days.
Second, parties implement internal processes because of the obligation by national or international regulation. Political parties have traditionally been understood as primarily private and voluntary organizations. Consequently, due to the fundamental democratic principles the internal organization of political parties long remained outside the scope of state regulation. The legal regulation of internal processes can therefore be considered as controversial. However, the current legitimacy crisis parties face is, according to politicians and policymakers, only solvable by generating more democracy: ‘the only cure for democracy is more democracy’ (Van Biezen and Piccio, 2013, p. 28). To ensure the proper functioning of the democratic system, regulations to enhance the internal democracy of parties become more and more customary. In most European countries, internal partydemocracy is nowadays regulated by party law. Rules to increase internal partydemocracy are adopted in the constitution or separate party law (van Biezen and Piccio, 2013). The Dutch party law does not contain regulations on the internal organization of parties (Van Biezen and Piccio, 2016, p. 31). Moreover, political parties are even not mentioned in the Dutch Constitution.
several suggest that he was not among the instigators of the party. 50 Instead, he was brought in by the founders to head the list. Two more substantial calculations (beyond the electoral ambitions of a single personality) were allegedly involved. First, Durán Ballén was involved in a fundamental challenge with Febres-Cordero, attempting to redirect the party into genuine political organization rooted in its founding Christian Democratic philosophy rather than as a party in close alignment with Guayaquil business sectors (Hammond 2004). Having lost this battle, Durán and other elements saw the creation of a new party as a chance to embark on such a project. Furthermore, in the twilight of the troubled presidential administration of the chief social democratic party, ID, the founders saw an opening to create a party which included center-left support in the coalition. On top of the weakness in ID, the traditional left in general was in disarray following the crumbling of the Soviet Union. 51 The PUR was courting probably support from one moderate leftist faction, led by Alfredo Castillo, which had formed the PLN. One founding member argued, “I wanted to make a party not only out of the circumstances, but for the long-term.” 52 Whatever their intentions, the tactical decision over choice of a vice-presidential running mate for Durán rent the party in two. Durán was favoring an alliance with the Conservative Party (PCE), placing hard-line liberal economist Alberto Dahik on the ticket. PUR director, Mauricio Gándara, opposed a joint ticket with the Conservative Party because it would alienate support on the left. Furthermore, Dahik wanted the ticket to support PCE candidates in the legislative elections rather than the affiliates that
The study examined internal democracy and democratic consolidation of people democratic party (PDP) in kogi state. Specifically, the study examined internal democracy and democratic consolidation and the consequences of poor party internal democracy on the party democratic consolidation. The study has its method rooted in the survey design using close and open ended structured questionnaire, textbooks, journals, internet materials, etc. using Multi Stage Sampling, 1919 study participants were randomly selected from the 12 local government, party leaders and these leaders comprised of 8 Local Government party chairmen and four Local Government party secretaries proportionally selected from across the 3 senatorial districts in Kogi State. Data obtained were quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed descriptively on percentage tables using the Special Package for Social Scientist (SPSS). Findings of the study show that; reveals that the level of popular participation in the party was very high, while adherence to nomination process is commendable, however, serious fears were expressed regarding adherence to party policies/constitution by the party leadership. This mixed result for the internal democracy mechanisms invariably has mixed consequences on democratic consolidation, ranging from stalling or abandonment of development projects, intra-party conflicts or violence among others are inevitable outcomes. The results of correlation analysis revealed that the party internal democratic mechanisms had positive impact on democratic consolidation. However, at the 5% level of significance, only adherence to nomination process (r = 0.283; p<0.050) and adherence to party policies (r = 0.046; p<0.050) had significant impact on democratic consolidation. The study recommends that; there is need to strengthen the internal democratic mechanism and legal frameworks for fighting the imposition of candidate within political parties in Nigeria. As things stand now, Nigeria‟s political parties are still perceived as those whose destinies are in hands of the power-brokers within the parties.
Dual processing theories (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggest two alternative mechan- isms responsible for such effects: Positive (or negative) reporting may make the party itself, but also the positive (or negative) evaluations, more accessible in people’s memories (heuristic processing or priming). Alternatively, positive reporting might actually persuade voters by presenting convincing arguments for a certain candidate, especially if voters are motivated to process the information more thoroughly (systematic processing). Both effects should also be important for intra-campaign changes in voting preferences. Heuristic processing may trigger a decision for the party that has been presented more favorably in individuals’ news media environment (e.g., Fournier, Nandeau, Blais, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004). Systematic processing may persuade voters to change their vote preference as a result of more careful considerations of the information provided about the different parties. Our “media tone hypothesis” thus postulates:
Along the same lines, the change in course in the NPD-case represents a conscious decision to confine Art. 21(2) primarily to Weimar-scenarios and to restrict its application for ‘softer’ threats of parties that only create conflicts of legitimacy. Contrary to the Bundesrat, the Court seems to perceive a greater damage to the image of German democracy in an overly generous use of party- banning than in the legal existence of an extremist party like the NPD. In this regard, establishing a ‘potentiality doctrine’ does not represent a purely judicial step, but also contains a political statement. However, it would be overhasty to characterise the Court’s approach as a bold form of legal policy-making. First, the revision of guidelines for interpreting Art. 21(2) lays within the Court’s mandate of “considering the provisions of freedom and value decisions within the Basic Law and putting them in proportion to the protective purpose of Art. 21(2) to ensure the greatest possible accordance” (FCC, 2017, p. 163). Second, Bligh (2013) admits that there is one scenario under the ‘legitimacy paradigm’ where a probability question could be useful: “[…] when the parties are so insignificant that they could not pose any actual danger” (p. 1372). Given this background, this analysis continues to examine how the FCC applies the ensemble of its old and new legal criteria for party-banning to the case of the NPD.
Existing research on intra-party unity and conflict has mostly focused on (dis)unity within the legislative branch of the party at the national level, while neglecting conflict between the different faces or at different levels of the party. Intra-party unity and conflict have also been routinely defined and operationalized through ideological homogeneity or distance, although intra-party conflicts are multi-dimensional and dynamic phenomena. The articles included in this special issue seek to address these shortcomings in the literature. Their contributions are threefold: (1) they theorize intra-party conflict as a dynamic and multifaceted concept; (2) they explore conflicts across and between several party faces, and among different intra-party actors; (3) they investigate the determinants and management of conflict at several party levels.
There is also a third grouping within the post-crisis literature that requires addressing. There have been several valuable contributions to the academic literature focused on the UK Labour Party under Miliband (see Gaffney 2017; Bale 2015a; 2015b; Goes 2016; Cowley and Kavanagh 2016; Manwaring and Beech 2017) and Hollande’s Socialist administration (see Gaffney 2015; Wall 2014; Kuhn 2014; Di Francesco-Mayot 2017). Each account furnishes our understanding of the two cases with a level of political detail that is hard to attain in a comparative study, even a two-case comparison such as this one. For instance, Goes (2016) provides an excellent account of the failure of Miliband’s leadership to provide ideational renewal within the Labour Party that resonates with a number of the findings in this thesis. Yet, in general, the analytical focus in these volumes is placed too readily and too narrowly on political agency. Thus, in contrast to the material and institutional literatures cited above, these works give us a tremendous insight into the ups-and-downs of front-line politics, but often lack a deeper consideration of how the wider political economic environment has shaped the strategies and capacity of social democratic actors post-crisis. In consequence, such works have tended to engage with concepts such as ‘economic credibility’ on relatively uncritical terms as non-negotiable constraints (see Bale 2015a; 2015b; Goes 2016), rather than interrogate the foundations upon which such concepts are built and the dynamics through which they come to shape actors’ behaviours.
Political parties have been acknowledged as the forces that shaped democracy in Ghana (Debrah and Gyima Boadi 2005). Political parties made it possible for voters to make choices amidst divers competing programs and ideologies driven by the parties manifestoes and campaign messages. That notwithstanding, political parties in Ghana also provided a legislative cohesion and are also responsible for the mobilization and the entrenchment of political education and also served as a platform for recruiting and training party members and leaders in Ghana. Ghana returned to competitive politics in 1992 after the long decades of experimentations with varying political forms. The fourth republic of Ghana was marked by two important democratic landmarks. First, the fourth republic constitution has witnessed a relatively stable period of democratic continuity and the efforts towards changing Ghana into a functional liberal democracy. An instance central to this development is the regular conduct of national elections which led to the peaceful alternation of political power among the dominant political parties thus the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic party (NPP). Second, irrespective of the roles of political parties in the consolidation of democracy in Ghana, their inner circles are plagued and bedeviled with internal conflicts and factionalism which in most cases leads to party split and decamping.
For cross-ethnic coalitions to sustain, an effective political law should provide incentives for coalitions to remain functional and cohesive beyond elections. W.J. Rules of Procedure and other regulations can achieve this end by incorporating anti-switching provisions: mandating the removal of W.J. members from an office as soon as those members decide to disassociate from their parties or coalitions. Many new democratizing societies have adopted anti-switching laws to promote party discipline in their legislatures. As Table 8 indicates, in eight out of ten countries, legislators may lose their seats as soon as they disaffiliate from their parties or coalitions. Similar provisions exist in other diverse
The campaign website was launched May 26 th 2010 and was active up to the election day September 19 th . Here visitors could practice in voting for Nina through an interactive application (she collected 28000 votes on her campaign website before election day), donate money, pose her questions, reading about her political agenda, watch and listen to campaign materials. The four main links were to the four profile issues/ matters of heart, she based her campaign around. These were better schools, smarter transports, a successful integration of immigrants and making it easier for companies and businesses. There were links to her Facebook profile on the front page, and further inside the site there were also links to Ninalarsson.se and her Twitter feed. The visual design was centered around the cornflower, the liberal party symbol, and one of the main headlines read “vote for the liberals and then tick my name”. Hence no-one could mistake that Nina was a liberal politician first and foremost. The campaign website was completely controlled by Nina and Hello Clarice. They decided which questions should be answered to and be made visible on the website, approximately one per day. This makes it questionable whether we could even conceive of this as a social media platform at all. On the other hand this strict orchestration makes the preferred image very apparent here.
4 In most European countries, public funding was introduced in the ‘60s of the previous century (Koole, 2014, p. 46). Before that, political parties primarily also gained income from other sources, mostly from civil society, such as through membership fees paid by the party members, and donations from third parties, such as companies, foundations and wealthy individuals. However, the relative importance of public funding as a share of the total of party income has increased over the years. As party membership has been declining due to the decreasing loyalty of members and voters to one particular party, and the bond between voters and parties has grown weaker and less direct, income from these sources has declined as well (Koole, 2011, p. 221). For a number of political parties, public funding is now the largest and most important source of their income (Piccio & van Biezen, 2018, p.70). As a remedy to the deteriorating financial position of political parties and its effects on their ability to perform their democratic functions, public funding was introduced (Ohman, 2014, p. 1). Its introduction, however, did not go without fundamental discussion. Introducing public funding meant that all taxpayers were now collectively required to fill the gap left by the decreasing amount of membership fees and donations. Proponents argued that since political parties play a pivotal role in the functioning of democracy, it was justified to support them with public means. However, opponents objected that this would be undemocratic, because through public funding, every citizen would now support every political party with their tax money, including the ones with which they did not agree and which did not represent their interests (Heidenheimer, 1970, p. 17).
Presumably, the outcome of an intra-party decision process is not independent of the importance that each of the factions has in the party. Along this line, the fact that pragmatist politicians play no role in the choice of their party’s policy under a Roemer equilibrium may thus appear as a shortcoming of the concept. Like we mentioned earlier, by offering a natural intra-party decision process under which PUNE results inadequate as a solution concept for political competition, we provide an alternative equilibrium concept for political games when Pareto efficiency is not sustainable. What do we mean by offering a natural decision process? Although in most presidential systems, the president is elected by popular vote, it isn’t a surprise that party factions engage in negotiations, despite the common interest in agreement, they still have conflicting preferences among each other. For instance, United States use caucuses and nationwide state level primaries to elect a candidate for office that will narrow the field of candidates before the general election. But, what if Pareto efficiency isn’t not sustainable when party members decide over what party platform to present. Furthermore, what if, instead, faction members negotiate over the terms of the party platform to present, say, in the primaries. And as a result, factions harm one another within the party as evidence suggests happens during electoral races.