Jus post bellum as a more philosophical and at the same time complex idea covers the termination phase of war. Jus post bellum widens the classical just war theory based on two notions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. G.J. Bass puts this issue within the three questions: the obligations to restore the sovereignty of a conquered country, the rights and obligations that belligerent states retain in the political reconstruction of a defeated power and obligations of victorious states to restore the economy and infrastructure of a defeated state 1 . Bass does not directly involve human rights arguments in his vision of
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is to acknowledge that providing for refugees and internally displaced is not simply a matter of justice post war, it is necessary to meet the jus in bello conditions of proportionality and necessity. Claims that jus in bello greatly affects jus post bellum are not new. For example, not meeting the conditions of, for example, discrimination, and deliberately targeting civilians is not only wrong because it is a violation of their rights, but also because it undermines the ability to achieve reconciliation and long-lasting peace after war and the goal of jus post bellum, if not all of just war theory, is sustainable long-lasting peace. Failing to meet the displacement-sensitive in bello proportionality or displacement-sensitive in bello necessity has significant consequences not only for permissibility of a particular action in war, but also for what is required of us post-war. This suggests that we have a preponderance of reasons to argue that a state entering a war ought to set up displacement infrastructure at the onset of war. The displacement infrastructure should include political and financial assistance for neighboring countries housing refugees, safe migration routes and most importantly staffing and resources for sufficient number of refugee camps in the region.
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the basic principles of Jus post Bellum as a way to incorporate cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. If incorporated properly into a cosmopolitan humanitar- ian approach, this would include such activities as altering unjust economic conditions, curbing arms sales to conflict regimes (Oxfam, 2007; Pogge, 2001), limiting cash trans- fers to warring parties (Pogge, 2001), reforming unequal market conditions and trade relations (Nili, 2011), addressing systems of capital flight/profit shifting and strengthen- ing poverty reduction efforts, and so on (IDRC, 2001). Although detailed here only briefly, the implications are considerable. Namely, ‘intention’ is always logically linked to ‘aim’, and any consistent cosmopolitan position therefore needs to make this link between their intention to save strangers and their concern for the broader conditions in which these strangers require saving in the first place, especially as measured against the bar and aims of cosmopolitan justice.
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3) to simply save distant strangers from immediate mass killing while leaving any long-term institutional solutions for debate during post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, underpinning this just war principle, particularly in relation to the justification for humanitarian military intervention, is the moral argument for the protection of human beings from harm. As mentioned above, in the case of cosmopolitan humanitarian military intervention, the grounding for the protection of individuals stems from their inherent moral worth and the equal dignity we owe them as fellow human beings. If this is the case, as all cosmopolitans suggest, then the right intention is not simply to stop the immediate violence (although this is certainly a principle of first intent), but to also establish a global condition of public right. In this regard, it would seem that for the cosmopolitan a condition of just intention must take into account the just aims associated with those intentions and how those aims correspond to deeper structural socioeconomic conditions that threaten to perpetuate violence. This is not just in regards to cases of immediate crisis, but also in relation to regions where there is a high potential for future crisis. Therefore, it would seem that for the cosmopolitan having a just intention is coupled with also having a just aim that must necessarily go beyond the basic principles of Jus post Bellum as a way to incorporate cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. If incorporated properly into a cosmopolitan humanitarian approach, this would include such activities as altering unjust economic conditions, curbing arms sales to conflict regimes (Oxfam, 2007; Pogge, 2001), limiting cash transfers to warring parties (Pogge, 2001), reforming unequal market conditions and trade relations (Nili, 2011), addressing systems of capital flight/profit shifting and strengthening poverty reduction efforts, etc (IDRC, 2001). Although detailed here only briefly, the implications are considerable. Namely, intention is always logically linked to aim and therefore any consistent cosmopolitan position needs to make this link between their intention to save strangers and their concern for the broader conditions in which these strangers require saving in the first place, especially as measured against the bar and aims of cosmopolitan justice.
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O’Brennan’s position must be incorrect, based as it is on an erroneous conflation of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, and a failure to acknowledge the distinction which exists between these two discrete bodies of international law, which apply independently of each other. An earlier point must be reiterated – the existence of a situation of armed conflict, ‘global’ or otherwise, does not negate the requirement for compliance with the jus ad bellum. Put simply, on each occasion when a use of force by the United States (this includes force applied by means of armed drone strikes) violates the territorial sovereignty of another state, that breach must be justified under the jus ad bellum in order to be considered lawful. Clearly, it is the overriding purpose of the jus ad bellum to regulate when a state can lawfully resort to the use of armed force, and not how, and against whom, that force is used. It is for that reason too that Kenneth Anderson’s pronouncements on a doctrine of ‘naked self-defence’ must be rejected outright. Anderson has advanced the view that US drone operations in Pakistan need only satisfy the jus ad bellum, submitting that there is legal authority in international law for a policy of, “targeted killing, as a self-defence toward ends of vital national security that do not necessarily fall within the strict terms of armed conflict in the sense meant by…international treaties on the conduct of armed
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Book 2 (68-233), which will be discussed below. The survivor’s account of the civil war between Marius and Sulla shares many thematic similarities with other accounts before and after the Bellum Civile. Authors such as Cicero, Dio Cassius, and Plutarch depict Marius as immoral and willing to undertake various actions regardless of the legal and psychological guilt that was associated with them. In these sources, the character of Marius reinforces the opposition between good fortune and virtue because Marius, acting under the guise of virtus, commits crimes to ensure his continued success. Although Cicero often expresses his admiration for Marius, he condemns Marius’ propensity for committing unlawful actions, especially when Marius murders the senator Quintus Catulus in 87 BCE (Cic. Tusc.5.56). Dio Cassius, in the Historiae Romanae (26.89.2) argues that Marius can conceal his guilt, and pass his actions off as virtuous, because of his extraordinary good fortune: “[Marius] dared with great readiness to say anything, to promise anything, to lie about anything, and to swear falsely about anything from which he hoped to gain an advantage, [but]…because of his extraordinary cunning and luck (τύχης), a benefit he experienced in the absolute highest degree, he even acquired a reputation for virtue.” Dio Cassius’ description of Marius invites comparison with Lucan’s account of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon in Book 1 when Caesar attempts to conceal his guilt by trying to convince Roma that he acts out of virtus as her soldier. Finally, Plutarch (Mar.29) writes that, during his last consulship, Marius committed various crimes, such as murder, bribery, and deceit and that “he personally counted the ability to lie as a mark of virtue and skill.” For more information on Cicero and Marius see Lavery (1971); and on Marius and his perversion of virtus see McDonnell (2006: 241-292).
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190 JUS-CQI increase slightly compared to JUS (0.96 of JUS-CQI compare to 0.89 of JUS). The increase in the number of UEs leads to the achievement of the overall throughput by the JUS-CQI scheduler, which is 35 Mbps more than the JUS on average. Furthermore, the results show that the required average received Signal-to-Noise power Ratio (SNR) satisfying the average Block Error Rate (BLER) of 10 using JUS-CQI is decreased by approximately 4.8 dB when compared to JUS. There has been an improvement of the throughput within the case of the JUS-CQI algorithm, without costing much in BLER performance at different SNRs. Therefore, the suggested scheme permits high performance, making it feasible for carrier aggregation implementation in LTE-Advanced networks.
checked for accuracy by faculty not involved in their design. The scores from the pre- and post-intervention tests were analyzed statistically using JMP Pro v11 software (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) to reveal differences between the means of both groups. Data were checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Due to non-normal distribution, non-parametric tests were applied and hence the Mann-Whitney U test was employed for comparison between groups of the pre- and post-test scores. Statistical significance was set at P < 0.05.
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After a while, one realizes that the likelihood of success principle differs significantly from the other principles discussed so far (just cause, last resort, proportionality, and good intentions). Likelihood of success is tailored for nation vs. nation wars where each side can, with some difficulty to be sure, assess its resources and chances. But it makes no sense to burden non-nation groups with this principle. Most non-nation groups cannot possibly satisfy the principle. It follows that Just War Theory, the theory itself, needs to be modified so that it becomes asymmetrical. Nation vs. nation wars are symmetrical. Both sides must jump over the same Just War Theory hurdles. In contrast, nations at war with non-nation groups can still be asked to meet likelihood of success standard, but not so with non-nation groups. To go to war justly, non-nation groups need to meet only four of the five jus ad bellum principles discussed thus far.
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such substitute openings reinforce the idea that readers are apt to connect the opening lines with the rest of the poem, as well as with the poet and other examples of the genre. Commenting on four lines beginning, ille ego ... , ‘I am he ...’, Williams, 1972, writes that that they are: ‘quoted by Donatus and Servius as having been removed from the beginning of the Aeneid by Varius and Tucca, the posthumous editors of the poem’ and states that ‘it is certain that they should be omitted’. 6 Austin, 1968, discusses in detail the ancient evidence and shows that although some scholars defended the lines as a valid connection between this and Virgil’s previous works, in fact the lines are not in early manuscripts and he states that Virgil did not write these verses. 7 Conte, 1988, 8 considers the claims by some of the ancient commentators, that what we know as the beginning of Lucan’s Bellum Ciuile is spurious, that the poem should begin at line eight: quis furor, o ciues, quae tanta licentia ferri, BC 1.8 ‘What madness, oh citizens, why such great freedom of iron’, and that the first seven lines were added later. Very few scholars support this and all look to the purpose stated at the outset and a comparison with the proems of both Virgil and Homer. The fact that scholars have argued for and against other or alternative openings confirms that beginnings are important to our understanding of both the poems and their place within the genre.
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Thucydides both claimed that war was central to their reasons for writing, and both include numerous battles in their works. 50 Extant Latin sources written before the Bellum Gallicum are rare; however it is likely that lost sources such as Catoʼs Origines included battle given the prevalence of warfare throughout the republican period. 51 One of Caesarʼs contemporaries, Sallust, also included what he believed were noteworthy battles in the war against Jugurtha. 52 Livy, writing in the early imperial period also includes numerous battles, for example major accounts of the battles of the Second Punic war. 53 Similarly Cassius Dio, Arrian, Appian and Tacitus all include battle in their works due to the environment of martial endeavour in which their works are set. 54 Even a biographer like Plutarch could record battle in some detail, as evidenced by his account of the battle of Marius against the Teutones and Cimbri. 55 Other sources such as manuals on warfare also existed, and while many of these do not survive, Frontinus provides an almost encyclopaedic list of battles and the basic principles involved, and the fragment of Arrianʼs array against the Alans gives a clue to the level of detail that could have been provided in other works. 56 The later work of Vegetius, with its recollection to the earlier periods of Roman warfare, is indicative of the pervasiveness of the martial ethos and military concepts. 57 This small selection of the surviving works illustrates that Caesar wrote within a long tradition of literary representations of battle, which continued to be a major feature of ancient writing after the events described in the Bellum Gallicum.
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71. The process question is easier in the context of detention. One of the lessons emerging from the post-9/11 conflicts is that adversarial administrative and court proce- dures can be employed to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations of liberty where there is serious risk of misidentification of alleged combatants. See Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 61, at 221 (criticizing the decision of the Bush administration to provide mini- mal process to detainees in the conflict with al Qaida and the Taliban). The technical na- ture of cyber operations suggests that there may be the need for technical witnesses in determining whether a captured cyber warrior is a combatant or a civilian.
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Figure 7 shows the UX methods that were studied. Usability testing was overwhelmingly the most frequently studied method. That finding is not surprising because usability testing is research-like in its components. The testing studies contribute to the strong trend toward evaluation methods. Those studies also fit into an extensive literature that has been developing over the past 25 years. What was a bit surprising to us is the lack of studies of the other methods used in product development, particularly requirements gathering methods such as site visits and early design methods such as prototyping. Perhaps the restricted methods seen in JUS papers is the result of the name of the journal. “Journal of Usability Studies” may suggest to some potential authors that the journal is focused on usability testing or usability evaluation. If that is the case, a name change that includes “user research” or “user experience” might encourage a wider range of submissions. It is, however, encouraging to have a good number of papers on universal design.
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Under the armed conflict paradigm, enemy combatants are targeted solely in virtue of their status as enemy combatants. 7 Whether by an infantryman aiming a rifle or a pilot firing a missile, the enemy is justifiably targeted inasmuch as he is wearing a uniform and operating under a command structure of an enemy force. Granted, there are further qualifications for targeting a uniformed combatant (it is illegal to target and kill the wounded, POWs, hors de combat, etc.). Nevertheless, when combatants are targeted in armed conflict, there is no need to justify the application of force on a case-by-case basis. In theory, declaring war against an enemy in the first place is justified by jus ad bellum considerations. But any subsequent application of force to that enemy is legally justifiable regardless of whether the war itself is justified: all that is required is that a state of armed conflict exists and the targeted individual is a member of or directly and significantly contributes to the enemy military threat. Thus, it is not the conduct of the targeted individual that makes him a permissible target, but rather his status as a member of the enemy force.
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Since the end of the 1980s the geo-political structure has undergone dra- matic changes but this has happened without any single shocking event that would have implicated the vital interests of the most powerful states to the ex- tent, or in the manner, of the two World Wars of the last century. Rather, changes have been more gradual, and some of the most significant ones have not been bloody. Neither the genocide in Rwanda, nor the crimes against hu- manity committed in the former Yugoslavia, nor even the September 11th ter- rorist attacks (though the last directly affecting by far the most powerful state in the world), have forced the states to sit down and draft new rules corre- sponding to a changed political environment requiring new legal responses for such new threats. These developments have not impacted the evolution of in- ternational law treaties concerned with the core of international law it- self—jus ad bellum, as the two World Wars did. However, due to the character of the main victim-state and the particularly tragic nature of the at- tacks witnessed by millions on television screens on 9/11, terrorists may well become victims of their own “spectacular success” for these events may have shocked the world enough to open the way to radical reappraisal through cus- tomary process of some basic principles of the jus ad bellum.
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Grotius’ inclusion of punishment as a just cause reintroduces the ideologically driven wars back into his program, albeit with a reduced emphasis compared with the justifications from self-defence and retrieval of property. Whether or not we find Grotius’ argument as to why these punitive wars are justifiable persuasive there is still something to be said for the fact that Grotius at least attempts to make the basis for punitive wars universal. Compared with the religious thinkers who came before him, all people, not only Christians, can and must recognize the human rights abuses that are punishable by war. However, the inclusion of punishment as a just cause is not without its problems. Richard Tuck, for example, argues that Grotius’ list of atrocities that can be punished with warfare neatly justified wars by Europeans against indigenous peoples around the world in order to annex territory. 107 We can, perhaps, differentiate between the theory as Grotius presents it and the use the theory was put to, but we may have further theoretical reasons for disagreeing with this part of his jus ad bellum. Grotius presents a list of abuses and historical incidents of peoples responsible for carrying out atrocities that he thinks others were justified in punishing. We may disagree in principle with the categories of abuses that he thinks justify punishment, with the historical examples that contribute evidence towards his categories, or more importantly, we may take issue with the entire idea that others can punish abuses to which they themselves are not subject. Kant, as we will see in later chapters, takes issue with the idea that outsiders have a right to punish people who are not part of your political community unless they have failed to maintain what he calls the “civil condition”. He might, therefore, agree with Grotius that tyrannical rulers who abuse their subjects can be attacked for the benefit
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The principle of proportionality, as with its counterpart in jus ad bellum, seeks for a response that is proportionate to the occasion. For jus in bello application this is less a question of the act of war as proportionate, as of individual actions. Hence the use of tactical nuclear weapons would most likely be judged disproportionate in response to an opponent armed only with rifles, but not an enemy similarly equipped. Applied to surveillance this principle makes reference to different kinds of surveillance and the idea that the less extreme the occasion, the less invasive and pervasive the surveillance should be. CCTV cameras in areas where cars are frequently stolen is more proportionate than bugging the telephones of everyone in the city in which the cars are being stolen. Hacking into an e-mail account to catch an employee suspected of stealing paper clips seems less justified than doing the same to catch a foreign spy. The principle is thus helpful in assessing which means of surveillance may be employed in situ, and so forms a crucial aspect of the ethical framework that must be considered in deploying surveillance. Films such as Enemy of the State (Scott 1998) play off this concern when the protagonist finds the full might of US state surveillance turned on just one person, the disproportionality of the situation (the use of technology designed to monitor the activities of enemy states being used on a single, and in the event, innocent person) feeding the audience’s support for the hero.
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The purported justification for applying lex specialis as a principle to me- diate between human rights law and IHL is to resolve an apparent conflict between the two legal regimes, but in the context of NIAC, it is a solution to a problem that does not arise. We can see this by contrasting the situation in international and non-international armed conflict. In a conflict between States, as argued above, the collective nature of the authority granted under jus ad bellum combines with the detailed rules of IHL to create a comprehen- sive regime that permits targeting and detention without proof of individual threat. Citizenship of the opposing State and the absence of protection are enough to make one a lawful target. However, if we agree that the targeting and detention of at least some citizens of the opposing State is also governed by human rights law that would bring into play an alternative legal frame- work, in which the justification for the use of force would be determined on an individual basis. We would then be faced with a clash between two diver- gent perspectives: one that assessed the use of force against a collective en- tity, and another that assessed the use of force against the individuals making up the entity. The lex specialis doctrine offers a way to resolve the tension between these viewpoints, by aligning the metric used in justifying the resort to force against individuals with the procedural rules that govern targeting and detention in the case of collective authorization. In this way, although the doctrine is generally presented as a way of reconciling the conflicting norms of IHL and human rights, it is in fact fundamentally driven by the tension between two alternative levels at which the justification required for
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At times, however, administration officials have appeared to add an additional or alternative justification: the US can act in self-defence against imminent threats to its national security. For example, John Brennan, at the time Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser, said in April 2012 that “the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defence” (emphasis added). This justification seems to address situations where the US feels the need to use lethal force outside the boundaries of an existing armed conflict; it looks back to earlier cases where the US used military force in response to terrorist acts, such as President Ronald Reagan’s strike against Libya in 1986 and President Bill Clinton’s attack on supposed al-Qaeda facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. However, in the present context, it appears to intermingle or conflate a number of different notions: first, the concept of self-defence under the principles of jus ad bellum (the laws governing the use of force between states) as a justification for violating the sovereignty of another state, traditionally assessed by reference to the so-called “Caroline criteria” elaborated by the US in 1842; second, the threat to innocent life as a justification for the deliberate killing of an individual person (perhaps with reference to some conception of human rights law or principles); third, perhaps, some idea that an actual or imminent armed attack by a non-state group provides a justification for the targeted state to use force against that group as a collective entity.
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Winston Churchill first coined the term “supreme emergency” in 1939 when describing the Nazi threat to Great Britain. 38 Walzer points out that when we consider this term we are acknowledging that there is a possibility of some greater threat that surpasses the normal dangers of war. A “supreme emergency” is something which is outside of the normal vision of the law. Indeed, as the concept implies, it occurs when a society faces a life-threatening emergency which could result in the annihilation of a people and their entire way of life. Walzer introduces his concept of the “supreme emergency” with a particular occurrence in mind. This occurrence is Great Britain’s inability to effectively preserve its “way of life” through conventional jus in bello methods when faced with the threat of Nazi invasion in 1939-40. As Walzer puts it, “Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful.” 39 Thus, the threat faced is not the loss of some tangible territory or government, but the loss of an entire society’s philosophy of life. This unprecedented threat, as a result, allows a “stretching” of the bounds of the tradition, for Germany at this time was “a threat to human values so radical that its imminence would surly constitute a supreme emergency.” 40
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