Apart from commenting on language norm transmission, some inspectors also re- flected on the language that was used in the classroom by teachers and pupils. Against the background of the strongly ideological approach taken in official dis- course and in policy measures, we expect policing practices to be omnipresent, spe- cifically with respect to non-standard variants in the spoken language. Again, met- alinguistic comments turn out to be relatively rare and seemingly random. Still, this tells us something about the way in which school inspectors perceived language and about their attitudes to variation. Contrary to language norm transmission, policing language use was not part of the official language-in-education policy. Although the acquisition of so-called civilized speech was, in educational discourse, believed to be an important aspect of child development, this was not made explicit in curricula. There was no distinct subject nor were there separate methods or materials aimed at the acquisition of a spoken standard. For those who adhered to standard languageideology, of course, it was an implicit goal underpinning all educational activities.
The study deals with languageideology linked with gender categories and the research is conducted by using descriptive qualitative method (Cresswell, 2008). Languageideology and gender categories are closely related. Language ideologies are thus best understood as beliefs, feelings, and conceptions about language that are socially shared and relate language and society in a dialectical fashion (Voloshino, 2006). The paper highlights the influence of the society and the area in which the language is communicated as one of the main contributors to the speech differences between men and women, which later on contribute to their social differences. In other words, the differences or similarities, if existing, between male and female speech characteristics will be presented in the paper, taking into consideration the attitude of speakers and their communication habits and characteristics.Therefore, the research shows that ideology may not be divorced from the material reality of the sign and the sign may not be divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse. From the data, it is seen that fifteen respondents, that is 90% states that there are differences while women and men talking, especially differences in gesture and intonation. This means that language only exists in actual interaction; but language ideologies give it a life outside of that interaction and link it to other interactions. Language only exists in interaction in context, but language ideologies including the language ideologies of professional linguists abstract from interactions in context and thus open language to social manipulation.
teachers were allowed to apply for official recognition. 70 The 393 teachers who applied for registration in 1928 and 1929 were asked to promise to ‘only teach in schools where the instruction given is solely in the vernacular’ (British Government, 1929, p. 75). This restriction was motivated by the desire ‘to safeguard the purity and accuracy of the English taught’. In spite of the frictions between colonial education authorities and vernacular schools, the latter continued to gain prominence and education authorities had no other option but to appoint education supervisors to oversee their work and help them improve in quality (British Government, 1937, pp. 78-79). However, Basel Mission tribulations with colonial education authorities led to the creation by the mission in 1929 of three English primary schools in Buea, Besongabang and Bali. In 1931 another one was opened in Nyasoso. It is suggested that as the number of English schools increased, that of the vernacular schools decreased. 71 The mission also undertook to develop the skills of its teachers by opening a Preliminary Teacher Training Centre in Nyasoso in 1944 where teachers were trained for a year, and in 1946 opened a Teacher Training Centre in Bali which was transferred to Batibo in 1947. 72 Despite policy tolerance towards the use of local languages in schools, the language question came to bear on the distribution of grants-in-aid to schools and on the education choice of Cameroonians. Schools vying for ‘quality education’ increasingly sidelined Pidgin English and local languages. They were encouraged in this by the colonial government which kept trying to improve the standard of English as opposed to other languages (British Government, 1936, p. 93). Trudell (2004, p. 87), however claims that the lack of availability of English medium schools increased the popularity of vernacular schools. 73 In its 1938 report to the League of Nations, the colonial government indicated that only 11 per cent of the 100,000 children of school age in British Cameroons received any form of education, either in English or the vernacular, and blamed this low school attendance on the lack of communication in sparsely populated rural districts and the reluctance of farmers to release their children for education. The report viewed the prospect of proximity education in terms of an increase of small schools and corresponding expansion of teaching staff and inspectorate (British Government, 1938, p. 81).
Essentially the spread of English can be accounted for as the one having two sides. One side represents those people who use English as their first language and the other represents those who use English as an additional language. The number of people using English as their additional language, the „other language‟ has indeed grown very large in size in comparison to those who employ English as their first language. The question however that has been repeatedly asked is “why English?”, “couldn‟t there have been any other international language, a language maybe artificially constructed with no prior cultural and linguistic connotations?”
As Gamal El-Din explains in the interview, it is the popular level of el (i.e. ʿāmmiyya) which lep seek to codify to become the official language of Egypt. He argues that the authentic language is that which people use, saying that ‘language is the daughter of the people and the populace not the intellectuals’ (al-lugha hiya ibnit al-gumhūr wa-l-nās, mish ibnit al-musaqqafīn) – employ- ing the metaphor of parenthood a second time. He asserts that all Egyptians ‘essentially speak the same language, with only slight differences, possibly at the phonetic level but not at the grammatical level’ (seg3). The codified variety, he explains, should be modelled after the el found in art forms such as poetry, theatre and cinema ‘where Egyptian fuṣḥā is absent’. Gamal El-Din points to the shortcomings of the Arabic writing system in representing the full range of ‘Egyptian phonics’ and says that this writing system will need to be adapted, or indeed an entirely new writing system adopted, in the process of codifying el. Significantly, Gamal El-Din makes it clear that the process of codifying el involves simply recording it, and not laying down rules for it since the people who use it have already established its rules.
Understanding the complex relationship between language and politics in the Arab world can shed light on some of the deep-seated political ideologies in the region. In this chapter, I aim to provide the reader with an appreciation of the important symbolic role that Arabic has played – and continues to play – politically in the Arab world. The chapter is divided into two main parts: the first focuses on standard languageideology and the second on linguistic nationalism. In the first part, section 2, I address the inherently political nature of language standardisation, drawing on Bourdieu’s ideas, and apply this to Arabic. I also present research evidence from Egypt to demonstrate how standard languageideology is challenged. In the second part, section 3, I focus on the role of Arabic in identity politics, and how it has been deployed – or rejected – in a range of nationalisms in the Arab world. I discuss the cases of Lebanon and Egypt, where language has been notably operationalised in territorial nationalism, in some detail. I also address the role of language ideologies in inter-state relations in the Arab world through a discussion of the Maghreb-Mashreq languageideology. I end the chapter with an overview of other research contributions on language and politics in the Arab world and the prospects for future research in this area.
Ideology describes the ideas or conduct of a class or group of people and is regarded by them as justifying their behaviour (see OED 1989: 622). In the realm of Bible translation, religious ideology has naturally played a large part and was the impetus before and during the Reformation for first translating into the vernacular (Deansley, 1921, Lohse, 1986). The ideology of the translating group was usually demonstrated in the accompanying prefaces and commentaries. Current practice for the delivery of Bible translations has changed, so that most texts prepared for the general public as opposed to scholars come with limited commentary (for example the Good News Bible, 1989, or the New International Version 1973 New Testament, 1978 complete version.). In the relatively young discipline of Translation Studies 2 it has long been acknowledged that group or individual ideology may exert a considerable influence on the translator (see Lefevere, 1992, Hermans, 1985). There is also the issue of institutional influence and control. As
The simplicity of Frost‟s diction and style belies the depth of his thinking or of the viewsexpressed by him in his poems. As Geoffrey Moore remarks, “Frost‟s poetry is deeper, and tougher than it seems. The simple language, the conversational manner, and the near-whimsy of some of his observations tend to obscure the fact that he was no pantheistic romantic.” The element of occasional lightness and humour in Frost‟s poetry also tends to prove him a superficial thinker. But behind this humour is hidden much serious thought. According to Randall Jarrell, “The very humour which endured him to a wide audience masks a pessimism which is akin to Robinson‟s. Like so many other New Englanders, he saw the skull beneath the skin, and his mind turned easily to metaphysics and symbolism. In this respect he was of the company of Emerson, Thoreau and Emily Dickinson, a true Yankee, gnarled, aphoristic and-for all the seeming directress of his manner-essentially oblique in his comments. Local in reference, he is universal in application.” Frost himself acknowledges the importance of intellect or of the element of thinking in poetry; he writes: “If a writer were to say he planned a long poem, dealing with Darwin and evolution, we would be tempted to say it‟s going to be terrible. And yet your remember Lucretius. He admired Epicurus as I admired, let‟s say, Darwin. And he wrote a great poem. It's in and out, sometimes it‟s poetry, sometimes intelligent doggerel, sometimes quaint. But a great poem. Yes, the poet can use the mind in fear and trembling. But he must use it."
By way of illustration we might consider the example of the body scanners implemented at a number of airports worldwide – as technologies collecting and processing data in digital form they too form part of the move towards ubiquitous surveillance. In the UK Manchester Airport came under severe scrutiny by privacy advocates during their trial of body scanners that used x-ray technology to scan through passenger clothing. When the European Com- mission failed to approve continued use of the scanners after the trial period had ended, Manchester announced it would begin using “privacy-friendly”, “non-invasive” scanning equipment that would merely produce cartoon images of the passenger’s body (BBC News 2012). While the new technology might indeed produce a less accurate image of the body (in so far the argument for greater privacy may be correct), the use of terminology such as “pri- vacy-friendly” or “non-intrusive” ignores the fact that the scanning process as such repre- sents an invasive procedure as the human is subjected to surveillance by a machine with no knowledge about what happens with the images once collected. So while we adhere to our conventional understanding of the connection between language and truth, we might assem- ble everything that is correct, but fail to realise the full significance of what is being said.
The above idea of systems ideologies is the consequence of the application of Marx’ concept of action on human reality and its consequent mediation between subject and object. Taking the study of IS and its subject m atter as a phenomenon made up of social action makes the above point a valid conclusion. Literally all phenomena under investigation by the study of IS, whether it be participative methods in IS-design, competitive influences of object-oriented programming in the banking-sector or people’s attitudes toward information, are describable as a consequence of actions taken by individuals. The specific contribution of Marx is the labelling of such a realisation of knowledge as ideological, describing a series of influences and grouping them together into one concept. A true Marxian investigation would then try to establish a connection between the economic circumstances and the emergence of one particular systems ideology on the basis of the struggle between a ruling and a ruled class. The ideological distortions would be seen as upholding the ruling class’s socio-economic supremacy over the other. As the discussion of Mannheim in chapter three showed, this is a one-sided approach.
The first obstacle is the vulnerability of organic intellectuals and the inconsistency of their political agendas. Felix Stalder (2010) argued that organic intellectuals, or “super- empowered” actors as he coins them, are well suited to trigger large-scale events relative- ly quickly and cheaply, but that broader social movements would be needed to sustain counter-struggles in the long-term. “Many of the issues that are typical of small groups organised by a charismatic leader seem to affect WikiLeaks as well, such as authoritarian- ism, lack of internal procedure, dangers of burnout and internal and external attacks on the credibility of that single person (if not worse)” (Stalder 2010). Social movements like “Occupy Wall Street” 5 challenging global finance or the hacktivist collective “Anonymous” 6 advocating for issues such as freedom of information, independence of the internet, and a new copyright law may be seen as newly emerging phenomena of this sort. On a Europe- an level initiatives like the Chaos Computer Club 7 , which scrutinizes privacy violations Google and others commit, or “Europe vs. Facebook” 8 , which fights for the compliance of US-based companies with European data protection law, have been created. They may all be seen as locations where counter-struggles form and hegemonic actors are chal- lenged. Rather than following a coherent political agenda, however, they all have very different political goals and visions. While “Occupy Wall Street” is rooted in a radical cri- tique of capitalist society, Anonymous or WikiLeaks stress liberal freedoms without chal- lenging capitalist ideology in and of itself. Gabriella Coleman (2011) argued that Anony- mous and WikiLeaks share certain ideological sympathies, such as the freedom of infor- mation, but perform very diverse politics: “This diversity of politics results, in part, because geeks and hackers labor on different objects, initiate different types of projects, and are located in many different parts of the world. They are also quite sectarian, engaging in fierce debates as to what constitutes legitimate forms of access, openness, transparency, hacking, privacy, and dissent. As with most political domains, they are bedeviled by ideo-
The United States, perhaps more than other societies, is central to ‘ideology-free’ ideological production and hyper-efficient dissemination. Foundations claim to be scientific, objective, non- ideological and non-political, beyond the state and big business. In that regard, they attach to the longer American pragmatic philosophical tradition the late-nineteenth and early twentieth- century development of scientific superiority. Hence, foundations claim to pioneer scientific giving and scientific management of society, economy and government. It was just a century ago that American leadership in disseminating a message was demonstrated – presided over by the father of liberal internationalism – President Woodrow Wilson – who gave publicist George Creel licence to sell World War I to the American people; and he did so with devastating effect. 4
This secularization arose from the sense of self-sufficiency that came with widespread prosperity. Darwinism was a symptom of the attitude, not its cause. Whitehead (1925) pointed out that by the time of Darwin "the notion of the mechanical explanation of all the processes of nature" had "hardened into a dogma of science" (p. 59). Like every other ideology, this one rested on assumptions and denied the value of what it could not explain, but it appealed to the self-confidence associated with material prosperity. Talk about ultimate causes is threatening in an age that has found faith in the sufficiency of proximate causes.
First, studies that have applied Marxist ideology critique in communication and media studies have been fruitful. Nicholas Garnham (2000) argues, for example, that theories of the “information society”, especially Manuel Castell’s careful analysis of it, work “as an ideology” in ways that Marx and Engels describe, “to elicit uncritical assent to whatever dubious proposition is being put forward beneath its protective umbrella” (Garnham 2000, 140). Theories of the “information society,” specif- ically, view “networks” (and primarily, the internet), rather than capitalism as primary organizer and driving force, and consequently, place undue and misplaced emphasis on technologies as re- sources that need to be “accessed” in order to boost productivity and individual wealth 3 . “Infor- mation society” theories, furthermore, exert political and economic power, and like ideology, have material effects. In the U.S., as elsewhere around the world, government agencies and private corporations have funded initiatives to move “information have-nots” to the “right” side of the “digital divide” (Sterne 2000, U.S. Department of Commerce 1995). Without addressing systemic prob- lems, like structural unemployment, however, such efforts help reproduce “that monstrosity, an industrial reserve army”, that as Marx explained, was “kept in misery in order to be always at the disposal of capital” (Marx 1867, 314).
inferior behind coalesced in an image of overcoming. Indeed, these two elements were the foundations for the meaning of overcoming. Beyond good and evil, perhaps, but more effectively, beyond the world as it had been, beyond the provinciality of forces which always and already ran up against other forces of the same character. The religions, their denominations, their opposing cultures, and their bitter struggles and ironically hypocritical and sadistic conquests, were the institutions that were the hallmark of the traditions Nazism sought to overcome, though as often as not by using their methods. But it was the advent of the scientific worldview and its attendant cosmic imagination that cleared the ontological space for such ideas: "What is extraordinary about this fact is that it relativizes the distinctions among the great world religions. Each of them must certainly continue to hold that its own doctrine and its own faith are the true doctrine and the true faith, and yet scientific atheism and its political organization represent a viewpoint from which - politically considered - all the differences amongst religions seem less serious." (Gadamer 1998:89 ). Cast in this way, modern knowledge appears to be but the fruit of a new and highly successful competitor to agrarian metaphysics, one that has territorialized much away from the latter. But this is not quite accurate. The correct attitude of the empirical scientist is one of a kind of agnosticism, and not atheism, which, as we have already seen, is a specific form of religious- based fervor apparently appropriate to the post-Darwinian period. Science proper is more like the thought of Marx and Engels, proper, as 'for the communist man the question of god cannot arise'. As against Feuerbachian atheism, Marx reminds us that a truly revolutionary consciousness no longer thinks of matters in the old binary of either there is a god or there is not. This is patently an eighteenth century question, and one, after Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, seems to have less value today. This is where atheists of all stripes make an historical error. They seem to wish to turn the clock back on the metaphysical debate a few centuries, and in this they participate as much in their own version of religion as those they rail against. Even so, if agnosticism is both the more reasoned and ethical form of thinking concerning the other world, the question of its existence or its non-existence are still somewhere in our minds. I think this will be the case unless and until technical evolution as a specific aspect of the cultural evolution humans have been subject to since the earliest of the hominids developed technology, language, and the community of humanity, pushes us into a new species with indefinite lifetimes.