Though used in the context of the “first” encounter between the coloniser and the colonised, the concept of “contact zone” will be used here to mean a space where the culture, the local and the outsider interact, negotiate, get modified, accepted and resisted (even in situations where power relations are viewed as asymmetrical) which may result in a form of peace that is neither liberal nor local but a mixture of the two, that is, a hybrid peace. This results in what Pratt regards as a contact perspective – a perspective that considers the relations between (in the case of contemporary peacebuilding) local and international actors in terms of “co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often with radically asymmetrical reflections of power”, and not in terms of separateness (Pratt 1992: 7). This helps us to break from binary oppositions, for instance, the civilised and the primitive, the local and the international, the modern and the traditional, and the developed and the underdeveloped, and as such, could help in finding ways of creating conditions for durable peace in post-conflict environments. In this sense, an understanding of post-conflict environments as “contact zones” in which international actors and local actors interact, at the same time paying attention to unequal power relations, would emphasise facts on the ground and attempts to show that post-conflict situations follow their own logic or that state institutions exists alongside with non-state institutions such as indigenous and traditional political institutions and secret society institutions (as in the case of Sierra Leone) which have various claims to authority, legitimacy, power, sovereignty and order. This calls for the need to recognise multiple sovereignties and legitimacies in such situations rather than focusing on undermining or banning these institutions.
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The differences between the interpretational regime of patrimonialism, and that underlying the default approach of liberal peacebuilding (as well as a significant share of Western academia), point to a certain „culture clash‟ evident in our conventional dismissal of patrimonial politics as corrupt, with its reliance on personalised ties as vastly inferior, on the grounds of both mores and efficiency, to the impersonal and transparent bureaucratic institutions of Western political culture. The obvious ethical failings of a regime implicated in the violence of the 11-year long war (as well as structural, and on occasions overt, violence of the preceding and following years), are reinforced by the „objectionable‟ qualities of its interpretational economy, evident in what appears, to an outsider, as a shallow „tokenness‟ of roles, titles, and commitments, whose „soundness‟ is premised not on their correlation with an immutable realm of higher truth, but on their momentary relevance on the social plane and embeddedness in the current social situation. However, the very „matter- of-factness‟ of such ready judgements points to their origin in a Western culture as „common sense‟ (cf. Geertz 1973, Chabal and Daloz 2006), which can be taken as an invitation to question the cultural groundings of the default approach of peacebuilding and most conflict analysis, which sees itself as being outside, or „above,‟ culture (Richmond 2009b). The array of accepted remedies for the conflict – liberal reforms, disarmament, national reconciliation, etc. – also belie the understanding of conflict as an arbitrary „add-on‟ to the otherwise peaceful „norm‟ of social and political relations, which can just as arbitrarily be „removed‟ from the equation – and not something embedded in these relations and playing a role in their reproduction. The approach of the Special Court
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139 peace agenda, both in terms of what it purports to promote and in terms of the controversial question of compromising political sovereignty. This has become increasingly the case during the re-interpretation of peacebuilding as statebuilding, discussed in Chapter One, and reflects the general increased concern within development circles around the issue of ‘governance’ in recent years. That former President Chissano also received the first Mo Ibrahim Foundation Award was an indication that by and large Mozambique was perceived to have relatively ‘good governance’ compared to other countries in the continent, insofar as Chissano also did not seek a third term in office. 341 Health is another central issue in the liberal peace debate. The health sector in Mozambique is, just in front of education, the largest public recipient sector of international aid in terms of recorded equivalent cash value. Given that one important aspect of some critiques of the liberal peace, such as that of Pugh, has been its failure to develop social welfare, the fate of the health sector is especially relevant for the discussion. Finally agriculture was also selected as the sector in which the livelihoods of the vast majority in Mozambique are based. As the analysis offered within this project aims to be more inclusive and grounded in the experiences of the population than the existing critiques, an engagement with agricultural policy and the rural economy beyond this is a useful way in. Furthermore, given the importance of poverty reduction and development as central contemporary legitimating discourses of intervention, understanding the particular impact of interventions on this sector is also of broader political importance. 342
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aspired to by the local population. This gap between the realities and aspirations of the local population and the kind of peace generated for them creates local resistance (Mac Ginty, 2010a; Mitchell, 2010; Richmond, 2010). This resistance, and other kinds of interaction between internationals and locals, consequently produces hybrid peace. Hybrid peace, therefore, is a product of processes of accommodation, cooperation, compromise, and encounters between agents, networks, and structures of peace and peacemaking (Mac Ginty, 2010a). The concept of hybrid peace, as an alternative to the “traditional, top-down, state- centred, technocratic, and unsustainable” approach to peacebuilding, highlights the “locally rooted, everyday needs, behaviours, and aspirations” of a post-conflict society (Belloni, 2012, pp. 33-34). By reassessing the impacts of actors, networks, and structures on the achievement of peace, hybrid peace interrogates the blind preference for anything that is local. It also encourages the development of existing local resources instead of filling the gaps in peacebuilding with more liberal attributes that that have proved ineffective (Belloni, 2012). Recognizing the hybridity of peace produced from post-conflict peacebuilding processes raises to the surface the underlying structural factors that cause violence and conflict, which liberal peace tends to ignore or, sometimes unintentionally, intensify (Mac Ginty, 2010b). It also allows an examination of how the everyday forms of peace—those that are a “culturally appropriate form of individual or community life and care”—impact the effectiveness of peacebuilding (Richmond, 2009a, p. 558).
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Taking these into consideration in the peacebuilding process would essentially change the role of the EU and produce a less conditional and artificial dialogue with local society. This might ultimately require the EUPF to be far more supportive of such critical agency, which may also facilitate the reform and accession process (given that it is a long stated goal of governments across the region), as well as modify the way the latter is conducted. This in turn requires a debate about how a more locally legitimate state could be constructed in the framework of a regional approach. It would also entail reconciliation in which politics, autonomy, agency, rights, and needs debates were present, rather than merely relying on international institutions and frameworks to mitigate unresolved conflict as is currently the case. The liberal peace has not managed to take hold in BiH and the EUPF has failed so far in connecting with the local. This may well be because, as Chandler has said, the EUPF positions BiH’s politics and people as dysfunctional, rather than being open to the interplay of power, political subjectivity, and the loss of meaning inherent in the 'death of liberalism', which has occurred in a Bosnian context where liberal rights, reconciliation, and autonomy have been subsumed by 'statebuilding'. li Ironically, the existing political order has become a hybrid of often corrupt, ethnicized elites and liberal frameworks that encounter resistance or are co-opted by those elites.
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9 repression. 27 Within this liberal approach peacebuilding is framed as international security 28 . The reasoning behind intervention thus becomes the maintenance of international security and stability rather than addressing the causes of the particular conflict. Whilst this approach results in much needed humanitarian assistance, resources for development and capacity building it also results in an emphasis on stability and conflict containment rather than conflict resolution. 29 Local demands for justice are excluded in favour of externally driven top-down processes which focus on dealing with elites and existing leaders and building state level institutions. This hampers community driven peace building with alternative or conflicting priorities and agendas for peace. Hence the peacebuilding agenda becomes externally driven – often a donor led agenda. 30 Furthermore, a heavy reliance on top down promotion of democracy and market based economic reforms also often ignores local priorities and local voices for peace. 31 Market reforms can result in exacerbation of existing inequality and social grievances. Ill-timed market liberalisation including privatisation or public spending cuts in transitional societies can threaten broader peacebuilding goals, such as public service delivery. 32
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encouraged to apply for loans and purchase land. The initiative only exacerbated rural poverty yet further: peasant farmers were offered title to land at excessive prices, land that was generally in poor conditions and not fertile. Peasant farmers that purchased land were subsequently unable to work it effectively. With no state initiative to develop rural markets to accompany the land sales, and with low levels of crop production, many peasants abandoned their newly bought land, leaving them both landless and in debt. In this context, many peasant farmers have been easily persuaded to collaborate with illicit actors, such as drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), who pay farmers handsome settlements to grow illegal crops and facilitate their trafficking. The peace accords also emphasised a focus upon individual political rights – a central axis of the liberal peace agenda – to address the political exclusion that had been a core cause of the armed conflict. Political parties became a focus of the political reform programme at the centre of an international agenda emphasising political democracy. However, said initiatives only served to strengthen an already
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Similarly, governments may also be inclined to get extraction underway as rapidly as possible and to grant permissions without adequate processes to assess the consequences, to include local society in the project, and to ensure good contracts with the extracting company. Transitional and elected post-conflict governments and in- ternational development agencies alike encourage the introduction or reintroduction of private businesses and corporations that are able to invest quickly and generate revenues shortly after, and often even before the opera- tions commence (for example, through payments for exploration grants and concession rights, signing bonuses, etc.). Further, authority figures in power during interim or transitional governments may be tempted to grant ex- ploration and exploitation rights to dubious companies soon after peace to reap benefits before more accountable governments are established by election. Thus, post-conflict countries may need to deal with contracts signed by previous governments, transitional governments, or rebel groups, in which the short-sighted interests of the few may have trumped the long-term development needs of the population as a whole. For example, in DRC, the state had granted mining companies tax exemptions for periods up to 30 years during or immediately after the two Congo Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) . Thus the Congolese state and people were deprived of im- portant fiscal revenues.
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Unified and patriarchal local spaces, despite evidence o f inequality, are buttressed by a further aspect o f Tajiki tinji: a strong aversion to the political sphere, an anti political outlook. This is temporally juxtaposed to memories o f the divisive pre-war election, particuallry the 1991 presidential elections. Community leaders in M argedar provided a particularly strong example o f this. ‘In our village’, one man noted, ‘peace ( spokoystvo ) is one o f our strengths’. Another man added, ‘there are no tensions, no kind o f political parties.’60 At this point he was quietly chided by fellow group members for mentioning politics. Another leader (the raisi mahalla) in a later interview agreed that there was no political tension. However, he acknowledged that ‘there are political parties’61 but contended that ‘there are no contentious (sporni) questions between them .’ More generally, citizens strongly express deference to and respect for the state - both the idea o f it and its representatives. But, this deference seems to be rooted in a rendering o f time as post-conflict where conflict is a period o f the past associated with political activity. The remembering o f the past produces parameters for contemporary social and political behaviour. The above example offers a glimpse o f the retreat from active political participation which has taken place in Tajik society since the numerous popular political movements o f perestroika , prior to the civil war. The association o f plural and competitive politics with w ar is extremely strong. Accordingly, the political becomes a place for elites, represented by the state. This anti-political discourse envisages the political as an attribute o f an ‘other’ and thus tames the political as something which can be avoided or forgotten. Ironically, this gives the
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The constructivists’ explanation about the role of ASEAN is the most accepted view, which distinguishes the uniqueness of the “ideational” Asia from the “material” Western world (Acharya, 2001; Khoo 2004; Tan 2006; Kivimäki 2008; Stubbs 2008; Narine 2008; Johnston, 2012; Kohno, 2014). Through the emphasis on the social construction for consensus among common interests, values, and norms, ASEAN maintains the regional peace by constructing a “security community” (Deutsch, 1961; Adler & Barnett, 1998) which promotes peace through socialization instead of sanction or coerce. Since a security community is built on the process of socialization, “[w]hether any specific security community will continue to function in the long run will depend on the ability of its facilities for peaceful adjustment to keep ahead of the strains and burdens which any growth of social transaction may throw upon them” (Deutsch 1961: 103). These “strains and burdens” could result from internal and external, such as the failure of consensus building or the adding of new unsocialized actors and the consequent new material burdens. However, this constructivist approach does not go without challenge. What determines the success or failure of internal consensus building and whether the adding of new actors will compromise the original consensus remain a question the constructivists have not well answered. For example, the security community argument does not give us clear and consistent answers about the questions of ASEAN: why the old ASEAN member the Philippines and Thailand have more battle deaths after they joined ASEAN while all the other Southeast Asian countries have largely reduced them (Kivimäki, 2011); why Indonesia and the Philippines had experienced more conflicts after they joined ASEAN (Kivimäki 2011, 75); why MID, especially the fatal ones, did happen between joint ASEAN countries (Tang 2012, 395); why after 1996 the ASEAN
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The cultural dimension of the EMP has also failed to drive a “convergence of civilizations.” Certain dialogues were set in motion and at the civil society level transnational interaction between NGOs developed; but these largely excluded Islamist groups and even Arab liberals were reluctant to engage closely. The securitization of immigration issues damages Europe’s image and restricts freedom of movement within the imagined Mediterranean community. Culture wars also blighted relations: the Danish cartoon fiasco inflamed opinion on both sides. Europe does not practice its liberal values, as MENA publics see it, as it moves to ban headscarfs and mosque or minaret building. One Saudi columnist considered Europe’s simultaneous tolerance of female nudity and intolerance of the veil as breathtaking hypocrisy (Syed 2010). Europe is pulled between anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiment on the right and on the left demands for humanitarian interventions seen by MENA states as threats to sovereignty, e.g., in support of the Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf war or in Dhafur (Salame 1998, Joffe 1998). The success of political cooperation among the partnership countries was predicated on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict expected in the wake of the Oslo Accord but, according to Aliboni (2010), the failure of the peace process blocked such cooperation.
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The levels and intensity of violence in Bosnia following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995 present an encouraging exception to the patterns of violence observed in many of the other post- conflict settings examined in this volume. 1 The suggestion here is emphatically not that post-war Bosnia has been spared ‘post-conflict’ violence. Indeed, violence was very much part of the early post-war landscape, especially so in the period between late 1995 and 1998. The overall picture nonetheless compares favourably to other cases of war-to- peace transitions where civil wars were also brought to a formal end through a negotiated settlement.
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19 nevertheless conditional on the relevant government’s willingness to engage in liberal reform. As a consequence having given the Rajapakse led government the ‘green light’ for war in 2006, international disquiet over the military strategy grew, becoming open from late 2008. Far from ushering in a process of renewed liberal reform, the onset of conflict in 2006 led to three years of high-intensity and, even by Sri Lanka’s standards, exceptionally bloody fighting along with enormous humanitarian suffering and heavy civilian casualties. The ‘All Party Representatives Conference’ had gone nowhere and was revealing itself to be a sham. Moreover, having weakened the LTTE by 2008, the government, rather than pushing for negotiations and a political solution, was escalating and widening the military onslaught triggering further new waves of displacement amid heavy casualties, and ignoring calls by the West and India for a political solution. Matters came to a head in the final months of the conflict in early 2009. The government explicitly and vehemently rejected calls by leading western states – including an explicit demand by President Barack Obama 62 – for Sri Lanka to refrain from shelling hospitals and civilian locations, and allow international access to supply aid and evacuate civilians. Instead Sri Lanka further tightened humanitarian access and escalated its bombardments. The war finally ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE and the mass killings of 40,000 Tamil civilians. 63
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UK when the government attempted to promote moderate Islam in the context of the counterterrorism policy, ‘Prevent’, in the course of the 2000s. Among British Muslim communities, it was felt that those organisations and individuals that had engaged with the government or received state funding had lost credibility (see Silvestri 2010). Galtung (2012) calls upon international leaders to explore the ‘enor- mous reservoirs of experience’ that are presented by religions. He emphasises that the insights of religions can help societies to judge political developments. For him, religions provide a ‘toolbox’ to promote peace; ‘their comparative advantage is their transcendence perspec- tive’ (Galtung 2012). He believes that different religions can be used to address different forms of violence. Buddhism, for example, provides perspectives on how to address direct violence; Islam can be used to fight against structural violence. However, more research needs to be done to fully understand the lessons that can be learnt from different religions. Similarly, Stückelberger (2012) argues that research in peace studies has not yet succeeded in fully understanding the ‘instrumen- talisation’, of religion, or how it can be organised and adapted for their discipline. Again, more research is needed to grasp the complexity of economic, social, political and ethnic forces. Stückelberger (2012) also warns that excluding religion is a way to postpone problems not to solve them; moreover, integrating religion early can pre-empt the emergence of violent fundamentalism before it is too late.
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With regard to Kosovo case, when it comes to peacebuilding, many challenges have come across the peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. On this long journey of Kosovo, there were many successes and failures of the Kosovo political class. With the achievement of independence in 2008, Kosovo policymaking has shown that successes have dominated in relation to failures.
Although this peacebuilding mission was classed as a success by the United Nations, the cracks in the process began to show by early 2006. In January of 2006, 400 soldiers went on strike, sighting east-west discrimination, ill treatment and poor conditions as the catalyst for this reaction. These soldiers were dismissed from the F-FDTL in early March of the same year. These soldiers remained disgruntled and at the end of April a demonstration by them turned violent. What had begun as a demonstration by members of the armed forces about internal problems, soon turned into a violent protest against the Alkatiri government. The police were not able to control the violence so the army were called in to re-establish law and order. The official death toll was five, but others alleged that up to 60 people had lost their lives. By June, as the conflict escalated, foreign peacekeeping forces were invited into the country to help restore law and order. This prolonged violence led to the resignation of the country‟s Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri (Palmer, Niner and Kent 2007: 1). The unrest continued into 2007, although there was some order restored along the way. The crisis severely damaged the capability of both the army and the police. This breakdown in law and order among the armed forces signifies the institutional weakness and lack of a cohesive framework for both forces (Call 2008: 297).
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that clearly challenges this agenda and views human rights as indivisible and interdependent (as noted in numerous instruments of international human rights law, for example ICESCR 1966 Preamble; Proclamation of Teheran 1968; UDHR 1948; World Conference on Human Rights 1993). It is evident that if a peacebuilding program is to address the idea of human security as its priority then a holistic approach must be taken to protecting human rights. Human security cannot be achieved through the realization of civil and polit- ical rights alone, but requires addressing all human rights. “Economic, social and cultural rights may be implicit in, or constitute the basis for, the realisa- tion of civil and political rights and vice versa” (Mapulanga- Hulston 2002, 32). In a peacebuilding context, for example, people will be unlikely to engage with democratic institutions and postconflict politics, including the right to vote, if their housing is inadequate or their access to education is denied owing to continuation of the discrimination that was a root cause of the conflict. Consequently, without this indivisibility of rights being “operationalized,” the underlying sources of unrest and violent conflict can remain.
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This competence highlights the idea that transforming conflicts brings benefits to people and the environment. In this sense, it is one of the drivers of change which aims to sustain peace in one’s daily life and Earth as a community. Transforming conflict begins with replacing a need to control with a willingness to reflect and understand the source of conflicts and violence in one’s personal or social life. The next steps are to be able to be empathic to others, create pathways to transform inner and outer conflicts and to engage actively in transforming conflicts to reduce their negative impact on oneself, others and the environment.
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In situations where clashes eject and there is a gross infringement of human rights and barbarities conferred by those associated with the contention, there have been worries about the timeframe it takes to approve and set up together peacekeeping powers and send them to the warring states to keep up the peace and secure existences of the general population. Regardless of the solid case for why international community ought to mediate in specific clashes, Mays (2002) advises us that 'the authorizing of peacekeeping activities and intercessions in clashes or the growing of continuous tasks relies upon the endorsement of all UN Security Council individuals'. Furthermore, there are worries that the perpetual individuals from the Security Council have settled on choices about where and when to intercede depending, not on the need to ensure people or authorize a peace understanding, however on the vital connections they have with nations influenced by struggle (Adebajo, 2011). It can likewise be contended that the absence of firm activity by the Council in specific clashes radiates from the absence of specific financial, political or vital interests individual members from the Council have with nations in strife or their pre-occupation with different emergencies. The annihilation in Rwanda, for instance, and the withdrawal of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) exhibits the connection among countries and individuals from the Security Council and the desires of the last in mediating in specific clashes over others (May 2002). The way that most individuals from the Council did not have major vital interests in Rwanda at the time, especially in the post-Cold Wartime, the intersection of contentions that required the consideration of the global network amid that period and the encounters of the United States in Somalia prevented individuals from the Council from completely submitting.
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The proliferation of civil conflicts at the end of the Cold War and a sense of donor fatigue and disillusionment with conventional relief and development models prompted a fundamental change in the international community’s engagement with the developing world in the early 1990s. It became evident that donor programs and policies designed to alleviate poverty and under-development were failing to adequately address the social, economic, and political inequalities that fuelled violent conflict around the world, and at the same time, were equally unable to deal with the aftermath of these wars. Against the backdrop of these emerging challenges at the beginning of the 1990s, the UN, unhindered by the ideological obstacles that had constrained action in the previous decades, sought to adopt new approaches to ‘ending the scourge of war’. However, not only did the UN face difficulties in operationally adapting to the dual challenges of violent conflict and underdevelopment with any consistent success, but Cold War informed, state-centric academic thinking around issues of conflict, development, and security was also found to be lacking in its explanatory ability. As it became apparent that the international community’s traditional tool-box of frameworks and strategies for addressing conflict was no longer appropriate, theorists and practitioners alike began to search for new ways of approaching contemporary conflict. This signalled the beginning of the UN’s forays into peacebuilding.
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