1989. Though it is true that people are conceived as beginning as ‘political atoms’ (193), it does not follow that as a result, at least in the theories of Pufendorf, Grotius, and Locke (Taylor’s list, p. 193), the human agent is ‘no longer to be understood as an element in a larger, meaningful order’, or that ‘he is on his own’. (193) Nor is it the case that all contractarian theories emerging out of the natural law school (such as Pufendorf s, Grotius’, and Locke’s) assert a ‘primacy of rights’ which denies the same status to ‘principle of belonging or obligation’, and ascribes rights to men as ‘binding unconditionally’. (Atomism, p. 188) This should be obvious given the account of Pufendorf I have provided here, and will hopefully be true also of the account of Locke below. Taylor builds the individualism of the . founding contract into an all embracing ontological argument about the ‘hard’ subjectivism of contractarianism - which is only really found in Hobbes (whom Taylor curiously does not include on his list). Though at first glance it might seem that Taylor is only attacking particular contemporary accounts of this tradition (particularly those who have made historical and normative connections between social contract theory, individualism, rights, and modem liberalism) rather than the tradition itself, in his most recent work he seems to lay the blame at the feet of the original theorists themselves (see 1989, Part II, ‘Inwardness’, pp. 111-207 et passim.).
with the Western republican tradition to create a Chinese model of republicanism, whereby an expanded citizenry participated in societal affairs. Concepts such as social order and duty in China’s group-based Confucianism continued to effect in the new public realms in which each individual had received his/her legal rights. Even though voices of some publics or counter publics might be marginalized or belong to the weak in society, print venues such as the newspaper offered these groups arenas in which they could vent their grievance or expose social injustice. Recent scholarship on the public sphere and civil society shows that the Confucian civic tradition presents a different concept of “public” from that of the Western republican tradition. Western concepts of public opinion and the public are rooted in the conceptions of liberalism and republicanism. Although China can claim no role in the origin of republicanism, a version of civil society and public opinion (gonglun) in the moral-administrative system based on Confucianism exists and will be explored in the pages that follow.
litical turn in animal rights, in terms of neo-republican theory. We believe that by taking the political turn in a republican direction we can offer an account superior to liberalism of the triad of liberty, equality, and fraternity in our relations with animals. Our neo-republican ac- count goes beyond the ascription of animal rights on the basis of weak species egalitarianism. We argue that the mere ascription of rights to animals necessarily leaves them systemically or structurally dominated within the zoopolis. But there are significant hurdles to arguing for a republican conception that makes sense of non- dominating relations with animals. In particular, it would appear that the basis of egalitarianism between human and non-human animals is so weak that there is no plau- sible basis for interspecies reciprocity. Non-domination requires reciprocity between those who assign rights and statuses and those to whom these are assigned in the sense that the latter must be able to challenge the assignments made by the former (see for example Pettit, 1999; Rich- ardson, 2002; Bohman, 2007). But non-human animals cannot plausibly perform this task of challenging the rights assigned to them by humans, with the conse- quence that there is no reciprocity sufficient to warrant talking about an interspecies relationship of non- domination.
A republic is a largely non-dominating regime. There are four parts to the definition. No individual or interest group (here defined loosely as a group of people with similar interests) can dominate the state. This first part of the definition means that no one individual or interest group can systemically deny the rule of law to another person or interest group. A stricter standard of scrutiny is used for some protected classes rather than others due to the long traditions of their protection in political theory and practice. Ethnic and religious categories are the oldest, but I have added the racial category to the ethnic category to form a joint ethnic/racial nondiscrimination category. However, all categories are protected classes to some extent and thus the systematic denial of the rule of law including systematic discrimination against any group can constitute domination. If one group is systematically dominated, it disqualifies the regime from being a republic of any kind, as it violates the doctrine of minimum liberalism as well as that of non-domination.
This response is realistic and sensible, but if I am correct in my general account of the links between pluralism and liberalism, then pluralists may be able to say more than this. To begin with, they can argue that even in tragic cases some decisions may be better than others because there can be decisive reasons for choosing between conflicting incommensurables within a particular context. Some individuals’ background ethical and personal commitments point more strongly towards career than family, or vice versa. 86 Moreover, the idea of pluralism itself implies certain general norms—value diversity, accommodation of reasonable disagreement, and promotion of individual autonomy—that can serve as critical standards for public policy, and that together point to a certain kind of liberal political framework within which these decisions should be made. I have argued that, when it comes to questions of distributive justice, this framework will be egalitarian rather than laissez-faire. Within the egalitarian approach, I have so far tended toward its capabilities variant in contrast with the welfare and resources alternatives distinguished by Dworkin.
Neoliberalism influence the activities of Multilateral institutions like the IMF, World bank, World Trade Organization and European Central Bank. It also dictates and influence the policies of governments in both developed and developing countries. In fact, neoliberalism is the leading ideology influencing almost each and every aspect of human’s lives. As a political slogan it has been described in various meanings and interpretation. Neoliberalism 3 is assumed as the imperial extension of US control over other territories and the elimination of various cultural diversity across the planet. Literally neoliberalism represents a new type of liberalism which appeared in the Anglo-Saxon countries in the concluding periods of 18 th century and in the beginning of 19 th century. In contrast to the hypothetical conception of man and society the earliest version of neoliberalism is then defined as a sensible ideology 4 of making and then continuing a state governed by a system of democracy and safeguarding personal liberty. As a political
control over economic activity in manufacturing and trade, it was argued that if everyone was left to its own devices then the result would not be disorder but a well-balanced society of ever- growing prosperity. To abolish the social, political and religious arrangement prevailing in the Christian dominated Europe, the ideology of Liberalism was introduced. This idea argued that free market, and self-adjustment of the economy in a Laissez-Faire system devoid of any state and social interference would produce maximum prosperity for the whole nation. In market economies, decisions about production of goods, valuation, trade, distribution, etc. are all settled by individuals or small groups acting with maximum possible freedom, and a minimal set of legal or social constraints. Although all of us have observed and participated in markets where goods, services, and money are exchanged, but “the market” which are imagined by economists is an automatic and self- correcting, “smoothly performing machine”, governed by empirical rules and general norms. Like advancement in the field of hard sciences, it is claimed that liberal/market economic system is as an advanced state of social development, and its
Universalization of western liberal democracy was suggested by him as the final form of human ideological evolution. He explained that Nirvana, perfection in mankinds socio-economic affairs is achievable only by accepting the triumphant liberal creeds. He however stopped short of explaining an interstate relationship, but Bernard Lewis writing at the time of the disintegration of the USSR economy predicted a clash of civilizations, though his predicted was unpopular and did not receive popularity at that time. Notwithstanding this, the idea of a clash of civilizations (Liberalism versus Islam) gained popularity when Huntington asserted that Islam is unable to co-exist with progress, modernization, democracy, human freedom, economic development, technological change, gender equality, free markets, the separation of religion and state, and further suggested that the war between the liberal West and Islam is unavoidable (Hunter, 1998).
To clarify what is meant by “justifiable to”, a law L being justifiable to an agent Alice involves two senses of justification. The first is the law being justified by practical reasons. For instance, one may think that what justifies laws against murder is that murder is wrong or that what justifies a social safety net is that such a policy would stave off the worst effects of poverty. Associated with these practical reasons are propositions, which can be moral or non-moral. For instance, the claims that murder is wrong or that we ought to alleviate the worst effects of poverty are moral propositions. The claim that a guaranteed minimum income changes the distribution of wealth in certain ways is a non-moral proposition. Both types of propositions can be associated with reasons to enact, abolish or enforce certain laws and policies. The second sense of justification is epistemic: In order for L to be justifiable to Alice, the practical reasons which justify L must be epistemically accessible to her. Little has been said about what this access condition involves; Larmore’s (2015) and Gaus’s (2011) accounts of political liberalism suggest that, at the very least, Alice having access to a reason R involves her being epistemically justified in believing that P, the proposition associated with R. More recently, Peter (2018) has argued that the propositions associated with the reasons which justify political decisions should be justifiably believed by each reasonable person. Later in this chapter, I shall defend the claim that being epistemically justified in believing that P is necessary and sufficient in having access to the reason, R. For now, it is sufficient to note that an agent must have some level of epistemic access to the practical reasons that justify a law, in order for that law to be justifiable to her.
Her target clearly is liberal thinking and liberal philosophy. She pinpoints the illusion of Òself possessiveÓ individualism, the liberalism which believes that the combination of rights bearing citizenship and free economic exchange can, under certain ÒjustÓ conditions, lead to more emancipation and (some kind of) equality for all, rather than, inevitably, always, growing inequalities, gender domination or Ð the typical default critique Ð colonial slavery. Clearly, the UK is not heading in any progressive direction today, on any of these points perhaps, although with rising middle classes worldwide, the debate about global inequalities is an empirical and complex one, not one to be adjudicated exclusively on reductive Marxist terms. Much of what Anderson writes is stated more reasonably as an exploration of ÒtensionsÓ within liberal democracyÑ and, yes, any good liberal would respond that, precisely, liberalism is a philosophy of tension and imperfection, of Isaiah BerlinÕs crooked timbers, of J.S. MillÕs
This is to say nothing of how the business school is understood inside the university itself, where it represents both the bringing of the market into the university, and the spread of new management techniques (and indeed new managers) across the university. But even this popular academic image of extreme neo-liberalism requires some thought if extreme neo-liberalism is not merely to be dismissed as the spread of empty terms like excellence or entrepreneurship, forward spies for the invasion of market relations. Indeed, if we turn this around a bit we can see that to focus on the movement of the market into the university, through the conduit of business school misses its other important half: the movement of the university out into the metropolis. This other movement, this metroversity offers its own incubated techniques of university management to private firms and local governments, techniques for the management of the production and circulation of knowledge. After all, what organisation is more experienced at encouraging, capturing, and exploiting knowledge than the university? Its techniques today can be found in every technology park (not accidentally sometimes called technology campusus), creative industries district, financial centre, and multiculturally marketed neighbourhood. Peer review, departmental democracy, university governance, mentoring and probation, research
Barry emphasises that some form of emotional or affective attachment to the nation state may be needed to sustain liberal institutions, but that this is compatible with cosmopolitan morality. The only obvious difference is that Miller sometimes advocates a shared collective purpose or destiny as a source of civic virtue. As Barry notes, there are two reasons to be suspicious of this. First, Miller is not actually very explicit about what this might be in particular cases (Barry, 1999, p. 58). Second, and more importantly, a strong sense of national destiny can work against democracy, “For it offers the constant temptation to use it as a way of short-circuiting debate about the country’s future and delegitimating the views of those who reject it” (Barry, 1999, p. 59)46. The obvious task for defenders of Pettit’s version of republicanism is finding a form of civic identity that is strong enough to sustain institutions capable of preventing domination, without sliding into communitarian excesses in which strong conceptions of national destiny override healthy democratic debate47. Whether this requires any strong sort of national identity is an open question. My view is that it depends on the kind of institutions that are required to prevent domination, and the answer to that institutional question becomes clearer when we have a better idea of the kind of 46 Hanasz directs a similar criticism at republicanism, arguing that (communitarian) republicanism requires a degree of unquestioning loyalty to the republic that conflicts with democratic debate and contestation. I am unconvinced by Hanasz’s version of the argument because he conflates communitarianism with republicanism too easily, ignoring Pettit’s distinctions between Athenian and Roman versions of republicanism. See Hanasz, 2006, p. 298-9).
landscape in Northern Ireland as Ulster loyalists come to terms with the new realities created by the peace-process, security normalization, decommissioning and the rise in the threat of dissident republican violence. The article will also demonstrate that these perceptions are not purely antagonistic and based on the creation of negative stereotypical ‘enemy images’ fuelled by decades of conflict, but pragmatic, bound to societal and local events and influenced by intragroup attitudes and divisions, in addition to the expected conflictual ingroup vs. outgroup relationships. Finally, the paper will explore how loyalists employ republicanism and the transformation of the Provisional IRA in particular, as a mirror or benchmark to reflect on their own
Beyond these contributions to social theory, du Gay’s book has another offer to make: to view management and organisation theory through a political-liberal (in stark contrast to the economic neo-liberal) lens. He shows that the supposedly libertarian character of the neo-‘liberal’ excellence movement is ultimately anti-libertarian, and thus provides a cornerstone for an alternative, no less critical position to management and organisation than Foucauldian, Frankfurt-school or labour-process approaches. Although the term liberalism is rarely mentioned throughout the book, du Gay’s treatise is a defence of and call for political liberalism, properly understood. It dissects the enthusiastic management language of ‘opportunities’ and ‘challenges’ and convincingly shows the irrefutably metaphysical basis of the enterprise culture. Thus In Praise of Bureaucracy clarifies that the neo-‘liberal’ plea and enthusiasm for privatisation, de- bureaucratisation and anti-interventionism has certainly to do with economic liberalism, but next to nothing with political liberalism. There has always been a gulf between these two sets of ideas, but to my mind this important boundary has often been collapsed in labour-process or poststructuralist theorizing by putting ‘liberalism’ in general into the corner of neo-conservatism. In Praise of Bureaucracy clarifies this distinction second to none, and it should alert us that the neo-‘liberal’ mainstream may well be capable of eroding the sense of legitimacy not only in the arena of management but in the public in general. The fact that the erosion of legitimacy and legality, based on religion, morality and the enterprise culture, has taken hold of governments of superpowers indicates how far we have travelled. Du Gay’s book could not be more timely.
R. Jeffrey Lustig, Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 8 2 ) ; Larry G. Gerber, The Limits of Liberalism: fosephus Daniels, Henry Stimson, Bernard Baruch, Donald Richberg, Felix Frankfurter and the Development of the Modern American Political Economy (New York: New York
181 The normative assumption that moderation should entail a change in values is brought into question by this context, however. Having been developed in the class and religious context, this fails to take into account the fact that an ethno-national party has an irreducible core to their ideology – issues such as self-determination and sovereignty are the sine qua non of an ethno-national movement. Assuming in advance that moderation should entail a change in these values or beliefs may be unrealistic and overly normative in this context. Expecting Irish republicanism to legitimise a bi-national understanding of Northern Ireland’s sovereignty and accept alternative sovereignty claims to the territory of Northern Ireland is an inappropriate measure of moderation. Existing understandings tempt us to understand this as a case of behavioural moderation without any ideological moderation, but this underestimates the depth of the changes that republicanism went through by assuming they are merely restricted to the level of behaviour if they do not come to embody tolerance, pluralism and other ‘progressive’ liberal democratic values. This problem derives from the fact that existing approaches fail to offer an adequate understanding of what constitutes ideology and, in fact, the separation of ideology from behaviour is overly artificial, given that ideology is ultimately action-oriented. Republicanism’s changing behaviour certainly entailed changing their worldview too and there can be little doubt that agreeing to participate fully in elections or acquiescing to decommissioning their weapons represented crossing an ideological plain. Certainly within republicanism there was a tension between their behaviour and their original beliefs, but this did not prevent them from demonstrating a clear commitment to the moderate path and becoming almost entirely accommodating, even while retaining their core beliefs around ethnic self-determination.