Russia’s status as a major European power was already established by the dawn of the 19 th century. The foreign policy of France (another big European power) under Napoleon Bonaparte who ruled between 1799 and 1815 was dominated by warfare. In the Napoleonicwars, Napoleon at different times had to take on Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia who had formed coalitions against her. Russia’s refusal to join the Continental System, an economic warfare mechanism initiated by Napoleon in 1806 to weaken British power by destroying her trade, led to Napoleon’s attack against Russia in 1812. Due to a combination of military resilience and diplomatic cum strategic savvy on the part of Russia, Napoleon eventually lost the war, recording one of the costliest retreats in military history. Russia proceeded to play a pivotal role in the post-Napoleonicwars diplomatic and international cooperation arrangements hatched by the great powers after the fall of Napoleon. This paper is an evaluation of Russia’s role in European politics and diplomacy between 1803 and 1815 with particular respect to the Napoleonicwars of that period, and the post-war international diplomacy initiatives of the great powers. The paper concludes that the outcome of the Russian war of 1812 in favour of Russia coupled with her active participation in the Vienna congress of 1815 and subsequent conferences of that era strengthened Russia’s sense of its own greatness as a modern state and great power, and also set the stage for her epochal roles in European international relations during subsequent decades.
comparable datasets. 20 Data mining this information is, necessarily, a recent phenomenon that required access to computing power to process this information, and the technical skills to translate this raw material into something that could be processed. Initial forays into this have revealed indicated the demographic stability of the army and the high physical standards, such as minimum height requirements, that were maintained during the wars. 21 The recent digitisation of Chelsea Pensioner records provides further scope for research into a sub-set of soldiers in the period. 22
Throughout the greater eighteenth century, prisoners of war in European conﬂicts were not held for the duration of the conﬂict. Rather, prisoners were exchanged in cartels between belligerents, and oﬃcers were granted their parole, giving their word as oﬃcers and ‘ gentlemen ’ that upon their release they would return home and not take up arms again during the conﬂict. During the Revolutionary-NapoleonicWars, however, these traditional conventions broke down. This resulted in over 100,000 French prisoners being held in Britain over the course of the NapoleonicWars. Ordinary soldiers and sailors were held in land prisons and on board hulks at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, whilst oﬃcers were granted parole on condition that they remained in speciﬁc towns in Britain. Under parole, oﬃcers could roam no further than one mile from their parole town, had to observe morning and evening curfews, and keep regular contact with the local parole agent.
Three days after reading Robert Southey’s paean to the battle that brought to a close the French Revolutionary and Napoleonicwars, The Poet’s Pilgrimage to Waterloo (1816), Jane Austen began work on the novel that she referred to as The Brothers, and which her family later titled Sanditon. i The latter is more than appropriate, given that Sanditon is the name of the seaside resort in which the novel’s central character, Mr Tom Parker, is so heavily invested. Mr Parker’s ambitions for Sanditon include the building of a Waterloo Crescent, a plan that characterises the Regency world as one in which, as Roger Sales argues, ‘everyone and everything can be merchandized through advertising’ (201). For Clara Tuite, as for Peter Knox-Shaw, Mr Parker is recognizably a post-Waterloo figure in the sense that his
Thus far, thus good: in brief, Broers has made an important contribution to the historiography which should enjoy a prominent place in the library of any scholar working on the Napoleonic period. That said, it has unfortunately to be said that the book’s message is not entirely convincing. Completely to demonise Napoleon is obviously as shortsighted as it is ahistorical: he was, beyond doubt, a man of extraordinary talents who rose further and faster than almost anyone else either before or since; a man of unlimited charisma who won almost equally unlimited admiration and devotion; a man of vision who was sincerely committed to achieving a society founded on the thoroughly laudable precepts of equality before the law and the career open to talent; and even, within certain rather obvious limits, a man of decency and humanity who eschewed the concept of the vendetta, sought genuinely to unite the competing factions of French society into a single polity, was capable of immense personal charm and sent very few political opponents to either the firing squad or the guillotine: not for 18 Brumaire the bloody scenes that followed the fall of Brissot or Robespierre. And, above all, however much terrified contemporaries may have stigmatised him as a Jacobin, Napoleon was no Terrorist and, more than that, someone who, having witnessed the slaughter of 10 August 1792, felt real horror at the notion of unleashing the crowd on the rest of society, it being to his very great credit that he refused to do so even in the dark days of 1814.
Ida is linked with naval battles and nautical imagery. Determined to pursue Rose relentlessly until the girl reveals the truth about Pinkie's murder of Fred Hale, Ida moves through Snow's restaurant "like a warship going into action, a warship on the right side in a war to end wars, the signal flag proclaiming that every man would do his duty." (Brighton Rock, 144.) Yet her attempt to persuade Rose to betray Pinkie meets "militant" resistance both literally and figuratively when Rose refuses:
Two school shootings took place in Finland in 2007–2008, in which 20 people lost their lives. After the shoot- ings, foreign journalists used the violent culture of Finnish men as an explanation for the tragedies. 1 Of the old EU countries, the highest rate of capital crimes is found in Finland. The country has for a long time debated where the violence comes from. One explanation is that the historical culture in Finland glorifies war. The wars that were fought against the Soviet Union (1939–1944) have been elevated in Finland to become key elements of the national psyche, manifested in celebrations, anniversaries and through family narratives. According to this explanation, a Finn already learns as a child to accept violence which is considered to be legitimate and to behave in accordance with warlike ideals. This article examines the warlike historical culture in Finland and clar- ifies why war has remained a popular theme of Finnish historical culture. Further, it discusses the impact that a warlike historical culture has on the attitudes of young people.
Surprisingly, the civil war literature has not paid much attention to mercenary involvement in hostilities. One reason may be that the literature has traditionally focused less on the impact of single actors than on structural variables such as regime type, military power, or natural resources (Cunningham et al. 2009:571). Likewise, the PMSC/mercenary literature has not yet investigated in-depth the repercussions of mercenary involvement in civil wars, though some preliminary work has been done on the mercenary-civil war nexus. Christopher Kinsey, for instance, has shed light on the reasons why mercenaries are hired in civil wars (Kinsey 2007). Moreover, Sven Chojnacki et al. provide an exploration of the conditions under which mercenaries are hired in civil wars (Chojnacki, et al. 2009). However, there are only a handful of case studies that investigate the consequences of PMSC and mercenary involvement (Cleary 2002; Francis 1999;Shearer 1998; Vines 2002).
and the concentration patterns of conflicts in different locations are not discussed either. I argue that to know where the main battlefields are in civil wars, we should look for clusters of battles. I assume that the more intense the battle is, the more influence it would have for local environment, ecological system, economy and spread of disease. The closer the battlefield to the concerned object, the more influential it could be. Proximity is also a key link. The closer people are to pathogens the greater the probably that they will be infected. Proximity increases the probability of exposure, so does time. The temporal aspect is another essential concept of intensity. Battlefields are not only clusters of concentration of combats in space but also in time. Concentrated attacks that take place in a short period of time around a possible target also indicate the importance of the target, a high level of hostility between the government and the rebels, and of course a larger impact to the surroundings. Only with the temporal information of war can researchers identify casual relationships between different variables of interest. 2.2 EXPLAINING BATTLE CLUSTERS WITH NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS (NSAG)
that his attempt to offer an answer to this problem “should be seen as only a first step that will undoubtedly need further theoretical and methodological refinement” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 5). It is hoped that the above points of critique provide helpful insights for such refinement; their offering, is not intended to suggest that Flyvbjerg has been unsuccessful with his aim. Indeed, his provocative argument will capture the interest of academics and students alike and, Phronetic Social Science is likely to help generate interesting and valuable research in the future. However, the tensions and paradoxes in Flyvbjerg’s arguments need to be careful scrutinized before it can be said that phronetic social science actually offers a way out of the science (or any other paradigmatically oriented) wars.
Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review of such studies.
This thesis consists of three essays at the intersection of the fields of economic history and labor economics. Using the case of the United States during the two World Wars and the Civil War, the thesis shows the unintended consequences of wars on the socioeconomic outcomes of those who stay behind especially through the channel of war deaths which disrupt labor markets, family structures, or social attitudes, among others. Chapter one studies how deaths among semi-skilled whites during World War II opened employment opportunities for African Americans from which they had been barred in the past. These improved opportunities in the labor market not led to better economic outcomes for blacks, such as wages, education, or house values, but also led to better black-white social relations such as friendships or attitudes towards integration. Chapter two uses linked Census data and information on soldiers from the U.S. Civil War to study the effects of losing a father on the long-term effects of children. While the negative results are expected, this is one of the first studies to follow children over such a long period of time and it also provides an identification strategy based on allocation of soldiers to battles that were unexpectedly costly. The final chapter estimates the effect of discrimination against Germans in the U.S. during World War I on economic growth. Counties with higher anti-German sentiment during the war years discriminated away their German-born population at the cost of reduced economic growth. This particularly affected the manufacturing sector, a high-productivity sector with a disproportionally large share of German workers.
Free Speech Wars SMU Law Review Volume 48 | Issue 1 Article 9 1995 Free Speech Wars Kathleen M Sullivan Follow this and additional works at https //scholar smu edu/smulr This Article is brought to you[.]
In both cases, we see the evidence of states pursuing a strategy of less-than-total-war to achieve security objectives. Long ago, Raymond Aron said that rivalries will be pursued in non-traditional ways, largely signaling an end to the predictive power of state war as a system changing policy. Instead, states will focus on new methods of increasing security such as economic war, environmental war, and increasingly, anthropomorphic war, a war that combines massive data trawling in order to specifically target discrete individuals with either traditional kinetic weapons, or in the nearer future, nano-weapons. However, the idea that total war is no longer possible is at some risk. The move of dominant states from total war to limited war did not limiting the objective of increasing security. Likewise, for the populations engaged in irregular war, the conflict is total in that the population must be totally mobilized in order to withstand the assault and sacrifice required in wars against powerful states. In both case studies, the dominant state’s strategy of offensive irregular war was greatly aided by a partisan group deeply tied to their tellurian identity . These partisans, the Vietnamese and the Mujahadeen were triggered by the perceived existential threat to their chosen way of life, whether communism or religious convictions. Carl Schmitt translated the classic guerrilla in his jungle and mountain perch to the interstate trotting communist vanguard. The modern partisan has moved on from the ‘real enmity’ which ends with the ejection of the invader from the sacred homeland. That territorial anchor has been translated from the physical to the abstract through the threat to identity, which being existential, is absolute . In the same way, the creation of ISIS and AQ is a reaction to the vast spread of the proto-culture of neoliberalism which threatens their way of life, however crude it is. The unlimited enmity of nationalism has been replaced by the unlimited enmity of identity-action in defense of placeness.
understood battle over the nature of science, the importance of culture and the role of the Left. A member of the ‘old’ Marxist New Left, physicist Alan Sokal decided to expose the errors and obscurantism of a trendy new cultural Left which he saw as undermining the strength of an older class-based Left, more respectful of science. He was assisted by two feminist scholars, Barbara Epstein and Ruth Rosen, angry at the glamour surrounding feminist cultural theorists within the academy and the neglect of women’s activism outside it. Sokal placed a hoax article in the Left cultural journal Social Text in their special edition on the “Science Wars”, edited by two of his New York
Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition under- mines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory ex- periment confirms the model’s main predictions. We also explore extensions of the basic model, including one where each agent’s productivity is private information.