Women’s roles were not limited to the sphere of public protest. Beyond pitched street battles in the streets and warrens of Srinagar, women provided militants with food and shelter and took care of the injured (Ramachandran 2002). In instances where a young man was picked up by the military, women protested at security bunkers in order to secure his release (Abdulla 2002, 266). Women acted as guards at the narrow alleyways of the city, sounding an alert and blocking the advance of military forces in order to allow militants to escape. There were instances of women using the burqa to smuggle arms, explosives and militants, and it was women who organised food supply lines during an unprecedented curfew for over six months during 1991 when it was too risky and dangerous for men to go out (Manchanda 2001a, 52). Rita Manchanda quotes Anjum Zamrood Habib of the women’s group Muslim Khwateen-e-Markaz (MKM): “We would visit jailed militants, take them shoes, a shirt, pyjamas, cigarettes and collect funds to bail them out. We did go for training in the use of guns, but we never used them” (2001a, 52). Shiraz Sidhva witnessed women’s political resistance against the Indian state in Srinagar: “Kashmiri women picketed the streets of Srinagar and other towns and villages to voice their agitation about rape and killings by the security forces” (1994, 123). Madame Bakhtawar - a member of the JKLF - who was imprisoned for three years told writer Pamela: “I have sacrificed my house and my home, my parents, my life for the organisation, for my land” (Bhagat, Pamela 2002, 270). The multiple roles played by women kept “intact the fabric of family and community which enable[d] the men to go on fighting... Women faltering in the support of the struggle would have seriously crippled the movement” (Manchanda 2001a, 52).
For instance, within the United Kingdom, there are nations of English, Scottish and Welsh as well as part of the Irish nation. The history of Ireland is significantly about the struggle of a national project to establish a state of its own in order to break free from the British Empire, but one which is never fully realized. It is obvious in the case of Ireland that it is necessary to distinguish analytically between nations, states and other polities since during the 19th cen- tury the Irish nation was ruled by the British state. The Irish nation sought its independent state, winning one in the 1920s after military action on behalf of the nation, but only for that part of the Irish nation living in the south of the island (Curran, 1980). During this struggle the nationalist movement made an alliance with the transnational Catholic Church (Larkin, 1975), and as a con- sequence the inter-war Irish constitution gave a special place for the Catholic Church (Farrell, 1988). The transformation of Ireland into its current ‘Celtic Tiger’ status (O’Hearn, 1998), as a modern rapidly growing economy, only took place after Ireland joined yet another transnational polity, the EU. This not only provided a stepping-stone to global markets, but also demanded the mod- ernization of gender relations in employment, such as ending the then legal ban on married women working in some occupations, as a price for membership of the EU (Curtin, 1989).
Therefore a distinction in terminology is worthwhile. Building on Table 1, a taxonomy of risk coverage can institutionally demarcate (a) territory (place) (b) labor status (work), (c) employer-dependent benefits (work-place). These describe the state ’ s relationships to firms and their regional risk ecology (see Srinivas 2009). The three categories therefore advance evolutionary and testable paths and timelines for the emergence and change of institutions and can make more evident gender disparities. They offer distinctive policy lenses for economic downturns when work- place benefits decline or disappear. The terms can be mulled over: national insurance based on residence or citizenship is place-based even if administered through work- places. French nineteenth-century municipal welfare lends itself to place-based analysis mingled with some employer-driven benefits (work-place); contemporary U.S. challenges are to expand beyond work-places; India ’ s rural employment guarantees are work entitlements, which may (or not) eventually combine contributory benefits independent of places and work-places.
The paradoxical situation is, however, that the nation in the Third World for which sovereignty was claimed frequently had very little meaning, considering that different ethnic, linguistic, religious and social groups were lumped together into areas with little historical experience. The borders which were artificially drawn by European powers, became themselves the borders of nationalist movements against western power. The modem state subsequently played a crucial role in creating national unity out of diverse elements in the third world as well as at home. Territoriality and the creation of a common ’culture’ went hand in hand in materialising national projects. In fact it is suggested by Horsman and Marshall that territoriality is very closely linked to the political drive for nationhood through relentless reference to common culture. “The physical aspect of nationalism, that is, its territoriality, pervades its mythology. This is not just the remembering of great historical events which took place at specific locations, but the reverence for landscape, for the environment in its broadest sense.’’ (Horsman & Marshall, 1994 p. 45)
addressed at greater length (pp. 39–40, 74, 179). Feudal land systems in so-called “ancient” cultures have been notoriously resistant to equitable land reform. Michael Menser suggests that even now, and within the emerging food sovereignty move- ment, there is growing cleavage between the peas- ants on “rich” land and the “poor,” landless, “have-nots.” This is especially true in nations with a feudal history, where antediluvian communal inequality, rather than “modern” state-sponsored land grabbing, may be the most significant “flash- point” (pp. 73–74, 345). A fuller critique of Patel could have provided a context for including a chapter focusing exclusively on identity politics in the aboriginal/indigenous sovereignty movements of North America and Canada.
The study of externally-led democratisation in conflict-affected societies has expanded over the last two decades. The introduction of democracy from the outside has attracted extensive scholarly interest in accordance with the increasing engagement of the United Nations and other international agents in attempting to build long-lasting domestic, regional and international peace through promoting democratic forms of government in the post-Cold War era. The studies conducted to investigate democratisation in post-conflict societies have focused on the construction of government institutions and transferring necessary institutional competencies due to the fact that externally-driven democratisation policies target the state rather than the nation. In this respect, some studies undertaken to examine the process of democratisation in post- conflict societies pointed to the need for sequencing of tasks such as establishing security, law and order and building strong and capable government institutions in the first place. Their focus, however, has still remained on the state rather than the nation. Through examining two case studies, this thesis emphasises two significant points: 1) achieving successful democratic transformation in conflict- affected societies requires not only the construction of functioning central state institutions but also the creation of a shared sense of national community; and 2) sequencing of post-conflict reconstruction tasks therefore should also involve building a sense of national cohesion through promoting social communication, participation and inclusion in political, institutional and social processes while postponing the competitive or potentially conflictual aspects of democracy.
In the relationship between society and state, the historical appearance of democratic practice has implied a decisive change. It has allowed the possibility for peaceful changes in the government or administration of the state, as rebellion no longer was the only means available to change a government. Given the nature of the state, more than one state cannot exist within a single region, and so there is no competition among states themselves in the same geographic area. Interestingly, democratic practice has incorporated a certain kind of competition that involves government candidates instead of government entities. So, strictly speaking, it is not accurate to assert that there is no competition at all regarding states, as different candidates can compete with one another to gain individual votes in order to become state officials for a predefined period of time. Their future as state officials depends on how well individual voters value their performance. 9
Every system is sustained and driven by specific drivers and for an economic and region-state; amongst its other drivers is the “Generally Accepted Accounting Practices” (GAAP). The GAAP sets up the framework of conformity in operations and very difficult will you find investors and corporations establishing in regions whose framework do not conform to the corporate rulings. A conceptual framework is a statement of generally accepted theoretical principles forming the frame of reference for financial reporting. The lack or non-conformity of this conceptual framework often results to ambiguity, contradiction and inconsistencies in basic concepts. The GAAP for individual countries or regions is primarily the combination of their company law, accounting standards and stock exchange requirements (BPP Learning Media, 2007). So the key to the success and attractiveness of any community for business prospects depends greatly on their GAAP, normally every nation or region has unique company laws pertaining to, guiding the fiscal policies but to open the system, nation or region the accounting standards and stock exchange requirement should conform to their understanding. All the superpower economic nations and regions of the word are giving special considerations to this.
Analysis was also undertaken on responses to the teaching survey to further explore confidence. Over three-quarters (76%) of those teachers (excluding Science Leaders) who state that they ‘strongly agree’ they are good at science also ‘strongly agree’ they are confident teaching science. Just under half (47%) of all teachers who ‘strongly agree’ that they like to watch science programmes also ‘strongly agree’ they are confident teaching science (see Figure 39 in Appendix 2). Additional analysis also highlights that a lower proportion (13%) of teachers (who were not Science Leaders) who have not received any support from their school in the last 12 months ‘strongly agree’ they are confident teaching science when compared to 20% of those who received some form of support in the
to have won dominance over other terms as the name of the national cinema. Although New Korean Cinema generally means a period of new commercial filmmaking that strengthened the domestic market and the industry, many scholars have wrestled with its exact definition and periodisation, ever since the term came into existence. For Shin Chi-Yun and Julian Stringer, New Korean Cinema started in the year 1993 with the release of Im Kwon-taek‟s mega hit Seopyeonje which gave the industry a much-needed taste of commercial success. 63 Darcy Paquet, meanwhile, sees that 1996 announced the end of the Korean New Wave and heralded the arrival of New Korean Cinema. His rationale is that in 1996 two important events happened that flung open the doors to a new era of filmmaking: the release of Jang Sun-woo‟s A Petal and the high court‟s ruling that the government‟s pre-release censorship is unconstitutional. 64 Choi Jinhee suggests an even earlier date 1986, when direct distribution by foreign companies was approved by the government. 65 What is more, how the film scholars appreciate and study New Korean Cinema and what kind of films from Korea are actually consumed inside and outside the nation is an entirely different matter altogether. Robert L. Cagle touches upon this point when he says:
1970 Young Maori Leaders Conference convened by the Maori Council at Auckland University established Nga Tamatoa ‘the young warriors’. They initiated legal aid, an employment office and a nation-wide programme for full recognition of the Maori language in education. Began protests at Waitangi to challenge Pakeha and their own elders about lost rights, e.g. to sell kaimoana under 1866 Oyster Fisheries Act. They raised the cry of “How much longer must we wait?”
As Fernandez (2008) notes, the rigorous study of culture and economics in its infancy propagate and change has yet to be fully understood. A recent article by Alesina et al. (2011) makes a first attempt in accounting for the origins of gender roles by tracing them back to traditional agricultural practices. The authors show that societies that traditionally practiced plough agriculture have lower female labour force participation and higher prevalence a attitudes favoring gender today. The percent article aims to advance this line of research by investigating the role of language gender systems as a source for the persistence of gender biased cultures and there by ultimately as an explanation for gender inequalities in labour market outcomes across genders, although feminist criticism of gendered language has been influential that intolerance, big reforms to make language more gender neutral have been initiated or proposal , with the hope that these reforms will lead to more gender – equal outcomes. For example in Sweden, the promotion of new gender – neutral terms and ways of communicating have recently been actively pursued not only by feminist movements , but also by the Swedish language Council (Miles,2011) some feminists have been proposed the introduction of a new language as a path to gender equality (e.g. Elgin 1985). Given the costliness of such reforms, it is important to study the empirical plausibility of the underlying assumption: is it really the case that linguistic gender systems are linked with gender inequalities in outcomes?
Tourism is considered key to economic development – especially in developing countries endowed with ‘unspoilt’ natural resources (Jiang et al., 2011; Mitchell and Ashley, 2010). While the tourism sector is considered as a mainly private sector activity, the policies that shape the sector are state driven. Consequently, governments are seen as central to tourism development in any destination (Adu-Ampong, 2014; Slocum and Backman, 2011). How governments affect tourism and the influence of state public policy on tourism development have long been of interest to a number of academics (Hall, 2008; Jeffries, 2001). The priority given to the tourism sector through state policies and the statements of government officials is considered as key in shaping tourism development and to a less extent the revenue generated from the sector (Yuksel et al., 2012).
This process of regionalisation of citizenship appears most pronounced when one, or both, of two factors is present (Jeffery 2006; 2007b). The first concerns inter-regional economic disparity. Elite and/or public opinion in parts of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK show evidence of a growing unwillingness on the part of economically stronger regions to share wealth and equalise welfare risk on a statewide scale where there are wide disparities between richer and poorer regions. The second concerns sub-state territorial identity. Elite and/or public opinion in parts of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK which have strong sub-state identities show evidence of a growing desire for fuller ‘ownership’ of decision-making (that is, more powers) at regional levels of government. In some places – in Bavaria, Flanders, Catalonia, parts of northern Italy – regional wealth and territorial identity coincide as powerful, dual challenges to all the accumulated imagery of the ‘nation-state’ as the ‘natural social and political form of the modern world’.
This report provides an important stock take on the current state of careers and enterprise provision in England, and highlights the critical role schools play helping to prepare young people for life and work. Yet, it also demonstrates that this cannot be achieved by schools alone and shows that it is only through working in partnership with employers, parents, and civil society institutions that we can ensure that future generations have the tools they need to fulfil their potential. This report shows us not only what schools need to do, but what all of us with an interest in future of young people and the nation’s skills need to do. Employers are increasingly looking to recruit on behaviours and strengths, rather than just on technical and job
Habermas (1969), for instance, has already argued that, due to its historical connection with the social consequences of the French Revolution, sociology’s epochal diagnoses are attached to some idea of crisis and crises have therefore become the standard way in which ‘the present’ makes its presence and urgency felt in the discipline. At the same time, the idea of the crisis of sociology on the basis of its inability to keep pace with the changes in society is as old as sociology itself (Marshall 1963). From a strictly sociological point of view, then, there is nothing intrinsically new or radical in claiming that the nation-state is in crisis, the direction of that change being unknown, neither is it new to argue that the pace of social change gets quicker by the day. There is nothing intrinsically new in a group of scholars claiming that they live in hectic times, and that they are the privileged observers (and participants) of an epochal change. What else did Marx, Parsons or Arendt think about their own times? It is as though intellectuals ‘need’ to believe that they live in hectic times, they do not seem to experience their own times as ‘un-historical’, as moments when history is not or cannot be made. They can be disappointed with the mediocrity that surrounds them, but that is a different argument altogether. How can intellectual activity possibly find personal and social legitimacy in a historical context without major social issues to be tackled? As we shall see, both classical and modernist sociologists have regarded themselves in a critical crossroad: the excitement with the intellectual and historical possibilities that are open to one’s own generation is one of the characteristics of history of the social sciences.
ACES Cases 2012.1 Daly, p. 7 social policy has no financial costs in that it is aspirational – but the EU does have funds that can have an impact if social policy is broadly conceived. For example, the direct financial assistance given to countries and regions by virtue of the Social and Structural Funds is a form of social policy since it is designed to compensate regions for possible losses associated with economic integration, to promote social cohesion across the Union and create the conditions for competition between regions. Although initially very small-scale, the Funds have been significantly revised and increased over time. The European Social Fund now accounts for some 10 percent of the EU’s budget while the Structural Funds overall account for in excess of 30 percent (Falkner 2006: 85). These are the main forms of income redistribution within the EU even if their focus is on territorial cohesion, co-operation and competitiveness as well as (in the case of the European Social Fund) improving employment, employability and the linkages between these concerns and social inclusion. The Common Agricultural Policy is also relevant to any categorization of EU social policy. A form of income support, price controls and subsidies for farmers and their enterprises, this has been said to constitute a kind of welfare state for farmers (Leibfried and Pierson 1992: 341). The EU, then, is best seen in terms of a series of loosely connected fields – hence the term ‘social Europe’ – rather than the tightly bound package of measures oriented to social protection and risk coverage which characterize social policy at national level.
First of all, in terms of the emergence and development of the nation-state, it is an inevitable byproduct of modern society. The interpretation of nation-state should be placed in the whole field of human history. Industrialization has enabled the survival of the nation, accompanied which these two closely related categories, nation and state, have gradually combined and become the most important political organization in modern society. We know that before industrialization, the disappearance of nations, groups, cultures and traditions often happened. They were lost in time and disappeared without a trace. So, industrialization is the decisive factor for the survival of modern nation and the creation of nation-state. So to speak, if there is no industrialization which including all existence in the production process, and through the widespread of capitalist industrialization, modernization and globalization in the world, then the modern nation-state will not emerge. Because of industrialization the nation-state can be the most effective form of community to provide its members with a “belonging”, that is providing the national identity, national awareness and national cohesion with a legitimacy boundary. It is obvious that industrial development must be given an important position in the analysis of the emergence and development of nation-state. What closely connected with nation-state is the outbreak of the industrial revolution in western countries, and the successful large-scale industrialization, modern economic growth and the unprecedented economic prosperity. It can be said that the nation-state, as the external carrier of politics, economy, culture and science and technology, is the projection of modernity to human society. With industrial revolution, “capitalism’s invasion of the world produced the nation-state. That is, produced the relatively mono-cultural, homogeneous, unilinguistic entities that have become the U. N. O. standard pattern of this century.” In the modern sense, nation-state, as the most fundamental form of entity in world system, is the
Furthermore, the German Empire founded in 1871 as an ethnolinguistic German nation-state was frustrated in its ethnopolitical aspirations by the existence, outside its borders, of other polities with German as their official or national language, for instance, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland. The situation continues to this day, as German is shared as an official and national language of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Switzerland (also by Namibia before 1990). The Italian nation-state faces a similar debacle, as, since its inception in 1861, it has shared its national language with San Marino and Switzerland (and later with the Vatican, too, officially recognized as a state by Italy in 1929). Likewise, the Netherlands did not then and still has not met the isomorphism's requirements, because it has shared Dutch in an official capacity with Belgium. It could be argued, however, that Dutch was not an official language in Belgium before 1898, which means that between 1830 and 1898, the Netherlands was an ethnolinguistic nation-state that met the requirements of the isomorphism.
MP, in the Irish National Land League that independence for Ireland was more seriously advanced than in previous generations. The connection between agrarian and constitution- al politics forged the broad nationalist identity in the 1880s; the ‘Land War’ of 1879-1882 helped to focus many strands of separatist and socialist demands into one generally coher- ent, connected movement. The voice of this movement would be Parnell; the demand would be improved legislation, ultimately ownership, for the tenant-farmers of Ireland. It did not happen precisely by design: in fact, the Land League itself emerged only in Mayo as conditions during the terrible year of 1879 drove many to support any platform for improvements in the tenant-farmers’ lot. What started as a local initiative to address a local concern in County Mayo became the engine of a national movement to address summary evictions, while simultaneously creating a blueprint for the first truly national organisation of party politics in Ireland. The ‘Land Question’ emerged as one of the most vexatious and incendiary of issues. It would also be the defining issue in exploiting the real potential for a separate State. How that local initiative became a national movement deserves our attention today, with the Corrib Gas Field and other locations around Ireland seemingly portrayed by the national media as isolated incidents rather than repeated symptoms of an emerging broader struggle over environmental impacts and state financial returns.