The occupational values of medical professionals are likely to be undermined by bureaucratization as a process of the transformation of work in accordance with the values of instrumentally rational administration (IRA) (McKinlay & Stoeckle, 1988; Ritzer & Walcak, 1988; Rosenberg, 2007). Bureaucratized systems of national governance enforce the values of IRA by developing a regulatory framework that enables these systems to increase administrative and economic efficiency in the utilization of public resources (Weber, 1978). Over the past decades, the bureaucratization of national governance systems has weakened medical professionals’ commitment to their occupational values by regulating medical work using audit systems, accountability measures and performance incentives (Pollitt, 1993; Hunter, 1996; Power, 1999; Light, 2000; Harrison & Smith, 2003). Prior studies have demonstrated how the employment of medical professionals in bureaucratized work roles, organizations and healthcare fields
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The institutional changes and corporate governance mechanisms in national governance systems are essentially important for the transition process, thus there are specificities of corporate governance mechanisms in transition economies that indicate the progress towards market based economy. Most notable are: the market-based corporate governance mechanisms, management- structure based corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure, boards of directors, management compensations schemes, that is, management structures and financial structures. Corporate governance mechanisms are seen through governance and enterprise restructuring indicator which has already established link to gross domestic product and foreign direct investments in the literature.
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Thus, in elaborating this special issue we view corporate governance systems as comprising bundles of interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces, which provide structures and processes of the relationship between firm’s management and stakeholders, most commonly owners. The historical path dependence among such mechanisms has resulted to a variety of country and organization type specific governance solutions which fit well within the context they evolved (i.e. current legislation, national culture and ownership structure of the organization) and both complement and substitute each other (Roe, 2005). Therefore, these combinations can be seen as National Governance Bundles (NGB), which means configurations of governance mechanisms that simultaneously operate at the firm- and national- levels to govern firms within an overall economy or collection of economies. It is worth noting that we see national governance bundles as distinct from firm-level governance bundles (e.g., Aguilera et al. 2011) and national governance systems (or country-level systems of corporate governance) (e.g., Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi and Hilton, 2005), while the former comprises only complementarities and substitution among firm-level governance choices, the last focus on exclusively on country-level governance systems.
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Privatization has raised corporate governance issues in sectors that were previously in the hands of the state. Firms have turned to markets to seek capital, and mutual enterprises and partnerships have converted themselves into listed corporations. The private, market-based investment process is now becoming more substantial for most of these economies, being underpinned by better corporate governance. The role of institutional investors is growing in many of these countries, with economies moving away from “pay as you go” retirement systems. This increased delegation of investment has raised the need for corporate governance arrangements.
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Michel Foucault coined the neologism governmentality as shorthand for mentalities and techniques of governance that link knowledge and power to governmental rationality. Foucault analysed the ways by which neoliberal governmentality becomes pervasive but warned that neoliberalism should “not be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity and intervention” (Foucault 2008: 132). ‘Free’ markets require extensive state regulation best achieved through “a minimum of economic interventionism, and maximum legal interventionism” (Foucault 2008: 167). Foucault understood measurement, surveillance and monitoring are crucial mechansism of disciplinary and biopower.
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constitutional and legislative particularities of the UK system. Given that no major economic powers currently have a national climate plan compatible with their Paris pledges (Climate Action Tracker 2019), it is reasonable to conclude that a commitment to far-reaching action is eluding most political groupings. However, the reasons for this may differ across different political systems. Comparative studies would reveal whether different political systems result in different strategies by individual politicians. For example, UK Members of Parliament are elected to represent a geographical constituency, which could explain their efforts to link the global issue of climate change to the needs of their local area. Strategies may well be different in a different political system, such as proportional representation based on a national list, as used in
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Along with the rapid development of information technology, the ability and level of national governance is also constantly upgrading, showing a high technology development trend . Modern state governance should take the information and technology as the basic means, methods and tools. “Big data” is an important characte- rization of the information age, it has four fundamental characteristics: massive data size, fast and dynamic data transfer system, multi-type data model and low density data value. Based on these characteristics, it can inte- grate the information resources of the country’s political, economic, cultural, social, ecological and other fields more effectively, and provide important data base and decision support for national governance.
In recent years, China's air quality has deteriorated and the phenomenon of haze weather has increased. In order to control haze, the country speed up the adjustment of energy structure, make environmental laws and regulations, and control enterprise pollution emissions. But just relying on the government to force companies to pay attention to environmental pollution is not enough; the enterprise is the main role of the environmental pollution. Air pollution caused by haze mainly comes from industrial pollution. In the haze governance, enterprises should take the initiative to assume and fulfill their social responsibilities. The current research on the haze governance focuses in the field of astronomy, earth science and environmental science and other technology science. There is little research from the management perspective. From the perspective of corporate social responsibility in the management, this article explores the behavior lacking of corporate social responsibility in the haze governance , analyzes that what social responsibility enterprises should assume in the haze governance and proposes recommendations for that how to promote enterprises to bear corporate social responsibility in the haze governance.
It is also worth noting how misleading analogies are often employed to lead the reader to believe that there is something uniquely positive about the current Internet governance arrangements. For example, Souter  states “The development of the Internet has not been overseen by intergovernmental agencies and national governments in the same ways as, for example, telecommunications. Instead, its development has been facilitated by entities in which Internet technical professionals, private sector businesses and other non-governmental stakeholders have been at least as prominent as governments.” The first sentence is correct. The second sentence ignores the privatisation and liberalization of telecommunications that has taken place since the mid 1970’s. At present, the development of all telecommunications technologies is driven primarily by private businesses, which are indeed more prominent that governments. And this also holds for the development of most other areas of economic activity. Thus, a statement such as “The Internet has become such a fantastic success because it was based on a governance structure that was open to all interested stakeholders, global in reach and guided by a cooperative spirit between all involved parties”  in reality applies to most areas of economic activity, and applies for sure to mobile telecommunications which, as shown below, has actually grown faster than Internet, without being “governed” by some special so-called multi-stakeholder model.
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15 IGF for another five years ‘in order to maintain well-established best practices developed in the context of the IGF that reflect this principle’ (ibid). Second, and given the success of the institutional practices at the IGF, the European Parliament in its resolution on the second Internet Governance forum (Rio de Janeiro, Nov 2007) called for the construction of a European IGF, and in this sense, has been a one of the most active EU actors promoting the creation of the IGF’s institutional form in Europe. In its call it stated that ‘the European Union's responsibility is to support this process, as it gives a positive and concrete context to the shaping of the Internet's future on the basis of a multi-stakeholder approach’ and went on to stress ‘that lessons can already be learnt from the fruitful exchanges held in the context of the IGF up to now, and put in motion, notably on electronic communications regulatory aspects and data security and privacy issues …’ (European Parliament, 2008). Furthermore, the European Parliament was very supportive (along with the Council of Europe) of establishing the European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG) with a similar working format to the IGF. EuroDIG is an open platform for informal and inclusive discussion and exchange on public policy issues related to Internet Governance (IG) between stakeholders from all over Europe. Indeed, the EP, the EU Presidency, and the European Commission have all been active within this forum alongside other European stakeholders (business, civil society, academic).
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Nowadays, managing complex governance systems is seen one of key challenges of governance. Complex systems are today subject to system pressures, system shocks, chance events, path-dependency and self-organisation. One key idea to manage complexity is the idea of dual thinking and dual action strategies, which can satisfy the desires of controlling processes and the need to adjust to changes simultaneously. (Teisman, van Buuren & Gerrits 2009). Complex systems do not follow conventional path-dependency rules. Typically, governance means systems that emphasize networks, self- organizing units, and collaboration between actors. The model involves negotiations between people from different agencies committed to working together over more than a short term and aims at keeping any single agency from acting alone (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002; Dickinson & Glasby 2010, 815). So-called inputs come into the system not only from hierarchy administration but from other directions as well (via networks, etc.). To summarize, the concept of governance includes multi-actor systems and network based collaboration (Klijn 2008; Virtanen & Stenvall 2010, 55–56.). In the context of governance the self-organizing networks are autonomous and they shape their own environment. (see Rhodes 1996; 1997) The different interest groups involved in the solving of the problems of the public governance are citizens (as individuals), local public organizations, NGO´s, media, public institutions and the politicians.
This paper will not attempt to provide a legal view of the various legislative changes being enacted around the world. The purpose of this paper is to offer a personal view of the future of project governance based on the author’s assessment of the likely consequences of the changes in the behaviours and attitudes of corporate managers generated by their response to SOX (and similar legislation elsewhere). However, as any project planner will tell you, all attempts to predict the future are fraught with difficulty (particularly when there is no previous history to provide a reference), prone to error and requires regular monitoring and updating to retain relevance.
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In the last few years, there has been a growing interest in debating governance in land administration. What is more, the major concern of the issues as addressed above relates very much to inappropriate structures of governance in the system. Yet, institutional arrangements have become a substantial obstacle; therefore, some authors (Enemark, 2001; Williamson, 2001a; Barnes, 2003; Steudler, 2004 and Burns et al.,2006) highlight the role of decentralisation as a panacea for the ills of poor land administration governance and the failure of the centralised system. The concepts of centralisation and decentralisation have been hot issues among scholars and practitioners in public management about the mismatch between theoretical view and reality contexts. Many raise the advantages, criticisms and limitations of both centralised and decentralised approaches. Principally, centralisation refers to concentration of power at the top level while decentralisation means the extent of decisions being taken at the lower level of society (Shah, 2010). Under centralisation, authority over service delivery is delegated to bureaucrats appointed by the central government (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). To tackle and eliminate the problems and the failure of centralisation, many consider decentralisation as another option for improvement of the services at the local level.
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Second, the practice of self-identification (自证式实践) is an effective way to con- struct NGOs ’ subject legitimacy as one of the participants in governance. For NGOs, when the legal arrangements are outdated, their space of action is expanded both by the empowerment of formal institutions and informal institutionalized practices. Dur- ing this revision, Friends of Nature’s subject legitimacy was self-identified by its judicial practice in the case of ‘Yunnan Qujing Chrome Slag Pollution’. Based on this, this NGO pushed the expansion of subjects qualified to participate in environmental civil public interest litigation. Also, the Supreme Court confirmed the NGOs ’ legitimacy as potential plaintiffs in cross-province environmental civil public interest litigation by taking the case of ‘Fujian Nanping Ecological Damage’ as an example, in which Friends of Nature and Fujian Green Homelands were plaintiffs. The civil society ’ s attempts at driving legal revisions have the same logic as ‘ pilot ’ and ‘ innovation ’ , which is to im- prove the lagged laws and also make it possible for NGOs to construct their subject le- gitimacy as participants in national governance.
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Israel’s national program is an opportunity to study intersectoriality in action. As the program is in its early stages, there is a unique opportunity to design a monitoring effort that can contribute not only to Israel’ s program, but, also, to HiAP efforts worldwide. It is an opportunity to learn about points of interaction between health and other sectors. How, why, where and when does each sector respond? What do these “points” look like? Which governance structures in the WHO analytical framework are sustainable and lead to genuine action? How important is informal collaboration, and how are unofficial partnerships affected by being formalized? Are there key elements that mechanisms must include in order for intersectoral action to be successful? What does it even mean for an intersectoral action to be “successful?” Interactions exist throughout the National Program, many of which have the potential to shed light on several of these questions.
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Ethical regulation has become increasingly complex and restrictive without any evidence that the current ma- chinery has improved the quality of qualitative research or protected research participants from substantive harm. However, it is clear that qualitative research does not fit within the current bioethical framework of ethical regulation which was designed to protect research parti- cipants from the very real harms which could be involved in taking part in experimental studies including commercial drugs trials. The need for ethical review and regulation is not at issue. However, this must be appro- priate and proportionate to the risks involved. Existing regulatory frameworks disenfranchise qualitative research- ers by preventing them from carrying out flexible, respon- sive research according to accepted best practice within their academic disciplines. They force adherence to a bur- eaucratic system of procedural ethics which is ill suited to the nature of the research and which, in the worst case, works ‘unethically’ to compromise the quality and reach – and consequently also the value - of the findings. The greatest protection for participants in qualitative studies is for adequately skilled and experienced researchers to con- duct and supervise research. Researchers should, of course, be accountable for their actions and work within institutional systems of supervision and support. However, moving responsibility from an over-reliance on external audit towards a greater degree of internal accreditation and review would exert powerful leverage in increasing the quality and integrity of qualitative research.
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Kenya’s historical inequality can be traced to British colonization. Colonialism through expropriation, native reserves, hut taxes, compulsory labour, marketing boards and commodity monopolies, etc…created land scarcity and excess labour. Thus Kenya became a rent extraction colony. Institutions evolved to support high inequality. These institutions were not completely dissolved at independence; instead they were coopted by the new elite. Thus the political economy of inequality was maintained and ethicized as opposed to racialised. Consequently, the heart of political contestation in Kenya is the competition for scarce resources created by high inequality institutions. The relationship between inequality, class formation and political power has been the underlying motivating factor in Kenya’s politics since the colonial period. However, there is little empirical research aimed at disentangling the linkages between class formation, high economic inequality and Kenya’s political economy. This is despite the fact that inequality, conflict and social injustice are increasingly characteristic of Kenyan society. At the core of these linkages has been the development of a political system based on patronage i.e. a neo-patrimonial state. The institutional organization of the Kenyan state grants the Executive, more specifically, the President sweeping powers of patronage. Consequently it has led to imperative of political mobilization as well as self- serving interest have transformed this custodianship of national wealth enjoyed by the state into a potent tool of economic exploitation and exclusion for some and a vehicle for accumulation and social ascendancy for others.
Since the general decline of structural-functional thinking in the social sciences (from around the 1960s), social theory has explored many complementary schools of thought that help us to better understand the outcomes emerging from the health, or otherwise, of our social system, and consequently our governance systems. Conflict theories, for example remind us that power imbalances within society (caused by several functional defects) can lead to the marginalization of key actors from decision making structures (e.g., those social structures involved in setting societal objectives). Further, the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984)opens up the possibilities of more inclusive decision making. Indeed, some of these schools of sociological thought have focused on the role of structuralism within society (Dixon & Rhys, 2003), while others (Emerson et al., 2011) have focused on functional aspects of society (e.g., key societal outcomes achieved via the health of decision making processes).
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Unlike in Europe and America, trade unions in Africa grew mainly in agrarian society predominated by capitalist relations imposed on workers by colonial rule (Geiss, 1965). Low wages, poor housing, high rents and soaring prices were among of many problems which led to unionization among workers to demand colonial employers at that time to cease exploitation of labour. Colonial government repression through state organs was one among many challenges against trade union movement. During the struggle for African independence, labour unions in several African societies joined national movements and political parties to demand an end to colonial rule (Musa, 2014). However, the period after independence was a turmoil for many trade unions in many parts of Africa. The single party regimes in Africa post-independence left no room for free and independent trade unions and consequently the existing trade unions became branches of the regimes or were banned (Budeli, 2012).
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To build consensus on the validity of the results as well as assign weights to each of the nine domains, the re- sults of this initial analysis was presented to another group; a group of 9 Subject Matter Experts consisting of high-ranking health sector government policy makers (e.g. directors in the NPHCDA and Federal Ministry of Health), chief executives and senior representatives of selected stakeholder organizations (e.g. Health Reform Foundation of Nigeria, Johns Hopkins University Inter- national Vaccine Access Centre and representatives of the National Steering Committee). The weighted averages for each domain were agreed on by these Subject Matter Experts using a modified Nominal Group Technique. We asked each of them to rank each of the 9 domains in order of perceived importance with “1” representing the highest and “9” representing the least important. The results were displayed in plenary with the mean and mode for each do- main. Final rankings and weights were assigned through consensus informed by the measures of central tendency. The weighted scores for each state were determined by multiplying domain scores with corresponding weights. Overall score for each state was calculated as the mean of
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