Non-state actors and private parties

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Engagement with non-state actors

Engagement with non-state actors

Non-State actors in official relations with WHO Report by the Director-General 1. “Official relations” is a privilege that the Executive Board may grant to nongovernmental organizations, international business associations and philanthropic foundations that have had and continue to have a sustained and systematic engagement in the interest of the Organization. The aims and activities of all these entities shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of WHO’s Constitution, and they shall contribute significantly to the advancement of public health. 1 2. In accordance with the provisions of the Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, 2 entities in official relations with WHO are international in membership and/or scope, have a constitution or similar basic document, an established headquarters, a governing body, an administrative structure and a regularly updated entry in the WHO Register of non-State actors, through which such entities provide all the necessary information on their nature and activities.
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Non-State Actors Escaping Justice - Obligations Regarding Child Soldiers Applicable to Non-State Actors

Non-State Actors Escaping Justice - Obligations Regarding Child Soldiers Applicable to Non-State Actors

38 The legislative jurisdiction theory, or doctrine, is based on the ability of the State to legislate for all of its people and this legislation can originate from either international or national law. This principle applies even if some nationals decide to fight the regime. It works the same way when a State legislates in accordance with new international law which affects the rights and obligations. of the nationals. This theory works on the assumption that States can transform its own binding legal obligation as binding legal obligations for its nationals and the same goes for any NSA that works in the State’s territory. Although this assumption would be logical, it is problematic to draw such a conclusion based solely on the ratification to a treaty by the State. Moreover, this theory requires a nationality link which sometimes might be hard to establish when it comes to NSAs because they are protesting against the current regime and will often not acknowledge their nationality. This would also mean that in case any foreign fighters participate in the name of the NSA, they are not as bound by national law as some of the other fighters. Since NSAs often are multi- and transnational, such a principle would prove difficult. 84
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Sanctions against non state actors

Sanctions against non state actors

One trend in UN Security Council targeted sanctions against NSAs, noted above, is a move towards widening the concept of ‘threat to the peace’, so that action taken to tackle the threat include measures directed at deterring or stopping the violence by NSAs, and measures aimed at those responsible for violations of human rights law and humanitarian law. Although not present in the sanctions against UNITA, punitive non-forcible measures were included in the Security Council’s responses to the violence in Bosnia but in the form of the creation of an international criminal tribunal. This approach was developed in relation to Libya in 2011, when targeted sanctions were combined with a referral to the ICC. However, in more recent episodes, sanctions (in the form of assets freezes, travel bans etc.) have been imposed on NSAs either because they undermine the peace process or otherwise threaten the peace, but also if they threaten the human security of civilians, manifested in the commission of violations of international law. This is a reflection of a move towards not only securing peace within the state but also in establishing the security of individuals within it. Thus, although appearing to be a form of punishment for breaches of the law, they remain measures aimed at restoring peace and security but at the level of civilians as well as the state. As well as the examples mentioned above, whereby sanctions were taken on this basis against NSAs in the DR Congo, and the CAR, other examples can be found in Cote D’Ivoire, 95 Lebanon, 96 and Sudan. 97 However, in other instances, targeted measures are more clearly of the UNITA-type, being directed at those regime elites and NSAs who have threatened the peace; for example in Guinea-Bissau, 98 Iran, 99 North Korea, 100 Liberia, 101 Sierra Leone, 102 Somalia, 103 Eritrea, 104 South Sudan, 105 and Yemen. 106
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Framework of engagement with non-state actors

Framework of engagement with non-state actors

14. For each of the four groups of entities above, the overarching framework and the respective specific policy on engagement apply. WHO will determine through its due diligence if a non-State actor is subject to the influence of private sector entities to the extent that the non-State actor has to be considered itself a private sector entity. Such influence can be exerted through financing, participation in decision making or otherwise. Provided that the decision-making processes and bodies of a non- State actor remain independent of undue influence from the private sector, WHO can decide to consider the entity as a nongovernmental organization, a philanthropic foundation or an academic institution, but may apply relevant provisions of the WHO’s policy and operational procedures on engagement with private sector entities, such as not accepting financial and in-kind contributions for use in the normative work.
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case of non-state armed actors

case of non-state armed actors

Taliban still disputes the central concepts of civilians in a discursive way. In the recent response to the UN report on civilian protection, Taliban disputed the western conception of civilians: On several occasions, UNAMA counted the American and Kabul administration related armed forces as a civilian while not wearing military uniform and some others, while they do not distinguish between civilian and non-civilian Mujahideen. All those Taliban who are working in administration, education, health, court, reconstruction and other civilian sectors, are counted Taliban and their killings are not counted as civilian casualties. American and Kabul administration usually assume that all civilians that have been remained under control of Islamic Emirate Mujahideen are a legitimate target. Similarly, Mujahideen strictly limits its operations to military objectives while UNAMA criticizes them for using IEDs that IEDs cannot distinguish targets. While on the other side, they shut their eyes on American and Kabul
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Non-state actors and the use of force

Non-state actors and the use of force

Yet while nothing exists conceptually to prevent NSAs from carrying out an ‘armed attack’, the issue arises as to what constitutes such an attack. Although both were implicitly accepted as armed attacks giving rise to the right of self-defence the attacks by the NSAs in these two examples were of a starkly differing nature with the former using aircrafts as missiles with the resulting deaths of 3,000 civilians, while the latter resulted in the death of three military personnel from the use of an anti-tank missile and the abduction of a further two soldiers. The ICJ has adopted the position that armed attacks (that give rise to the right of self-defence), are distinguished from mere uses of force, (which do not), by their ‘gravity’ and ‘scale and effects’. 45 The 9/11 attacks can be clearly separated in their ‘scale and effects’ from the incident in Israel that sparked the war in Lebanon. The Court did not, however, elaborate further on how one is to make this distinction, 46 which has led some, such as Rosalyn Higgins, to argue that it is in practice operationally unworkable and that instead the legality of a forcible response will depend more upon the proportionality of the response as opposed to the gravity of the prior attack. 47 The above two examples arguably bear witness to this, as whereas the 9/11 attacks where so many lives were lost led to the forcible toppling of a governmental regime, the relatively minor attacks by Hezbollah led to more limited strikes within Lebanon. While the latter operation was accepted by the international community as a lawful action in self-defence, when Israel began targeting Lebanese state infrastructure condemnation of them as disproportionate became widespread. 48
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NON-STATE ACTORS IN CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

NON-STATE ACTORS IN CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS

Scammers are usually considered to be the least skilled actors in cyberspace. The ordinary cyber scammers are similar to the real-world, analog counterparts, but instead employ information technology to defraud their victims. These scammers commonly make use of random spamming, trying to get the attention of victims by advertising fake lottery winnings, a recently discovered large inheritance, or a job offering with an unreasonably high salary, while masquerading as a trustworthy entity. This approach is sometimes called “phishing”, a term influenced by the related term “phreaking”, a portmanteau of the words phone and freak. Phishing refers to the use of tempting “baits”, in hopes that the potential victim will be tempted to “bite”, and thus fall for the scam. The motives of cyber scammers are almost universally pure economic gain, by deceiving the ones who respond to the scams into disclosing credit card details or other valuable information. However, there are more sophisticated and subtle scammers who target their victims carefully, perhaps after analyzing lists of stolen bank statements, open source intelligence gathering of personally identifiable information. This type if scam, sometimes called “spear phishing”, includes the use of advanced social engineering schemes to separate the victims with from whatever items of value that they may have.
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Are Non-state Actors Better Innovators? The Ambiguous Role of Non-state Actors in the Transition Process: The Case of Benin and Madagascar

Are Non-state Actors Better Innovators? The Ambiguous Role of Non-state Actors in the Transition Process: The Case of Benin and Madagascar

Frequently it even undermines indigenous development capacities. Innovators in the informal sector and the agency of the civil society, embedded in the local socio-cultural setting, but closely linked to transnational social spaces, do often outperform the state's development efforts and international aid. African culture is not inherently good or bad, but under certain conditions its propensity to change and to influence perceptions of power and values can induce important improvements in well-being. Even seemingly static cultural factors as custom, tradition or ethnicity, often said to be barriers to economic growth in Africa, have been invented or adapted to changing requirements of societies. Rather than blaming the failure of development efforts in Africa over the past decades on cultural barriers or traditional minded actors, we should investigate the propensity of African societies to create indigenous innovations, notably within the realm of the informal sector.
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Are Non-state Actors Better Innovators? The Ambiguous Role of Non-state Actors in the Transition Process: The Case of Benin and Madagascar

Are Non-state Actors Better Innovators? The Ambiguous Role of Non-state Actors in the Transition Process: The Case of Benin and Madagascar

Frequently it even undermines indigenous development capacities. Innovators in the informal sector and the agency of the civil society, embedded in the local socio-cultural setting, but closely linked to transnational social spaces, do often outperform the state's development efforts and international aid. African culture is not inherently good or bad, but under certain conditions its propensity to change and to influence perceptions of power and values can induce important improvements in well-being. Even seemingly static cultural factors as custom, tradition or ethnicity, often said to be barriers to economic growth in Africa, have been invented or adapted to changing requirements of societies. Rather than blaming the failure of development efforts in Africa over the past decades on cultural barriers or traditional minded actors, we should investigate the propensity of African societies to create indigenous innovations, notably within the realm of the informal sector.
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Are Non state Actors Better Innovators? The Ambiguous Role of Non state Actors in the Transition Process: The Case of Benin and Madagascar

Are Non state Actors Better Innovators? The Ambiguous Role of Non state Actors in the Transition Process: The Case of Benin and Madagascar

Frequently it even undermines indigenous development capacities. Innovators in the informal sector and the agency of the civil society, embedded in the local socio-cultural setting, but closely linked to transnational social spaces, do often outperform the state's development efforts and international aid. African culture is not inherently good or bad, but under certain conditions its propensity to change and to influence perceptions of power and values can induce important improvements in well-being. Even seemingly static cultural factors as custom, tradition or ethnicity, often said to be barriers to economic growth in Africa, have been invented or adapted to changing requirements of societies. Rather than blaming the failure of development efforts in Africa over the past decades on cultural barriers or traditional minded actors, we should investigate the propensity of African societies to create indigenous innovations, notably within the realm of the informal sector.
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The Legitimacy of Non-State Actors in Humanitarian Intervention

The Legitimacy of Non-State Actors in Humanitarian Intervention

The first concern Dobos addresses with UN authorization is the rights of the target state. 55 As shown in the section on sovereignty, however, the rights of the target state can easily be questioned if not dismissed in the cases of human rights violations, as their sovereignty has been impugned in some way and the more relevant rights are those of the civilians affected. Dobos then argues that international vigilantism can be wrong not because it violates the target states rights but because it can wrong the international community 56 . The 'humanitarian non-state actor' would operate on behalf of the international community via universal human rights. Assuming the actor is legitimate in intervention and upholds universal human rights, this objection is not a problem. The third issue he advances is that one could argue that contractual rights are being ignored. When UN authorization is denied to a state or IGO can still appeal to the UN charter and claim they were within their rights to carry out an intervention and ultimately get past such contractual worries if the appeal is successful. A non-state actor has no such claim if it is not signatory to the UN charter. It would have to be held accountable in international legal systems if wrong doing is perceived, just as if it were a signatory in that case but then they could appeal to the same aspects of the UN charter states and IGOs do to justify their interventions. As well, the non-state actor should attempt to become members and signatories to international treaties such as the UN. This can help provide further external legitimacy prevent other worries about legitimacy if accepted. There is of course another option and that is to seek external intervention legitimacy elsewhere, namely in the form of moral legitimacy.
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Defensive Force against Non-State Actors: The State of Play

Defensive Force against Non-State Actors: The State of Play

ing sovereignty interests of the territorial State and the victim State. As for how to strike that balance—and when to permit defensive force—the liter- ature is conflicted. Essentially three grounds for permitting such force are plausibly available: (1) the territorial State actively harbors or supports the non-State actors, or lacks governance authority in the area from which they operate, (2) the territorial State is unable or unwilling to address the threat that the non-State actors pose, and (3) the threat is located in the territorial State. To be clear, each of these grounds for permitting defensive force has some interpretive space and overlaps with the others. The three are best conceived as concentric circles; as one moves from the first ground to the third, the scope of permissible defensive actions expands. Treating the three as distinct is analytically useful, then, because it exposes the variations in the practice as the application of Article 51 broadens. As I explain in the next Section, any of these grounds for permitting defensive force might be further restricted by other conditions that attach to Article 51.
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Carbon markets as regulation strategy: States, non-state market actors and public-private climate governance

Carbon markets as regulation strategy: States, non-state market actors and public-private climate governance

Therefore, corporations submitting proposals for credit-generating projects can earn allowances to produce higher emissions than the emission cuts they help produce, thereby allowing for more pollution that what is to be offset (Bachram 2004, 8). Although quality assurance mechanisms are used, information on their use is limited, and the extent of their use is uncertain. Since private actors take up standard setting and registry functions on their own terms, questions about the consistency and accuracy of measuring and monitoring are raised. In such settings where little external regulation is exercised, it is based on the integrity of corporations that accurate reports on emission levels and reduction levels are prepared. There are in fact many cases where private entities take up a number of these functions with a conflict of interests involved. Firms can act both as advisory firms for carbon trading schemes, as well as verifiers for the carbon credits generated (Bachram 2004, 8).
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Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State

Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State

2015] PUBLIC ACTORS IN PRIVATE MARKETS 159 government intervention aimed at resolving network failures that hinder commercialization of technological and scientific advances. 196 From this perspective, one might imagine numerous possibilities for a more seamlessly integrated developmental strategy. 197 Undoubtedly, identifying and operationalizing potential synergies is a complex task that raises various economic, legal, and organizational issues. 198 Our present goal is merely to suggest some possibilities for building a proactive, entrepreneurial, and development-oriented national infrastructure- financing body. As discussed above, the operations of this new public actor—both in its basic NIB version and in its more advanced NCMC version—represent a direct expansion of the government’s market- levering function. However, it could also play significant market-making, market-moving, and market-backstopping roles. The NCMC model is particularly likely to act as a market-maker, by actively inducing infrastructural change that would not otherwise happen and thus creating new markets for financial instruments. Both the NIB and NCMC models could also perform the market-moving and market-backstopping functions. For example, if there were signs that demand for state or local infrastructure-related bonds was becoming either too overheated or too lackluster, making local borrowing either too easy or too expensive, an NIB/NCMC could modulate the price swings through open market operations. Alternatively, if the value of infrastructure bonds suddenly plummeted as a result of a broader market panic, an NIB/NCMC might stabilize these markets by temporarily acting as a “buyer of last resort.”
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The bioterrorism threat by non-state actors hype or horror?

The bioterrorism threat by non-state actors hype or horror?

by the one-step process of dry-spraying because of its quality, something he believed Iraq was capable of accomplishing based on his weapons inspections in the early 1990s. 103 Adding to the debate on how the agent was manufactured, experts disagree on the quality of the anthrax in the last two recovered letters. The quality of the anthrax in these letters was significantly better than that found in the first two; however, conflicting reports have appeared from different government groups. 104 Alibek says the anthrax is not from a state-run weapons program due to the particle size inconsistencies; however, he does not discount that it is of decent quality. 105 Others such as Spertzel, think it is of phenomenal purity. David Franz, former head of the Army’s biodefense lab, believes it to be of a very concentrated, pure form with “no garbage” after seeing pictures of the anthrax spores. He bases his characterization on the lack of spore coating to remove static electric charges—weapons-grade anthrax (meaning anthrax from state-sponsored programs) would be treated in this manner to increase floating and dispersal attributes. 106 In late September 2006, the FBI officially confirmed Franz’s theory that the powder did not have anything added to increase lethality. It did not, however, downgrade the purity of the powder. Instead, the FBI only clarified it was not weaponized to a state weapons program standard with anti-static additives. 107
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Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors

Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors

NSAs are involved in the continual use of force or armed activities resulting in losing their categorization as civilians under IHL. 32 However, the International Committee of the Red Cross has noted that, though NSAs are considered combatants, they cannot enjoy the legal privileges that are ascribed to state combatants. 33 The most influential NSAs are those that openly control larger territories in a state, compared to weaker NSAs that work clandestinely, because NSAs aspire to gain power, land and to undermine state control. 34 Their control can be both transnational and affect civilians in several countries. This is the case for terrorist organizations such as: the “Moro Islamic Liberation Front”, which controls territory in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Nepal; the Lord’s Resistance Army which controls territory in Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan; 35 and Al-Qaeda which controls territory in Syria, Yemen and Somalia. 36
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Quantifying the Value of Sport Diplomacy to Non-State Actors

Quantifying the Value of Sport Diplomacy to Non-State Actors

67 gain, but can damage the brand image of both parties. This extends to misaligned product-program fit as has been analyzed with KFC and Susan G. Komen. 216 Identifying and working toward common goals and objectives is an evolving challenge between NGOs and their corporate partners. Goals relate to long-term missions like improving financial literacy in a particular region or improving market share among a specific demographic, and objectives refer to the short-term benchmarks designated to achieve those goals. Horstmann explains that SFW strives for long-term engagement and deeper vertical impact with constituencies, while corporate objectives center on employee engagement and horizontal reach. However, from their respective industry vantage points, both Horstmann and Haubrich note that this trend is shifting to a greater emphasis on a narrow consumer focus. 217,218
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THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN OUTER SPACE SECURITY

THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN OUTER SPACE SECURITY

O THER CHALLENGES POSED BY NON - STATE ACTORS There are two other ways in which non-state actors raise interesting questions about the uses and misuses of access to outer space. One challenge is posed by non-state actors using commercial satellites for communications or imaging. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, some observers worried that terrorists might use commercially available satellite images to aid in planning attacks, although terrorists arguable require more timely and detailed information than is available from commercial imagery. 15 Commercial availability of images and communications is widely accepted as a beneficial development; nevertheless, a sensible dialogue about the peaceful uses of outer space should reflect the potential for misuse of such services. In the months before Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the United States purchased exclusive access to commercial images taken by Space Imaging’s Ikonos satellite, at least in part to deny those images to the Taliban.
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Just war, legitimate authority and non-State actors

Just war, legitimate authority and non-State actors

35 In a similar vein, Michael Walzer, perhaps the premier secular commentator on just war, argues in favor of the “political community” interpretation of legitimate authority. States are morally valuable because it is within states that citizens can build their own political community. Thus the state provides “an arena within which freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won.” 78 The interpretation is that this is the moral basis for states’ right to resort to war. The logic here suggests that if “non-state entities can provide this same possibility for meaningful political community, then such entities may also at times have the right to wage war…” 79 Brian Orend takes this a step further. He argues that war should be understood not as a conflict between sovereign states, but instead as conflict between political communities. 80 This seems to make room in the just war tradition for wars fought by and between NSAs. This is, however, a very slippery slope argument. If such a loose standard is used to judge the authority of actors to engage in the use of force, there is really no end in sight. Adopting this standard of legitimate authority, we would have to include substate revolutionary groups, armed criminal organizations, terrorist groups, etc. As long as an NSA used organized violence to affect a political order, they could seemingly meet the standard. The incorporation of NSAs is something that contemporary just war scholars have thought the tradition incapable of addressing. 81 In order to strengthen the tradition, the argument is to adopt new standards of justice to account for the changing nature of warfare.
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Non-state actors and cultural heritage: Friends or foes?

Non-state actors and cultural heritage: Friends or foes?

humanitarian norms. To date 53 non-State armed groups have signed «Deeds of Commitment» and have overall respected the obligations provided therein (67). In 2014, UNESCO invited Geneva Call representatives to Beirut on the occa- sion of a training activity on the fight against the illicit traffic of Syrian cultural objects. This training was dedicated to police and customs officers from Syria and neighbouring countries, and focused on archaeological sites, museums security and theft prevention, but also on national and international legal instruments. Cru- cially, the training also included practical experiences on how Geneva Call oper- ates on the field (68). Given that cultural resources are vanishing at an alarming rate in the conflict zones in the Middle East, it is to be expected that Geneva Call will become an arm of UNESCO by extending its field of activity to the enforce- ment of the treaty-based rules and the international customary law norms on the protection of cultural heritage. In the alternative, UNESCO should strive to put into practice by its own means the innovative and constructive method developed by this NGO. Either way, the effect of engaging non-State armed groups to respect the prohibition on looting artefacts could have an important –albeit slow and indirect–
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