Non State Armed Groups

Top PDF Non State Armed Groups:

The applicability of international law to armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups: between status and humanitarian protection

The applicability of international law to armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups: between status and humanitarian protection

The previous chapters have discussed the different thresholds created through international treaties, for the applicability of different regimes of the jus in bello to armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups. The discussion has yielded some tentative conclusions, central to which is the point that the thresholds are influenced by a status- based rationale. This, compounded with the decentralised and incompletely legalised process of assessment, leads to problematic results as far as the protective potential of the rules is concerned. These regulatory shortcomings were heightened by the limited protective rules activated in case the applicability of one of the above instruments was established. Again the unwillingness of states to develop the substantive regime has been shown, particularly through the examination of travaux préparatoires, to be related to the above sovereignty- and status-based rationale. This is where the law stood at the beginning of the 1990s when the Security Council, responding to the atrocities committed in conflicts which included non-state armed groups, established the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 1 and Rwanda (ICTR). 2
Show more

282 Read more

Geneva Call’s Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State Armed Groups in Sudan

Geneva Call’s Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State Armed Groups in Sudan

The other major protagonist in Darfur was the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). JEM announced itself just weeks after the SLA in the hopes of drawing international attention. However, it had weak military forces and had to rely on the SLA help to avoid defeat in towns along the Chadian border (Flint and De Waal 2008). However, the group’s strength lied into its leader, Khalil Ibrahim, a highly educated Zaghawa, smart political entrepreneur and great organizer, with the ability to understand the importance of publicity. Evidence can be found in the group’s origins with the publication of the Black Book demonstrating the planned underdevelopment of Darfur with clear signs of political and economic discrimination (Daly 2007). JEM was also one of the first to portray the conflict in Darfur as a genocide to international powers. The group’s objectives were to unify Sudan and fight against marginalization with specific national solutions, such as a rotating presidency between Sudan’s regions. Unlike the secular aspect of the SLA, and given its Islamist background, JEM does not offer a separation of state and religion (Flint and De Waal 2008). Before 2006, the group can more accurately be described as a political party with an armed branch. In comparison to the SLA, it has a more rigid structure and delegated authority with the creation of an executive board, a legislative committee and a General Congress. After 2006 and until 2010, JEM received support from the Chadian regime of Idriss Déby and the Libyan regime of Colonel Qaddafi, making it the strongest military group in Darfur. The rebels expanded their operations in July 2011 by sending troops to Nuba mountains, in support of the SPLM-N. It subsequently joined the SRF. In December 2011, after the SAF killed Khalil in airstrike, his brother Jibril and secretary of foreign affairs was appointed as the new JEM leader and SRF vice president of foreign relations and humanitarian affairs. JEM possess around 300 vehicles and 2,000 fighters, making it the strongest Darfuri group. JEM employs highly mobile tactics with effective logistics and coordination. They operate along the border with Chad, in eastern Darfur, South Kordofan and South Sudan (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012).
Show more

45 Read more

Individual, Not Collective: Justifying the Resort to Force against Members of Non-State Armed Groups

Individual, Not Collective: Justifying the Resort to Force against Members of Non-State Armed Groups

n the years since September 11, 2001, military campaigns by States against non-State groups based outside their borders have proliferated. Yet, despite the prevalence of these operations, people continue to disagree fiercely about the legal framework that governs them. There is particularly intense dispute about the U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda, the longest lasting and most ex- pansive of such actions. As part of this campaign, the United States has con- ducted targeted killings in countries where it is not involved in regular hos- tilities, and has detained alleged enemy fighters (including many captured away from any battlefield) for over fifteen years. While the United States presents these measures as the legitimate acts of a country fighting a geo- graphically dispersed foe, critics see them as troubling examples of military overreach that are undermining the international rule of law.
Show more

51 Read more

Insurgency as a social process: authority and armed groups in Myanmar’s changing borderlands

Insurgency as a social process: authority and armed groups in Myanmar’s changing borderlands

With regards to these natural resources, official trade and investment figures only capture the tip of the iceberg. Most money in this sector flows through illicit channels. Actual investment and trade volumes in these border provinces are much higher. This is best exemplified with the jade trade. Global Witness - an organisation specialising in the study of war economies, concluded in a 2015 report that ‘Myanmar’s jade industry may well be the biggest natural resource heist in modern history’ (Global Witness 2015, 95). Exact figures of Myanmar’s jade industry are impossible to compile for various reasons. This is because almost all jade mines are located in Kachin State’s conflict areas and the mining and trading is controlled by an in-transparent network of actors. According to Global Witness, the main profiteers include the families of former dictator Senior General Than Shwe, former General Secretary of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and retired army general Maung Maung Thein, former regional army commander in Kachin State and Minister for Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development under the U Thein Sein administration Ohn Myint. They also include drug-lords with links to non-state armed groups such as the ethnic Kokang Lo Hsing-Han, and Wei Hsueh Kang, a narcotics kingpin and long-time supporter of the UWSA who has a US$2 bounty from the US government on his head. The latter are invested through crony business corporations, such as the Asia World and Ever Winner groups (Global Witness 2015, 10–12). Jade has also long been the main funding source of the KIO (Lintner and Lintner 1990, 164). While some of its leaders also amassed personal riches by collaborating in the ever expanding Jade business during the ceasefire period, Kachin rebel leaders and businessmen were increasingly squeezed out of the most lucrative parts of the industry (cf. Chapter 6). Indeed, the Tatmadaw has taken over control of the main mining sites in Hpakant since the 1994 ceasefire, which left the KIO to tax smuggling operator at the Chinese border (Global Witness 2015, 87–91; cf. also Chapter 6).
Show more

281 Read more

Armed Groups and the Protection of Health Care

Armed Groups and the Protection of Health Care

14. Even IHL, which undisputedly applies to non-State armed groups, foresees that highly organized entities will be bound by more international obligations than other groups. In order to be applicable, the 1977 Additional Protocol II requires that organized armed groups that are under responsible command “exercise such control over a part of [the] ter- ritory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement [the] Protocol.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. See also Olivier Bangerter, The ICRC and Non-State Armed Groups, in E XPLORING C RITERIA AND C ONDITIONS FOR E NGAGING A RMED N ON - S TATE A CTORS TO R ESPECT H UMANITARIAN L AW AND H UMAN R IGHTS L AW 74, 76 (2008).
Show more

19 Read more

Detention by Armed Groups under International Law

Detention by Armed Groups under International Law

The international community has proven to be incredibly coy about dis- cussing the obligations of armed groups with regard to detention. When it comes to discussing who may be detained and the procedures for challeng- ing such detention there is a weird sort of silence. This is, of course, under- standable as there are knock-on effects in any such discussion. If there is no right to detain fighters from the other side or dangerous civilians, what does that tell us about the State’s own rights under international law? If one starts to set out procedures and prohibitions, will that not legitimize the behavior of those that comply? The problems are exacerbated for interna- tional organizations whose members do not want to see such potentially legitimizing behavior towards those who would seek to overthrow them. Non-governmental organizations similarly have to tread carefully for fear of being charged with material assistance to terrorism.
Show more

45 Read more

Orphans and Icons: Small Arms Control and Armed Groups in Southeast Asia

Orphans and Icons: Small Arms Control and Armed Groups in Southeast Asia

This study  evaluates small arms control as it relates to nonstate armed groups  in Southeast Asia.  It is guided by the research question “to what extent does the  current  small  arms  control  architecture  affect  how  armed  groups  in  Southeast  Asia  obtain,  retain  and  surrender  their  weapons?”    The  core  findings  of  the  study  are  that  there  are  three  defining  features  of  the  illicit  small  arms  proliferation  pattern  in  Southeast  Asia,  augmented  by  two  enduring  themes.   Combined,  these  features  and  themes  contribute  to  a  more  nuanced  appreciation  of  the  illicit  small  arms  proliferation  and  control  dynamic  in  the  region.   
Show more

17 Read more

Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict

Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict

The changing nature of conflict likewise augurs against a geographically restrictive application of IHL. Two aspects of twenty-first century conflict are particularly noteworthy in this regard. First, organized armed groups have increasingly exploited territoriality in order to shelter operations from counterattacks. It is now common for such organizations to establish base camps in other States for training and logistical purposes, especially when the areas in which they operate are located in States that lack the ability or will to exercise control over those activities. Moreover, their members of- ten operate abroad to frustrate attempts by States involved in the NIAC to identify and locate them. This propensity is in direct relation to the degree of military advantage enjoyed by the State’s forces, for asymmetry tends to drive organized armed groups away from the conventional battlefield. The same dynamic will incentivize their exploitation of any geographical limita- tions to the applicability of IHL as a means of shielding themselves from its more robust targeting regime.
Show more

20 Read more

Networks in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Crossing Borders and Defining "Organized Armed Groups"

Networks in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Crossing Borders and Defining "Organized Armed Groups"

(2011) (suggesting that targeted killing under certain conditions is consistent with LOAC); Peter Margulies, The Fog of War Reform: Change and Structure in the Law of Armed Conflict After September 11, 95 M ARQUETTE L AW R EVIEW 1417, 1471–77 (2012) (same); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J OURNAL OF T RANSNATIONAL L AW & P OLICY 237 (2010) (asserting that targeted killing is legal under international law as long as targeting force observes principles of distinction and proportionality), with P HILIP A LSTON , H UMAN R IGHTS C OUNCIL , R EPORT OF THE S PECIAL R APPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL , SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS (2010) (arguing that targeted killing in State that is not geographic site of armed conflict violates international law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in S HOOTING TO K ILL : T HE L AW G OVERNING L ETHAL F ORCE IN C ONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., 2011); cf. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U NIVERSITY OF P ENNSYLVANIA L AW R EVIEW __ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn .com/abstract=2049532 (suggesting additional guidelines to regulate targeted killings).
Show more

24 Read more

Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflict

Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflict

It is suggested that territory does still play a role in determining when an armed conflict exists, particularly in the case of “global” armed conflicts. Problems arise if the manner in which the threshold of a NIAC has been determined in internal conflicts is simply transposed to those conflicts that are geographically dispersed across numerous territories. Two issues in par- ticular may challenge the way in which the organization and intensity crite- ria are applied to “global” armed conflicts. The first concerns the matter of links between armed groups—can violence conducted by various armed groups that are linked to one another be conglomerated in order to fulfill the intensity requirement? If so, what must the nature of the link be? Sec- ond, can violence that is dispersed over large geographic spaces be amassed in order to meet the requisite level of intensity for the existence of an armed conflict? In addition, the underlying purpose of the requirements may be affected by a shift in State sovereignty. These factors are now ex- amined.
Show more

49 Read more

Fragmented Wars: Multi-Territorial Military Operations against Armed Groups

Fragmented Wars: Multi-Territorial Military Operations against Armed Groups

As for IHL, complexities included identifying the existence of armed conflict and classifying it correctly, as well as the scope of the conflict re- garding the parties and geographical location. In principle, operations in which one side of the conflict is a non-State actor will usually be non-inter- national armed conflicts, even if conducted outside the State’s territory. If these operations are taking place on the territory of another State without its consent, there will be a need to determine whether the operations have also triggered an international armed conflict. Automatically assuming the exist- ence of such a conflict based solely on a non-consensual forcible operation having taken place could result in an inappropriate classification. Such de- terminations must be based on both the factual nature and the effects of the operation, as well as the intent and positions of the States involved. The scope of the conflict may widen to include new parties and the test for this could require a different intensity threshold than the one for determining the start of the new conflict. Nonetheless, great care should be taken in advanc- ing support-based approaches that do not require active participation in the hostilities themselves. The IHL framework itself does not serve to define the geographical boundaries of the conflict. Indeed, this is a task better suited to the jus ad bellum. However, the interplay with human rights law may mean that in some situations in which IHL is applicable, a more restrictive para- digm for forcible operations may be required.
Show more

37 Read more

War Crimes relating to child soldiers and other children that are otherwise associated with armed groups in situations of non-international armed conflict. An incremental step toward a coherent legal framework? - QIL QDI

War Crimes relating to child soldiers and other children that are otherwise associated with armed groups in situations of non-international armed conflict. An incremental step toward a coherent legal framework? - QIL QDI

In a marked contrast to the IHL of IAC, the IHL framework on NIAC is divested of the concept of ‘civilian followers’ as defined in Arti- cle 4A GC III. This concept might be of special pertinence to ‘associated girls’ of the age between 15 and 17 who are engaged in welfare services for fighting members of an armed group without being members of the ‘armed forces’ of a non-state party to NIAC. In case a special agreement predicated on Article 3(3) common to the Geneva Conventions is reached among the parties to NIAC to apply GC III, such associated girls (including brides) may be treated as analogous to the ‘civilian followers’ under Article 4A(4) of GC III and accorded the POW status (while not being combatants). In that case, the detaining power would be allowed to prolong their detention and release (as well as repatriation) until the termination of hostilities in accordance with Article 118 of GC III. Yet, in the absence of such a special agreement to give effect to GC III, the default position of the law of NIAC is that such associated female juve- niles, as with girl soldiers under the age of 15, are civilians. An optimal solution is to recommend that the parties to NIAC should conclude a special agreement in such a way as to prioritise the application of Article 132 of GC IV over the pertinent provisions of GC III. By way of this, all ‘associated girls’, together with girl soldiers under the age of 15, may be released (and repatriated if they are of foreign nationals) whenever the situation of safety allows even during the course of hostilities. One ques- tion that remains after their repatriation is if ‘associated girls’, who have participated in the perpetration of a crime in one way or another, should be regarded as victims of forced marriage or sexual enslavement (taking into account pressures of their family and closely knit social milieu) or as perpetrators. 59
Show more

24 Read more

Military Integration of Armed Groups as a Conflict Resolution Approach in Africa: Good Strategy or Bad Compromise?

Military Integration of Armed Groups as a Conflict Resolution Approach in Africa: Good Strategy or Bad Compromise?

DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1105518 5 Open Access Library Journal which may embolden them or inspire other groups. This is a real problem espe- cially the use of established para-state structures by warlords, rebels, big men, or militias, as temporary solutions and building blocks for reconstructing statehood [14]. Another problem is whether such an approach would simply risk the strengthening and legitimization of armed groups thus challenging state’s mo- nopoly on the use of force. Additionally, such an approach runs the risk of sending the wrong message, that “violence pays”, especially when too much at- tention is devoted and privileges are granted to non-state armed actors who have already benefited from war and shadow economies [9]. Such pitfalls may not only trigger increasing demands by such actors but also seriously damage the credibility and legitimacy of external actors in the court of public opinion [15]. Nonetheless, and in the face of all these moral hazards, peace has to be pursued by all means. A brief review of some peace process in Africa, that attempted to employ integration, will be done in the proceeding sub-sections. They include in countries like South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR).
Show more

16 Read more

Individuals and groups outside of the state system

Individuals and groups outside of the state system

Nadelmann, E.A. 1990. 'Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of No1ms in International Society' in Nikos Passas (ed.), Transnational Crime. Florida State Nanda, P. 1999. Women's participation in rural credit programmes in Bangladesh and their demand for formal health care: is there a positive impact? Health Economics 8 (5): 415-428.

35 Read more

Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-international Armed Conflicts

Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-international Armed Conflicts

He notes that the rules of engagement being used by peace-keeping forces in former-Yugoslavia and the rules proposed for NATO forces acting in support of the United Nation[r]

6 Read more

Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?

Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Detention Dilemma?

IHL operates on the principle of legal equality of the parties to the armed conflict. Friction around this principle often arises in connection with the separation of equities concerning the right to use force (jus ad bellum) and rules applicable for the use of force (jus in bello). The argument goes like this: customary international law and the UN Charter forbid the use of force in international relations save in individual or collective self-defense or when authorized by the UN Security Council. Why then should an ag- gressor State be entitled to benefit from the same IHL use of force privi- leges as the defending State? Answer: because IHL is not meant to either punish or reward parties to armed conflict, but, rather, to protect individu- als. In the absence of equality of the parties, the impetus to obey IHL dis- appears. No party will either admit it is the aggressor, or agree to forego privileges of belligerency and other benefits of IHL because it is labeled the aggressor. While the obligation to abide by IHL is not conditioned on re- ciprocal respect for its rules by the opposing party, the agreement of States to be bound by IHL is conditioned on expectations of reciprocity of obli- gations, regardless of which party is the aggressor or defender.
Show more

29 Read more

Methods and Means of Naval Warfare in Non-International Armed Conflict

Methods and Means of Naval Warfare in Non-International Armed Conflict

fact , it has all the trappings of an internatio n al armed co n flict. , 1}4 The blockading power must use what- ever means it has available to prevent e n try and exit of a[r]

26 Read more

Defining Non-International Armed Conflict: A Historically Difficult Task

Defining Non-International Armed Conflict: A Historically Difficult Task

Let u s begi n with the fact that, as surprising as it might appear, the l aw of wa r , or the law of armed conflict as it is also known, provides no definitive defi n ition[r]

13 Read more

Will-o' -the-Wisp? The Search for Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts

Will-o' -the-Wisp? The Search for Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts

First, the assertion that a significant number of rules contained in the Additional Pro- tocols to the Geneva Co n ventions have achieved the status of customary internat i [r]

25 Read more

Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts

Authorization versus Regulation of Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts

26. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Special Report on the Hu- man Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9, rev. I, ¶ 122 (1999); id., ¶¶ 128–29 (“The Commission notes that the vast majority of these detentions relating to the election boycott constituted breaches of international humanitarian law. The armed dissident groups repeatedly captured and held civilians, although they did not pose any direct threat to the military operations of the guerrillas . . . . Armed dissident groups are also responsible for arbitrary deprivations of liberty carried out against civilians, outside of the context of the elections.”).
Show more

17 Read more

Show all 10000 documents...