In fact, the planned US missile defences could not fulfil such an intention with respect to Russia. To achieve the purpose of intercepting a large proportion of Russia’s still numerous strategic nuclear missiles, Washington would need to deploy several hundred missile interceptors in Europe. The present US plans are based on 54 GBIs – 44 in the US and 10 in Europe – through 2013. More importantly, some of the Russian missiles would not cross Europe in order to reach US territory, but would cross the North Pole region; therefore, they could not be intercepted by systems stationed in Poland. Even if future US presidents were to decide to intensify US missile defence efforts, these would never reach a point in which missile defences could be relied upon to destroy or intercept all Russian nuclear forces in a first strike. After all, why should a US president decide to attack Russia without the ability to be certain that New York City, for instance, could not be entirely destroyed by one large, Russian nuclear weapon in response? Indeed, if Russia were really concerned that US missile defences could endanger its second-strike capability, why has the Russian critique of US interceptors already stationed in Alaska and California thus far been rather lukewarm, while the rhetoric criticising the US plans to build up parts of its missile defences in Europe been so intense? Prior to the June 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Russia had been escalating its campaign against the US missile shield. It warned of a possible new arms race – including the test firing of new Russian missiles. In addition, Moscow threatened to abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which bans an entire class of US and Russian ballistic missiles, and to suspend compliance with the reductions agreed in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. These statements almost led to the point where the struggle about missile defences became more important than the other items on the original G8 agenda such as global warming. In making them, Moscow intended to underscore its importance as part of the family of the world’s leading countries.
weapons would only be used in response to another nuclear attack. In the wartime strategy, China emphasizsd that it would apply the principle of active defence, which combines strategic defence with a tactical and operational offensive. In spite of peaceful declarations, China is continuing its “nuclear triad” programme. They are developing solid fuel strategic ballistic missiles with over 13000 km range, implementing MIRV warheads (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle) able to transfer 10 autonomous warheads, and MARV (Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicle) which is able to break anti-missile defence systems. They are building mobile systems which are more difficult to destroy, an increasing number of warheads and missile platforms, building modern nuclear submarines with ballistic SLBM missiles, are carrying out work on tactical nuclear weapons and its platforms and manoeuvring tactical missiles launched from DH-10 launchers and air DH-20 carriers (CJ-20), tactical nuclear bombs for fighter-bombers, developing anti-satellite weapon systems (ASAT-Anti-Satellite) and building a network of underground tunnels for storage of mobile launchers.
With regard to delivery systems, Russia and the United States have recommitted to maintaining a triad of land, sea and air forces for the long-term. China, India and Israel are seeking to build triads of their own. In the case of China and India, major ballisticmissile programmes are underway, both to increase the range and sophistication of land-based systems and to build fleets of nuclear powered ballisticmissile submarines. In the case of Israel, the size of its nuclear tipped cruise missile enabled submarine fleet is being increased and the country seems to be on course, on the back of its satellite launch rocket programme, for future development of an inter-continental ballisticmissile (ICBM). Pakistan is not only rapidly increasing the size of its warhead stockpile but is building new plutonium production reactors, which could add to its fissile material stocks and, like North Korea, it is seeking to rapidly enhance its missile capabilities. France, having recently completed the modernisation of its ballisticmissile submarine fleet, is also introducing new and more capable bombers to the air component of its nuclear force, though at reduced aircraft numbers overall, and is introducing new and better nuclear warheads to both its sea-launched ballistic missiles and to its aircraft.
Aggrieved by the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, which singled out Israel (however mildly) without mentioning Iran, Israeli officials have not indicated whether or not they will attend the 2012 Conference. Not having participated in the Review Conference negotiations, Israel will not attend a conference if it is solely tied to the NPT process without a broader agenda, such as in the July 2011 EU seminar. Even with a broader agenda, there is no guarantee of Israeli attendance, especially if the decision is up to hardline Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. If Israel does attend, it will be very cautious about entering into any open- ended process aimed at its nuclear disarmament. For Israelis to accept a process that goes beyond a one-time meeting, they would have to see security benefits in it for them. This could be achieved, for example, if the Conference were to address Israel’s growing concerns about the insecurities and uncertainties unleashed by the Arab uprising, including the lawlessness that has overtaken much of the Sinai Peninsula and the increased quantity, range and sophistication of rockets directed against Israel by non-state actors to their north and south. 35
political uses. In the first instance, it is ideologically significant, highlighting the ongoing risk of external threats and the need for vigilance, a martial spirit and military-like social discipline. The concept also has obvious political significance, signaling Kim Jong Il’s favoring of—and arguably dependence on—the military as a core institution of his rule. However, military first politics has also had an important political economy dimension as well. In an important contribution to our understanding of the reform process in North Korea, Robert Carlin and Joel Wit used North Korean economics journals and other sources to track the debate about economic reform in North Korea prior to and following the onset of the nuclear crisis. 11 The debate was cast largely in terms of the relative priority to be given to the military and heavy industry sectors as opposed to light industry, agriculture as well as Kim Jong Il’s particular preoccupation with high-technology projects. Conservative arguments not only warned about the risks to socialism and the significance of military strength in providing the context for growth; they also argued that the military and heavy industries could in effect be a “leading sector” in the effort to create a “strong and prosperous nation” (kangsong taeguk). Carlin and Wit were ultimately cautious in their conclusions, but noted that these open debates could constitute evidence—rather than anecdotal observation and assertion—of
A parametric study was conducted to investigate the effects of panel thickness, Schedule 40 pipe size (mass and diameter), pipe velocity, and concrete uniaxial compressive and tensile strength on the resistance of reinforced concrete panels to impact by wind-borne missiles. The axisymmetric SPH model used for the simulations was partially validated using data from tests of four reinforced concrete panels. The values of panel thickness and concrete compressive strengths considered in the parametric study are typical of those in existing nuclear power plant structures in the United States. The impact velocities envelope the maximum velocities recommended by U.S. NRC Regulatory Guides 1.76 (=41 m/s) and 1.221 (=94 m/s) for the design against the impact of Schedule 40 pipes. Impact resistance was evaluated using the metrics of a) perforation (complete penetration of the panel by the missile), and b) scabbing (ejection) of concrete from the back face. A considerable number of design parameters have a meaningful effect on the impact resistance of reinforced concrete panels. The most important parameter, aside from panel thickness, is tensile strength of concrete.
The safety of some important structures such as nuclear containments, industrial buildings and underground facilities is an important concern. Impact loading on reinforced concrete structure such as due to aircraft crash, missile hit or free fall of a heavy machine part may cause different types of global or local damage such as flexure, penetration, scabbing, spalling, perforation and punching shear failure. The identification of each of the above failure modes is highly complex from the point of view of experiments as well as numerical simulations. To accurately analyze the structural response and the failure modes due to transient dynamic loads, it thus becomes necessary to develop a three-dimensional finite element model, which takes into account different types of material and geometrical nonlinearities. The prediction of failure modes for reinforced concrete structures under impulsive loads is a complex subject due to the effect of excitation of the higher modes of vibration, change in failure modes because of propagating stress waves, and a number of other failure mechanisms. The higher modes of vibration causes reverse reaction, reverse bending and localized high shear stress in addition to the generation of inflection point which consequently cause punching shear failure to be more dominant. During the last few decades numerous studies have been carried out to understand the behavior of reinforced concrete structures subjected to impact loading.
In order to qualify as an FM Approved Class 1 Exterior Wall System, all systems shall be tested in accordance with the Structural Test Method for Exterior Wall Systems Exposed to Cyclic Air Pressure Differentials. This test method (Procedure B) is intended only for use in areas not prone to hurricane force winds (Zone NH). Systems that are intended for use in areas that are prone to hurricane force winds (Zone HM and H) shall be examined in accordance with Procedure A as shown in Paragraph 4.2.2. This test method consists of sealing the test specimen into or against one face of a test chamber, supplying air to or exhausting air from the chamber according to a specific test loading program (a total of 1056 cycles) at various pressure levels across the specimen, and observing, measuring and recording the nature of any distress or failure of the specimen. The inward pressure level, P inward , that is used during the test shall be at the discretion of the test sponsor. The tests shall be conducted such that the ratio of the outward pressure to the inward pressure (P outward /P inward ) shall be either (-1.4) or (-2.0).
A revolutionary new generation of miniature loitering smart weapons (or sub- munition) is the U.S. Air Force’s LOCAAS (Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System) missile that was designed and flight-tested in the 1990s as a gliding weapon for armored targets only. LOCAAS can be air launched singly or in a self-synchronizing swarm that will deconflict targets so only one LOCAAS pursues each target. This futuristic smart weapon has a mind of its own. Scanning the land below, these weapons can identify and destroy mobile launchers. The key here is that they can distinguish between different targets and then shape their warheads to inflict maximum damage. Nose to tail, these $40,000, 31-inch (0.787 meter) long air-to-surface weapons will be anything but small in performance. The current production version calls for a five- pound turbojet engine with thirty pounds of thrust to fly 100 m/sec (328 ft/sec) while hunting for fast-moving missile launchers over a large target area. The size of a soup bowl, the warhead uses a shaped charge to transform a copper plate into fragments, a shuttlecock-shaped slug, or a rod that can penetrate several inches of high-carbon steel. That is, its warhead can explode into fragments, a long-rod penetrator, or a slug, depending on the type of target it detects. Without designating a specific target, flight crews will leave the thinking to the missile’s three-dimensional imaging ladar (or laser radar) and use its target recognition system in its nose to continuously scan target areas. That is, the LOCAAS seeker uses advanced target recognition algorithms to detect, prioritize, reject, and select targets. As many as two hundred of these flying smart weapons can be swooping down on an enemy battlefield.
Th e midcourse phase carries the greatest opportunity to intercept the ﬁ red rocket. At this point, the missile moves due to the force of inertia, so it follows a more predictable path. In this phase, the defence has much more time to intercept than in the boost phase, but it also has many more tasks to do. Before capturing the target, it is necessary to recognise all objects released by the carrier, including the warheads, false warheads, balloons and rocket debris. Incorrect recognition may result in a shot to an object that is not the main target. Unfortunately, a longer period in space also gives the attacker more chances to use remedies against the defence system. Th e U.S approach to ballisticmissile defence emphasises interception above the atmosphere, the longest portion of an ICBM warhead’s trajectory. Unfortunately, interception can be made particularly diﬃ cult here, posing high technical hurdles to success. Due to the absence of air resistance, lightweight countermeasures can be deployed that are indistinguishable from the warhead or can conceal its exact location from the defender’s detection systems. Th e last possibility of destroying an enemy projectile is its terminal phase. It is very short and starts when the missile re-enters the atmosphere. Intercepting the head during this phase is diﬃ cult and least desirable because of the small margin of error, because the destruction of the projectile occurs near the intended target. Defence systems designed for this phase are the most eﬀ ective in protecting dislocation sites of troops, ports or airports.
____ 67. During the Vietnam War, hawks and doves in America disagreed on whether a. funding domestic programs was more important than winning the Cold War. b. the U.S. forces should use a nuclear bomb to force the Vietcong to surrender. c. the United States should have a draft.
HSLA alloys have been the subject of many investigations over the past several decades. These investigations have mainly focused on microstructural examinations, mechanical characterization and metallurgical aspects of HSLA under various loading and environmental conditions. However, less attention has been paid to the ballistic behavior of the material particularly under frigorific conditions. Martineau et al.  investigated the penetration of Tungsten projectiles into the plate targets made of HSLA-100 alloys within the range of velocities 800 to 2500 m/sec. In the present study, the ballistic behavior of HSLA-100 steels was investigated at ambient and subzero temperatures of - 400, -800 and -1960 ° C . The ballistic limit of the alloy
The detection of pan-national ballistic crime breaks down into a number of complex problems. The first is the realisation that such crime is happening and, for the individual investigator, that her crime might be related to ones which happened across the border. The second problem is to discover the related data. Where crimes occur in different jurisdictions there may be no way in which data about them can be shared readily or easily. Only by sharing data can investigators become aware that two incidents are similar or that they may form part of a larger pattern. The final problem is to share the actual ballistic data: meta-data about bullets or guns, images taken from comparison microscopes or automated imaging systems. The Odyssey platform demonstrates that all of these problems can be addressed using a suitably complex and distributed data management application
The ideas described in this paper have not appeared from scratch, rather having a long development and evolution history. Stemming from electrical networks and their digital simulation (mid of sixties of the previous century), with spatial fields and waves forming basis and integrity of behavior of large distributed power systems, they were used in creation of first citywide heterogeneous computer networks from the end of sixties (before the internet). The program code (agent) mobility at that time was pa- ramount for flexible and integral network management and control.