Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) is an international financial institution established with a view to facilitate economic growth and integration processes in Eurasia. The Bank was founded by intergovernmental agreement signed in January 2006 by Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. Negotiations are currently underway with a number of neighboring countries. Electric power, water and energy, transportation infrastructure and high-tech and innovative industries are the key areas for Bank’s financing activity. The Bank, as part of its mission, provides quality research and analysis of contemporary development issues and trends in the region with particular focus on Eurasian integration. The Bank conducts regular conferences and round tables addressing various aspects of integration. During 2007, the Bank in partnership with ITAR-TASS and EurAsEC published monthly analytical journal The Continent of Partnership. Archives of this publication for 2007 are available at www.eabr.org. In 2008, the Bank launched quarterly academic and analytical Journal of Eurasian Integration and an annual almanac EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook. In addition, every fortnight new issues of information digest are released covering regional integration, development banks’ activities and investment projects in the post-Soviet space.
The established venue for these forms of nuclearcooperation is the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) technical cooperation programs. As a result, a priority is for North Korea to rejoin the IAEA. Another area of cooperation, depending on progress at the Six Party Talks, is the conversion of the Russian-supplied IRT research reactor to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and the removal of its stock of about 40 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), all of which is in irradiated fuel. At a mutually agreed time, discussions among the nations in the Six Party Talks could resume about the restart of the project to build light water reactors (LWRs) to produce electricity.
Figure 6-2: Main areas of cooperation selected by the E.U. and U.S. experts (each expert could select more than one area).
Regarding RD&D expenditures, E.U. experts tend to see higher advantages in collaborative projects on basic and applied research (Figure 6-2). They suggest that all E.U. countries with active nuclear programs should aim at establishing an E.U. governance to foster the dynamics of knowledge and technology transfer. R&D should mainly focus on Gen IV technologies, to share the research advancements on innovative materials and nuclear fuel, and on safety and waste management technologies. E.U. experts recommend establishing international consortia on basic and applied research with technologically advanced countries like the United States and Japan. They stressed the necessity of exploiting bilateral or multilateral partnerships with Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and India on joint construction and operation of large experimental facilities, and on new design features for demonstrators (Figure 6-3).
Being the world's leading gas exporter and one of its largest oil exporters, Russia has become one of the most attractive emerging energy markets in the world. Russia has experienced a remarkable economic revival over the past decade, especially during Putin’s administration. Based on the real GDP growth data of Russia, the average annual growth has been high, hovering around 7%. In 2008, Russia's GDP grew an estimated 6.0% 1 . In the second half of 2008, however, the global financial crisis and a steep fall in the price of oil slowed Russia’s economy significantly. The roughly 1% drop in GDP growth indicated an imbalance in the structure of Russia’s economy—the country depends greatly on its natural resource exportation for its economic growth. The President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, has addressed in a recent speech that “achieving leadership by relying on oil and gas markets is impossible 2 ”. This structure, dependent mainly on the exportation of those two commodities, would not be expected to be stable with the historical fluctuation of oil and gas prices; the relatively weak sustainability to serve as a long-term solid mainstay of export; the lack of diversity in product forms; and the great potential to raise multiple political issues.
African universities could be the continent’s gateways into the global knowledge economy loci for local diffusion of new technologies. They are also the most critical nodes in internationalresearchcooperation. But this potential remains unrealized because universities and research institutes remain digitally-isolated from the rest of the world. African universities of the size of the University of Tokyo have the Internet capability of a single Japanese household. Put another way, it is like 30,000 people trying to use a single household connection. This is impracticable and as a result most African universities hardly benefit from the abundant scientific and technical knowledge against world. Access to new information is the lifeline of universities and should be given the same priority as other critical infrastructure services in society such as access roads, power and water supply. The little bandwidth that exists costs as much as $15,000 a month. And even when universities pay these exorbitant rates, the services are hardly reliable. The result is an isolated continent whose faculty and students hardly use the latest available knowledge. Moreover, the isolation prevents African universities from entering into effective partnerships with the rest of the world.
• H igh capital cost: as shown below, upfront investment costs for nuclear are significantly higher than for other power generation technologies. A 1,000 MW electrical reactor may cost up to € billion, and even more when interest during construction is taken into account. Competing technologies are both less expensive, per unit of capacity installed, and can be built in smaller units of capacity and are therefore much less capital-intensive. Small- and medium-size nuclear reactors may address this issue to some extent.
3. Factors Influencing the Success of Cooperation 3.1 Degree of Asymmetry
Though cooperation raises global welfare, individual countries may be worse off than in the status quo. That is, cooperation is not always profitable for all countries. This may be true for optimal solutions in the sense of a CBA but also in the sense of a CEA if countries have heterogeneous preference for the environment and/or different abatement costs. The reason is simple. If those countries which contribute on average more to cooperation are also those countries which benefit less on average from cooperation, profitability may be violated. As illustrated in the Introduction, a CBA and CEA requires those countries that face lower unit abatement costs than other countries (e.g., developing countries like Somalia and Ecuador and countries in transition like Russia and China in the case of greenhouse gases) and those countries that cause more regional damages than other countries (e.g., Great Britain in the case of sulfur) to contribute more to cooperation. As argued below, these are also countries that will enjoy low benefits from cooperation where low benefits from abatement may be due to various reasons. First, a country or its citizens have lower environmental preferences than other countries, even though the objective environmental damage caused by pollution may be similar. For instance, due to their lower stage of economic develop- ment, it is not surprising that developing countries usually put less weight on environmental quality but a higher weight on economic growth. Second, a country is less affected by pollution than other countries due to its endowment with natural resources. For instance, some studies in the context of the greenhouse gas effect come to the conclusion that Russia may even benefit from global warming since some currently non-arable land may then be used for agricultural production due to more favorable climate conditions. Third, a country is less affected by pollution because of its geo- graphical location. For instance, Great Britain suffers less from acid rain since a large part of its sulfur emissions are transported to the European continent, particularly to the Nordic countries. It is evident that even if asymmetries are not that strong that profitability is violated, they nev- ertheless pose a problem for participation and compliance. Those countries which benefit on average less than other countries from cooperation have a strong incentive either to remain a non- signatory or to violate the terms of the agreement.
Without the need to exchange operational information or initiate joint investigations, countries can decide to jointly address cybercrime or specific topics related to cybercrime at policy level. This can be achieved for instance by introducing new legislation or other regulatory measures. An example is the abuse of virtual currencies, like Bitcoin, for criminal transactions and money laundering. Introducing policy measures in various jurisdictions in line with the respective regulatory frameworks reduces the opportunities for criminals to benefit from unregulated matters. The policy measures do not necessarily have to be the same. Even diversity in the kind of measures taken reduces the number of safe havens available for cashing out criminal profits. Such policy alignment could even become more targeted if partners can agree. For instance, using again the example of the abuse of virtual currencies, countries could agree that each would target with priority the criminal use of Darkcoin, which is notorious for maximising the anonymity of its users. At a more general level, countries could also agree to prioritise the investigation and prosecution of specific crime types, such as online child sexual exploitation or the deployment of remote access Trojans. Each country could pursue such prioritisation individually under domestic legislation and as such contribute to the shared objective without the need for international operational cooperation. (Obviously, the effect of operational cooperation between countries would be stronger in view of the international nature of cybercrime and the dispersed actors and evidence.)
Posiva (MBA W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi- nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been exca- vating an underground rock characterisation facil- ity called “Onkalo” in Eurajoki since 2004, and thus preparing for the construction of the final disposal facility. While neither a nuclear licence holder nor a nuclear material holder yet, Posiva and its activi- ties are highly relevant to the national safeguards system because Posiva is foreseen to develop a new type of facility, the geological repository, where the nuclear material cannot be re-verified once it has been encapsulated and emplaced. In the IAEA safe- guards approaches it has been suggested that the geological formation should be under safeguards during the whole lifetime of the underground facil- ity. Therefore, Posiva has been required to develop a non-proliferation handbook, such as a nuclear mate- rials handbook, to describe Posiva’s safeguards pro- cedures and reporting system already before becom- ing a nuclear material holder. The preliminary basic technical characteristics (BTC) have been provided and the European Commission has already as- signed the MBA code W0LF for Onkalo. The facility without nuclear materials but having the BTC con- stitutes a site according to the Additional Protocol. The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area around the buildings supporting the repository con- struction. By the end of 2012, Posiva submitted to
Some of this cooperation has been facilitated via the Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA, but there have also been other mechanisms avail- able to contribute to the worldwide cooperation. In 2014, the partnership programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting Saudi Arabia’s nuclearenergy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and secu- rity experts continued practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE (Fig. 8.). In 2015, STUK assisted the U.S. DoE InternationalNuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) by con- tributing to the safeguards-by-design workshop held in Jakarta, Indonesia. The experiences from developing STUK requirement documents for new installations in particular in Olkiluoto with the aim to have safeguards to be included in the design and construction phases were demonstrated to the participants. In addition, the new facilities at the front- and back-ends of the fuel cycle – i.e. the extraction of uranium in mining and milling and the development of the geological repository – have widened the capabilities and scope of the Finnish national safeguards system.
Posiva (MBAs W0LE and W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It was founded in 1995 and is owned by the nuclear power plant operators TVO and Fortum. Posiva was granted a licence by the Government in November 2015 to construct a disposal facility. Based on the drawings presented in the application, the preliminary BTCs were prepared for for the encapsulation plant and the geological repository and submitted to the Commission in 2013. The MBA codes assigned to the future facilities are W0LE for the encapsulation plant and W0LF for the geological repository. The construction of the geological repository (GR) commenced officially in 2016 and the encapsulation plant (EP) construction in 2019. From 2003 to 2016, Posiva was building an underground rock characterisation facility called Onkalo in Olkiluoto, and thus preparing for the construction of the disposal facility. The rock characterisation facility is now a part of the geological repository and constitutes the vehicle access ramp, three shafts and the technical support premises. In the IAEA safeguards approaches, it has been suggested that the geological formation should be under safeguards during the whole lifetime of the underground facility, beginning from the pre-operational phase. For this reason, long before becoming a nuclear material holder, Posiva was already required to develop a non-proliferation handbook, such as a nuclear materials handbook, to describe its safeguards procedures and reporting system.
goodness or badness of a particular structural element without referring to its effects on the innovation process (Bergek et al., 2008; Klein Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 2005), and patents serve as a reference point here. The output of research activities is two-dimensional: quantitative and qualitative. Traditionally, quality is assessed through peer review, with very subjective outcome (Kruytbosch, 1989; Nederhoff, 1988; Roeder, Baumert, Naumann, & Trommer, 1988; Travis & Collins, 1991). Alternatively, bibliometric studies use publication and citation indicators as proxies for quality (Aksnes & Taxt, 2004; Korevaar & Moed, 1996; Rinia, Van Leeuwen, Van Vuren, & Van Raan, 1998). Citation factors can also be approximated though databases like the SCI, SSCI, A&HCI, and Scopus, as only those journals are included which have a sufficiently high impact factor (Schmoch & Schubert, 2008). Although co-publication cannot act as a proxy for quality (Schmoch & Schubert, 2008), it does function as a measure of integration of different R&D areas. See, for example, Glänzel and Schubert’s (2004) study on the integration between Europe and the US in the years 1980-2000. Also, internationally co-authored articles are more frequently cited (Glänzel & De Lange, 2002; Glänzel & Schubert, 2004). To guide our bibliometric and patent analysis, we used keywords: the list of technologies and products identified by experts in the field, which are also in line with priorities of the Energy Working Group of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (issued in May 2010):
DOE’s Nuclear Power 2010 program had paid up to half the cost of several COLs and early site permits to test the revised licensing procedures. However, the COL process cannot be fully tested until construction of new reactors is completed. At that point, it could be seen whether completed plants will be able to operate without delays or whether adjudicable disputes over construction adequacy may arise. Section 638 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58) authorizes federal payments to the owner of a completed reactor whose operation is held up by regulatory delays. The nuclear industry is asking Congress to require NRC to use informal procedures in determining whether ITAAC have been met, eliminate mandatory hearings on uncontested issues before granting a COL, and make other changes in the licensing process. 55
The United States is supporting the establishment of an international liability system that, among other purposes, would cover U.S. nuclear equipment suppliers conducting foreign business. The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) will not enter into force until at least five countries with a specified level of installed nuclear capacity have enacted implementing legislation. Such implementing language was included in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, section 934), signed by President Bush December 19, 2007. Supporters of the Convention hope that more countries will join now that the United States has acted. Aside from the United States, three countries have submitted the necessary instruments of ratification, but the remaining nine countries that so far have signed the convention do not have the required nuclear capacity for it to take effect. Ratification by a large nuclearenergy producer such as Japan would allow the treaty to take effect, as would ratification by two significant but smaller producers such as South Korea, Canada, Russia, or Ukraine.
In its concentration and focus, this atlas was intended to act as Hungary's 'business card', as the country's résumé, to serve as an information resource for the sophisticated general reader and to inform the international scientifi c community about the foremost challenges facing Hungary today, both in a European context and on a global scale. Examples of such intriguing topics are: stability and change in the ethnic and state territory, natural hazards, earthquakes, urgent fl ood control and water management tasks, land degradation, the state of nature conservation, international environmental confl icts, the general population decline, ageing, the increase in unemployment, the Roma population at home and the situation of Hungarian minorities abroad, new trends in urban development, controversial economic and social consequences as a result of the transition to a market economy, privatisation, the mas- sive infl ux of foreign direct investment, perspectives on the exploitation of mineral resources, problems in the energy sup- ply and electricity generation, increasing spatial concentration focused on Budapest in the fi eld of services (e.g. in banking, retail, transport and telecommunications networks), and fi nally the shaping of an internationally competitive tourism industry, thus making Hungary more att ractive to visit.
been hard for just one of the international standard-setters to address the issue adequately, because the field of relevant national authorities included both bank regulators and market regulators. The FSB was able to coordi- nate, and contribute to, the work of the Basel Committee and IOSCO that produced the eventual agreement. Another obvious virtue of a multiplicity of international entities with a financial focus is that different, complemen- tary perspectives are frequently brought to bear on a single set of problems. At some point, it likely will be beneficial to rationalize somewhat the overlapping, sometimes competing efforts of these various international arrangements. For the near to medium term, though, it is important to have some principles for deciding upon the international agenda that should govern the efforts of these arrangements as a whole.
Specifically, nuclear power makes no contribution to global warming through the emission of carbon dioxide. Nuclear power also produces no notable sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides or particulates. When nuclear power is produced, nothing is burned in a conventional sense. Heat is produced through nuclear fission, not oxidation. Nuclear power does produce spent fuels of roughly the same mass and volume as the fuel that the reactor takes in. These spent fuels are kept within the reactor’s fuel assemblies; thus, unlike fossil fuels, which emit stack gasses to the ambient environment, solid wastes at nuclear power plants are contained throughout the generation process. No particulates or ash are emitted.
In the course of the last years, South-South Cooperation has seen the increasing of its global importance, as it has become a fundamental contribution for economic and social development of developing countries. Colombia, as an Upper Middle Income country, has strengthened the management of actions aimed at contributing to institutional strengthening, on a solidarity basis, to the exchange of knowledge, experiences and capacities through South-South and Triangular Cooperation. In Colombia, changes in the way South-South Cooperation have taken place, have had an influence in the development of bilateral programs, making them much more robust and with greater scope, always taking into account the priorities of beneficiary countries and undertaking specific actions linked to integral projects. These actions have had an influence on the generation of strategic alliances that have in turn generated efforts oriented to link traditional cooperation from developed countries with South-South Cooperation that Colombia is promoting, conforming at the end triangular cooperation alliances.
Even with models of strategic interactions as a prism, it is clear that countries cooperate with one another in ways that are not as well understood as we would like. Our work shows that while there is leverage in the use of games on networks, empirical patterns still have many secrets to be unwrapped. The empirical data look a lot like a scale-free network with the US as a hub, and do not look like the utility of interaction with the hub, either through first or higher order effects, is yet adequately captured. This particularly shines through in the theoretical network’s serious dissimilarity to the empirical network in the eigenvalues. Clearly, there is some advantage to looking at the network dependencies, but there is also need to incorporate some inertial, initial conditions. Further, it may be the case that the theoretical network captures relationships that the empirical work does not. A valuable next step, would be to scan the parameter space and determine which sets of parameters generate an equilibrium network most similar to the observed empirical network. In particular, this would involve individually varying the parameters by small amounts while comparing the individual equilibria to the theoretical network using a loss function combining the different measures of network similarity (or using one of the two single number measures of similarity). This maximization process would also involve mutation and ”hill-jumping” – randomly changing some parameters to try to avoid returning particularly unimpressive local minima. This would not solve all the problems with the model, as omitted variables and incorrect functional forms would not be corrected, but it would allow the model to move from simply providing a proof of concept, and yielding some insights about cooperation, to explicitly testing given theoretical models of network behavior and cooperation.