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License and entry strategies for outside innovator in duopoly

License and entry strategies for outside innovator in duopoly

Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail when the licensor is an outsider and that when the licensor is an incumbent firm using the combination of royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity is given externally and it does not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside innovator who can use the entry as threat are not discussed enough. About the strategies of new entrant to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) pay attention to the future entrants with old technology, and argues that low license fee can be used to deter entry of potential entrants. But, it is assumed that the firm with new technology is incumbent and its choice of entry is not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of endogenous market structure determined by the potential entrant with the old technology and shows that the licensor uses the fixed fee and zero royalty in both incumbent and outside innovator cases which is exogenously given. In this paper we consider process innovation, that is, cost-reducing innovation. On the other hand, Hattori and Tanaka (2016b) analyzed license and entry strategies of an innovator about product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in vertically differentiated industry, and has shown similar results.

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‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus Selling by an outside innovator

‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus Selling by an outside innovator

A’s decision will depend on the relative values of @= and ( = . As we will see that the innovator is better off charging = as close to as possible and therefore = F (in fact at the optimum = ) and thus given @= " , firm A is better-off not accepting this asymmetric royalty contract. Again if we assume @= = = ) we can see that firm B is better off not accepting the contract. Therefore, with asymmetric royalty rates any one firm will not accept the contract and we go back to the single firm case. Put differently, asymmetric royalty rates cannot exist together. So to make both the firms accept we need to assume symmetric royalty rates, without loss of generality. To fix ideas, we assume = = . Now given this,when both firms get the license, from (27) and (28) we get that the industry output is 1 and therefore the total revenue of the outside innovator is 23 G8HIJ H 8 9 - = . Thus the outside innovator will optimally choose = and it’s revenue will be . Only we need to check whether both firm A and B accepts this contract under the alternative assumption. Under symmetric royalty if firm A accepts it’s profit will be

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Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: Two step auction

Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: Two step auction

and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002) showed that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does not have production capacity. Wang and Yang (2004) considered the case when the licensor has production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely, when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given, and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.

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License and entry strategies for an outside innovator in duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee under vertical differentiation

License and entry strategies for an outside innovator in duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee under vertical differentiation

and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002) showed that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does not have production capacity. Wang and Yang (2004) considered the case when the licensor has production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely, when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given, and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.

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License fees in oligopoly when outside innovator can enter the market: two step auction

License fees in oligopoly when outside innovator can enter the market: two step auction

We have examined the definitions of license fees for new superior technology developed by an outside innovator in an oligopoly when the innovator may enter the market with or without licensing. In the future research we will investigate the optimum strategy, to sell licenses to incumbent firms without entry, or to enter the market with or without license, for the innovating firm based on the definitions of license fees in the various cases presented in this paper, and we want to extend the analysis to more general oligopolistic setting with n 3 incumbent firms.

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License and entry strategies for an outside innovator under duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee

License and entry strategies for an outside innovator under duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee

production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely, when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given, and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.

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Robustness of subsidy in licensing under vertical differentiation: General distribution and cost functions

Robustness of subsidy in licensing under vertical differentiation: General distribution and cost functions

In this paper we analyse only a problem of a possibility of negative royalty with one licensee and one non-license. For an outside innovator or an incumbent innovator with two potential licensees whether it sells a license to one firm, or sells licenses to two firms is an important problem. How ever, such an analysis may be complicated under general distribution function and general cost functions. It is a theme of the future research.

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Negative royalty in duopoly and definition of license fee: general demand and cost functions

Negative royalty in duopoly and definition of license fee: general demand and cost functions

There are three firms. One outside innovator and two incumbent firms. The innovator has a superior cost reducing technology which can commonly used by all firms, and licenses its technology to the licensee. Another incumbent firm is the non-licensee. The licensee is called Firm A, the non-licensee is called Firm B and the innovator is called Firm I. Firm I is an outside innovator at present. But it may enter the market if Firm A refuses to buy the license. Therefore, we consider a possibility of entry of Firm I so as to determine the license fee imposed on Firm A. Firm I does not really enter the market.

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Outside politics/Continuous experience

Outside politics/Continuous experience

Opening Night depicts the struggle over a move from identity politics and micropolitics to the politics of imperceptibility in the everyday. Continuous experience materialises – not through the resolution of tensions between all those involved in staging the play – but as a fact with which all have to contend. A new play is there. Unburdened by others expectations of their success, or even failure, Sebald’s characters simply move imperceptibly. The migrants take up the dispersal of continuous experience and in so doing they reveal the social relations which are being forged in the neglected spaces between hegemonic discourses of tragedy and loss – modes of sociability which rework our sense of the everyday lived experience of the Holocaust and the futures such experience makes possible. Their everyday experience is the place where history unfolds. Rather than moving towards futures which are determined by their pasts, the migrants navigate without ever puncturing the “mist that no eye can dispel” (Sebald, 1997: 25). Moving deeper into the immanence of the present entails a refusal of clichéd subject positions, a retreat from the self. This is the subjectless condition of outside politics. Policing proliferates through the capacity state-politics, identity politics and micropolitics have to evoke subjects through processes of representation. In contrast, outside politics refuse representation, harnessing everyday sociabilities which exceed the constitution of today’s subjectivities. In this paper we argued that it is through continuous experience that these sociabilities operate and de facto change the world we live in. They create an imperceptible world, World 2 (Papadopoulos, 2006), which has the power to challenge the political constitution of post-liberal societies. Outside politics insist that another world is here.

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An innovator for our times: George Goyder and Australian forestry

An innovator for our times: George Goyder and Australian forestry

One MP was so persuaded of Krichauff’s view that trees caused transformational rainfall that he staunchly opposed a clause for urban forestry. In England, he declared, it ‘was the invariable practice to destroy the trees on the sides of the road’ in order to ‘reduce the rainfall’ (SAPD, Sept 6, 1870). He wanted no part in causing these downpours and flooding in the city and its suburbs! It was up to Goyder working outside parliament to try and arrest what became a descent into ill- informed dispute. He drafted recurring parliamentary reports, noteworthy for their concision, which studiously avoided the grander claims for forestry - particularly its power to dramatically alter the climate - but reiterated its benefits. His aim was to keep the big picture in the forefront of debate: the practical necessity of planted reserves with, perhaps, some potential to generate export revenue over time (SAPD, Sept 6, 1870).

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Inside, Outside

Inside, Outside

Why does anyone create art? There‘s no guarantee of its permanence and it is usually a financially impractical profession. It does not, in effect, clothe the naked, feed the hungry, build housing, or save the environment. But it feeds the soul. And a satisfied soul can lend a hand in the practical world. Good poetry is good business: connects humanity, sheds light, opens some wounds and heals others. It can feed the hungry of spirit and the lonely, who feel stripped naked. It puts a roof of solace over our heads at times. If my poems do this as they are read in journals and other venues, I have conserved part of the intellectual and literary environment that allow readers to examine the values and quality of their human connections within and outside themselves.

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Moderate innovator trap – Does convergence of innovative potential occur?

Moderate innovator trap – Does convergence of innovative potential occur?

more productive technologies applied in leader countries, as imitation is seen as a less expensive process than innovation (Altuzarra 2010). We are going to discuss why authors report cross-country divergence of innovative potential and why similarly like in case of the macroeconomic activity stylized facts are opting for existence of “ moderate innovator trap”. The innovative potential does not have a single measure. Most popular strain in macroeconomic theory associates innovation with a presence of national companies on the global technological frontier and achievement of the higher labor and multifactor productivity (e.g. Cameron et al 2005. Fu & Gong 2010, Fu et al 2011). Firm level studies suggest that convergence is not always a case even in the developed economies. While Cameron et al (2005) confirmed that the process of catching up exists based on UK industrial firms’ data , numerous researchers provide evidence that technology gap between leading innovators and moderately innovative areas remains persistent in several industries (Fu et al. 2011, Iacovone & Crespi 2010). In a cross-country perspective, less productive firms tend to converge only towards the local (national) frontier rather than global one (Andrews et al 2015).

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Different Approaches to Managing Innovation Activities: An Analysis of Strong, Moderate, and Modest Innovators

Different Approaches to Managing Innovation Activities: An Analysis of Strong, Moderate, and Modest Innovators

In Romania, a background in innovation is missing and therefore determinants of innovative activities are not able to influence the growth of turnover from innovation. This is one of the signs of an innovation paradox, which these countries (especially modest innovators) may suffer. An innovation paradox refers to the apparent contradiction between the comparatively greater need to spend on innovation in lagging regions and their relatively lower capacity to both absorb public funds earmarked for the promotion of innovation and invest in innovation related activities (as we can see in Table 2 – FUNLOC, FUNGMT, FUNEU) as compared to more advanced regions or countries (Oughton et al., 2002). In Croatia, the situation is similar. Most of the determinants do not influence the growth of turnover from innovation on their own. ENOUT (sell, close, or outsource some of the company's tasks or functions) and COCUS (cooperation with clients or customers) were most significant. On the other hand, in Slovenia (a strong innovator), firms in the manufacturing industry effectively utilize the various determinants of innovation activities, and these determinants have strong influence on the growth of turnover from innovation (e.g., financing from the EU, cooperation with clients or customers, cooperation with public research institutes, and expenditures in extramural R&D).

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“FORMULATION, DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF ATORVASTATIN, ASPIRIN AND CLOPIDOGREL TABLETS IN CAPSULES FORM”

“FORMULATION, DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF ATORVASTATIN, ASPIRIN AND CLOPIDOGREL TABLETS IN CAPSULES FORM”

Discussion: From table. No:17 & figure. No:18 it can be seen that the variation of concentration of Super disintegrant and different disintegrant is affecting the release in same proportion. Different approaches were tried in batches ATF7 it was found with t w o s u p e r d i s i n t e g r a n t w a s showing good release pattern. A T F 7 shows a similar release profile to that of the Innovator with f2 value of 64. From the above results it is seen that Batch ATF7 is showing best f2 & f1 value. From Fig.no: 19 it can be inferred that release profile of Batch ATF7 matches with that of innovator product, also f1&f2 values shown in Table. No:18 are good enough to comply with the innovator‟s product INNOVATOR have reported similar kind of results for studies with Atorvastatin Calcium.

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The Preliminary and Subsequent Stages to Integrating Pedagogical Innovation: The Crux of the Matter for the Innovator

The Preliminary and Subsequent Stages to Integrating Pedagogical Innovation: The Crux of the Matter for the Innovator

Simon (1957) recalls that most individuals are only able to make decisions in a rational manner. Consequently, let us assume that the decision making mechanism is affected by cognition, ignorance and emotion: complexity that serves to slow down decision making, which can prove to be a true hindrance. To respond to these negative aspects pertaining to models of rationality and bounded rationality, heuristic-based decision making becomes essential to speed up the process using heuristic techniques, such as simple, rough guidelines governing the procedure or strategy aimed at solving a particular problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; 1979; 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; 1973; 1974; 1981; 1983; 1992). The Judgement Heuristics and Biases Model does, however, lead to substantive bias towards human intuition, which includes representativeness, anchor-and-adjustment, and availability. Thus, it is certainty, a balanced and comfortable stability, that the professor innovator must leave behind in order to navigate through risky circumstances that plunge them into limited instability, or even, in some cases, absolute uncertainty arising from unbounded instability. The chronological and systemic model of chain decisions (Bru, 1991) places the emphasis on the choice of learning objectives, which favours certainty. However, what about professors who risk innovating?

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License or entry decision for innovator in international duopoly with convex cost functions

License or entry decision for innovator in international duopoly with convex cost functions

We have examined the optimal strategies for the foreign innovator in international duopoly when it can enter the domestic market, and have shown that its optimal strategy depends on the relative size of the foreign and the domestic markets. In the future research we want to extend the analysis to an oligopolistic situation.

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A Study of Innovator Evolution in the High tech SMEs

A Study of Innovator Evolution in the High tech SMEs

Apparently, as for the subject of innovation, there is still a big gap between innovators and average person. But this kind of gap can be shortened, even eliminated, so that more average persons can be transformed into innovators. That is to say, innovators can be simulated and developed. Average person can be with more innovative desire and innovative capability through education and research. At the same time, the whole society can be with more innovator impetus through publicity, subtle influence and rule system. The research of Zhu Cheng-liang and others proves that the human capital of higher education has a great effect on improving the efficiency of economic growth. [12] Ordinary people used to follow certain conventions, or certain thinking and behavior logic. There is always mental set exist. Under its influence, it is hard to change in cognition dimension; it is also difficult to find the problem from a new perspective and to solve it; it is difficult to create a new object of observation. Only when mind is free, is it easy to get rid of the mental set, to facilitate divergent observation, divergent memory, divergent imagination, divergent thinking smoothly. In one word, only when mind is free, is it easy to facilitate the process of divergent cognition smoothly. There are divergent thinking and convergent thinking in creative thinking, which is the unity of divergent thinking and convergent thinking. [13]

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FORMULATION AND EVALUATION OF LANSOPRAZOLE DELAYED RELEASE PELLETS

FORMULATION AND EVALUATION OF LANSOPRAZOLE DELAYED RELEASE PELLETS

Enteric coated pellets were evaluated for assay, acid resistance and dissolution; E8 enteric coated pellets were found to be optimum and were filled into capsules. These capsules were evaluated and the results were found to be more similar with innovator. Based on the above data, it was concluded that Lansoprazole Capsules 30mg (E8) complies with the Innovator and may be considered as an ideal formulation for developing Lansoprazole delayed release capsules 30mg.

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Effects of R&D spending on innovation by Irish and foreign owned businesses

Effects of R&D spending on innovation by Irish and foreign owned businesses

Now, let me mention one aspect the current literature on innovation which is largely ignored in the paper. This relates to absorptive capacity, the idea that firms differ in terms of their ability to identify, access and assimilate knowledge from outside the firm. Standardly, one indicator of absorptive capacity is internal R&D. The argument runs that where firms have an in house R&D capability they will be more able to absorb external knowledge, i.e. their absorptive capacity will be greater. In empirical terms this implies that there will be a positive interaction between internal and external R&D – the innovation value of external R&D will be greater when a firm also has internal R&D. In the paper this is not considered and instead the different types of R&D are treated as entirely separate – and independent - inputs into the innovation process. This is important here as we know that locally-owned firms and externally-owned firms in Ireland differ significantly in terms of their internal R&D investments. So locally-owned firms, which typically have lower levels of internal R&D spend, are likely to have lower absorptive capacity which may alter the ‘returns’ to investing in external R&D. Exploring the interactions between the different types of R&D spending would have dealt with this issue and significantly strengthened the analysis.

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Effect of Government Mediated Access Pricing on Prices of Targeted Drugs in The Philippines

Effect of Government Mediated Access Pricing on Prices of Targeted Drugs in The Philippines

This study also provided some interesting exceptions to these general findings. For metronidazole 500 mg tablet, the brand submitted for GMAP was Winthrop, which was neither an innovator drug (Flagyl) nor a competitor drug (Patryl) in this study. In short, it was not among the market leaders. The study showed that having a GMAP-listed drug did not automatically result to price reduction for all drugs in its class. The price of Flagyl 500 mg tablet did not change and remained the same in 2009 and 2011. This is corroborated by the result for its competitor, Patryl 500 mg tablet, which even significantly increased its mean price by more than 50% in 2011. This absence of a reducing effect of having a GMAP-listed drug on the prices of Flagyl and Patryl 500 mg tablets could indicate a possible limitation on the effectiveness of government-mediated approach to price regulation. It might not lead to the anticipated lowering of prices for other drugs if the manufacturer/distributor that volunteers for reduced pricing is not an industry leader. The other oddity is the observed non-compliance of drug stores to MDRP for Asomex 5 mg tablet. Given that MDRP/GMAP posters were exhibited in almost all drug stores as required by the DOH, it is surprising that the MDRP-listed drug Asomex was sold at prices above the price cap in 93% of the stores where it was available (see Table 4). The government should ensure strict monitoring of compliance to MDRP/GMAP of the drug stores for the public benefit.

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