Yet, although these instruments are certainly laudable in terms of flexible and integrated funding, there are also limitations. Overall, the schemes funded by these instruments are relatively small and the “project-by-project” approach of the instruments is not ideally adapted to the chronic and structural problems of fragilestates. 27 The instruments’ management structures therefore pose limitations in terms of establishing a WGA. This is particularly true in the case of the Netherlands’ Stability Fund, which is managed and largely financed by one single actor (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Development Cooperation). Even though the Stability Fund involves actors from the security, the economic and other communities for consultation, they do not contribute financially. This arrangement limits the possibility for real joined-up decision making and planning; actors remain executors and subcontractors. In order to create more ownership and involvement it would therefore be recommended to consider funding arrangements and instruments aimed at involving other actors as equal funding partners. The same would apply to the case of Canada, where the Global Peace and Security Fund (administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) is aimed at funding initiatives co-ordinated by the interdepartmental Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force. Similar to the case of the Netherlands, this limits the involvement and shared responsibility of other actors.
Knowledge of health systems within ISFs is necessary to avoid unintended negative impacts on health systems and to be able to recognize and exploit opportunities to use ISF assets to support health systems. Some security policymakers may feel uncomfortable developing this expertise within ISFs because it seems so far afield from traditional security training. Indeed, few security organi- zations appear to invest in programs or foster career paths devoted to developing experts in public health emergency response much less health system strength- ening. However, at least within militaries, there is long precedence of public health and medical advising. This experience has, until recently, focused primarily on keep- ing troops healthy and addressing public health threats to personnel, rather than the public health toll of conflict on civilians. The rubrics of ‘stability’, ‘peace building’ and ‘civilian protection’ missions have the potential to change this focus because these concepts emphasize supporting effective indigenous governing institutions to varying degrees [51,52]. ISFs could thus build health system sup- port into their long-established health training programs with the reassurance that this would be in line with increasing their capacity to conduct these ‘non-trad- itional’ types of security missions.
This background paper for the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 discusses current financing arrangements for postconflict countries and fragilestates, with a focus on official development assistance. In recent years a consensus has emerged that in these “difficult environments” the core objective is to build effective and legitimate governance structures that secure public confidence through provision of personal security, equal justice and the rule of law, economic well-being, and essential social services including education and health. Yet tensions persist between business-as-usual development policies on the one hand and policies responsive to the demands of peacebuilding on the other. The preferential allocation of aid to “good performers,” in the name of maximizing its payoff in terms of economic growth, militates against aid to fragile and conflict- affected states. Compelling arguments can be made for assistance to “poor performers” if this can help to prevent conflict and build peace, but the difficulties that prompted donors to become more selective in aid allocation remain all too real. The move to selectivity came in response to evidence that in some contexts aid has perverse effects on economic performance. The same dilemma arises when aid is assessed in terms of its impact on peace and conflict: sometimes aid helps to prevent conflict and build peace, but sometimes it can have the opposite effect. This paper considers how international aid can more effectively help to build resilient states and durable peace.
The literature on conflict, war, and failed states while important for the understanding of the root causes of state failure and implications of the national security dimension of development, it is too narrow a lens for broader development policy options. From a policy perspective, the broader question is how development policy and assistance can be effective in reducing state fragility to improve the probability of mitigating conflict and to find a path toward sustainable peace and development. It is often too late once violent conflict or war occurred for development assistance to be effective. Costly military interventions are then required, reconstruction and effective development becomes harder, as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. Another strand of literature initiated by the World Bank suggested that the root causes of terrorism and violent conflict were economic exclusion, poverty and under-development. The World Bank (2004) called this the LICUS initiative (Low Income Countries Under Stress). The World Bank’s main focus was to find appropriate policy and strategic responses to improve development effectiveness under difficult circumstances. It is true that many fragile and failed states are poor. But many analysts pointed out that poverty by itself is usually a symptom not necessary a causal factor. Fragilestates also exhibit poor service delivery, weak governance and economic institutions, and a high degree of inequity.
The medical images, produced by diagnostic equipment, such as X-ray images, ultrasound images, endoscopic images, microscopic images, tomography and magnetic resonance images, has widely applied to the whole progress of clinical activities. It plays an important role in medical diagnosis, accounting for 70% -80% or more in medical information . The medical image not only increases in number, but also doubles in capacity. Numerous data of it does not only take large memory and store space, but brings potential risks to the management of information. The extensive application of Picture Archiving Communicating System (PACS) provides a good platform to information management in hospital . However, because the low security level of public network platform, medical images and doctor-patient information cannot be protected and certificated effectively. And the data sharing between hospitals is limited. Therefore, the PACS systems of each hospital are like “information isolated island”, which restricts the application of PACS and the integration goal between medical institutions at all levels and academic communities . With the rapid development of
Abstract: Kant described the state as a ‘moral person’, and did so when dealing with international relations. For all the interest in his contribution to the theory of global politics, the locution according to which Kant characterized the state has received very little attention. When notice has been taken of it, the moral personality of the state has moved arguments in opposing directions. On one recent reading, when Kant called the state a moral person he intended to indicate that it possessed certain duties to itself and to others, for the sake of which it could be coerced to leave the international state of nature. On another, the juridical compulsion of states to join a state of nations or world republic is categorically ruled out because this would impair their moral personality. Both cannot be right. In this paper, I analyze Kant’s notion of moral personhood, contextualizing it within his wider philosophical concerns. On the basis of this groundwork I put forward an argument about Kant’s theory of the moral person of the state which allows me to show how he in fact was able coherently to incorporate two seemingly contradictory arguments about the state as an international actor in a single argument, and present this as my solution to what I call the Perpetual Peace Puzzle.
Feminism, Peace, Human R i g h t s C H A R L O l T E B U N C H Cet article examine comment les flministes tout au long du Peace, Human Rights, and Gender vingtitme sitcle, surtout depuis h progression[.]
Risks to the members of an international force to monitor the implementation of agreements would be minimal so long as it was seen as eschewing absolutely any suggestion of providing a combat capable presence. Although the security outlook for the border area would be significantly improved by the conclusion of a Syrian- Israeli agreement acceptable to both sides, there would be a higher level of risk associated with the monitoring of arrangements in the Israeli-Lebanese border area than in the Israeli-Syrian border zone because of the unpredictability of dealings between Syria, Hezbollah and Israel. But with the development of local knowledge and contacts, and drawing on the experience of observer activity in the Golan and in Lebanon under UN auspices, the level of risk to observers, even in the south of Lebanon, would probably not be unacceptably high under most circumstances. The possible functions of an American presence on the Golan have not been clarified in any detail. There is little wisdom from a military perspective in deploying a combat-capable force to such a restricted area as the Golan. The ambiguity of its mission and the limited scope to manoeuvre would place a third force in an awkward position, and probably at considerable risk, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. In the longer term, as discussed earlier, water disputes, in particular, may be capable of giving rise to heightened tensions and possibly conflict between Israel and Syria. The Syrian regime will have to cope, over the next decade, with political and economic pressures which have largely been suppressed in recent years. Biological factors alone mean a replacement for President Asad, who is now in his mid-sixties, will have to be found on the Syrian side at some stage. While these challenges may be met without exceptional increases in regional tension, for the reasons outlined earlier the odds do not favour an easy transition to more cooperative relations between Israel and Syria.
in different geographic regions is a common practice. But unfortunately, this exchange of images through open networks like the Internet is unsecure. These medical images require strict security because the critical judgment is made on the information provided by these images. Therefore, they should not be changed illegitimately; otherwise, undesirable result can cause loss of essential information. The large bases of image data must be processed in the hospitals for both clinical and research purposes. These bases of image data must be protected against malicious attempts. For this purpose, the medical image authentication may be performed through the digital watermarking technique. In the watermarking process, the insertion and extraction steps are more important. A watermark (secret message) is inserted into the original image (insertion phase). The doctor will be able to follow the authentication phase, when the image is retrieved from the database; it will include the extraction watermark. Consequently, if the extraction of the secret message fails, the doctor will know that some manipulations have been performed. However, if the extraction watermark is made successfully, the doctor can proceed securely to the diagnosis.
BELGIUM AUSTRALIA UNITED STATES IRELAND PORTUGAL JAPAN CANADA LUXEMBOURG SWITZERLAND UNITED KINGDOM NEW ZEALAND NETHERLANDS HUNGARY AUSTRIA FINLAND SWEDEN ITALY SPAIN SLOVENIA CZECH REP. DENMARK ESTONIA FRANCE NORWAY GERMANY URUGUAY GREECE CYPRUS BOTSWANA CHILE COSTA RICA LITHUANIA TRINIDAD & TOBAGO MAURITIUS KOREA, REP. SINGAPORE THAILAND BOSNIA ETHIOPIA CAMBODIA IRAN EQUATORIAL GUINEA CHAD UNITED ARAB EMIRATES NIGERIA CUBA HAITI LAO GAMBIA QATAR SOUTH AFRICA PAPUA NEW GUINEA FIJI VIETNAM TURKMENISTAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. GUINEA OMAN SLOVAK REP. KUWAIT MOZAMBIQUE YEMEN BELARUS CAPE VERDE NIGER CROATIA CAMEROON MACEDONIA NAMIBIA UZBEKISTAN TOGO PARAGUAY MALAYSIA SAUDI ARABIA KENYA MADAGASCAR MALI ZAMBIA MAURITANIA SYRIAN ARAB REP. SWAZILAND BAHRAIN DJIBOUTI JORDAN ARMENIA GEORGIA LESOTHO JAMAICA LATVIA MONGOLIA BRAZIL MEXICO BANGLADESH VENEZUELA BURKINA FASO PANAMA BENIN KAZAKHSTAN TUNISIA ARGENTINA MOROCCO ALBANIA HONDURAS KYRGYZ REP. TANZANIA GUYANA DOMINICAN REP. UKRAINE LEBANON ECUADOR EL SALVADOR MOLDOVA MALAWI SURINAME NICARAGUA BULGARIA ROMANIA GABON BOLIVIA GHANA INDIA COLOMBIA ALGERIA MYANMAR ISRAEL TAJIKISTAN PHILIPPINES SRI LANKA EGYPT NEPAL CONGO, REP. RWANDA CHINA PERU GUATEMALA SENEGAL PAKISTAN TURKEY RUSSIAN FEDERATION INDONESIA UGANDA CONGO, DEM. REP. ANGOLA SIERRA LEONE BURUNDI CôTE D’IVOIRE GUINEA-BISSAU AZERBAIJAN
Leadership qualities have also played a critical part in determining development capacity, particularly in younger, institutionally immature states, where the character of the ruling elite, and particularly the head of government, can exert a major influence. Even in the absence of democratic institutions, enlightened and committed leadership can be instrumental in guiding countries onto paths of solid progress. But ill-motivated leadership will have the opposite result. Strong leaders can, for good or ill, create or influence policies and lay down norms of procedure and execution. Their personality and example is a further guiding factor. In many developing states, strong leaders often emerged from within the most disciplined and cohesive institution—the armed forces— which then served to buttress the leader’s position. The manner in which they have led, however, has then depended on their personalities and their patterns of co-opting support within the elite: in the best case, by soliciting individuals on the basis of merit; in the worst case, through family and crony relationships. The record of generals has mostly been egregious. From Argentina to Burma, from Liberia to Zaire, development has suffered the depredations of military men.
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 2016) argue that within social protection programmes in fragile and risk-prone contexts there has been a shift towards cash-based programming to provide safety nets. For example, in fragile and humanitarian contexts where social protection structures are not in place, but markets continue to function (FAO, 2016, p. 4). The benefits of cash transfers include minimising recourse to negative coping strategies, allowing families to reduce their exposure to hazards, promoting public works programmes to create and rehabilitate infrastructure, and in the context of forced displacement, strengthen the capacity of host communities to tolerate additional strain on resources (FAO, 2016, p. 1). However, according to the FAO (2016, p. 4) more needs to be done enhance the potential of cash-based interventions including strengthening partnerships with financial institutions and mobile phone companies, using e-payments, digital transfers and where possible leveraging cash transfers to build medium and long-term social assistance structures that can be used in recurrent
Together these diverse confrontational practices imply a more expansive ontology and epistemology than those underpinning the dominant deterrence view, with its focus on unitary states and on means-end rationality. Campers’ security practices conform to Rowley and Weldes’ account of everyday security practitioners as drawing on ‘divergent epistemologies’ that validate experiential knowledge, from a range of situated perspectives (Rowley and Weldes 2012: 524). They call upon a range of individuals and communities to confront nuclear weapons, thus dramatically expanding who counts as an agent of security, and they treat these agents in a holistic way. Humour is often key; alternatively, campers may act in deliberately emotive, feminized ways to convey rage, despair or love, as in the instance when they interrupted a “nuclear defence” training seminar: campers ‘presented the delegates with large posters with images of victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffering the effects of radiation burns … [and] read out first-hand accounts from Hiroshima survivors in unison before being loudly ushered out’ (Faslane Peace Camp, 2012b). Such modes of disordered emotional engagement are common in anti-nuclear protests (e.g., Managhan, 2007; Krasniewicz, 1992), making it difficult for officials to respond with reason or force. More than this, campers are treating their varied local audiences, whether sympathetic voters or base workers, as socially-embedded, embodied, feeling individuals, capable of experiencing shame, amusement and empathy, and of being convinced of the wrongness of nuclear weapons on any of these emotional registers.
As 1325 was created for all actors relevant to peacebuilding, not just the United Nations, connecting this value of gender inclusion to principles for gender-inclusiveness in (post) conflict alone does not indicate an evolving or effective norm. The final step in identifying a norm of engendered security lies in the policies meant to enact it. Given my three-level approach, I can utilize the ‗policy‘ level to operationalize engendered security within multiple political spaces and among multiple political actors to assess the degree to which the norm is present. One could look into different UN departments and their mandates and funding decisions, or post-conflict donor conferences. For the purposes of this study, I focus on peace agreements and the degree to which these include clauses that embody this norm. Peace agreements and their inclusion of ―gender clauses‖ allow us to identify what engendered security looks like in practice. Peace agreements are a particularly interesting forum for the study of engendered security because they include the parties most relevant to resolving conflict and may include state, international and transnational actors at the same time, so we can potentially learn a lot about how peace processes are organized in a way that is conducive to engendered security, and not (included in the Appendix are all the countries included in this study). Additionally, according to data on peace agreements, we know very little about what‘s being done for women in post-conflict peacebuilding, so a systematic approach would give us a bigger picture on how women are included.
competitive environment, state could be a greedy entity that interest could be achieved through power. Globalists on the other hands are the anti-thesis of neo realist (power politics) that understand international system structure as mutuality. Globalization is mainly rooted in cultural, transnational and political economy approaches towards international security. The hallmark of this perspective is about the acknowledgement of independent role in both transnational entity and non- governmental socio-economic organization (Gupta, 2010). In this theory, territorial sovereignty hardly ordering human activities. Technological improvement, transportation, communication, free flow of goods, information and ideas affect the territorial sovereignty. Many scholars like argues that globalization is responsible for complicating security agenda (Waltez, 1979). While at the same time reducing the element of control that underpin the security option of a state. Globalization increase incentives for the state to peruse more cooperative security policy, especially at the regional level after September 2001 attack. Even USA wants to sweep away state centric security analysis and replaced by center-periphery analysis model (Buzan and Waeber, 2003). After 2001 globalization in general and or specific aspect of it (e.g. financial globalization, terrorism, migration, trade liberalization and cultural imperialism) become securitized by actors in the international system (Buzan and Waeber, 2003). As we have seen in the globalist perspective, globalization is seen and represented as threat by states and other actors in the system. Then, it plays alongside and compete with more traditional securitization (states) and in the respective territory (regions). Global system directly and indirectly create constellation of securitization. Indeed there is a debate between anti globalist and pro globalists. Marxist insisted that the relationship is unequal, exploitative and manifested by colonialism, imperialism and cultural hegemony. But reflect Buzan, B. and Waeber, that economic liberalization creates security agenda. Zaire, Angola and Iraq evidenced to this relationship (Buzan and Waeber, 2003). Whereas, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore transformed themselves economically and politically within the embrace of globalization. For globalist, globalization is a path for steady erosion and elimination of traditional security agenda.
Economic shocks have the potential to turn fragility into a crisis and poverty into destitution. The capacity to manage shocks, whether natural disasters or economic, is crucial for fragilestates. Fragilestates are seldom able to do this without help from the international community. Table 2 shows how governance reforms can be prioritised on the basis of how significant they are to worsening state fragility. The rationale is to enable delivery of the most important changes as fast as possible. Other changes can follow in due course, but initial success on an achievable reform package can be critical to the state’s legitimacy and to the political will that is necessary to carry through further reform.