The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I outline the theory that will be our worked example throughout the paper: namely, that of Newtonian gravity set in (full) Newtonian spacetime, 2 or “Newtonian gravitation” (NG) for short. In section 3, I outline some apparatus for approaching the symmetries of this theory (an apparatus which should generalise to other similar theories); and in section 4, I discuss how models related by different kinds of symmetry relate to one another. With this much setting-up done, I turn in section 5 to consider why models related by boosts should be taken to represent observationally identical states of affairs, and why this licences the dismissal of absolute velocities from our ontology. In section 6, I go on to argue— against the received wisdom—that we can implement this dismissal without altering our theory, i.e., merely by making acceptable interpretational stipulations regarding the theory. In section 7, I discuss the situations in which such an interpretational strategy would be advantageous. Finally, in section 8, I consider whether such an interpretational stance may in fact be not merely acceptable, but positively required— at least if an unpleasant indeterminacy of reference is to be avoided. It is in sections 6 and 8, in particular, that we will see how ideas from the philosophy of language (specifically, ideas regarding synonymy and translation) may be usefully borrowed for the purposes of philosophy of physics.
presentation of one such argument, see Carol Cohn, ‘Nuclear Language and How We Learned to Pat the Bomb’. f. Alienation is discussed in Chs. 6-8 of Cameron (cited at b.). g. Cameron Chs. 6-8 are relevant again. And see T. Olsen, Silences (New York: Delacorte Press, 1978). One focus of debate has been Catharine MacKinnon’s claim that ‘pornography silences women’: see ‘Francis Biddle’s Sister’, in C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1987). h. E.g. Patrizia Violi, ‘Gender Subjectivity and Language’, in Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity eds. Gisela Bock and Susan James (Routledge: London, 1992) 164-176. i. For references to ideas about how imagery and metaphor work in philosophical texts, see Lloyd’s paper in the present volume. For French feminism and the philosophy of language, see Nye ‘The Voice of the Serpent’. And for relevant psychoanalytical material, see ‘Further Reading under ‘Feminism and Psychoanalysis’ in this volume.
Textualists claim that they follow statutory text. This Article argues that, in practice, textualists often create meaning rather than find it. Deploying the analytics of linguistic philosophy, this Article takes a deep dive into textualist methodology. The philosophy of language reveals what legal scholarship has left submerged: The very choice of text can put the thumb on the scales of any interpretation. When one pulls a term out of a statute and isolates it from the rest of the text (what I call “isolationist” method), this decontextualization offers the opportunity for adding and subtracting meaning from the statute by “pragmatic enrichment.” Only by working out these enrichments is it possible to assess whether the hypothesized meanings are cancelled by the rest of the statute. In the end, we need to ask of all interpreters, including textualists, whether they are making rather than finding the meaning of statutes.
That at least some such universals are fed us predigested by language appears not to concern Husserl. Here, as elsewhere in his philosophy of language, the social dimension of language, the fact that it is a community affair which is learnt interactively with already competent language users, and the constraints on learning imposed by this fact, are underemphasized. In part this is the result of bracketing other people and the social world, retaining for phenomenological consideration only our sense of these things, but for the most part he is simply not interested in anything but individual consciousness. 12
Metaphor is a highly pervasive aspect of all language. We most often think of it occurring in poetry and other forms of literature, but we use it in our daily speech without realizing it. For example, we often use spatial terms in nonspatial applications, such as when we speak of time: ‘The weeks ahead of us are coming closer,’ ‘Meet me at five o’clock.’ Philosophy, especially metaphysics, relies heavily on metaphor as an essential part of its explanations, e.g., Wittgenstein’s language games and the treatment of the mind as a container—again, an application of spatial terms in a nonspatial setting. This could be a reason why the Logical Positivists and, in turn, the majority of analytic philosophers, rejected both metaphor and metaphysics as ‘unscientific.’ In light of contemporary analytic philosophy, metaphor has been relegated to the ‘softer’ of area of pragmatics in the case of the philosophy of language and, among other disciplines, rhetoric, philology, and other areas of literary criticism. This is because most theories in the philosophy of language assume that literal meaning is fundamental, viewing metaphor as a case of deviant language. Nonetheless, if metaphor is so central to both everyday and philosophical language, it should be accounted for in a serious manner.
In addressing the question of whether Russell had a philoso- phy of language it is useful to distinguish between two Russells, setting 1918–1919 as the boundary. Russell wrote in the late 1930s that ‘[t]he problem of meaning is one which seems to me to have been unduly neglected by logicians; it was this problem which first led me, about twenty years ago, to abandon the anti- psychological opinions in which I had previously believed’ (1938, 362). Even a casual look at the later Russell’s writings shows that he was, indeed, concerned with meaning; after all, he even wrote a whole book with the title An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. True, Russell’s inquiry in that book is not philosophy of language con- strued as an autonomous discipline (perhaps à la Dummett). This only shows, though, that he did not do philosophy of language in the way some others have done it since; and as Stevens points out, Russell’s psychologistic approach to meaning has subsequently been endorsed by many other philosophers of language. We must
proposition and a state of affairs) 19 . In short, signification separates language from bodies, provides it with a quasi-autonomous order, and with a purely linguistic, or more precisely, propositional foundation (hence the modern analytic co-incidence of philosophy of language, logic, and mathematical formalism or foundationalism). Given that only intensional definitions have a purchase on the determination of essences, it follows that the enumeration of types or instances of knowledge, are always both incidental and incomplete with respect to the articulation of the Idea. (This, in turn, constrains the activity of the philosopher: she can neither be an expert, nor an accountant of parts or participations. In her positivity, she dwells in the static glory of the form, but in practical affairs she takes on a negative role as the master-purveyor of derivations, a guardian against false images and simulacra. Unsurprisingly, ideal ascent has immediate moral consequences. To take one well known example, this peculiar constraint of the philosopher yields a distributive genius capable of according her the right (or the burden) of philosopher-king 20 . “...[T]he philosopher is a being of ascents; He is the one who leaves the cave and rises up. The more he rises the more he is purified. Around this “ascensional psychism,” morality and philosophy, the ascetic ideal and the idea of thought, have established close links.” (LoS, 127).
Language, culture and literacy are three major components that are necessary for the national development of any country. It is difficult if not impossible to see adequately the functions of lan- guage because it is so deeply rooted in the whole of human behavior that it may be suspected that there is little in the functional side of human conscious behaviour in which language does not play a vital part either directly or indirectly. Culture on its part is the sum of the attainments and activ- ities of any specific period, race or people including their implements, handicrafts, agriculture, economics, music, art, religious beliefs, traditions, language and story. Culture is indeed an indis- pensable part of human conscious existence. Literacy on its part is the ability to read and write. It encompasses a complex set of abilities to understand and use the dominant symbol systems of a culture for personal and community development. This paper critically affirms that the three aforementioned components of language, culture and literacy could be harnessed to ensure na- tional development in the country. It suggests a critical and paradigm shift in the practical use and application of these three major components towards enhanced national development.
Cultural diversity creates differences in the understanding of concepts, leading to diversity in the definitions of common notions. Searle ’ s and Wittgenstein ’ s philosophies of language provide nuanced accounts of precisely how the meaning of accounting concepts or principles can vary according to cultural and historical context. Two ideas are especially critical for understanding the impact and meaning of the relevant principle. First, Searle ’ s concept of social facts as collective intentionality, and second Wittgenstein ’ s emphasis that the meaning of words and ideas varies not only according to the different cultural meaning of the words themselves, but also according to the specific social practices in which the language usage is set. The philosopher Searle (1995) explained, based on the concept of “ intentionality, ” how social objects come into being. In this regard, it is possible to distinguish between subjective dependent facts (i.e. dependent on individual intentionality) and social facts (dependent on collective intentionality). Searle (2006) de ﬁ ned a social fact as “ any fact involving collective intentionality of two or more human or animal agents ” (p. 16). According to Searle, people have the ability to share beliefs and desires, which – in certain conditions – can give rise to a specific type of social fact, namely, “ institutional facts. ”
I am grateful to my colleagues at the Alutiiq Museum, who were understanding o f my reduced hours and divided attentions, and extremely supportive of my research and educational endeavors. My language teachers Florence (Kuukula) Matfay Christiansen Pestrikoff and Nick (Nickolai Kesiin) Alokli, who taught me to speak Alutiiq and continue this never-ending effort to this day, have inspired and encouraged me since beginning as my teachers in 2003. My friends in the Alutiiq Language Club, both learners and Elders who I wish to acknowledge, include Peter Boskofsky, Fred Coyle, Irene Coyle, Alisha Drabek, Lory Ernest, Mary Haakanson, Paul Kahutak, Dennis Knagin, Susan Malutin, Gayla Pederson, Phyllis Peterson, Sophie Katelnikoff Shepherd, and many others. Many of them are also the members of the New Words Council, who I gratefully acknowledge in making this research project possible, for being so willing to share their experience with the world in the hopes it will help others and our own community to understand more about new words creation.
My remark s i n chap t e r two ab out th e pub l i c nature o f language and t r e d i stinc t i o n b n tw e e n ' a.n.yo ne ' an d ' ev e ry one ' s hould no t b e forgott en h e r e . To b e ob j e c t ive i s t o f o rm and u s e our t � rms 2 c c o rd ing t o int e rp ers o nal rul e s , but t h i s d o e s no t m e an t hat svoryone has t o b e invo lve d in forming or u s ing t h e t erm. . All t h at i s r e qu ired i s t hat anyone Bight b e i nvo lve d , i n th8 s en s e that th ere i s no t hing in thn mann e r in wh ich the rnl e s f o r the u s e o f a t erm are formu h .t e d vvh i c h , a s a mr.t t er of l o g i c , prevent s anyo n e from fo llQ.wing t hem . Som e o n e m i ght not have o n e of t h e n e e d s e t c . inc o rpo rat e d in the f o rmal e l ement and h enc e wi ll no t have o c c as ion to u s e the t e rm , at l e ast in t h e f i rst p er s on , b u t t h i s i s a c o nt ingent mat t e r . Anyo ne who has the appr o p r i at e n e e d s c an u s e the t e rm . The no t i o n is form o d from the po int o f vi evv o f anyo n e ; that i s , from the p o i nt o f vi ew o f no o n e i n p ar t i cul ar . �hi s d o e s no t rul e out the p o s s ib i l i t y o f a no t i o n whi c h , as a mat t e r o f fact , i s c o nfine d t o o n e
[I]t will … be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of spirits? We must no longer say upon these [i.e., Lockean] principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar. They who … are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system, do nevertheless say the sun rises, the sun sets … : and if they affected a contrary style in common talk, it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it manifest, that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets. 228
36 have of Heraclitus’ work does he actually use the word in question. According to Roman Dilcher, Heraclitus “refrains conspicuously from calling his “opposites” ἐναντία” (Dilcher, 1995, p. 109). Dilcher also rejects Geoffrey S. Kirk’s casual explanation of this abnormality, that “it is perhaps accidental that this word does not occur in the extant fragments” (Kirk, 1954, p. 173), on the grounds that “the ancient sources quote just the fragments we have in order to demonstrate Heraclitean ἐναντία” (Dilcher, 1995, p. 109: n. 15); i.e., these ancient sources were engaged in an exposition guided by a theme similar to that of Rescher’s outlined above. Perhaps, then, Rescher can be forgiven for taking a similar approach. However, it cannot be inferred merely from the use of this interpretative characterisation that Heraclitus wished his readers to understand his sayings in terms of any standard conception of ‘opposites’ ( enantia ). If we regard Heraclitus’ paired terms as being explicit ‘opposites’, even though he does not explicitly refer to them as such, it is probably due to the nature of some prior propensity we ourselves have to apply this concept; that is, upon encountering a pair of such terms they ‘leap out at us’ as being ‘opposites’. However, it could well have been Heraclitus’ intention to draw our attention to, and to somewhat mediate, or even overturn, this initial instinctive reaction. Indeed, one of the main aspects of Heraclitus’ theory is often explained by interpreters as an attempt to explicate the unity of opposites. This objection of Dilcher’s, to the interpretative use of the term ‘opposites’, is one of the three main problems that he raises for anyone wishing to uphold a notion of ‘unity of opposites’ in Heraclitus’ philosophy. I will deal with these problems, and present solutions to them, in Chapter 3.
Recent speculative experiments have also attained self-identity by defining themselves against many of the trends of twentieth century philosophy (which, it is claimed, were still in thrall to the post-Kantian settlement). In no respect is this more evident than in their negative attitude to “the linguistic turn” and “the theological turn”. This critical attitude is most virulent with respect to language. The linguistic turn at the beginning of the twentieth century is the most extreme manifestation of the Kantian (dis)solution of the problems of the philosophical tradition. Language is another form the problem of our access to the world assumes. Meillassoux in this regard quotes Francis Wolff, “We are locked up in language… without being able to get out… We are in consciousness or language as in a transparent cage. Everything is outside, yet it is impossible to get out.” 5 In a similar way, Harman speaks of “this ghetto of human discourse and language and power” to which philosophy has confined itself “for the past two hundred and twenty years.” 6 Analytic philosophy of language and post-structuralism both fall afoul of speculation’s criticisms. They turned their attention away from “the great outdoors”, to obsess over how language gets (or, more accurately, fails to get) us there. 7
last factor refers to the situation in which participants were required to set a role model for other family members. Two participants, Shi and Yi, reported that they were obliged to paint an image of good English learner for their younger brother (Section 6.7.1). I was alert to the fact that, during the interview process, some participants (Lan, Li, Zhuan, Xu) responded definitive ‘no’ to the question whether their learning motivation was influenced by their family. Through an attentive examination of the data, it is not hard to notice that such response from these participants was inconsistent with their descriptions in the remainder of the scripts as well as the attitudinal questionnaires. As mentioned above, Lan, Xu and Zhuan have evidently demonstrated a motivational factor of family edifying (Section 6.7.1), while Li also reported that her English learning behaviours such as attending the English specialty class was substantially supported by her parents. One reasonable explanation for this contradiction could be the ambiguity caused by the interview question, under which family influence was instinctively understood as family interference by the participants. This interpretation was somehow corroborated in the follow- up interview, through which I interrogated the issue by changing the question into ‘will you think about your family factors in making a decision?’ and the result showed that none of the participants gave negative response to this question. Another possible interpretation is related to the motivational fluctuation that some participants have experienced, which is discussed at the end of this section. The second major factor concerning relationship influence is the environmental influence. Unlike the language learning environment mentioned in Self-Cultivation, the environmental influence herein describes participant’s expectation for fulfilling other people’s view of English learning, for instance, communal belief about the language and peer’s recommendation for a particular class. In the narratives of participant’s English learning in China, Qi and Sa related their reason for attending English speciality class as a result of following their peers’ decision. Li attributed her domestic language learning to the English superiority in her hometown. Sa, Xu and Yi assigned partial reasons for selecting English as their college major to the preconception that language study is suitable for females (Section 6.7.2, in Chapter Six). Even after coming to the new learning environment in Ireland, some participants, such as Li, Shi and Zhuan, still reported that their participation in the EAP class was a direct influence from other Chinese students (Section 6.7.2).
In order to gain attention and popularity from the public, language should be novel in its application to achieve communication. In many restaurants in China, there are slogans which read “Refuse Waste on the Tip of Tongue” instead of “Don’t Waste Food”. First, it is deeper in extent to convey meaning. From the tiny part---the tip of tongue, the meaning “Don’t waste any drop of food” is conveyed vividly. Second, this expression can attract people’s attention better for its combination of humorous and warning effects. Nowadays, people in this modern world are under great pressure from many aspects, so subconsciously, they hope to ease pressure through using humorous language. A Bite of Waste (Waste on the Tip of Tongue) meets this mental need to some extent. This is the reason for its good effects. The mental process of A Bite of X (X on the Tip of Tongue) is the same. Thus the structure A Bite of X (X on the Tip of Tongue) gain its popularity.
The methodological importance for Boyle of personal experience of discrete results of empirical investigation does align him with experimental philosophy in the sense of Systma and Livengood. Boyle’s personal involvement in generating the airpump data corresponds to the do-it-yourself character of experimental philosophy as Systma and Livengood define it. But it also raises a question of the coherence of a research programme geared to natural histories as opposed to common opinions and textual sources. If personal observation of phenomena, including experimental results, is supposed to contribute to a written record of natural phenomena that others subsequently rely on, then the natural histories of the experimental philosophers contribute to second-hand explananda just as much as textbook results. They may be more specific, and more reliably described, second-hand explananda than those derived from textual sources with no explicit conception of the dependence of natural philosophy on natural history, but they are second-hand all the same. 11 In other words, the more natural history is compiled and relied on,