(even if he appears to be referring to Wittgenstein's later work). It should also be noted that Deleuze here marks the relationship between expression and representation, a relationship that constitutes the very limit of Wittgenstein's work in the Tractatus; a relationship that animates every one of its propositions and constitutes its very raison d'être. Yet, this relationship animates Wittgenstein's first great work somewhat in the manner of a Freudian drive—namely, in silence. Hence the Tractatus appears to us less a treatise on “the event” than a treatise as an event; it does not represent an event it expresses one. The work itself is such an event. Thus, the relationship so described above is turned on itself, since its 'living usage' becomes in the Tractatus embodies (even if in anguish) this very relationship. Therefore, the Tractatus stands as a unique logical crystal, the very “static logical genesis” 16 of sense itself. While endeavoring to grow-out from the edges as it were, to elaborate and elucidate the strange static becoming of sense, and this point of contact between two great, and therefore, irreducible thinkers, it is imperative for us first to apprehend the problematics involved in each of their works, and further, perform the critical labor of a serialization of perspectives from each side that offer some vision and appraisal of the other. We will begin by contextualizing both Wittgenstein's and Deleuze's projects with a view to their conceptions of sense, especially as it bears upon logic and language, so that we can then offer a series of intersections; places where each thinker comes under the torsion of the other's thought.
Jacques Derrida was born in 1930. While his philosophical train- ing was done at the École Normale Supérieure, where he subse- quently taught until quite recently, his writings have had an impact upon a broad spectrum of thinking in the human sciences and cul- tural criticism. Although he received his doctorat d’État in Paris only recently (1980) and on the basis of his many publications, Der- rida’s writings have had an even more significant effect outside France than at home. This element of alterity at the center is impor- tant for understanding continentalphilosophy in general. The term itself was introduced by British philosophers who referred to the philosophy practiced on the European continent as other than that which they themselves did. At first, and in its original version, conti- nental philosophy was characterized almost exclusively as some type of phenomenology (transcendental, existential, or hermeneutic). Ana- lytic philosophy (positivist, linguistic, or ordinary language) set itself off against these accounts of phenomenology. Gradually, even in Britain, continentalphilosophy came to characterize an aspect of philosophy (a legitimate ‘area’ of philosophy) that could be taught as part of the philosophy course offerings. With the burgeoning of interest in continental thought, this ‘area’ became a mode of philoso- phizing in its own right—even one that could be practiced by British and American philosophers irrespective of what was happen- ing on the continent itself. Indeed, often some of the most adventure- some and significant work in continentalphilosophy has been occurring outside the European continent (though still owing its debt to certain traditions and modes of thinking prevalent there in this century). Hermeneutics, semiotics, critical and dialectical theory, structuralism, post-structuralism, ‘French’ feminism, deconstruction, and post-modernism all came to operate as continental thought whether in Europe or elsewhere. That Jacques Derrida oftenlectures and teaches in the United States (and on occasion in Britain) intensi- fies the non-geographical location of what is now known as continen- tal philosophy.
stranger who comes to disrupt or to interrupt the tranquillity of the enclosure, so as to bring about doubt, disorientation or alternatively experiences of the sublime? Who is the arrivant, Derrida asks? He responds and says: ‘The arrivant will arrive perhaps, for one must never be sure when it comes to arrivance; but the arrivant could also be the perhaps itself, the unheard-of, totally new experience of the perhaps’ (Derrida 2005:29). The difference of the arrivant (stranger) as well as the deferral of the arrival is Derrida’s interpretation of différance (Derrida 1982:7, n. 7). Is différance, the perhaps, a stranger that knocks at the door of the enclosure seeking hospitality, and in seeking hospitality becomes the host and thereby dis-enclosures the enclosure? Would this not be a kind of metaphysical ethics as argued by Levinas (1969:52)? I believe it would, as the Other/Stranger would fulfil the position of the transcendent. Yet, Derrida does not argue that différance is a stranger, but différance is inscribed into language itself; in his later work, for example, Politics of Friendship (2005), he will make use of the term autoimmunity. 9 In other
So this essay contemplates the force of logic within the structure of prevailing discourse and language. The force of that logic is derived from an assumption of binary opposition, an opposition fundamental to the structures of theological understanding. In Biblical hermeneutics we see this structure represented in the idea that what is not exegesis, reading out, must fall within the category of eisegesis, reading in. In the hermeneutics of divination, for example in astrology, the process of speculative reading through the casting of horoscopes, crosses over into a symbolism which allows for the given realisations that constitute the work of divination (Cornelius, 2003, chapter 15). A further example can be found in the three stages of orison, of medieval prayer, which describes a path from recollection, through quiet, and into contemplation likewise charting the transition between the active and the passive (Underhill, 2002, p. 306). Despite these and other examples, religious insight is often regarded in terms of either something realised or revealed, as something speculative or projected. The force of logic within this duality expresses an anthropology in which human agency is called to submit to divine will, by a path of self-abnegation, an apophatic anthropology.
This course will provide a journey into moral reflection. Its aim is to invite students to subject their own views about ethics to critical examination. We will work towards three goals. The first is to explore several moral issues that raise questions about ethics and justice in today’s diverse and complex society. We will ask how a just society might distribute the things we prize – income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honors in the right way; how ought each person be awarded her or his due. The second goal will be to understand and evaluate the role of philosophy and critical thinking in addressing issues such as financial bailouts, affirmative action and the death penalty. We will ponder three central ideals or ways of thinking about ethical issues: virtue, freedom and
Components: LEC. Grading: GRD.
PHI 107. Introduction to Philosophy and Law. 3 Credit Hours.
Introduction to philosophy in a way that emphasizes its relevance to thinking about the law and legal reasoning. It will familiarize you with traditional theories of moral obligation, social justice, free will, and responsibility. And it will provide an opportunity to explore the significance these theories have for addressing questions about the nature of law, our obligation to obey the law, rights, freedom, punishment, andliberty.
Together with Kelsen and his Pure Theory of Law, Herbert Hart, who considers the indetermination of Law as a product of the limitation of language that, in some cases, comes from the will of the creator or interpreter of the legal text, is also among the precursors of the legal positivism in the twentieth century. His less conservative view in comparison with Kelsen allows his theory to be entitled “moderate positivism”, as the legal system may accept the existence of morality to support court decisions. In this sense, the analysis of the language used by the law has become a major challenge to the legal hermeneutics and the definition of the normative criteria to the lawmaker (see BOBBIO, 1995, p. 18-36). However, the understanding of this peculiar type of positivism in the thoughts of Hart is only possible when we admit the concern arising from the philosophy of Wittgenstein. In this sense this paper aims at recovering the elements of the approach between the discussion on the language conducted by Wittgenstein and the theory of moderate positivism proposed by Herbert Hart in his work The Concept of Law.
36 have of Heraclitus’ work does he actually use the word in question. According to Roman Dilcher, Heraclitus “refrains conspicuously from calling his “opposites” ἐναντία” (Dilcher, 1995, p. 109). Dilcher also rejects Geoffrey S. Kirk’s casual explanation of this abnormality, that “it is perhaps accidental that this word does not occur in the extant fragments” (Kirk, 1954, p. 173), on the grounds that “the ancient sources quote just the fragments we have in order to demonstrate Heraclitean ἐναντία” (Dilcher, 1995, p. 109: n. 15); i.e., these ancient sources were engaged in an exposition guided by a theme similar to that of Rescher’s outlined above. Perhaps, then, Rescher can be forgiven for taking a similar approach. However, it cannot be inferred merely from the use of this interpretative characterisation that Heraclitus wished his readers to understand his sayings in terms of any standard conception of ‘opposites’ ( enantia ). If we regard Heraclitus’ paired terms as being explicit ‘opposites’, even though he does not explicitly refer to them as such, it is probably due to the nature of some prior propensity we ourselves have to apply this concept; that is, upon encountering a pair of such terms they ‘leap out at us’ as being ‘opposites’. However, it could well have been Heraclitus’ intention to draw our attention to, and to somewhat mediate, or even overturn, this initial instinctive reaction. Indeed, one of the main aspects of Heraclitus’ theory is often explained by interpreters as an attempt to explicate the unity of opposites. This objection of Dilcher’s, to the interpretative use of the term ‘opposites’, is one of the three main problems that he raises for anyone wishing to uphold a notion of ‘unity of opposites’ in Heraclitus’ philosophy. I will deal with these problems, and present solutions to them, in Chapter 3.
My remark s i n chap t e r two ab out th e pub l i c nature o f language and t r e d i stinc t i o n b n tw e e n ' a.n.yo ne ' an d ' ev e ry one ' s hould no t b e forgott en h e r e . To b e ob j e c t ive i s t o f o rm and u s e our t � rms 2 c c o rd ing t o int e rp ers o nal rul e s , but t h i s d o e s no t m e an t hat svoryone has t o b e invo lve d in forming or u s ing t h e t erm. . All t h at i s r e qu ired i s t hat anyone Bight b e i nvo lve d , i n th8 s en s e that th ere i s no t hing in thn mann e r in wh ich the rnl e s f o r the u s e o f a t erm are formu h .t e d vvh i c h , a s a mr.t t er of l o g i c , prevent s anyo n e from fo llQ.wing t hem . Som e o n e m i ght not have o n e of t h e n e e d s e t c . inc o rpo rat e d in the f o rmal e l ement and h enc e wi ll no t have o c c as ion to u s e the t e rm , at l e ast in t h e f i rst p er s on , b u t t h i s i s a c o nt ingent mat t e r . Anyo ne who has the appr o p r i at e n e e d s c an u s e the t e rm . The no t i o n is form o d from the po int o f vi evv o f anyo n e ; that i s , from the p o i nt o f vi ew o f no o n e i n p ar t i cul ar . �hi s d o e s no t rul e out the p o s s ib i l i t y o f a no t i o n whi c h , as a mat t e r o f fact , i s c o nfine d t o o n e
theoretical science. Putting the emphasis slightly differently, physics and
chemistry were lumped together as exact natural sciences with focus on stud- ying its logical structure. This meant that the interest was in laws in the sense of mathematical equations stating relations between quantities and theories that were axiomatic, at least in principle. Mainstream philosophy of science simply regarded chemistry as part of physics and an unimportant part at that, the general impression being that with the quantum mechanical interpreta- tion of the chemical bond, chemistry had been reduced to physics. If there might have been some philosophy of chemistry in the pre-quantum era, with the advent of quantum mechanics, it became irrelevant at one fell swoop. This applied in particular to the German Naturphilosophen and the British emergentists.
Plato to Hume to Nietzsche in empirical questions, the existence of that very low common denominator does not mean that there is a uniform, or even a relatively unitary, understanding of the empirical from ancient to pre-analytic philosophy. On the contrary, there is reason to think that Aristotle was much more geared to preserving pre-philosophical opinion or ‘appearances’ in natural philosophy than either Plato before him or the post-Cartesians. Indeed, the concept of ‘scientia,’ which on the surface appears to be shared by ancients and moderns, is in fact radically reinterpreted, starting with Descartes (Sorell, Rogers and Krave 2012). As for the supposed status of the analytic tradition as anti-empirical turning point in philosophy, this fails to take into account Descartes’s insistence on a first philosophy that is prior to and conceptually independent of the concepts (extension and
In the tradition of the ASCP, the 2017 conference hosted a plenary honouring the work of a significant Australasian philosopher, and on this occasion, the focus was on the extensive and diverse feminist philosophy of Professor Moira Gatens. The three articles celebrating Gatens’ work reflect the depth of her contribution across social and political philosophy, feminist philosophy, early modern philoso- phy, and philosophy and literature. Louise Richardson-Self starts with Gatens’ ground-breaking 1983 publication “A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction,” and reads the central themes of this article, embodiment and social imaginaries, in relation to Gatens’ subsequent work. Timothy Laurie examines the ways that Gatens situates knowledge claims and speech acts within specific conditions of community formation, focusing on the way that “monstrous” ideologies and be- liefs might be subject to contextualisation, without resorting to the static models of group consensus. In the final commentary on Gatens, Simone Bignall exam- ines the contribution that Gatens makes to Spinoza studies. Bignall examines how Gatens works through Spinoza to articulate her concept of “imaginary bodies” in order to think about power, freedom and the right, and then examines the ways that Gatens uses this foundation to consider institutional arrangements of power. Finally, Bignall shows that Gatens is not only an exemplary feminist thinker but also “an imaginative philosopher whose associative methodology creates new pos- sibilities for thought,” and who “presents a reconception of philosophy as a genre and a practice that strives to exert an imaginative power capable of changing and reshaping reality itself.” 48
The MScR programmes fit in among a number of MSc degrees offered by the Department of Linguistics and English Language (LEL). LEL is part of the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences (PPLS), within the College of Humanities and Social Sciences (CHSS). Most teaching is organised at Department level, but most administration for postgraduate degrees occurs at the level of the School. The most important contact for you during your time on your degree will be your supervisor (or supervisors, if you have more than one). Your supervisor(s) will likely be assigned before you start the programme and will be responsible for all your work toward your dissertation, as well as for negotiating the set of courses that you take as part of the programme. The Programme Director is responsible for the smooth running of admissions, co-ordinating examinations, programme evaluation and curriculum development. In addition, the Programme Director is available to all MScR students to provide pastoral support and advice for any scholarly or personal issues which may arise whilst students are on the programme and which you may not want to discuss with your supervisor(s).
However, in the framework of linguistic relativism, two languages are nev- er considered to represent the same reality, as mentioned above. The worlds in which different communities live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached; as we said before, the deaf vision is quite different from the hearing vision, as it is built in the scope of another language. So, the translation between languages is problematic and sometimes impossible. Accord- ing to D. Chandler, some authors suggest that even within a single language any reformulation of words has implications for meaning, since meaning is not in the text, but is generated by interpretation, and for Steiner (1975), any act of human communication can be seen as involving a kind of translation (Chandler, 1994).
Rationalists gave priority to thought over language. Language is instrumental in expressing the thought. Humboldt‟s aphorism that language involves “the infinite use of finite means” here finite means „being which that constitutes (I- language). 16 Applying a rationalist view to the special case of language learning, Humboldt concludes that one cannot really teach language but can only present the conditions under which it will develop spontaneously in the mind in its own way. Thus the form of a language, the schema for its grammar, is to larger extent given, though it will not be available for use without appropriate experience to set the language forming process into operation. Like Leibnitz, he reiterates the Platonistic view that, for the individual, leaning is largely a matter of reminisce, that is, “of drawing out what is innate in the mind”. This view is sharply contrasts with the empiricists notion that language is essentially an adventitious construct, taught by conditioning as could have maintained by Skinner and Quine or by drill and explicit explanation as claimed by Wittgenstein, or built up by elementary data-processing procedures (as modern linguists typically maintains), but, in any event, relatively independent in its structure of any innate mental faculties. In short, empiricist speculation has characteristically assumed that only the procedures and mechanisms for the acquisition of knowledge constitute an innate property of the mind. Thus for Hume, the method of „experimental reasoning‟ is a basic instinct in animals and humans, on a par with the instinct „which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery; it is derived from the original hand of nature as Hume assumed. The form of knowledge, however, is otherwise quite free. On the other hand, rationalist speculation has assumed that the general
characteristically ‘transcendental’, in that it proceeds from the assumptions that social research could not take place at all if reality were not constituted in a certain way. This is how Durkheim originally carved out a niche for sociology in the French academy, and ‘critical realists’ following the lead of Roy Bhaskar continue to justify a normatively inspired structural Marxism. (4) Philosophy relates to sociology as conscious to unconscious. In this guise, sociology articulates the logic of everyday practices that constitute the social order, which are not normally dignified with comment, much less codification. It charts realms of ‘local knowledge’ and ‘situated reasoning’, which philosophers have traditionally dismissed as trivial or irrational. Weber’s interest in the meaning that social agents attach to their actions falls into this category, which has been since then taken up by symbolic interactionists and ethnomethodologists. But perhaps the most interesting work in this vein comes from feminist and postcolonial sociologists who turn this perspective into an opportunity to give voice to subaltern groups.
Abstract: This short paper explores the overall relation between philosophy of science and science such as the influence of one over the other, the major aim of philosophy of science and the contribution of philosophy of science to philosophy itself. A lot of peoples confused of the very meaning and contribution of philosophy in general and philosophy of science in particular so as they believe that as if philosophy is done in the vacuum without basing on any practical evidence in human life. So, the central argument of this paper is to show how philosophy of science, philosophy in general, able to do with science or empirical concern and aware those peoples who have misconception about it. I try to show how philosophy and science are interdependent on each other. Both disciples share common denominators in many ways as they try to understand and influence each other in different epochs of human life. But through the passage of time, people start to doubt as if philosophy has less contribution in human life and only concentrate on playing with words rather than giving attention to tackle practical human problems comparing with sciences. I suggest that philosophy has indirect contribution for human life as it tries to be foundational for scientific theories and practices.
There is a wide variety of social, intellectual and sporting clubs and societies on campus, including the Philosophy Society (PhilSoc) established by undergraduate philosophy students in late 2011. PhilSoc aims to provide students with an outlet to pursue philosophical interests, whether political, social, ethical or epistemological, and is open to students across campus, not just those studying philosophy degrees. Since its establishment the society has been hosting weekly discussions on a variety of philosophical and practical topics, and has taken part in events such as the British Undergraduate Philosophy Society annual conference, and ‘My Night with Philosophers’ held at the Institute Français du Royaume-Uni in central London.