So far, little research has been done on this structure. From the perspective of meaning expression, Luo Kun categorizes it and analyzes it in great detail and also gives a description of its pragmatic effects (2013). Qu Liwei and Wang Dongmei analyze the formation of the language model and the reason of its popularity from the angle of language model (2013). Xiong Dan explains the syntax and semantics irregularities using construction coercion theory and analyze the rich meanings of the constructions using conceptual metonymy in her postgraduate thesis A Cognitive Study on the Catchphrase A Bite of China (China on the Tip of Tongue) (2013). However, the research on its mental operation based on the philosophy of mind is rare.
Swinburne holds, as I have shown, that human beings are immaterial conscious substances (souls) interacting with material substances (brains and body parts). In his discussion of this interaction Swinburne is concerned to set out arguments that he believes will show how an immaterial conscious substance can intentionally cause neuronal events that initiate body movements. He wants to persuade his readers that the purposings that a subject has can be actualized in movements of the body. It is important for Swinburne’s philosophy of mind that he can give a persuasive account of how the soul can move the body, because if he is unable to produce a convincing account and supporting arguments for this, his substance dualist position will be vulnerable to soft materialist claims that all conscious events are caused by brain events, and that all events only have physical causes. Swinburne would be particularly vulnerable to attack from a soft materialist if he were unable to produce persuasive arguments for soul to body interaction because he freely admits that brain events are physical events that often cause conscious events. 1 In this chapter, therefore, I will set out and evaluate the particular theory of causality that he argues for in order to show how an immaterial conscious soul can move a material body.
This study presents an intricate design and illustration of a high school ELA curriculum model conceived to help students improve their critical thinking and interpretation skills. The model is infused with philosophy-based exercises that prompt students to closely examine their thinking as part of their ELA coursework. Writings by the early pragmatist philosophers, reader response theorist Louise Rosenblatt, and critical thinking scholars provide fine-grained analyses of reading, writing, and thinking, all of which inform the design for each model stage. The final two chapters of this study feature close examination of the model in action. I use qualitative content analysis to peruse 70 artifacts created by ten students who were immersed in the ELA curriculum model’s connected stages. I report my findings in three layers of analysis: close study of the teacher’s perspective; detailed analysis of a student’s complete learning arc; and comparison and contrast of artifacts that all ten study participants created throughout the course. The findings of this study provide a foundation for answering two research questions, the first concerning how high school ELA teachers can guide students to develop a practical philosophy of mind, and the second concerning how student work displays critical thinking and
proposition and a state of affairs) 19 . In short, signification separates language from bodies, provides it with a quasi-autonomous order, and with a purely linguistic, or more precisely, propositional foundation (hence the modern analytic co-incidence of philosophy of language, logic, and mathematical formalism or foundationalism). Given that only intensional definitions have a purchase on the determination of essences, it follows that the enumeration of types or instances of knowledge, are always both incidental and incomplete with respect to the articulation of the Idea. (This, in turn, constrains the activity of the philosopher: she can neither be an expert, nor an accountant of parts or participations. In her positivity, she dwells in the static glory of the form, but in practical affairs she takes on a negative role as the master-purveyor of derivations, a guardian against false images and simulacra. Unsurprisingly, ideal ascent has immediate moral consequences. To take one well known example, this peculiar constraint of the philosopher yields a distributive genius capable of according her the right (or the burden) of philosopher-king 20 . “...[T]he philosopher is a being of ascents; He is the one who leaves the cave and rises up. The more he rises the more he is purified. Around this “ascensional psychism,” morality and philosophy, the ascetic ideal and the idea of thought, have established close links.” (LoS, 127).
In this chapter my reflections have taken a decidedly anti individualist line. By way of summary, my key points can be described in the following manner. The endorsement by scientific psychology of the computational theory of mind does not commit it to individuating psychological states individualistically, several key arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. There are practical problems associated with any attem pt to engage in a narrow psychology, problems that may well outweigh any benefits that such a psychology could bring us; whether the possible benefits are outweighed by the drawbacks may well be contingent upon such factors as whether we have any other-worldly twins or cousins. Moreover, the advantages of narrow over broad psychology have often been exaggerated; for example, it is far from clear that scientific psychology has to go narrow in order to recognise the similarities betw een us and our tw ins and cousins and capture the generalisations that subsume us all. When addressing the question of how scientific psychology individuates psychological states it is of param ount importance to bear in mind the actual explanatory ambitions of its practitioners. As a matter of fact, or so I contend, in keeping with the continuity of scientific psychology with folk psychology, they are often concerned with accounting for broad cognitive capacities and, as a result, sometimes appeal to intentional properties that are not locally supervenient. That scientific psychologist's should seek to account for capacities that are salient from the folk psychological perspective, and particularly interesting to those who adopt that perspective, should come as no surprise; at the end of the day what we all want is for science to answer those questions and account for those facts about the world that seem particularly interesting and important to us.
perhaps impossible to determine, than upon the utility o f the system, how well it is able to provide a workable framework within which to fit our more specific philosophical theorising about the mind, science, language, aesthetics, morality, social science and so on. To put the point in less grandiose terms, the study o f ontology and metaphysics has less to do with seeking the tmth and more to do with shopping in an overstocked supermarket: the choice o f acceptable versions is so great and there is little to choose between the alternatives, so it is only by consideration o f the particular purposes for which entities are required, mixed with a liberal dose o f stipulation, that any decision can be made at all. The call for justification must end somewhere: each account that I consider will be forced to leave some fundamental facts more or less unexplained. Common-sense intuitions about fundamental entities such as objects, properties and events are too sketchy to provide anything more than a superficial guide to choice, and philosophical intuitions almost invariably clash; if they did not, the problems o f incompatible presuppositions underlying theories o f mind which I have described would not arise. Having said this, one does not want a metaphysical schema packed with utterly implausible entities bearing strange or fantastic relations to each other, even though that system might fulfil the role of being a sound metaphysical basis upon which to theorise about science and mind. The task at hand is to tread carefully between these extremes, minimising stipulation, while maximising the intuitive plausibility and utility o f the system for grounding areas of philosophical discourse and it is this which I must endeavour to do.
1. To provide students with a systematic framework for approaching topics in the phi- losophy of mind. On this framework, students will investigate the connections between three domains of facts (or alternatively: three domains of sentences): physical, phenom- enal, and intentional.
and the authors’ presentation of a clear and cogent case for cognitive ethology against this chaotic background is in general one of the real achievements of this book. As they point out, at its beginning ethology was already ‘cognitive’ with the work of Darwin and his follower George Romanes. As such, however, it was limited to a somewhat anecdotal and uncritical ascription of mentality to animals, and came to be regarded as unscientific with the onset of behaviourism in this century. With the later decline of behaviourism, the issue of animal mentality returned to the scene most forcefully, perhaps, with the work of Donald Griffin. But while sympathetic to the broad goals of Griffin’s work, Allen and Bekoff agree with his critics who argue that his attribution to non-human animals of intentionality and consciousness remains uncritical and anecdotal. Allen and Bekoff see their goal as that of using advances in recent philosophy of mind and cognitive science to suggest ways in which mentalistic approaches to animal behaviour might be tested, and this results in an approach that is admirably open and non-dogmatic. Anyone interested in the issue of animal mindedness will, I'm sure, find the book interesting and enlightening. Moreover, by bringing conceptual and empirical issues together in making their case, the authors fruitfully open up the issues of human consciousness and intentionality to new ways of thinking as well, and so the relevance of the book goes beyond the brief the authors have set for themselves.
Joachim's (1901) thesis predates 'functionalism' as a theory in the philosophy of mind, but he nonetheless sees Spinozistic modes only as causal thing-stages. He builds his thesis on Spinoza's avowals that extended modes are "distinguished by" and are "nothing but" their ratios of motion-and rest, and human minds are only the ideas of these states, not differentiated any other way and in themselves merely mental relata (Joachim pp.23-24). Further, Joachim professes surprise at the easy acceptance of other commentators of a 'parallel' relation between the two attributes (ibid. p.l37). He holds instead that 'The inner articulation of each attribute is one and the same; or there is, in reality, only one modal system' (ibid. p.l26). The same mode which is an idea, Joachim claims, is also extended:- 'It is the same thing, one and the same mode of God, which is both body and soul' (ibid. p.71). Joachim asserts that God's free causality is actual in two separate lines of force' (ibid. p. 140), but he merges the diverse forces in those lines. I do not think this move is justified, for Spinoza makes it clear that while the mind is the intelligence of the functionality of the body, and mind and body are identical in substance, the mind is a self-contained causal system, operating through a power which cannot influence extension. Humans are therefore radically twofold in nature. They are two modes in union since substance expresses two eternally disparate essential natures. Spinoza's thesis of parallel power-concatenation (that is, the way in which instance y of thinking-power relates to instance x of extension-power, in a logically necessary correlation) shows that Nature is a unified causal system, but that its two separate causal systems are not reducible to just one. His principles forbid us to liken his causal role theory to a functionalism which allows the causal role of a mental item to lie either in the physical, or in some attribute-neutral flow of power. As seen above, he claims :-
that it is just an ultimate fact about human beings that they find certain a priori inferences natural. Logicians are chiefly concerned with language used informatively in affirming or denying propositions, formulating arguments, evaluating arguments, and so on. Many other purposes are also served by language, however, and its informative use may be better understood when contrasted with other uses. The great philosopher of analytical tradition and notable logicians, insisted rightly in his work ‘philosophical investigations, 1953) that there are countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. Among the examples suggested by Wittgenstein are giving orders, describing an object or giving its measurements, reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, presenting the results of an experiment, making up a story, play-acting, singing, guessing riddles, telling a joke, solving a problem in arithmetic, translating from one language into another, asking, cursing greeting and praying. Thus we can say that, Mind and logic is an approach in the philosophy of mind which explores mind, its analysis, its functions, and the task of inductive and deductive reasoning in the operations of the mind. While both inductive and deductive processes are scientific, both the processes are dependent on each other’s. Mind is a software part of brain which is its hardware part. The attributes of mind are thinking, imaging, doubting, memorizing. There is no permanent place of mind but ordinary we argue that mind resides in brain. Mind is three dimensional and its structure as the persons enhances in age the structure and the functions of the mental processes also increases. Philosophy of mind not only explores the nature of mind but it also explains the theories like monism
I feel the distinct weight of the palette knife in my hand, the subtle vibrations of my own breath, and the vividness of color rushing toward my eyes. The nuances of texture and glare smear left and right as I peer deeply into the paint, seeking something unknown to my intellect and yet so clearly to some other part of my mind. Perhaps it’s the omniscience of my heart, my soul, or my intuition. I like to view all three as different expressions of the same quality of awareness that rests beyond my ego. Through patience, calmness, and complete attention I find the ability to uncover some part of me that’s stable, everlasting, and fully at ease. Yet, as fast as I can step into this quality of being, I can be taken out equally as fast by the onslaught of thoughts rushing back into my mind. My commitment to this awareness practice, which comes from Buddhist teaching, is a useful method which can help me cultivate a deeper and longer lasting connection with this essential ground of who I know myself to be. The more I practice, the deeper I connect and the longer I can remain immersed in the mystery of each moment. However, it is an ongoing battle for me to maintain such a practice, especially in the wake of our digital culture. I find myself consumed by glowing screens, enticed by social media,
Coming back to our earlier thoughts about ‘hierarchies’, it is clear that when we have moved from percepts to concepts to images, and from there on to words and sentences, we are nowhere near the end of the hierarchy of mental complexity. Thus, while a moral mind is surely necessarily a linguistic one, the naturalistic analysis of its grammaticality tells us relatively little about its moral content. As John Mikhail (Washington) discussed with reference to a rich tradition of inquiry lasting several centuries, however, the moral mind is nonetheless crucially a generative one as well: A moral being is capable to compute, on the spot, a potential infinity of complex moral judgements appropriate to an occasion, whose perceptual and physical feature will typically radically underdetermine the judgements in question. The rationality of these judgements is furthermore clearly not rational in the sense of consciously rationalizable by the subject in question, creating an analogy with a major insight in regards to the grammatical mind associated with the second cognitive revolution in the 1950s. The generative principles of moral judgment may thus be as inaccessible to conscious introspection as the principles of grammaticality. Yet, as was discussed at length, differences between the moral and the linguistic faculty nonetheless abound, with the former for example being subject to learning, instruction, and moral conflict in a way that linguistic judgements are not. Morality may also not allow for the methodology of individualism, in the way that grammar has at least been thought to do (though Hinzen’s story in regards to the deictic significance of grammar suggests reasons for skepticism in this regard). An account of the moral mind that appropriately identifies both the overlap and the differences between the two kinds of computations needs to predict these differences, so that talk of a ‘moral grammar’ in the brain is able to avoid the danger of involving a metaphorical extension of the term ‘grammar’ — much as, on Mukherji’s account, talk about grammar in ants and bees may involve such metaphorical extensions.
The concept of the unconscious is now so firmly associated with Sigmund Freud that an alternative conception of the unconscious, one which is not in some way dependent on or derived from that of psychoanalysis, is hard to imagine at present. Yet, as studies of the prehistory of psychoanalysis emphasise, by no means did Freud introduce the concept from scratch: already by 1900, when Die Traumdeutung (The Interpretation of Dreams) appeared, the unconscious was a well-established intellectual topic (the classic studies of psychoanalysis’s ancestry are Ellenberger 1970 and Whyte 1979; see also Brandell 1979: ch. 8, Decker 1977: ch. 9, and Ellenberger 1993: chs. 1–2; Freud’s debts are acknowledged in Jones 1953: I, 435–6). Throughout the period 1870 to 1914 the concept of the unconscious was, however, in comparison with its psychoanalytic version, indeterminate in several respects. This reflects its deep involvement with two broader issues in later nineteenth-century philosophy, namely the disentangling of psychology as an autonomous discipline from philosophy, and the opposition between ascendant materialistic naturalism and the contrary impulse to preserve something of the metaphysical systems which had dominated the first three decades of the century (for a different suggestion as to why the unconscious appeared in Western thought, see Foucault 1966 [1974: 326–7]).
The expression, 'you are what you eat' makes a lot of sense. If you eat healthily, you will be healthy, if you don't, you won't. Health professionals stress that to eat healthily and sensibly means concentrating on fibre-rich foods (like wholemeal bread or baked potatoes), fresh fruit and vegetables, and lean fish or meat. It means cutting down on sugary and fatty foods. (For more information about how different foods can affect our moods, see The Mind guide to food and mood.)
Such questions may raise a more fundamental issue of whether the disciplines of psychology and neuroscience should concern themselves with “non-task specific” mental activities at all. And the answer would depend on the motivations of scientists in question. If the aim to understand the fundamental nature of human experience, then the answer would be in the affirmative, regardless of the substantial challenges involved in doing so. It is also worth noting that non-task specific mental activities – in terms of spontaneous thought, stimulus-independent thought, task-unrelated thought, daydreaming or mind wandering – are already discussed within the psychological and neuroscientific literature as reflecting operations of imagination (e.g., Christoff, 2012; Giambra, 1995; Mason et al., 2007; Zedelius and Schooler, 2015). This is paralleled by rather wide notions in the philosophical tradition about the processes of imagination, where “to imagine something is to form a particular sort of mental representation of that thing” (Gendler, 2013).