The results from this field research were presented by means of a written re- port and a poster during a mini-conference at the university. The reports needed to be written based on the theories of history and philosophy that had been dis- cussed. In total, 23 reports were produced. These reports were read and gathered by similarity generating excerpts that could be associated with elements of scien- tific literacy. This analysis followed qualitative content analysis principles (Bar- din, 2006). This analysis allowed to identify indicators relating to three issues: the nature of comprehension of science, scientific language and socioscientific issues (Santos, 2007). These indicators were assembled in categories that can be considered to form a representation of the students’ scientific literacy.
The crucial problem of Western philosophy of knowledge was to recognize its foundations. By comparing past mathematical and physical theories I have ob- tained a new conception of the foundations of science. In the above a dichotomy regarding the two main kinds of logic was exemplified in a crucial case-study of the history of philosophy. In addition, in Mathematics some decades ago a long and obscure work achieved a new formalization of calculus and more in general of the whole of Mathematics; this constructive mathematics is new to the extent that it avoids (almost all) idealistic notions (Markov, 1962; Bishop, 1967). At present, although its premises are incompatible with those of classical mathe- matics, it is considered by mathematicians to be on a par with classical mathe- matics. I conclude that the foundations of science include two basic dichotomies, one in mathematics and the other in logic (Drago, 1987; Drago, 1996).
other. It may be the case that the underlying aim of early modern natural philosophy was the understanding and praise of the Creator, whereas modern scientists qua scientists usually do not have this aim. However, the essential incomparability of scientific goals should not be a postulate of history of science. Goals (and scientists or science need not have had just one goal at any time) may have been stable for some time in some respects: the ancient Greeks have never tried to split the atom, for obvious reasons, so in that sense they were not engaged (as a scientific community) in an intentional activity identical to that of some modern research communities; but on another level of abstraction (‘trying to identify the fundamental elements of physical entities’) they may have been pursuing the same goal. The verdict of progress will differ according to the ways the goal can plausibly be phrased, and according to our measure of technical progress in the realization of those goals. We are never just better at ‘science’ than the Greeks, just like polar bears are not better at ‘fur colors’ than their ancestors; we always need to find a plausible way of interpreting the purpose of what went on, then and now.
But more to the point, where does all this leave the new enterprise we are initiating in Pittsburgh this weekend? Is there room for yet another permutation of the busy combination of H, P, and S? The aim of the new society is to promote work that blends history and philosophy of science in a single unified inquiry. The motif of integration could easily be misunderstood if it were taken to propose that history of science and philosophy of science should lose their separate identities as distinct ways of approach to the sciences, each with its own methods and concerns. This is clearly out of the question for a whole variety of reasons. No, the aim of our joint venture is much more modest. It is simply to secure a place for work that does further the interests of both sides simultaneously, without for a moment suggesting that this is the only model to be followed.
Abstract We respond to two kinds of skepticism about integrated history and philos- ophy of science: foundational and methodological. Foundational skeptics doubt that the history and the philosophy of science have much to gain from each other in prin- ciple. We therefore discuss some of the unique rewards of work at the intersection of the two disciplines. By contrast, methodological skeptics already believe that the two disciplines should be related to each other, but they doubt that this can be done successfully. Their worries are captured by the so-called dilemma of case studies: On one horn of the dilemma, we begin our integrative enterprise with philosophy and proceed from there to history, in which case we may well be selecting our his- torical cases so as to fit our preconceived philosophical theses. On the other horn, we begin with history and proceed to philosophical reflection, in which case we are prone to unwarranted generalization from particulars. Against worries about selec- tion bias, we argue that we routinely need to make explicit the criteria for choosing particular historical cases to investigate particular philosophical theses. It then be- comes possible to ask whether or not the selection criteria were biased. Against worries about unwarranted generalization, we stress the iterative nature of the pro- cess by which historical data and philosophical concepts are brought into alignment. The skeptics’ doubts are fueled by an outdated model of outright confirmation vs. outright falsification of philosophical concepts. A more appropriate model is one of stepwise and piecemeal improvement.
In this chapter, I argued for the necessity of the historicist-hermeneutic approach for achieving a mutually beneficial integration of History of Science and Philosophy of Science. Aspects of the historicist-hermeneutic approach have been supported by various scholars during the last fifty years. I demonstrated how this approach can be applied concretely to solve one of the most problematic case-studies in philosophy of science: the reasoning underlying Jean Perrin’s argument for molecular reality. I argued that Perrin’s was a case of multiple determination. Perrin put forward a no-coincidence argument for the existence of molecules, which was based on the agreement between multiple, independent determinations of Avogadro’s number (and consequently, other molecular magnitudes). The blunt rationale of the argument was the following: it would be a highly improbable coincidence for multiple, independent determinations of molecular magnitudes to achieve concordant results, and yet for there not to be any molecules. The careful application of the historicist-hermeneutic approach, however, shows that there were additional structural elements of Perrin’s argument that were responsible for its exceptional strength and, ultimately, for its success. They were the following:
In this paper we have study four quantum experiments that challenge the “common sense” of reality. In fact, in the 20 th century, the emergence of Quantum Mechanics and Transpersonal Psychology have contributed to challenge our “common sense” about the vision of the world. It is true that scientific progress have allowed us an improvement in our day to day life, but the core of the questions that were raised in the Introduction of this paper, still remain to be answered by contemporary society, such as What is the role of the human being in the Universe (the choice of the observer)? How we could explain the exceptional capabilities of the human brain (telepathic communication)?What is the purpose of Life (the perception of Life)?.In this regard, Prigogine (Prigogine and Stengers, 1986). suggested “a new alliance” between science (physics, biology, chemistry) and humanities/social sciences (history, philosophy, psychology) in order to answer the previousquestions in a transdisciplinary and in a deeper way.
The focus of the two previous text was aimed towards highlighting correlating duplication of state and civil society as a special contribution of Hegel's political and economic theory and importance of private property rights as two key sources of development freedom and progress towards the absolute, mental. The authors will present a discourse on the paradigm of the modern state, which is confirmed by Hegel's views on one side and simultaneous propulsion entirely new influential agents (financial magnates - money managers, media, intellectual property - the cognitive capitalism, izmještenos power in relation to power, instrumentalization mind, artificial intelligence) that is lost horizon departing from Hegel's picture of the development of history as a process of emancipation and liberation of man, through a dialectical interweaving of necessity and freedom. In that regard, the fact that Hegel did not indulge in the temptations of predicting future events is underlined. For Hegel, history has an unambiguous goal. The Idea of Freedom. It is toward Hegel, the uneducated individual through action, to struggle for recognition, mediation and overcoming as the assumptions of advancement toward knowledge, until the degree of self-ascendancy or absoluteness reaches. But this is not possible in anarchic society. This is only possible in the state as a self-conscious customary substance pervading the "living spirit". In a country in which the individual, through the developmental dynamics of the practical realization of an objective spirit through bureaucratic rational will, can only reach the domain of self-confidence or have its "substantive freedom". In doing so, Hegel, through the parable of the "mindlessness of the mind", emphasizes that both means that are not obvious reflections of the mind, but the product
In the last section I provided a small bit of a much more complex history, not as an end in itself, but as an example of how a phylogenetic analysis of a current problem in the foundations of evolutionary biology can help clarify the problem for philosophical purposes. The method I have used is to trace back historically to a point where the problem does not exist, and then work forward historically until one can see it beginning to emerge. As in this case, it is often true that at that point, those involved in the scientific debate will be quite self-conscious of problems that a couple of generations later are submerged as unquestioned, unanalyzed presuppositions of the field’s common set of concepts and methods. People see the problems, but cannot see the conceptual and methodological assumptions that are producing the problems. Nor, while working with those concepts and methods can they imagine any other way of approaching their subject that will avoid the problems they are facing.
Ceruzzi 1988, esp. pp. 265–270, contains a history of the phrase ‘computer science’. In a re- sponse to a letter that appeared in one of the earliest issues of Communications of the ACM, an editor (possibly Alan J. Perlis, whom we will meet again below) listed several, admittedly “facetious”, names, including ‘turingineering’, ‘turology’, ‘applied meta-mathematics’, and ‘ap- plied epistemology’ (DATA-LINK, 1958, p. 6). (The first two are puns on the name of Alan Turing, arguably the founder of the discipline, whom we will discuss in Chapter 8. We’ll come back to “applied epistemology” in §3.14.4, below.) In 1966, Peter Naur (a winner of the Turing Award) suggested ‘datalogy’ (Naur, 2007, p. 86). A useful discussion of these terms can be found in Arden 1980, pp. 5–7, “About Names and Labels”. Abrahams 1987, p. 473, says: “My personal definition of the field and its name would be ‘computology: the study of computational processes and the means by which they may be realized.’ But alas, the name ‘computer science,’ like OS/360 Job Control Language, will probably persist until the sun grows cold.”
Philipp Frank––physicist, philosopher, and early member of the Vienna Circle––is often neglected in retrospective accounts of twentieth century philosophy of science, despite renewed interest in the work of the Vienna Circle. In this thesis, I argue that this neglect is unwarranted. Appealing to a variety of philosophical and historical sources, I trace the development of Frank’s philosophical thought and, in so doing highlight the roles played by history, sociology, values, and pragmatism in his philosophy of science. Turning to contemporary literature, I then argue that Frank’s work should be understood as an early instance of what is now called “socially engaged philosophy of science.” This understanding is explored through a careful consideration of his work on education, where previous work on history, sociology, values, and pragmatism is applied to an important, real-world problem. This socially engaged reading of Frank extends beyond pragmatic issues of theory application, because as I show, Frank used sociology to argue for the meaningfulness of metaphysical claims. However, Frank’s account of meaning may seem to be problematic since it heavily relies on Percy Bridgman’s operationalism. So, I outline the problems associated with Bridgman’s account of operationalism and show that Frank’s view does not fall prey to the same criticisms. After these objections are addressed, Frank’s work is contextualized in the broader debate about value-free science, where I argue that Frank did not endorse the value-free ideal. As a result of these findings, we will not only have a clearer picture of Frank’s philosophical contributions, but also a better understanding of how the philosophy of science can better engage important social issues.
Even though Toulmin emphasizes the importance of history of science and the difference between the historical periods, his philosophy of science highlights the internal factors of scien- tific activity. For him, the central aims of science lie in the field of intellectual creation. Thus, other activities — such as pre- dicting — “are properly called ‘scientific’ from their connec- tion with the explanatory ideas and ideals which are the heart of natural science” (Toulmin, 1961: p. 38). In this regard, a few years later, Toulmin criticizes Kuhn’s views on the distinction between normal and revolutionary science. He wants to em- phasize that “any attempt to understand the nature of intellec- tual development in science must, surely, be to distinguish between the intellectual authority of an established conceptual scheme and the magisterial authority of a dominant individ- ual.” 15
Historically, it has been a goal of liberal arts and sciences education to educate the social, political, and intellectual elites. In our century, the liberal arts and sciences are often advertised in somewhat different, but related terms: ‘training the leaders of the future who can solve global problems’ is something one often hears as part of the institutional rhetoric about liberal arts and sciences. Selective admission procedures, small class settings, and emphasis on basic logical, argumentative, and rhetorical skills do confirm this vision. Clearly, some of these leaders will also be leaders in their respective scientific fields, whether in applied or in fundamental science. So if the liberal arts and sciences aim at training the intellectual elites of the future, in particular they should be interested in the scientists who can really make a difference in research and scientists who will be the leaders of other scientists. Let me be a bit more precise here. I will take a useful practical distinction made by Lee Smolin, even if I don’t agree with the broad-brush way Smolin applies it to my own field. The distinction goes back to Einstein, who wrote in a letter (letter to Robert A. Thornton 7 December 1944, EA pp. 61-574): “I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today - and even professional scientists - seem to me like someone who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historical and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is - in my opinion - the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth.” 4 In this rich quotation,
This quotation implies that in the long history of mankind both philosophy and science have a common background in the sense that, as commonly believed, there was a time when philosophy has a nick name ‘a mother of all sciences.’ 1 Basically the relation between philosophy and science are intertwined or interdependence so as in both disciplines there is epistemology, metaphysics and different kinds of theories that are common for both of them even though the way they look at things are different. In other words, Science gave philosophy a way of empirically testing theories and concepts, while philosophy can contribute indirectly to the development of scientific theories that we are using today in a different ways. Furthermore, Philosophy also enables to show what areas science can and cannot test, demarcating the boundary between physical and metaphysical questions and thereby, based on this boundary both disciplines developed their own way of conducting research over the centuries. In line with this, philosophy of science also underlies methodology and foundations of the scientific process that contributes in shaping science in today’s world. To show how one influence the other, let me briefly discuss concepts like: logical positivism, Copernicus influence on the Kant’s philosophy (Kant’s Copernican Revolution), Descartes’ philosophy on Quantum theory in physics, Heisenberg’s notion of “The role of modern physics in the present development of human thinking” etc.
Whereas much post-Kuhn philosophy of science has tended to see scientific revolutions in terms of theory change, much recent work in the history of exact sciences has emphasized the importance of the invention of new research tools for an understanding of historical patterns and processes of change. In many cases, the de- velopment of new scientific instruments and experimental and theoretical techniques enable scientists to get to grips with problems that were previously beyond their grasp, opening up new fields of inquiry and new objects of investigation. “By bringing instruments front and centre”, Galison contends, we obtain a different picture of the history of physics, which can “only awkwardly classed under the old rubrics ‘internal intellectual history’ and ‘external sociological history’”. Such a history, of course, “must be a technical history”, but it “is necessari- ly also part labor history, part sociology, and part epistemology” (Galison, 1997: p. 5). One might add that it is also part cultural history. The quest for increasingly accurate measuring instruments, such as the thermometer and the torsion balance in the 1780s, reflected the “culture of precision” and the “quantifying spirit” of the late 18 th century (Heilbron, 1990; Wise, 1997).
different theorists might be resolved at a political rather than conceptual level. What we need then is not an integrated history and philosophy of science but a political philosophy of science. This leads me to a broader point about the nature of the history of science today. As this collection of articles demonstrates, the history of science as a discipline developed in response to Cold War politics. From an emphasis on socialist planning to a concern with postcolonial science, the clash between communism and capitalism structured how historians approached the sciences. Within this context, much of the history of science worked as a form of critique against the scientific establishment. With the threat of nuclear war, the growth of the military-industrial complex, and the immense power invested in scientists, engineers and doctors, it is easy to understand why. To an extent, this continued in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. If anything, the 1990s and early 2000s produced an even greater concentration in the power of science. Pharmaceuticals, mobile phones, and the internet all penetrated deeper and deeper into everyday life. Once again, historians of science, particularly feminist and postcolonial scholars, used history as a form of critique. Yet at the same time, many found the new cultural approach to society, filled with competing identity and truth claims, profoundly troubling. The ‘science wars’ and ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s highlight this best. They also reveal the ways in which neoliberalism permeated the historiography. For better or worse, everything was up for grabs in the marketplace: identity, culture, even truth itself. 124