By contrast, when the subject philosophy of the socialsciences got up and running (1940s) the political climate was favorable to social engineering. Hence both philosophy and the socialsciences were taken seriously and used as input into educational reform and expansion, and into the crafting of the protectionist state. Our journal, Philosophy of the SocialSciences, was founded by academics who favored scientific philosophy, so-called; that is, philosophy growing out of and continuous with the scientific enterprise. At the time we would have considered economics as part of the consensus on social reform and social engineering. It is remarkable how much the situation has changed almost unnoticed. Economics, the largest and most respected of the socialsciences, shifted its position on the political spectrum from intervention and technology (Keynesianism) towards preaching the gospel of neoliberalism, i.e. minimum intervention and instituting market-style competition wherever possible. A handful of economists resisted, of course. But mainly, it should be noticed, in the same period sociology, anthropology, and geography, became more radical rather than less, and deeply estranged from economics. Whether this change and indeed split in the socialsciences is a product or the driver of changes in the wider world of politics is best left to historians. Certainly these political shifts in the socialsciences were under way before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the formal close of the Cold War. As far as the academy goes, neoliberalism favors radical change in funding and structure, so that higher education becomes an investment risk taken by individuals who benefit, rather than by the society that benefits. The old-fashioned idea that education was in itself a good thing, and hence the more educated a population the better (J. S. MILL), has been subjected to some sort of cost-benefit analysis intended to suggest otherwise. Certainly the prior models of higher education were dirigiste rather than market-driven. Once extremely
1. Administrative and territorial division of Ukrainian lands in the composition of Russian Empire on the beginning of XIX century. The development of capitalist relations and the beginning of the industrial revolution. Social contradictions. 2. Western Ukrainian lands within the Austrian Empire.
Job demands Job demands were assessed through five questions related to the different sources of pressure experienced at work. Overall, call center employees seem to report a higher level of pressure when comparing the sum index mean to other service sector workers. The difference does not seem very large but it is statistically significant. By fur- ther examining the individual statements about demands, more detailed information is acquired. The tempo of work in call centers appears to be very high as call center work- ers reported more often being required to work fast compared with other service sector employees. This is also reflected in the statements of whether the demands exceed indi- vidual performance limits. Call center workers felt more often that their job required too much input from them compared with other service sector employees. However, there is only a small difference between call center and service sector employees in terms of being required to work very hard. These results are in line with earlier studies that high- light the high demands and stressful aspects of call center jobs (Grebner et al., 2003). Table 3 Social support in call centers and other service sector organizations.
About a dozen years ago I started a journal and wrote a book, both with the name social epistemology (Fuller 1988; Fuller 1996). In the intervening years a few intrepid philosophers and sociologists have tried to map this area, and the two books under review represent two very important, yet very different, efforts from both sides of the disciplinary divide. But before proceeding further, I should say that ‘social epistemology’ is not the only rubric that philosophers and sociologists have used to map a common conceptual space. To be sure, in the days when Popper and Wittgenstein aroused passions,‘philosophy of the socialsciences’ could lay fair claim to that goal. Much of the work of Gouldner, Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu is also easily interpreted as exercises in social epistemology, as each in its own way theorises the place of the knower in the production of social knowledge. However, at the same time, there has been considerable resistance to social epistemology amongst both philosophers and sociologists in Britain. (It is no coincidence that Collins and Goldman are American.) Instead, what may be called social ontology turns out to be the terms in which philosophy and sociology have sought common ground, and much of what today passes for ‘social theory’ – especially that which takes Anthony Giddens as a significant presence – falls under this rubric (Fuller 1995).
interest in ‘time’ was only one example of the inherent problems associated with seeking to reconcile ‘objective’ analyses with ‘internal consciousnesses’. In looking at time and work, Bourdieu was deliberately highlighting the clash between the ‘modern’, ‘objective’ labelling of forms of inaction as ‘unemployment’ and the traditional accommodation of identical behaviour as socially valid. This tension in the observed situations correlated importantly with methodological tensions. Travail et travailleurs en Algérie is in two parts, setting up a dialogue between ‘subjective’ ethnography and ‘objective’ statistics, and Bourdieu wrote an introduction to the first part – “Statistique et Sociologie” – in which he argued that together both approaches set up a phenomenological dialectic. The text offered detailed information about the procedures adopted by the research team and provided transcripts of interviews which constituted ‘spontaneous sociology’. Bourdieu argued that his team of indigenous research assistants were intervening in their own political situations by virtue of conducting their research. In short, from his very first research project, Bourdieu was eager to suggest that he was not seeking to generate ‘findings’ which ‘represented’ the observed social ‘reality’ but, rather, that the process of research enquiry was performative and that the textual communication of that performance was a rhetorical device to generate an encounter between the cultural assumptions exposed in the research and those of the metropolitan French
particularly clear exemplars of the two poles of the spectrum of available positions, that is to say, proponents of philosophies particularly attentive to the demands of ‘the concept’ and of ‘experience’ respectively. Historians of philosophy, both figures rejected the idea that history and the socialsciences were better positioned than philosophy to investigate the latter’s history. However, the nature of their understanding of the proper method of the history of philosophy and what renders it properly philosophical were opposed, and their longstanding conflict is emblematic of the dynamic of the postwar metaphilosophical debate in France. As Bianco (forthcoming, p. 2) notes, Alquié represents a literary model of philosophy orientated towards experience’s resistance to conceptuality and objectivity, whilst Guéroult represents a quasi-scientific model of philosophy orientated towards a rational interrogation of concepts, structures and systems. What is interesting about the metaphilosophical dispute between these figures from the point of view of the present chapter is that Deleuze manifests a clear commitment to both of them. This immediately indicates that any attempt to position Deleuze within the space of the debates indicated by Foucault’s schema will have to be more nuanced than Badiou’s. The conception of philosophy at which Deleuze ultimately arrives (‘transcendental empiricism’) is an attempt to reconcile certain aspects of Alquié’s and Guéroult’s conceptions of philosophy, and thus to find a point of intersection at which the divide described in Foucault’s schema becomes indiscernible. 35
Multicultural societies are not a result of modern globalization; on the contrary they were even the rule before, not only in the Roman, Chinese, Ottoman, Russian, British and Habsburg Empires, but in the USA from its very beginning, and certainly in the Soviet Union too. However, it is true that modern socialsciences and humanities developed first mainly within the nation-state (Delanty and O’Mahony 2002; Henry 2005). Although this is not completely true. As well Karl Marx’ and Max Weber’ s contribution covered much more than the national level, just to take the two as the most prominent examples. Western Europe dominated socialsciences until the Second World War. The roots were French and Germany philosophy as well as British political economy. Talcott Parsons, who was a great name in the 1950s and 1960s, did nothing else than to combine – in his own words – Durk- heim (1964). And although Immanuel Wallerstein from the USA has reached some notori- ety, especially due to his presidency of the International Sociological Association/ISA from 1994 to 1998, his contribution is more or less a spin-off of Fernand Braudel’s approach, as he is rightly giving his own research centre the name of the latter. Nevertheless in the last couple of decades substantial differences have emerged between Europe and the USA, espe- cially if we include some quite original French, Italian and Spanish evolutions (e.g. Castells, Foucault, Bourdieu et al.). On this background Yoshimichi Sato asks: Are Asian sociologies possible? (Sato 2010) Today we find a large scope of social science theories (Table 3).
Intellectual discourse is often as culpable as popular because it is tempted to ignore scientific rigour in the quest to identify and unify intrinsically disparate phenomena. Here Hegel is found guilty as much as media commentators. Passeron‟s reflections on the deployment of language bears comparison with the way in which, contemporaneously, Bourdieu was seeking to analyse the effects of Heidegger‟s appropriation of ordinary language within his ontological philosophy – (Bourdieu, 1988, , based on Bourdieu, 1975). The chapter is integrated by the common concern with the extent to which language constructs „new‟ social phenomena to be analysed sociologically. Passeron considers the term „audio-visual‟ as a construction which supplies an apparently insatiable need for „novelty‟ in the same way as does terminology about sport. Passeron‟s reflections on the „audio-visual‟ arose out of a research project which sought to analyse the effects on library use of the introduction of audio-visual technologies. Typically, Passeron‟s interest is in the nature and impact of the new tool affecting popular literacy whereas, Bourdieu‟s comparable project of the 1960s on the use of art galleries and museums (Bourdieu, Darbel, & Schnapper, 1966, ) focused on the social position-taking of populations of visitors to cultural institutions. Does an „audio-visual‟ phenomenon constitute something significantly different from the phenomena which make up its component parts? Passeron argues persuasively that different media of communication are terminologically juxtaposed in a way which embeds meaning in common parlance and that this juxtaposition corresponds with a social need for ongoing technological innovation, but he, nevertheless, pleads that we should „avoid confusing this common sense knowledge with a philosophy of the eye and the ear‟(p.11). In microcosm, this reveals Passeron‟s general orientation in Sociological Reasoning:
In the part of the foregoing quote (in their italics) they somehow read into it the idea that I think resolving contradictions in understanding automatically leads to belief. Why would resolving misunderstandings and contradictions in, say, a religion (pick any) lead me to believe any of it. Absurd!! Apparently they think I am not only authoritarian but an idiot besides. For a person, like me, who claims to be a scientific realist and is well versed in this aspect of philosophy of science, understanding and belief are steps on the way toward developing truth claims having the highest probability of truth possible. But, let’s see. I understand all of the history, logic, and thinking behind the idea that the Earth is flat; but sad to say, I don’t believe any of it. In this case, ‘flat-earth logic’ has been shown to be false; therefore I believe the Earth is round (more or less). I understand the logic and wishful thinking underlying creation science, Intelligent Design, and ‘born-again Christians’ (I grew up with all this stuff as a missionary-kid in India), but I don’t believe any of it since I don’t see any valid research supporting the ‘faith’. JC might better have said: ‘understanding is independent of believing’. But it appears that their belief in the logic of critical theory obscures their understanding of anything, certainly anything pertaining to scientific realism and science in general. The Burrell/Morgan model is the premier paradigm model? Are you kidding? Is this a case of believing without understanding? Do JC believe in incommensurability without comprehending it? JC say that “incommensurability is an issue of belief, not one of truth”. What happened to understanding? Well, yes, I agree that people can ‘believe’ in incommensurability without asking whether it is ‘true’ or not. No problem here. People, even academics and especially critical theorists can ‘believe’ anything; truth be damned. There is no rule against believing without understanding, believing what is false, even believing when all of the facts appear to line up against the belief. We still have people believing in God and we still have the Flat-Earth Society. Some people will believe anything; people in the UK apparently still believe monarchies are still relevant…. Is this a truth? I am not in a position to say since I am from the New World – where we long ago rejected such nonsense.
Please have a look at a real life philosophy proposition: "brother is bigger than little brother". Obviously, this is a permanent established absolutely effective logic proposition, therefore is a truth in real life, eternal absolute the truth. No! Brother head is smaller than little brother! - one objection to say. Oh, This article the truth said all should be: brother age always is bigger than little brother. This suggests that, as language of the science and philosophy, unless without ambiguity, it is allowed to use ellipsis speech. So, "Brother is bigger than little brother" is the truth in real life, the eternal absolute truth. I.e. Article 6 the truth. That is to say, philosophy and the truth is not far away, also not mysterious, is just by your side. In fact, eternal absolute the truth throughout all the land run, see you looking for or not! It is lamentable that due to the misleading of dialectics philosophy, until today, all human beings are not able to find the truth, a truth, worthy the truth. It is clear that dialectics is fundamentally wrong.
Social Survey, described in these pages, was initiated by the ESF and is a major development in this field. New consistent and high-quality data will allow social scientists to raise and unify the standards to which they work. More importantly, a unified knowledge base for Europe is an essential part of the continent’s intellectual infrastructure. Its role in allowing Europe to think about itself, its people and its societies as a whole is no less vital in its way than the transport links and telecommunications networks of the new Europe. The social scientists in Europe’s universities and research institutions produce outputs such as journal articles and books which can be shown to be of high quality by world standards. They also form part of a community of social scientists working in government departments, public and private sector business and the non-profit sector, all of which rely on social scientists produced through education, training and personal development in European higher education. And like other scientists, they seek increasingly to engage the public in their work by communicating it to the widest possible audience.
This course will focus on the importance of work to individuals during their lifespan and its implication for society; psychological, economic and social factors that affect career development and choice; relationship of career counseling to personal and social counseling; the counselor’s role in client’s career development; scope and sources of occupational information including emerging fields; application of career development theories to school, college and agency settings, visits to job settings, interviews with employees, employers and agency representatives; analysis of job satisfaction. 3 credits. CNSL 667 diagnostic tools for Measurement:
To consider all recommendations for promotion received from Department Chairs, the Director of the School of Social Work, the Director of the School of Labour Studies, and, where appropriate, the Director of the Indigenous Studies Program or Director of the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition. For each candidate, the Committee shall recommend to the Senate Committee on Appointments that promotion be granted or not be granted at this time.
The mission of the Division of Social & Behavioral Sciences is to promote the development of intellectual and emotional coherence, to promote the effective interaction of individuals with society and with their environment, and to promote the development of an appreciation of the heritage of the Western world.
The graduates of individual faculties who graduated in 1985-2003 agree on their opinions of important social competencies. In their opinion ability to solve problems, communicate with people and learn is important for practice. One half of the graduates stress the necessity of the ability of teamwork. The graduates who have been working for longer time stress ability to risk. It is possible to deduce from the above information that in practice it is more important for them to be able to solve problems and communicate with people than to adapt themselves to the situation of an enter- prise. It is good that these opinions are not advocated only by the graduates who hold high posts. The information witness that the graduates agree on principle regardless a faculty from which they graduated and a year in which they did so. The differences result from the variety of positions which they hold after fi nishing studies.
There is every reason why this should also be the situation within the socialsciences. The quality of argument and evidential support is fundamental to academic production because what stands in the literature can legitimately be cited in the process of adding to it. That quality cannot be taken for granted unless it is permanently open to criticism. As the readings in this special issue amply demonstrate, the one-time processes of editorship and refereeing (including those presently in process) cannot be relied upon to guarantee even a basic competence in quite influential publications (McDonald and Kam, 2007). As well as the distorting pressures discussed earlier, referees are often called upon to pronounce on work which lies at the periphery of their competence and to do so in whatever time they can find between other deadlines. Against this justification for an expectation of competence it may be objected that it posits a cumulative social science which is not a realistic prospect; that such a science is a positivist fantasy and certainly not one which can be realized by legislating for a standardized methodology (Pfeffer, 1993; Van Maanen, 1995).
Note that “social science” or “humanities” will not be analyzed here because generalizations at that level are of limited use. The bibliometric literature takes a more nuanced approach, examining issues at the field level, which has proved valuable. In almost every study the psychology and economics literatures are found to be most science-like and in this contrast with the sociology literature. Also, fields change over time. Zwann and Nederhof (1990) point out that some parts of linguistics have converged towards cognitive science and publication patterns have come to resemble socialsciences more than history. Thus core journals can be identified and the averagereference has become more recent. Bibliometrics becomes quite tractable, even in this area traditionally viewed as a humanities field. We should beware of very old studies, as their results may not reflect the current situation.