political economy of development

However, given the social structure of Balochistan a pertinent question may arise that how well entrenched the modern concept of development would be in a society that coexists with the primitive tribal system. It is worth noting that Pakistan has not been a smooth democracy hence the electoral politics has failed to prevail the political economy of the country. Therefore, during controlled or quasi democracy that intermitted the direct military rule or dictatorial regime the nature and style of the governance remained unaccommodating. The actual political and economic powers always cling on to the centrist forces and never devolved to the regional or provincial representatives. This led to the dysfunctional political process especially at provincial level that further consolidated the already stranglehold of local elites. Nevertheless, even if the power is given to the provincial-based leadership the social structure in Balochistan with strong tribal hierarchy may hinder the socio-economic and political development of the people of Balochistan. Unlike other provinces of Pakistan where a teeming middle class has emerged with the assertive political and economic ambitions, Balochistan is sharply divided between a tiny but extremely powerful class of tribal chieftains and (il) legal business tycoons, and remaining lower class and a small group of public sector employees. The vibrant middle class is missing in Balochistan that can have an assertive politics to further its social and economic interest. Hence, it is true that the federation has never been interested in developing Balochistan and bringing it fourth at par to other provinces. But unfavourable social and economic culture that entrusts and makes the local elites and bureaucracy all-powerful and unaccountable is equally responsible for impeding the process of development in Balochistan. In other words, one may argue that it is the power nexus of the state of Pakistan and the local elites and selected representatives that maneuver the governance in province in such a exploitative way that only upholds and nurtures their political and economic interest at the very cost of common mass. Therefore it will be plausible to argue that the current institutional structure is the construction of the political and economic supremacy of tiny elite. And such elitist political economy has created a rent-seeking oligarchy that has consolidated considerable economic and political power and drifted the provincial economy towards more exclusivity.

Another essential part of the demand for tourism is means to access the diverse tourist places with comfort and security. For the purpose infrastructure in the host country needs to be well designed. It would be comprised of good transportation facilities in the form of roads, railway lines, airports, seaports, shipping services, etc. The communication services and lodging facilities are also part of the tourism infrastructure. Due to earthquake in 2005, Pakistan’s tourist areas faced havoc loss of infrastructure in tourism areas and even tourist places were destroyed. Government faced many troubles due to scarcity of funds for rehabilitation of the earthquake-stricken areas and development of infrastructure and tourist places. On the other hand war against terrorism was also consuming huge amount of funds. The energy crisis in the form of load shedding of electricity, the insufficient supply of natural gas to households and automobiles, and non-provision of complete set of tourism services have also been assumed as factor keeping tourism infrastructure in a bad shape. The rank of flag carrier airline in Pakistan is not so good. There is political economy of war against terrorism and development of infrastructure in Pakistan.

How does the system of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) function in political economy terms? In order to analyse the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) system, this paper will utilise the overarching concept of governance. Hence, the paper will not (as is often the case 2 ) evaluate the CDM system with regard to its contribution to environmental, social, and economic sustainability. Neither will I explicitly analyse the potential impact on the developing countries (see instead Del Rio 2007; Cosbey et al. 2005; Sugiyama et al. 2005). Instead, it will analyse the CDM system in general and the multiple functions of the Executive Board of the CDM system in particular due to the fact that this institution seems to be quintessential to the governance structure of the CDM.

Further occluding the precise focus of political economy analysis in tourism is the ‘kaleidoscopic character of tourism capitalism’ (Gibson, 2009: 529), and the concomitant difficulty of exerting ‘property rights over tourism experiences’ (Williams, 2004: 62). Despite considerable corporate concentration in key tourism and hospitality subindustries, notably in international tour operations, airlines and hotel chains, the political economy of tourism comprises a multitude of firms of varying size, scope and ownership. That being said, Britton (1991: 451-2) highlighted the reluctance of scholars to recognise the ‘capitalistic nature’ of tourism and to ‘conceptualise fully its role in capital accumulation’. More recently, critical tourism analysts have challenged what they argue is the predominance of applied business perspectives and scientific positivism in tourism research (Pritchard and Morgan, 2007). Finally, one could argue that tourism’s uniquely privileged position within the framework of the United Nations system through the UNWTO (see Ferguson, 2007), and its association with discourses of peace, conservation and sustainability, has arguably reinforced a benign view of tourism, to some extent hindering the emergence of critical theoretical perspectives on tourism development.

For example, let’s return to Sachs and the issue of poverty. Finding agreed and accepted means of measuring poverty in China is an almost impossible task. Official Chinese figures calculate that the number of rural Chinese living in poverty has dropped from 250 million in 1978 to around 25 million in 2006. A further 100 million or so live just above the poverty line, but are considered to be vulnerable to falling back into official poverty in the face of floods and/prolonged droughts, or through a SARs-like health epidemic (China Daily, 2005) - as happened when those living in poverty increased in 2003 largely as a result of natural disasters (Watts, 2004). However, Chinese poverty figures are based on what is needed only to ensure what the Asian Development Bank (ADB) terms ‘a basic level of survival’ (ADB, 2004: 4) based on an index linked basic standard of living survey taken in 1985, and are not widely considered to be internationally comparable. If we take the World Bank US$1 a day standard, we then face the problem of how to translate US$1 into Chinese Renminbi (RMB) given that currency controls mean that the US$ to RMB exchange rate is not set by the market. Using Purchasing Power Parity calculations to try to get over this problem (a process that is itself the subject of considerable criticism), then the US$1 a day figure comes out at about 90 million living in poverty with the CIA Factbook which also uses PPPs giving a figure of 130 million for 2006

Field experiments occupy an intermediate position: Researchers typically maintain con- trol over the assignment to treatment while for- going control over the treatment itself. Fea- tures such as the characteristics of subjects, the information available to them, and the precise manner and context in which the treatment is applied are more likely to take on values given by “nature” rather than being set at the discre- tion of the investigator. In the political econ- omy of development, many field experiments go a step further and seek to study subject behavior in actual political processes, often im- plemented by someone other than the exper- imenter (these are sometimes referred to as “policy experiments”). These field experiments are designed to retain the advantage of con- trol over the assignment of treatment to ensure internal validity (in particular, in establishing causality), while seeking greater external valid- ity than lab experiments can generally achieve. But these gains come at a cost: The more that control over the treatment is lost, the more dif- ficult it is to match experiments to quantities of theoretical interest and to get precise estimates of treatment effects. 2

Figure 2.2: ELF and Ethnic Salience By District, Country Means While I have thus far pointed to the clear need for including a 'salience' component of ethnicity in my measure of ethnic d[r]

The shortages of consumer goods were felt as extreme hardship by the people of Soroako, attesting to the crucial role they had come to play in the local economy. The lack of salt, as well as patent medicines, was cited as the reason for many deaths. The dead had to be wrapped in woven mats (tikar) instead of the white cloth decreed by Islamic custom. A school teacher told me he had often worn a sarong to school, as he owned only one pair of trousers. This traditional dress was regarded as inappropriate for the classroom and he felt great shame. Food shortages were in part overcome by more intensive exploitation of stands of sago, but this often meant trips, under military guard, into areas not under firm rebel control. On one such trip, a group of Soroakan men were fired upon by government troops. One was killed, and a number of others wounded. The survivors fled, and on their return the next day, the body had been removed. At other times villagers were captured by the army and held in the town until the end of hostilities.

At the same time, Cliffe Leslie, another past member whom we are proud to claim3 stressed the importance of " the collective agency of the community, through its positive institutions as[r]

The second condition relates to the exclusion restriction, i.e. oil price variations should not affect political variables through another channel than transfers. Given the importance of transfers in state budgets (on average 80%), there is little scope for other budgetary mechanisms. However, we may be concerned that variations in oil prices have direct effects on state-level oil production and therefore on state-level economic activities. While we do not have quarterly state-level data on GDP per capita for the period of our study, we nonetheless assess further that identification threat. To that purpose, we use quarterly cumulative precipitation and temperature anomalies (that is, deviations from the long-term quarterly mean defined from 1950, divided by the long-run quarterly standard deviation) to proxy for changes in economic activities. Since agriculture accounts for about 60% of Nigeria’s GDP, rainfall and temperature anomalies occurring in each state can be considered as a reasonable proxy for change in economic activities. Cumulative precipitation and average temperature are constructed based on climatic data provided by University of East Anglia Climatic Research Unit (UEA-CRU 2013). The UEA-CRU time-series datasets report average temperatures and total precipitation by months at data points of a high-resolution grid (of 0.5 × 0.5 degree), which are based on measurements from weather stations distributed around the world (Harris et al., 2014; Mitchell and Jones, 2005). 15 As described in the next section, we also do not find any evidence of a direct link between oil windfalls and economic activities, proxied by night light densities.

Empirical’ works on Political Budget Cycles are extensive and have found dif- ferent evidence about the incidence of fiscal deficits, total expenditures and total revenues before elections. The results differ between the group or country under study. For developed and less developed countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) did not find any change of government expenditure before elections. Shi and Svensson (2006) provide an empirical analysis based on a large panel of developed and de- veloping countries and found that, on average, the fiscal deficit increases by 22% in election years. However, the size of political budget cycles is much larger in de- veloping countries. They argue that the main reason for this difference is that in developed countries there exist strong institutional constraints on politicians and a large section of informed voters, which makes fiscal policy manipulation less effective. Similar results were found by Brender and Drazen (2005) in a broad cross-section of democracies over the period 1960-2001. However, they highlight that the existence of a political expenditure cycle in the fiscal balance is extremely sensitive to the set of countries included and that once they drop "new democratic" countries the effect disappears. At the same time, they find a significant revenue cycle (revenues fall in an election year) when they only include "old democracies". In the same wave, for developing countries between 1970 and 1992, Schunknecht (1996, 2000) found increases in public expenditures and in fiscal deficits in pre-electoral periods and contractionary policies thereafter, emphasizing that these fiscal policy cycles are stronger in less trade-oriented economies 68 .

Economic conditions have been found to be important determinants of insurgent activity both internationally (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel et al., 2004) and in Colombia (Dube and Vargas, 2013), so I turn next to the possibility that economic fluctuations specific to the border region may explain the results. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7 I look for evidence of economic spillovers from Venezuela into the border region. Column 1 shows that the results are very robust to the inclusion of the interactions between Venezuela’s GDP growth rate and both the Border and Neighbour dummies as additional controls in equation (3.1). Column 2 shows results after I include the interaction between the price of oil and both the Border and Neighbour dummies. This regression is motivated by the high dependency of the Venezuelan economy on oil, whose price rose dramatically in the period 2002-2008 (Figure 3.7a), and also by the fact that Colombia’s main oil-producing region is in the eastern departments of Meta, Casanare and Arauca, which are located near to (or at) the border. Again, the results are quite robust, suggesting that it is not variation in the price of oil what is driving the results.

Foreign-sponsored bribery is considered by many observers in developing countries to be the most significant factor to corruption 60 , which is characteristic of a narrowing of interests. International bribery can provide a strong disincentive against accurate and high-quality accounting and financial reporting, and also distort policy decisions at the political level. Various forms of corrupt practices may be encouraged or condoned by bilaterals or companies. The self-interest of bilaterals may be interpreted in narrow terms and not be consistent with the broad social interests of the people of recipient countries. 61 The greater that this is the case, the more likely it is that information will be (mis)used to support narrow interests, and encourage both corruptors and corruptees to hide information about both their actions and knowledge. A government that seeks stable influence in a particular country may be much more likely to want to deal with a corruptible ruling elite than a potentially changeable democratic government. Business and trade opportunities with that bilateral may be opened-up that provides opportunities for some segments of the society, and this can have positive overall benefits. Depending upon specific bilateral interests however, foreign country representatives may decrease the encompassing-ness of a governments’ interest in its

Migrants bring broader economic benefits, including higher rates of innovation. Data from the United States show that between 1950 and 2000, skilled migrants boosted innovation: a 1.3 per cent increase in the share of migrant university graduates increased the number of patents issued per capita by a massive 15 per cent, with marked contributions from science and engineering graduates and without any adverse effects on the innovative activity of local people. The United States, in particular, has been able to attract migrant talent through the quality of its universities and research infrastructure and its favourable patenting rules. In Ireland and the United Kingdom the share of migrants with tertiary education exceeds 30 per cent, while in Austria, Italy and Poland it is below 15 per cent. Countries offering more flexible entry regimes and more promising long-term opportunities have done better in attracting skilled people, whereas restrictions on duration of stay, visa conditions and career development, as in Germany for example, limit uptake. The aggregate effect of immigration on the wages of local workers may be positive or negative but is fairly small in the short and long run. In Europe, both multi- and single-country studies find little or no impact of

The vision of development and the critical role for industrial policy proposed by the various con- tributors in this volume could be summarized as follows. Economic growth occurs when an economy is able to go through radical structural shifts, such as the movement from an agrarian to an industrial economy. That change can only hap- pen through the accumulation of knowledge, the implementation or adaption of new technology, and the coordination across many different sec- tors. The source of the market failure stems from both the public goods nature of knowledge as well as the coordination problems involved in bringing together many different actors to make innovation happen. The authors are skeptical that the market by itself will both generate sufficient knowledge and solve the coordination problem. Hence they argue that there is a critical role for industrial policy. They write that “the idea that a Toyota, a Samsung, a Tata, an Embraer can just naturally spring up out of a multitude of peasants, just due, again, to the ‘magic of the market’, is a fairy tale that few ought to be ready to believe” (4).

In the past many tribal people protested against SEZs and industrial estates that extended to their own lands. For many decades the exploration of iron ore, magnesium, silica and bauxite deposits were found in various parts of Goa. The Silica and bauxite were found in coastal Goa, while huge deposits of iron ore and magnesium were found in inland areas. The state of Goa generated the vast revenue on mine and there was no distribution of share profit for social development of those who lost their livelihood. For last many decades there was massive destruction of agriculture due to mining silt deposited in the agricultural fields and acute water shortages in Goa. The problem caused by mines have different effects on various tribal villages in Goa .These consequences include the Pollution effecting the crop, health ,damage of house, drinking water and agricultural water that got highly polluted and contaminated .

The armed forces are the other decisive set of Ivorian actors. The national army has remained factionalised based on ethnicity and partisanship, and its cohorts lack cohesion and discipline. Moreover, Ouattara has remained beholden to the former rebels who helped him reach power. In particular, zone commanders or com’zones associated with the former armed wing of the rebellion, still enjoy an important, ambiguous role, and have led repeated mutinies over issues of money, status, and functions, most prominently in 2017. Another group whose members have moved in and out of rebel and formal armed forces has been dozo hunters, a group of initiated hunters. In factions of the army not associated with Ouattara, there is widespread discontent too. Indeed, some political figures from the opposition have ties or influence of their own related to the armed forces, such as Soro, and the PDCI’s Michel Gueu. Police and gendarmerie have also formally undergone security sector reforms. The reforms have achieved some notable results in professionalising these bodies, while also being objects of power struggles and influence among both international and Ivorian actors.

The multi-stage randomized assignment of polling station teams was employed state wide in Bihar beginning in 2004, and has since been adopted nation-wide, covering more than 814 million registered voters across 543 parliamentary constituencies. Among the assumed benefits of the adoption of randomization was a weakened ability of political parties to coordinate ahead of time with polling station officials or identify which locations would be the easiest targets for capture. These policies are generally viewed as having been successful in reducing the frequency of outright booth capturing. However, issues potentially remain with biased election officer behavior on election day or types of electoral fraud that occur in the longer term prior to elections, such as vote buying or intimidation. I focus in this paper on the former.

incomes on a large number of outcome variables, including clothing, housing, die- tary choices and education. Mazumder notes that "[t]he education of children was another investment soldiers willingly made" (2003, p.42). While primary education was free, books, stationary, and uniforms made education expensive in rural areas (Darling, 1934, p.173). The income effect could potentially be further boosted by changes in preferences that were induced by military service. The following Jat soldier writing from France is quoted in Mazumder (2003): "What we have to do is educate our children, and if we do not we are fools and our children will be fools also". While demand for education (as a normal good) should increase in response to an inflow of income, the loss of male labour forces in the home communities due to the mobilisation of men for military service can counteract this effect. In the presence of credit and labour market imperfections, the opportunity cost of sending children to school may increase substantially if households have less la- bour available to work on the land held by the household. Hence, the opportunity cost effect could outweigh the income effect and the impact of large-scale military recruitment on the demand for education remains theoretically ambiguous. A third channel through which military recruitment may influence literacy is the supply side of education. It is possible that heavily recruited communities attrac- ted more public spending on education. While public spending on education could be exogenously driven by the preferences of the colonial authorities, it is also pos- sible that the public spending reflects increased demand from certain communities. The remarkable success of the military in securing favours for their personnel, of- ten under an implicit threat of rebellion, is indeed a central element in the political economy literature on the military (Collier, 2007). However, the Government of India faced an important trade-off from a recruitment perspective if it was to invest in educating its recruitment grounds: promoting schooling might raise the reserva- tion wage of future recruits. Therefore, the colonial authorities may have preferred not to invest more in education in their recruitment grounds. 15 The responsibi-

Once the Third World country's external debt had increased at rates from 20-30 percent over a period of ten years, and the levels of external debt had begun to approach 40-50 percent or [r]