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Integrating Social and Political Strategies as Forms of Reciprocal Exchange into the Analysis of Corporate Governance Modes

Integrating Social and Political Strategies as Forms of Reciprocal Exchange into the Analysis of Corporate Governance Modes

Our conclusions also matter because they will help fulfill the research promises implicit in such surprising conclusions that: (1) “most of management research focuses on expectations of reciprocity” (Copranzano & Mitche ll, 2005: 875); (2) “the rule of reciprocation is the most potent of the weapons of influence ar ound us” (Cialdini, 2007: 6 17); (3) the range of what is exchanged among firms covers not only traditional goods and services but also influence and favors; (4) while only large firms can fully integrate social and political strategies (Liedong et al., 2015: 421), organizations of all types and sizes can use reciprocity; (5) a firm can create value by sharing it with stakeholders when a pattern of positive reciprocity supports the creation of additional rent (Bosse et al., 2009: 450-451), and (6) non-contractual relationships create a firmer anchoring for the notion of “ relational governance ” (Crook et al., 2013: 73) by linking the latter to Fiske’s (1992) “equality - matching” relational mode rather than to the more common trust- based “relational contracting” explanation which depends on repeated transactions.

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"Associations matter: reconsidering the political strategies of firms in the European Union"

"Associations matter: reconsidering the political strategies of firms in the European Union"

Since our analysis of lobbying is based on newspaper sources, an epistemological note is necessary. One may assume that firms will most of the time be interested in confidentiality, which may lead us to suspect a bias in lobbying reported. Finding a public trace of lobbying activity might indicate that only firms that have called upon the media will appear in our sample. Since the use of media is considered an “outsider lobbying” strategies, employed by structurally weak actors, we would risk missing the more relevant “insider” activities. However, insider and outsider lobbying are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Goldstein, 1999, Kollman, 1998). In fact, outside lobbying may be a welcome complement to inside lobbying (Kriesi et al., 2007). It is often a way to remind the legislator of the lobby’s electoral weight and the potential damage it may produce. Moreover, the low salience of EU politics in general somewhat protects lobbies to a large extent from a public opinion backlash. This is a major difference to the national arena, where lobbying by individual firms may be very bad publicity and therefore counter-productive. These considerations lead us to believe that newspaper reports on EU lobbying indicate only consciously chosen outsider strategies.

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Framing and Agenda setting in Russian News: a Computational Analysis of Intricate Political Strategies

Framing and Agenda setting in Russian News: a Computational Analysis of Intricate Political Strategies

We expect different aspects of frames to be foregrounded during economic upturns than in downturns. To investigate these differences, we define a set of months M t + , as the 10% of months where RTSI showed the greatest growth, and a corresponding set M t − where RTSI showed the greatest decline. We then take M t+1 + as the month directly following every month in M t + , and we similarly define M t+1 − . From the analysis in §2.2, we expect media manipulation strategies to decline from M t + to M t+1 + , and increase from M t − to M t+1 − . For each frame, we take the subset of U.S.-focused articles that use the frame. Then, we use log odds with a Dirichlet prior (Jurafsky et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2008) to identify words that are overrepresented or underrepresented from M t + to M t+1 + and from M t − to M t+1 − . 6 Thus, for each frame, we identify words which become more common after a stock market downturn and become less common after a stock market upturn. We refer to these words as AgendaLex.

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Women’s Political Strategies: The Power of Telling Silence in Maghrebian Folktales

Women’s Political Strategies: The Power of Telling Silence in Maghrebian Folktales

Resistance embraces many coping mechanisms employed for survival including silence when it is used as an aid to the survival and healing of the individual. Throughout many Folktales in Monia Hejaiej’s Behind Closed Doors: Women’s Oral Narratives in Tunis, Jilali El Koudia’s Moroccan Folktales, Zineb Ali Benali’s Kan ya makan, L’ Algerie Conteuse, Dreams of Trespass: Tales of a Harem Girlhood by Fatima Mernissi, Maghrebian women use silence not as an indication of modesty and submission but as an act of defiance and strength. In the Maghrebian culture, silence is seen as a feminine virtue which signifies modesty and obedience. However, the silence of women, as presented in the folktales in the aforementioned books, extends beyond their muted voices. Women have used it as a powerful way to handle the pain of their lives. Silence has been used as a voluntary act, a freely chosen refusal to speak. Therefore, it becomes a political discourse and act through which women subvert the patriarchal norms by expressing their displeasure, their freedom to retain their own secrets. Significantly, the storytellers and the protagonists of their tales maintain silence as a loud sound that represents an appropriate, viable and useful response to patriarchy. Thus, they effectively reclaim an action previously regarded as passive, even apathetic and use it as a means of social and personal transformation.

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Political strategies of external support for democratization

Political strategies of external support for democratization

The word external in support to democratization conjures up a big field too. It denotes many actors of various types – governments, regional and larger inter-governmental organisations, quasi-independent and non-governmental organisations, commercial and not-for-profit – all seeking to influence the prospects for democracy within countries. The number of such actors based in Europe, the United States and elsewhere has increased considerably over the last 15 years. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has been a central actor in the Balkans for instance, and the United Nations (UN) too is increasingly involved (see Newman and Rich, 2005). No single democracy promotion agency operates in a vacuum. Nevertheless if only to make this inquiry more manageable the number of actors and unit of analysis used for illustration here will be the US and the European Union, rather than the multitude of individual democratization support agencies. Unlike the US the EU is not (yet) a state but there has long been a recognition that it conducts external actions, even if until recently it has lacked a comparable, institutionally-grounded foreign policy capability. That said, neither actor should be viewed as monolithic. Indeed, policy choices including those for foreign policy can be understood as the product of complex strategic bargaining among interested parties – actors concerned about their relative power within the institutional matrix, and not necessarily giving priority to policies that will be most rational for the whole (Milner, 1998: 779; 785). For instance Europe’s strategies for democracy support are said to have emerged from ‘strikingly inchoate decision-making processes. Rather than…a sophisticated and carefully reasoned conceptual approach, arbitrary accidentalism abounds’. (Youngs, 2004a:13). The situation in the complex bureaucracy of the US federal government may not be vastly different.

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Bangladesh: National Political Econmic Strategies in Perilous Times

Bangladesh: National Political Econmic Strategies in Perilous Times

English medium schools; they will cry themselves hoarse warning us about environmental crisis, but build high-rise buildings without any concern about their impact on urban blight; they will be eloquent about the need for moral clarity, but will have no problems winking their way through the ethical thicket of institutionalized graft and bribery; they will decry the politics of agitation, confrontation and brinkmanship, but engage in it themselves at the first opportunity; they will glorify the democratic process, but then undermine the parliament; they will loudly proclaim that religion is a private matter and there must be a wall of separation between mosque and state, but will make sure that their visit to Saudi Arabia and their participation in religious functions are widely publicized; they will forever express their solidarity with the people, but not care about the suffering their public policies or political strategies impose on them; they will be eloquent in defense of freedom of the press, but attack journalists and file cases against them if their investigations cut close to home; they will encourage political constancy and ideological commitment in others, but themselves function in a system of shabby bickering and horse trading, fluid alliances and fungible loyalties, and be chameleon-like in their ability to change color and direction depending on immediate advantage and opportunity. The political elite dismisses concerns about intellectual honesty or charges of hypocrisy as the work of, what else, “conspirators”. They seek power, and are not bothered that they do not have morel authority. There are , of course, striking and outstanding individual exceptions …However, generally, they have collectively helped to institute a system to “crony capitalism” through the formation of a “klepto-patrimonial”, rent-seeking predatory state, which has not “failed” but has probably been “struggling” for some time. In the hands of the same leadership class, it is destined to continue in the same direction. If we leave the foxes to guard the hen house, does it matter what party comes to power, that administrative changes are instituted, and what procedures are put in place? 7

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<p>Organizational Politics And Workplace Deviance In Unionized Settings: Mediating Role Of Job Stress And Moderating Role Of Resilience</p>

<p>Organizational Politics And Workplace Deviance In Unionized Settings: Mediating Role Of Job Stress And Moderating Role Of Resilience</p>

In organizations, politics is merely a reality of life; 12 thus, the practice of political strategies in organizations is well- known. Real-life experience, intuitions and circumstantial proof for years have maintained a general faith that behavior of organizations is habitually political in nature. It is the vicious and bitter reality politics and political behaviors in organiza- tions are unavoidable behavior. Organizational politics now has become a substantial research interest area in the context of behaviors and perceptions. 13 Earlier studies have veri fi ed the drastic consequences of organizational, political perception on organizational commitment 14 engagement with work, job stress, 12,15 job satisfaction, 16 turnover intentions, 12,17 and inno- vative work behavior 18 ). Signi fi cance of organizational politics lies in its possible potential negative consequences on personal and work-related outcomes. Previous literature has laid down extensive evidence that politics in the organization raises the negative perception of fairness, moderate organizational com- mitment, and at the end of the day, necessitates turnover plans or turnover. 19 Although the cost and prevalence of workplace deviance within organizations is high 20 but very little has been explored up till now to document the dark relationship between politics and deviance in unionized public sector organizations. Hence the prevalence of deviant behaviors within organiza- tional circuits is an economic threat for the wellbeing of employee and employer. 21

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Global political risk and currency momentum

Global political risk and currency momentum

of momentum strategies, which helps us understand better the determinants of currency risk premia. We construct a two-factor asset pricing model that incorporates information contained in our global political risk measure. More precisely, the first factor is a level factor as originally introduced by Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011), which is measured as the average return across portfolios in each period. This traded factor resembles a strategy that buys all foreign currencies and sells the U.S. dollar. As such, it is highly correlated with the first principal component of currency excess return portfolios. The second (slope) factor is our global political risk measure, designed to capture political risk surprises around the world; this factor is highly correlated with the second principal component of currency momentum portfolios. We find that global political risk is priced in the cross section of currency returns since it is able to explain a significant part of currency excess returns. Winner portfolios load positively on global political risk innovations while loser portfolios load negatively. Our main intuition regarding this finding is linked to the fact that investors require a higher premium for taking on global political risk by holding a portfolio of past winner currencies. On the other hand, investors accept a lower return from investing in loser portfolios, i.e. past loser currencies, as they provide insurance against adverse movements of currency returns in bad states of the world. From the perspective of currency momentum investors, bad states of the world are characterized either by increases in political risk in the

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"State Strategies in a Changing European Order - Sweden's Participation in the European R&D Cooperation EUREKA"

"State Strategies in a Changing European Order - Sweden's Participation in the European R&D Cooperation EUREKA"

The issues regarding EUREKA may be said to concern both so-called high as well as low politics. What decided the character of the specific issue seems to have been the percepttion of the persons involved and the fact that the Foreign Ministry has a right based in the Constitution to take part in issues with foreign and security policy implications. The EUREKA program initially had a rather problematic link to security policy, that is SDI and the technological direction of EUREKA. Apart from this, the EUREKA program seems to have retained similar implications. The politically sensitive part for Sweden, that is neutrality policy, was of course substantially diminished in importance by the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern European bloc. The cooperation within EUREKA has been influenced by this political change. The increased role of the Ministry of Industry in the handling of EUREKA seems to have taken place before this change in Sweden's external environment, that is before the Cold War finally ended. My archival materials instead imply that there is a sort of 'division of labor' within the government and that the Foreign Ministry had a kind of 'first choice' to handle these issues.

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Norms, strategies and political change: explaining the establishment of the convention on the future of Europe

Norms, strategies and political change: explaining the establishment of the convention on the future of Europe

The impact of the norms of transparent deliberation and democratically accountable governance accounts for this result. Norms affect political outcomes by providing a menu of legitimate forms of action from which actors choose those that are considered likely to solve a given political problem. Two factors indicated the problem solving capacity of the new institutional arrangement. First, the Convention that had been established in 1999 by the European Council to draft the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights 17 achieved its objective swiftly and earned widespread praise 18 both for the outcome and the process that led to it (interviews, Brussels, 8 July 2003 and Paris, 29 March 2004; see also Jospin, 2001). In other words, the first convention offered a concrete example of how this novel method could operate in practice. Second, the Convention on the Future of Europe had been mandated to choose between drafting different options or a single document so as to provide a clear basis for the subsequent IGC. Unlike the new method, the IGC had been unable 19 to provide this basis as demonstrated in Nice where the work done during eighteen months of preparations was ‘thrown out of the window’ as soon as the summit started (Gray and Stubb, 2001: 13).

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In Search of the Necessary Conditions for Transforming the Chinese Reified Social Reality

In Search of the Necessary Conditions for Transforming the Chinese Reified Social Reality

These problems are seemingly inevitable. Consider corruption. It has been en- demic due to the institutional features of a distorted Marist-Leninist state—with the People’s Congress as a “rubber-stamp” legislature, unchecked policy-making and implementation powers are vested in the state bureaucracy with self-serving state cadres being the wielders of political, social, economic, and judicial powers. Then, as PRC further develops economically, the corruption stakes increase ex- ponentially—recent news reports on anti-corruption reveal that bribes received by township level cadres could amount to millions of US dollars, while bribes at ten million dollars for provincial level cadres are hardly atypical. Given that their average annual income is just around US$10,000, state cadres inevitably find corruption irresistible. In this context, even though most state cadres and CPC members no longer subscribe to Marxian revolutionary values, they as power wielders are still committed to regime continuity, just because it enhances their self-enrichment (Butterfield, 1982).

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Organic farming policy networks in Europe: context, actors and variation

Organic farming policy networks in Europe: context, actors and variation

from an implementation perspective with no politicized debate. Furthermore, with a change in the Danish government the state interest in organic farming policy decreased. By contrast, in both Austria and England organic farming was an issue of policy debate in 2003/04. In Austria the agricultural ministry initiated the restructuring of the organic farming network which culminated in the creation of a new umbrella organization, Bio Austria. In England, an Organic Action Plan group was set up in 2002 by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the responsible administrative body for organic farming, and work was still going on in 2003/04 (DEFRA, 2002). In consequence, we find a more active state in Austria and England, explaining its higher betweenness centrality. In Switzerland and Denmark the state has taken a more background role in the policy process, leaving it to organic farming organizations. These interest groups have succeeded in retaining their powerful role in the policy network even though there is currently little political debate about organic farming.

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Political parties and political marketing ‘strategies’

Political parties and political marketing ‘strategies’

When implementing political marketing strategies, it would seem, at first glance, a greater professionalization of political parties enables the framework conditions to exist for a political marketing approach to be adopted, since there are professionals within a party. This has been facilitated by a move towards what Panebianco (1988) termed the „electoral professional‟ model of political party governance, whereby „careerists‟ in the central party assume ever greater importance in the political party apparatus. However, whilst professional political campaigners are highly skilled and committed, they arguably do not have the skills or perhaps „will‟ to implement the political marketing concept in the „pure‟ way in which is advocated by political marketing academics. Therefore political marketing is operating and competing against the more readily accepted idea of campaigning. It can thus be argued that to redeploy resources away from the campaigning function to the newer idea of political marketing is inherently challenging to any political party. This is because of a number of reasons. The first is related to human resourcing, as whilst political parties have large numbers of highly valued and experienced „campaigners‟ throughout the different hierarchical and geographic tiers of the party, there are very few that would admit and be willing to be „rebadged‟ as political marketers. Whilst they may have indirectly built up the skills of political marketing, they would not recognise and feel comfortable (because of historical-cultural reasons) with having their campaigning title being replaced by a new notion of political marketing. However, it has to be made clear that the postulated resistance by people inside political parties to become „political marketers‟ may in theory not be only a semantic objection. This is because inevitably there are likely skills limitations within the organisation with respect to political marketing. At strategic levels of the party, there may be an unwillingness for campaigners to further their skills from a political marketing perspective, as they regard themselves to be „expert campaigners‟ with tried and tested models of political campaigning that deliver results for the party. This view obviously has value, as it can be asserted what would be the point of taking risks in political marketing when

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The neutrality and formality of conflict: strategies, transformation and sights of the logical framework in Sarvodaya

The neutrality and formality of conflict: strategies, transformation and sights of the logical framework in Sarvodaya

This thesis outlines situations of conflict faced by NGOs through empirical analysis. Social and administrative tensions present in society, organisations, partnerships and projects blend to create situations of conflict. This thesis argues that perceptions of neutrality and formality are desirable in situations of conflict given breakdowns in communication, informal relations and trust. It illustrates that structural arrangements and desensitised representations support wider stakeholder involvement and provide a platform for developing coordinated visions. In addition, this thesis suggests that internal actors and wider community stakeholders can potentially construct formal and neutral accounts of their knowledge, experiences and aspirations. In relation to other accounting studies, the ‘particular conception of organizational reality’ portrayed by the LF is fluid and based on assemblage of an ambiguous methodology and degrees of flexibility promoted by technical paradoxes of the LF (Burchell et al, 1980, p. 5). In this thesis, stakeholders participated in the making of fluid representations and developed their own set of constructs which were on par with other stakeholders. This thesis also proposes that constructs can be mobilised to redress imbalances in authority by providing internal actors and locals with opportunities to structure interactions, facilitate coordination and intervene in their own affairs. In the midst of sensitivities between conflict-affected communities and government actors, the LF was a space where “interests [were] negotiated, counter claims articulated and political processes explicated” (Burchell et al, 1980, p. 17). Such deployment of the LF’s neutrality and formality in situations of conflict suggests that previous calls to study accounting beyond its technical features (see Hopwood, 1978) should also examine ways in which such technicality of accounting enables participation, rather than act solely as a force for discipline as well as aligning actors to dominant governing interests (Covaleski et al., 1998; Ferjuson, 1994; Hall, 2001; Neu et al., 2006; Rose & Miller, 2010).

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Interculturalism: Europe and Its Muslims in Search of Sound Societal Models. CEPS Paperbacks. June 2011

Interculturalism: Europe and Its Muslims in Search of Sound Societal Models. CEPS Paperbacks. June 2011

The situation of Muslim minorities in Italy (also not the subject of a chapter in this book) shares some features with Spain and France. Like Spain, it is a country without a long history of immigration; on the contrary it was a country of emigration until a few decades ago. But the immigrant population has risen fast in recent years, reaching around five million (without counting illegal immigrants). Their composition by country of origin and culture is very heterogeneous – the first three countries of origin are Romania (Christian and Latin), Albania (a highly secularised country of Muslim culture) and Morocco (a ‘regular’ Muslim country). As in Spain there have been several major waves of regularization of the residence status of immigrants (three in the 1990s), but without the granting of citizenship, which remains very restrictive. Also as in Spain, the relatively recent origins of this immigrant population explain why there has been little development of any political concept or model regarding their integration into Italian society. The implicit presumption seems to be assimilation, but without citizenship, which in due course will prove an inconsistent and undemocratic combination. There are no separate state- funded schools for immigrant communities, and little development of representative bodies or associations. As elsewhere in Europe, integration tests and conditions have been introduced as requirements for non-EU nationals to obtain residence permits (language texts and sponsorship by an employer). Right-wing parties within the coalition government have pushed hard for elements of repatriation policy, both in general and notably in bilateral relations with Libya, the geographically closest source of immigration. There is manifest tension between on the one hand right- wing politicians who are pushing an agenda of tighter restrictions on immigration alongside elements of repatriation policy, and on the other hand business interests in northern regions that need immigrants to make up for labour shortages.

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The intervention strategies of humanitarian agencies in a complex political emergency: The case of Sri Lanka

The intervention strategies of humanitarian agencies in a complex political emergency: The case of Sri Lanka

When direct talks started with the LTTE in Jaffna, on October 13 and 14, 1994, they centred on the following issues: economic hardships, rebuilding of the severely damaged infrastructure, rehabilitation of displaced people, and the reopening of a free passage for civilian travel between Jaffna and the mainland (Rajanayagam 1998). After the meeting, Karikalan who was the leader of LTTE’s delegation, LTTE’s Batticaloa commander, as well as number two in LTTE’s political wing, said that he would expect the talks to proceed in two stages. The first stage would involve finding solutions to the immediate problems that people were suffering. The second stage would focus on finding a political solution. The government, on the other hand, apparently saw the alleviation of the day to day problems of the people as confidence building measures which would run parallel to political negotiations (Rajanayagam 1998). During talks, in January 1995, when modalities for a cessation of hostilities were agreed, the government made an offer of Rs. 40 billion for rehabilitation and development of the North and the East. On January 26, 1995, the government lifted the ban on transport of all items to the North except for 18 items.1 On February 3, a Presidential task force was appointed for rehabilitation. On February 15, the President informed the LTTE that reconstruction projects could start almost immediately on electrification of Jaffna, roads, reconstruction of the public library and repairs to the Jaffna General Hospital. On February 24, the government unilaterally announced pulling back the Forward Defence Line at the Pooneryn Army Camp in order to facilitate safe passage of civilians between the peninsula and the mainland (Rajanayagam 1998).

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The Politics of Investing in Families: Comparing Family Policy Expansion in Japan and South Korea

The Politics of Investing in Families: Comparing Family Policy Expansion in Japan and South Korea

Turning to Korea, we also find that family policy did not receive much attention before the political left gained weight in Korean politics (see An and Peng 2016 and Lee 2012 for Korean family policy expansion). It was only during the first center-left government of Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) when family policy was expanded in a meaningful manner. The most significant improvement occurred in the area of services, as the government intended to in- crease both the demand and supply of childcare services. To boost the supply of childcare services, the government made it easier to open childcare centers by abolishing the previous government approval requirement. The deregulation of childcare provision led to near dou- bling of the number of private nurseries during the tenure of the government (from 6,538 centers in 1997 to 11,046 centers in 2002). With regard to demand-side intervention, the gov- ernment introduced childcare allowances for low-income families. A series of reforms were implemented to improve the time dimension for parents with childcare responsibility. Mater- nity and parental leave schemes were expanded in terms of duration and benefit; and the parental leave scheme, with a new flat-rate benefit, was also made available to fathers.

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Politeness of Discourse and Vocabulary Teaching

Politeness of Discourse and Vocabulary Teaching

There are some aspects of culture in different countries that may make an utterance impolite: specific taboo words and topics. There is a joke saying that one can speak of very frank sexual issues or drug-taking to a Dutch, but not about how much s/he paid for the new outfit. Though taboo topics are not exactly the sphere of vocabulary teaching (they are rather a sphere of speaking skills and strategies formation), explaining to the students that words like “cheap”/“expensive”, “cost”, “price”, etc. are a sort of “taboo” in small talk is an essential part of vocabulary teaching.

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Political crisis and political ethic in the  global age

Political crisis and political ethic in the global age

This article was aimed to analyze and describe political crisis and political ethic in the global age. Two methodswere used for understanding this topic, namely the analysis of theories and the review of literatures. This article presented a study of review and some results were obtained. Political ethic is a part of social ethic and literally talking about political life of human beings. Pancasila (Five Principles) cannot be separated from all aspects in the governing of a nation. Governmental officers may take benefits from political ethic. First, ethic is needed for the relationship of politic and power. Second, political ethic is aimed to empower community-based control mechanism against governmental policies by which the divergence from the ethic can be restrained. Third, governmental officers must take a responsibility for any decisions they have made with their position or also be responsible for the effect of their decision after they leave the tenure. Ethic distortion is a genuine consequence of politic. People say that politic is dirty, manipulating power, engineering fake-goodness, and showing a practice of deception. This statement reflects community nausea to political atmosphere. Political ethic could deliver a moral meaning into the duty of governmental officers when they hold public position and it should be change toward better mindset and action. In essence, political ethic is evidently importantto governmental officers either on the practical or conceptual terms of their duty. The definition of globalization is “a process to unify the products of thought and action from any humans, including individual, group, and community, from any parts of the worlds”. Technological advance has positive and negative impacts. Reversing this negative impact would require higher quality of mental standing. This quality involves noble character, faith, and trustworthiness to enforce the coalescence and unity of a nation.

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Identity Representation Strategies used by English and EL2 Political Actors and Researchers

Identity Representation Strategies used by English and EL2 Political Actors and Researchers

To extract the quantity and quality of the nomination strategy, several steps were followed. First, the semantic content of the elements chosen for reference to others was examined. Based on the entity they referred to and their linguistic realizations, we could identify three major categories of direct reference, membership categorization and suppression, each with several subcategories. After obtaining the frequency of all the sub-categories, they were qualitatively examined and compared regarding their specific socio-political context in English and EL2 discourse.

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