CENTCOM planners received initial instructions to begin planning for military operations in post-conflict Iraq. Civilian elements of post-conflict plans, which were within the purview of the Defense Department, did not receive any planning or policy consideration until January 2003. Initial post-conflict military planning was not developed until summer 2002. Two months before the Iraq war began, President Bush received his first post-conflict operations briefing.115 Secretary Rumsfeld acknowledged this institutional bias, telling Gamer that the Defense Department has not focused on the post-war operations as much as needed during the lead-up to invasion.116 As Gamer and his ORHA staff deployed to Kuwait, the reality on the ground reflected the institutional focus in Washington: the major combat operations subordinated all other tasks, including post-conflictstate-building. Consequently, there was no preparation for the post-conflict element. There were no civil affairs plans for the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) - a core part of CFLCC - after the fall of Baghdad. Colonel Alan King, head of civil affairs for the 3rd ID, was tasked to develop a civil affairs plan in 24 hours after realizing on April 8 - one day before the fall of Baghdad - that no such plan existed at higher headquarters.117
There are a couple of organizations and institutions that deserve my recognition for their (in)direct contributions to this inquiry. First, the Netherlands Institute for Military History (NIMH) of the ‘Command and Services Centres’ (CDC) of the Dutch Ministry of Defense. Here I was provided with a research assignment that helped me to familiarize myself with the issues regarding international military involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Particularly, I got acquainted with the concepts of SSR and DDR and learned how to scrutinize these in military conduct. In turn, this learning and thinking process helped me to streamline my thoughts on the subject matter of this inquiry. Second, the Dutch NGO Pax for Peace provided me with primary statistical measures of the effects of DDR as seen from the perspective of local Sudanese communities. This source material offers comparable samples that helped me to make a reflective assessment of post-conflictstatebuilding efforts. Third, I would like to thank The Hague Academy for Local Governance for providing me with an opportunity to discuss questions regarding state fragility, the rule of law and theories of change with various practitioners in the development world. This has helped me to translate my thoughts into text and allowed me to unravel the conceptual relationship between process legitimacy and liberal- democratic benchmarks such as the rule of law.
Following the model of the Washington Agreement of April 1994 which created the bi-national Federation of Bosniacs and Croats, the Dayton- Constitution also brought a complex system of ethnic power-sharing for almost all the institutions of BiH. So BiH has a bi-cameral legislature where the three so-called “constituent peoples”, Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, are represented in parity (5:5:5) in the second chamber, the House of Peoples. The same holds true for the collective State Presidency consisting of one Bosniac, one Serb, and one Croat member. Also the government with a chair and ministers and their deputies is composed according to an ethnic key. The Constituional Court, which is the only court established at the state level, is the only state institution for which the Constitution did not proscribe an ethnic key. In actual practice, however, two Serbs, two Croats and two Bosniacs were elected by the Entity Parliaments in 1997 as “domestic” judges in addition to the three international judges appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights. In addition to this ethnic representation, mutual veto power was entrenched in the Constitution. Each member of the Presidency and the members of the caucuses of the constituent peoples in parliament could declare a decision or bill “destructive of the vital interest” of a constituent people. In contrast to these ethnic and collective rights, both the Constitution and Annex 6 of the GFAP on the protection of human rights do, of
There are at least four rationales that have been put forward by different agencies as justifications for rule of law reform in fragile, post-conflict or underdeveloped states (this has varied partly on the basis of mandate or vogue). (1) Economic development: the argument that rule of law is essential to economic development focuses on the need for predictable and enforceable laws for contract enforcement and foreign investment. (2) Democratization: the protection of human rights and mechanisms holding government accountable are essential in liberal democracy, and inherent in rule of law. (3) Poverty reduction: rule of law reform is considered essential to poverty reduction as the poor suffer more from crime, the impact of crime on their livelihood is greater, and they are less able to access the justice systems (DFID 2000, p. 1). (4) Peacebuilding: transitional justice, creation of courts to resolve conflict, and writing constitutions and legislation to remove sources of conflict and injustice are increasingly considered essential aspects of peacebuilding in fragile and post-conflict states (Secretary General 2004). As is the case for most complex state-building goals, it is difficult to prove the requisite causality to establish any of these justifications with certainty. The propositions themselves are complex, multifaceted, and general, and while there is little rigorous evidence to support them, there is at the same time little evidence to disprove them. Moreover, the individual goods in themselves, such as economic empowerment, the protection of human rights, or professional and independent judges are generally recognized to have inherent value of their own.
international and local policy-maker in Libya should consider the enhancement of effective and accountable human security within a framework of democratic governance lead by the rule of law principle. The government shall address security at the political level and translate the outcome into government policy regulated by a legal framework that needs to reflect on the country’s legal culture and tradition. The external actor’s agenda should be attuned with local priorities and engage at the higher political level to provide support to security policy and national security architecture instead of lowering risks responding to security policy with operational solutions. In a postconflict scenario where the national ownership is weak and the external actors replace one of the contractual parties promoting the western concept of social contract, the process failed proving the social contract has implications far beyond the community itself and powerfully shaped by the discourse in the national political system which include state and non-state actors as well. The international community continues to struggle with inadequate and outdated conceptual tools maintaining Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and the state security monopoly of the use of force in a centralized political and administrative structure disregarding Libyan’s political discourse. The centralized state have failed because the original social contract between the state and its citizens was broken and the recreation of a political and social order requires to be restored. If the states is not capable of providing the highest levels of human security in their absence predatory violence by competing armed groups is likely to prevail instigated by the state itself in an insecurity vacuum and non-state forms of governance.
67 strengths that different actors including non-state actors-bring to the multiple tasks of conflict management. Smart power also looks to the lessons of the past decade and a half of conflict management and intervention successes as well as failures. (Leashing the Dogs of War-Crocker, et al, 13) The military has, in the past two decades has been increasing relied upon as a tool for not only fighting terror but also to rebuild shattered societies with its civil-military capacities. Building societies in a postconflict setting must go hand in hand with the traditional business of diplomacy and conflict management and our military leaders necessarily will be part of this process. They therefore need to be armed with the academic understanding of these processes so that they can stand shoulder to shoulder with their civilian peers with the credibility that makes them effective. Focusing in on and interpreting the causes correctly is essential to helping to define the prescription for conflict cessation. Analyzing the roles ethnicity, religion and most importantly economics play in intra-stateconflict provide the necessary context to enable policy makers to design and construct useful and sustainable programs. Simply killing “terrorists” while easy to quantify (see again “input metrics”) and while making sensational headlines, does little to alleviate the root causes. Indeed it may just inflame local passions and make the actual problem that much worse. Policy makers and military leaders especially will need to become more creative in applying multi-faceted strategies.
Democracy needs legitimacy, which is gathered from four interconnected sources: shared beliefs, international legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and process legitimacy (Dagher, 2018). International legitimacy stems from international recognition. In post-conflict states this is inherently earned to some extent, as the international actors that are participating in the peace process will to give recognition in order to do so. Process legitimacy is earned through the establishment of institutions and frequent elections. The haste with which elections are conducted in post-conflict states has been a significant source of criticism due to its consequences, and competition between former enemies (Autesserre, 2014; Bennett, 2016). In response, it has been argued that minimum preconditions, such as structural and institutional requirements, should be met before a post-conflictstate can democratize (Ottoway, 2007; Hippler, 2008; Schmidt, 2008). In fact, experts have suggested that U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should focus more its aid on nationbuilding and less on democratization, claiming that in the developing world, democracy is a “luxury good” (Boot & Miklaucic, 2016).
The 1978 Exclusive Economic Zone Act that transferred the natural resources in the continental shelves from the coastal states (Sagay, 2006) to the Federal Government transferred the revenues accruing to oil-producing states from the continental shelves to the Federal Government, Moro (p.184). Similarly, the Land Use Degree (now Act) of 1978 that puts all land in the country under the state governments to hold in trust for Nigerians but arrogates all land with petroleum in them to the federal government, is an instrument of oppression against the region. By this law, the people of the Niger Delta lost their means of livelihood to oil exploration and exploitation without adequate compensation. The effects were poverty, crime and militarization of the struggle for emancipation. The Land (Title vesting) Decree (now Act) makes provision for the federal government to assume the ownership of any land, hundred meters limit to the 1967 Shoreline of Nigeria (Moro p. 193). This implies that any lease granted by any corporate or incorporated body or any state government in respect of such lands shall cease from having any effect and such body or government has no right to institute a legal action against the state.
During early post-conflict interventions, donors and governments often need to show quick results, and pri- orities may follow externally driven political objectives rather than health needs. Priority is then given to the re- habilitation of the more visible physical infrastructures, such as tertiary hospitals, and peripheral structures that serve people who have less access to health care and often greater health needs are neglected. Similarly, in HRH, priority for rehabilitation of the different cadres may not be guided by equity concerns: the medical workforce is sometimes prioritized above the nursing workforce, despite the fact that nurses are the main pro- viders of basic services, particularly in more deprived areas where the population most in need lives . For example, in Cambodia, nurses and midwives trained be- fore the war were retrained as doctors. This took the ex- perienced HWs of these cadres away from their original professions, causing an over-production of doctors and medical assistants. Moreover, pressures were in place to abandon training of assistant-level nurses and midwives in favour of training diploma nurses, who often then ended up working in the private sector a .
All health care systems receive a degree of support from the state budget, funded by revenue gained through vari- ous taxes. Through the Abuja Declaration, developing countries have a target of dedicating 15 percent of their total budget to health; however even if they met that tar- get, many would be unable to generate sufficient revenue to provide universal access to health care services . Several options exist to increase funding for the health sector. Donors can provide direct budgetary support, but countries are then subject to the fickleness of donor aid, which ebbs and flows based on donors’ policy choices ra- ther than developing country needs. Direct budgetary sup- port without sufficient oversight capacity is susceptible to corruption [2,21]. To ensure accountability, donors often impose rigorous reporting requirements that can be bur- densome for developing countries . For more sustain- able domestic sources of funding, policy makers can introduce revenue generating reforms including user fees, social and private insurance schemes, and community fi- nancing. We begin our review with a brief examination of the gender implications of health financing through gen- eral government revenues and then turn to user fees, so- cial health insurance and private insurance.
Referring to intra-state conflicts or wars taking place within the context of the “disintegration” or “collapse” of states, the “new wars” are described in terms of a blurring of the distinction between war, organised crime and large scale violations of human rights. 21 Due to their spill-over effects, they are considered as the most serious threat to regional and international peace and security. The outbreak of a number of this kind of wars, in which the distinction between combatants and non- combatants and between international and domestic disappears, created a rising demand for new conflict resolution techniques, leading to the formulation of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The changing nature of conflict characterised by the collapse of government structures, massive human rights violations and refugee flows, in other words, required not only the deployment of international military personnel but also civilian, non-governmental and private agents such as police officers and legal experts, electoral observers, human rights monitors, humanitarian workers and communications experts. 22 The military component of the mission, tasked with restoring security, law and order and disarming warring parties, is expected to create the necessary conditions for civilian staff members to deliver humanitarian aid and undertake a comprehensive political, economic and social reconstruction process. 23 This reflected the convergence of the international development and security agendas in the post-Cold War era: that is, development resources must be used to change societies and the behaviour and attitudes of people in relation to violent conflict in order to reduce the likelihood of conflict in the future but development is impossible without attaining security and stability in the first place. 24
Interviewee 4, Architect, Interviewee 5, Procurement officer, and Interviewee 6, Finance Officer all identified another challenges of the Planning stage in the post-conflict Iraqi school building and delivery. It is about the lack of the culture of dialogue where the interviewee expressed their inability to communicate with other people who were involved in the project either on the site or in ministries. There is no transparency in the way these people deal with each other and it is difficult to obtain reliable information regarding the budget, the payments or anything that is related to the project. This is one of the consequences of the prolonged conflict from the one side, and the Iraqi culture from the other side. This agrees with what the World Bank (2006) has demonstrated that almost all post-conflict countries have demonstrated weak performance in the effectiveness of the government and control of corruption. Government effectiveness is also measured by the extent to which law is enforced in the country away from any other affecting factors. It is also measured by how far people feel secure with the police and the courts and how far rules and laws are enforced. The other criterion for measuring the government effectiveness is the extent to which the citizens are enabled to express themselves freely and have free associations and free media. Controlling corruption is another indicator of the government’s effectiveness. Corruption means exercising public power for personal gains through ‘petty and grand forms of corruption or state capture by elite and private interests’ (DESA, 2007). In the post-conflict countries the political institutions are too vulnerable to afford for the development reformist political system (Practical Action, 2005). The government’s efforts to restore the social and political normal life are hampered by the post-conflict challenges such as competition for power for personal interests and not for using it for the public interests. The other challenges are that political leaders have limited legitimacy, an extremely high level of polarisation, and lack of consensus on the way the country should follow to encounter the challenges and overcome them (Practical Action, 2005). All these challenges have affected the stage of Planning, and in fact, all the school building process.
In violence and conflict affected contexts, humanitarian interventions may be also viewed as antagonists of system development and their benefit considered ‘out of place’ once the country is declared in a reconstruction and development phase. Especially because the distinction between conflict and post-conflict can be so imprecise, it is worth to note the highly political nature of determining when conflict or crisis ends. Many states show reluctance to accept the continued role of war, violence and socio-economic precariousness as part of the context reality, as illustrated in the country’s self-assessments under the New Deal. Often this recognition is feared to delay or make the transition to development less clear cut, or even could raise questions about the legitimacy of development-oriented arrangements that coincide with potential vested interests of the existing system and state institutions.
While the debate young people as threats, perpetrators or victims of armed conflict persists in literature, their exclusion as invisible stakeholders in decision-making processes present fundamental challenges for conflict management and peace building. Since this vulnerable group have the capacity to be threats or facilitators of peace, listening to their voices, particularly the way they are (re) constructing their experiences with conflict introduces new perspectives to this discourse. This study responds to this deficiency. Data for the study was collected through qualitative in-depth-interviews and focus group discussions in Jos, the Plateau State capital. Findings of the study indicate that political marginalization, and social exclusion served as trigger factors for violence among young people in the state. The findings also show although young people feel alienated and lack an outlet to articulate their needs, aspirations and grievances, they are promoting peaceful coexistence through self-initiated non-violent alternatives like peace meetings and mutual participation in religious activities. The paper recommends among other things, that government and civil societies recognize young people as important stakeholders in the peace building process. The paper also advocates the importance of creating of a youth-centered, and youth- specific policy that will provide a platform for youth engagement in post-conflict peace initiatives in the state.
As conflicts have a greater impact on the built environment of a country, postconflict reconstruction requires repair and reconstruction of housing and the social and economic infrastructure of the affected countries. Among the reconstruction of physical structures, housing reconstruction remains important as housing reconstruction after war plays an important role in establishing the country’s development and peace. Despite this importance, it can be seen that there is considerable inconsistency between the provision of built housing and the needs of the users. It is claimed that postconflict housing reconstruction projects that overlook users’ needs and local variations in physical and socio economic conditions lead to dissatisfaction on the part of residents, and ultimate remodelling by themselves or rejection and abandonment (Barakath, 2003; Barakath et al., 2004). These factors highlight the importance and necessity of addressing conflict affected communities’ housing reconstruction needs in postconflict housing reconstruction. With regard to this, it is worthwhile to examine the concept of housing needs in general and to explore the housing needs of conflict affected communities. Therefore this paper presents a synthesis of housing needs literature relevant to usual and postconflict contexts. To clarify, housing needs are sometimes referred to as housing requirements or demand for housing. As an example, Kitchen and Milbourne (2006) define housing need in terms of housing units as ‘’the quantity of housing needed to house those households currently lacking their own housing, or living in unsuitable housing, and who cannot afford to buy or rent housing without assistance’’ [see also (Commission for Rural Communities, 2006; Pawson and Tuckley, n.d.)]. However in this study, housing needs are referred to as the factors that satisfy the requirements of occupants.
Scholarship on contested sovereignty, and weak and fragile states, proliferated after the end of the Cold War. Intrastate conflicts such as those in Abkhasia, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Chechnya, Kosovo, Iraq, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Rwanda, and others have become a new security concern. Weak and failing state institutions have been shown to be a breeding ground for terrorist and secessionist activities, lacking capacities to provide public goods and order, and often plagued by insurgencies that seek to carve out territories for themselves (Carment and James 1997, Rotberg 2003, Fearon and Laitin 2004, Newman 2009, Coggins 2014). In such places, statehood has been contested through challenges to its internal and external sovereignty (Krasner 1999), where international actors have developed “shared sovereignty” (Krasner 2004) with local actors in order to govern and provide peace, security, and governance. In the past decade, prominent indices have been developed to measure degrees in which institutions are weak (such as those published by Foreign Policy 2005–2016, USAID 2005, World Bank 2009, Brookings Institution 2008, Index on African Governance 2009, Rice and Patrick 2008, Rotberg and Gisselquist 2009, Kaufmann et al. 2009). Challenges to state sovereignty, domestic and international, have not merely involved external actors such as major states and international organizations. It has remained little understood that they also involve diasporas that are “outside the state” but “inside the people” (Shain and Barth 2003) in specific ways.
HOPE DRC was established in 2004 and started disbursing loans in Kinshasa, the capital city of DRC. While most microfinance institutions concentrate their activities in one area and then expand later, HOPE DRC chose from start to establish its activities in the three main cities of DRC (Kinshasa, Kisangani and Lubumbashi) separated by thousands of miles within a country emerging from decades of political and armed conflicts without basic infrastructures. “The main challenges include creating efficiencies in an environment with underdeveloped infrastructures and managing multiple branches separated by large geographic distances” (Mixmarkets, 2010, p.1). HOPE DRC entered the DRC’s financial services market when major armed conflicts ended and the DRC entered the post-conflict era. HOPE is a regulated microfinance institution recognized by the Central Bank of Congo (BCC) as a microfinance institution under the new DRC microfinance law. As of December 2007, HOPE DRC had a Gross Loan Portfolio of US$ 868,225; 11,160 active borrowers; an average of US$ 78 per borrower; US$ 0 deposit; 100 employees; and total assets of US$ 1,506,001(MixMarkets, 2010).
In 2011, a study by K. A. Idrissov, has shown that a phased research the psychological effects of persons in armed conflict is gradually reduced, but still remains higher in comparison with regions where military conflicts arose. More intensive dynamics of PTSD was observed in the first years, then the positive dynamics stopped, which may be the fact of the transition of PTSD to chronic forms of manifestations.
Indeed, the analysis offered here finds Robinson’s description of the technologies for managing authoritarian-democratic transitions that comes the US démocratisation literature very apropos. A successor to theories o f political development (those central to counterinsurgency, as per Chapter 3), this literature likewise relies on the reification of order in the social sciences as the key political ‘good’ (Robinson, 1996: 46-48). It restricts deeper definitions of democracy in the name of avoiding a regression to authoritarianism: ‘Popular forces have to be restrained in order to assure a stable transition, and are held responsible for jeopardizing “democracy” by inducing with their social demands a resurgence of authoritarianism’ (Robinson, 1996: 64). Elections are a key legitimating feature of this system, yet the undemocratic nature (indeed purpose) of elections is explicit; according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘put in a nutshell, parties of the Right-Center and Right must be “helped” to do well, and parties to the Left-Center and Left should not win by an overwhelming majority’ (Robinson, 1996: 65). Furthermore, (Robinson, 1996: 64)the requirement for orderly transitions leads to trade-offs between popular demands and the promise of participation in the consolidated, post-transition ‘democracy’ in two areas: the economy and the military. However, such trade-offs are not - as they are cast - temporary, transitional concessions; rather, they become structural features of the post-transition order (Robinson, 1996: 65). The Guatemalan peace process similarly u sed elections in an unreformed system to legitimate the negotiations and engaged in a number of strategic deferrals of essential issues, as discussed further below.
So, if conflict is inevitable among humans, its occurrence in multi-ethnic society like Nigeria is normal. This is not to say that, the diverse a society is the main conflict it will have, no, what we are saying is that, if close societies can have conflicts, then, pluralistic societies would have conflict too. And then, mechanisms should be put in place to manage them. This is very important, as no society can insulate itself from conflict, be it mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic. No matter the society one lives in, she/he will still struggle for survival will lead to conflict. For examples, homogeneous societies also have problems. The case of Somalia is very true that mono-ethnic societies do have problems. In conclusion, it will be so dangerously misleading to say that multi-ethnic society is sonorous with conflicts and mono-ethnic societies in peace.