Public management reforms are usually underpinned by arguments that they will make the publicadministration system more effective and efficient. In practice, however, it is very hard to determine whether a given reform will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the publicadministration system in the long run. Here, I shall examine how the concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) introduced by János Kornai (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai, Maskin and Roland 2003) can be applied to this problem. In the following, I shall describe some steps of the Hungarian publicadministrationreforms implemented by the Orbán government from 2010 onward and analyze them, focusing on which measures harden and which ones soften the budget constraint of the actors of the Hungarian publicadministration system. In the literature of economics, there is some evidence-based knowledge on how to harden/soften the budget constraint, which improves/reduces the effectiveness and hence the efficiency of the given system. My conclusion is that the concept of SBC can significantly contribute to public management studies by deepening our knowledge on what publicadministrationreforms lead to a more efficient and effective publicadministration system.
Studies addressing the public management reforms in Lithuania (e.g., Bouckaert, Nakrošis, & Nemec, 2011; Nakrošis & Martinaitis, 2012) rely on expertise and usually on “hard” data and concentrate on identification of reform trends, agentification or other important aspects of publicadministration system. However, the availability of systematically collected data via survey of public senior executives provides the opportunity to evaluate the functioning of publicadministration and reform trends directly from the “insider” point of view, using data on Lithuania from one of the largest comparative public management research projects in Europe - Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS). The aim of this article is to provide the general assessment of publicadministrationreforms since 2008 and to discuss some of the factors related the perceived success of functioning of the publicadministration. General assessment of the publicadministration (PA) reforms, perceptions of the results oriented culture and coordination during fiscal crisis are explored.
The solution I propose for the European Union member states is the establishment of a minimum set of principles that should be compulsory for each member state, for the candidate countries and possible for partner countries, and the construction of a structure inside European Commission responsible for their observance. As this proposal may be outrageous for many people, I will try to present some arguments in its support. Publicadministration is one of the few domains without acquis commu- nautaire. In addition, there is no directorate or other structure in the composition of the European Commission responsible with this field. The old member states were extremely reluctant related to any kind of European regulation related to public ad- ministration. Indeed, at a first glance it is diﬃcult to imagine rules that will apply for German, French or British publicadministration. But this pride of some of the old member states should be put in balance with principles like responsibility and ac- countability. As I mentioned above, in the case of Romania a large amount of money were spent by the European Union for the promotion of the administrative reforms. That is the European tax payer’s money. The results are precarious. Who is respon- sible for this poor outcome? What will happen in the future with the funds that will be allocated to the new and future member states? European Commission has moni- toring mechanisms for structural and cohesion funds. But ultimately the national ad- ministration of each country is responsible with the implementation of the projects financed through these funds. The low quality of publicadministration in a certain country will lead to a poor quality of the usage of the European funds. On the other hand, it is about a principal – agent type of relation. At one extremity of the chain are the European citizens and at the other extremity is the European Commission who should be responsible with the way European funds are spent.
According to National Reform Programme 2016, the publicadministration reform focuses on three main pillars: (a) civil service reform, (b) central publicadministration reform and (c) local publicadministration reform. Concerning the second pillar, the aim is to increase the efficiency, performance and stability of the public policy framework and of fiscal-budgetary framework at central level, and to place the citizen at the centre of the public service delivery system, especially by administrative simplification and reduction of bureaucracy. In this context, two months ago, the Romanian Government adopted a series of measures for de- bureaucratisation through Emergency Ordinance no. 41/2016 on the establishment of certain measures for simplification at central publicadministration level and for amending and supplementing some normative acts.
two more colleagues to be interviewed. Encouraged by this first experience, I started approaching people I believed might be helpful for my cause. It was a random search with no set criteria for informant choice except willingness to participate. The second interview I recorded was of a person belonging to the statistic wing. I decided to approach him because he had a reputation for being outspoken. On my request, he asked to come for the recorded interview after office hours as he was sharing his space with other colleagues. This is a general practice in Pakistan‘s public sector – that senior officers are provided a private room while the middle managers share space with support staff. After recording two interviews my confidence started rising and I continued my data collection. Mainly people showed a mixed reaction to my request as they were really interested in lending their voice to the topic, but were also afraid of the potential consequences that doing so may have. In addition to my personal assurance and trust gained from the informants, I believe timing was also a factor in successfully recording of the maximum number of interviews. The organisation I targeted has completed almost 10 years of reform activities and now people are ready to speak out despite known threats. To encourage interviewees to have confidence in the interview process, and especially in letting me record their answers, I had to play a few unidentifiable portions of previous interviews with other colleagues to prove that the recordings would be truly anonymous. All the interviews were recorded in interviewees‘ respective offices during or after office hours. Locking the door from inside, removing the phones from their cradles or meeting after office hours were the general actions taken by the interviewees during the interviews as precautionary measures to prevent on the plea that they don‘t want any disturbances during their interview.
Connections to other reforms, and information basis that is closely connected to diverse opinions, are premise factors. The latter ones produce complexity especially when several truths are in ques- tion. In publicadministration, there are connections between reforms, and the solutions made or not made in one may affect another (eg. Bouckaert 2009). The factor related to the social process and causing complexity is power games. When there are dissimilar interests, power games en- velopes the different actors’ ambitions to steer the reform in the desired direction. For instance, issues can be unpredictably taken up for strategic reasons related to power games. This can hap- pen both at the local level and in central government and is not easy to verify. The complexity in the implementation process is connected to, for instance, by whom and in what way the reform is taken forwards. Problems are caused due to unclear or not approved reasons of implementation or ontents. These all together illustrate that reform as a whole is viewed from various angles. It makes the overall picture of the reform polyphonic and thus it may appear blurred for many ac- tors. In a social process, different factors are linked together in a complex and unique way. One of the problems in the development of publicadministration in Finland has been the con- stant implementation of separate partial reforms (Nyholm & Airaksinen 2011). The reforms have affected a single sector of administration at a time, such as regional, municipal, or provincial administration. Operations have not always been coordinated.
To some degree the URA has contributed to strengthen existing social networks. For instance, when someone gets a job in the tax administration he or she is expected to help his or her kin and family. Because Ugandans perceive that URA-officers receive high salaries, extended family members expect to get their share of the high wages. It is one’s social obligation to help and share. URA staff are therefore seen by their family members and social networks as important potential patrons who have access to money, resources, and opportunities that they are morally obliged to share. A person in a position of power is expected to use that influence to help his or her kin and community of origin. Hence, increased salaries may lead to increased social obligations, which again may ‘force’ tax officers to take bribes to compensate for the higher expenses. What looks like corruption from the outside is undertaken by some tax officers in a context where the reciprocal obligations of kinship and community loyalty require such behavior in order to be regarded as a ‘good person’. Hence, as argued by Daniel J. Smith (2003), the standard definition of corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ assumes a rigid dichotomy between public and private that glosses over a complexity that characterizes the relationship between the individual and society in many African bureaucracies.
Improvements in the effectiveness of public education outreach programmes could also account for the improvements made in the quality of investigations. A growth in public awareness levels indicates that the majority of the public have developed an understanding of what constitutes corruption and economic crime. Lending credence to this are the results of a Customer Satisfaction Survey undertaken for the Botswana Public Service. They revealed that about two thirds of the respondents expressed their perception of the effectiveness of the DCEC’s public education programme as ‘very good’ and just under half (48.9%) rated the quality of education programmes on the evils of corruption as ‘good’ (Republic of Botswana: 2005:106). A favoured target of the education initiatives conducted by the Directorate has been the country’s youth; with schools, youth centres and universities often playing host to promotional campaigns involving presentations, brochure distributions and anti-corruption clubs (Oluwu, 1999; Matlhare, 2006). The use of a mascot, named Rra Boammaruri (Father of Truth), has aided awareness among youth of primary school level. According to Katlholo (2004:4), the mascot has proved particularly popular, with feedback suggesting that children continue to refer to it and that it has “helped them to make moral decisions when faced with ethical dilemmas”.
Another potential research issue is to examine how governments determine their public policy objectives and reforms, particularly in the area of PPPs. As a theoretical focus “governmentality” may be used as it examines the discourses that shape the meaning and significance of government policies (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011). Governmentality framework could thus provide insights into the thought processes as well as the mechanisms for exercising power to implement government policies for analysing the PPP policy discourse. There has been scant research on how institutional drivers lead to the development (or otherwise) of PPP policies globally (English, 2007; Petersen, 2010). But none of these studies have systematically analysed government discourses. A future research could therefore explore governments’ practices and processes that have been seeking the operationalisation of PPP policy objectives. This empirical analysis would help to further understand the functioning of PPPs and governments’ public policies towards PPPs and traditional infrastructure investment as an alternative public policy option. The governmentality framework (Foucault, 2008) and its bio-political implications (Foucault, 2009) could be useful to explore how governments (cities and regions) drive smart city initiatives in the pursuit of governmentality goals spanning from efficiency to societal goals. Another area of research in PPPs may be to explore the roles of Management Control Systems (MCS) and trust in operationalising governments’ policies, such as in PPPs. There is some evidence to suggest that MCS in hybrid and other inter-organisational settings, such as in PPPs, are instrumental for enabling government policy objectives into the localised practices (Arnaboldi & Palermo, 2011; Barretta & Busco, 2011; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Marques et al., 2011). Moreover, most prior work in PPPs has focused on how PPPs are managed during their operational stages (Broadbent et al., 2008; Edwards et al., 2004; Pollock & Price, 2008). More research is needed to explore the effects of operational MCS and the role played by trust (Andon, 2012). This would help to identify the criteria and characteristics of formal accounting controls that are supportive (or otherwise) to the development of trust and long-term relationships.
Finally, we present some tables using the Ebeke et al. dataset, which basically presents the same results regarding the effect of tax reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the variations are limited. For example, interacting LTU and SARA only provides two observations. These include interactions between the three reforms to test whether any tax reform works better when it is combined with another one (Table A.6). For this purpose, we constructed mutually exclusive coefficients of every tax reform. By mutually exclusive, we mean, for example for the VAT, we assign the dummy equals 1 only if the country only adopted the VAT and no other reform. We find no significant effect for any interaction, though the SARA is the only reform with a positive coefficient. These results do not meet the one in Ebeke et al. (2016) who presented positive and significant effects when the VAT is combined with the SARA.
One of the basic reasons for inefficiencies in PA systems around Europe is the very nature of the infrastructure of the political system in each country. An example of that is Greece. Greece has been an EU member since 1981 and since then had been awarded a considerable number of co-funded EU projects. One of the main issues associated with public sector projects in Greece is that of IT response rates from the project implementer to the main project coordinator/champion (Observatory for the Greek IS, 2007). That happens predominantly because the ICT penetration in PA in Greece is lower than the EU standards/average. In terms of Internet Connections (Broadband Networks in particular) for instance, current price policies do not, as yet, support individual and businesses to absorb the funds, although this is fast changing to the better (Observatory for the Greek IS, 2007). This problem exists in other EU state members.
MPA core competencies define the skills that MPA students are expected to have mastered by the time of their graduation from the program. The first list below of “basic” competencies are those that every student is expected to have mastered, based on the core curriculum. These are based on the MPA Advisory Board’s recommendations and NASPAA (National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration) guidelines. The second list includes additional competencies relevant to publicadministration (government and/or non-profit) that a course might address. These are based on NASPAA guidelines.
Publicadministration and local government in particular, which also includes municipalities in individual countries, is in the context of the economic crisis a very topical and widely discussed issue. The management of municipalities is subject to increasing control by the public, the state and the municipalities themselves. The aim of the presented paper is to offer a comprehensive definition of efficiency and methods that allow measuring it. As results of our analysis can be mentioned overview of TOPSIS technique application in a several studies.
These long-held beliefs so ably described by analogy with the medical profession seem obvious to any student of administration but to the practioner and in particular to Manx administrators they seem alien. Certainly the conceptual frameworks within which administration is pursued and the principles on which it is founded elsewhere are rarely examined by any Manx civil servant and what knowledge they possess of how government wprks in practice is derived solely from experience and socialisation. There is a lack of knowledge concerning how the same functions are performed elsewhere (except occasionally and on a superficial level in the UK) and concerning the analysis of administration by others (both practitioners and academics) about how administration ought to be practiced. Even the ’gifted amateurs’ of the British civil service are sent to be schooled at the civil service college in the principles of government, to study some elements of the political and economic environment of their work and to learn
Apart from detecting and indicating corruption in publicadministration a key issue in order for justice to prevail against crime is the detection and bringing to justice its perpetrators. The results of this paper prove that in this regard, despite the results achieved, regarding police and prosecution work were manifested significant stagnations. These stagnations usually were expressed in the investigation of senior public officers (ministers, deputies, judges, prosecutors etc.) “Thus, according to the Kosovo Police data for the period of time 2008-2013 were filed 2467 criminal reports related to the corruption phenomenon in publicadministration. Among the investigated persons, according to the used data, (excluding this year cases which have been discussed above) were included only the names of a deputy prime minister (to whom the investigation was later dismissed) and a former minister, two prosecutors and three judges. 41
However, in regard to legal employment relationship, even after the transition, until the year 1996 in Albania there has been no difference between the public administration’s employee and other working relationships. They were all regulated based to the Labor Code. Civil Service Commission, as a special institution for the civil service’s work- relations, was firstly established by Law 8059 dated 21.03.1996 "On Civil Service in the Republic of Albania”. For the first time this year it was set up the concept of civil servants. Implementation of this law had many problems in practice, because the Civil Service Commission had a conflicting interest task , as it was the selection of candidates to be appointed as civil servants and also the protection of their rights. It was a bias institution, hanging through the appointment of its members by the Council of Ministers. This law was later repealed by Law Nr. 8549, dated 11.11.1999 "On the Status of the Civil Servants". The new law corrects dependence of the Civil Service Commission, turning it into an independent institution, whose
Regarding the third research method (the fi eld interview), elite interview in Marx- ist-Leninist states is indispensable as governmental information is neither publicized fully nor in a timely manner. The authors had therefore conducted 720 in-depth inter- views between 1983 and 2017, involving 835 state cadres and academicians in Baotou (Inner Mongolia), Beijing, Chengdu, Dalian, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Hechi (Guangxi), Lanzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Taiyuan, Wuhan, Xi’an, Zhengzhou and Zhuhai, covering most major cities in China. The authors consider that the es- sence of all public administrative phenomena is ‘responsible purposive authority application’ (RPAA) and that RPAA is a function of various forces (i.e., socio-cul- tural, institutional, political, organizational, technological, executive, cognitive, and human, which can be linked up to construct an acronym, ‘SIPOTECH’), which act in concert to generate interactive and confi gurative contextual eﬀ ects on the general, specifi c and peculiar types of RPAA. It is therefore imperative to use interviewing to generate all available data and evidence about the SIPOTECH dynamics of RPAA. Thus, semi-structured interview, lasting from 30 minutes to three hours, was used to collect as much information and insights as possible from the interviewees. Further- more, instead of journalistically focusing on ‘what’ had happened ‘where’, ‘when’ and for ‘what’ reasons, interviewees were asked to refl ect on some critical admin- istrative events to explore the underlying behavioral logics and causal mechanisms of SIPOTECH forces. To ensure that the interviewing fi ndings are valid, the authors had used information and evidence collected from document analysis and fi eld ob- servation to triangulate. When discrepancy was observed, more interviews were then conducted to clarify.
Transcripts: Transcripts with the graduate degree posted are available upon clearance of the degree by the evaluator. However, transcripts showing the degree are not automatically sent to the student upon graduation. Transcript requests can only be done in person or by mail. Coordinators/directors should refer students to the Public Contact Window in Joyal Administration Building or the transcripts Web site <www.csufresno.edu/are/forms/> to print the transcript request form. A fee of $4.00 for the first copy, $2.00 for each additional copy through ten.
The Project Demonstrating Excellence is an independent research project, requiring a student to integrate and synthesize the knowledge and skills acquired in previous courses in the Advanced PublicAdministration sequence. It is designed to demonstrate a student’s mastery of theoretical and critical scholarship in the field as well as provide him or her with an opportunity to exercise originality and creativity. In consultation with the instructor, the student will select an existing public agency in New York City and identify one or more officials inside the agency who agree to serve as consultants for the project. Utilizing a range of research methods, the student will study the agency and write a 30-35 page report, divided into two sections. The first section will examine and analyze the public issues and problems the agency seeks to address. It will include an analysis of the constituencies served by the agency, a critique of existing policies, and recommendations for policy alternatives. The second section will analyze the agency from a structural and managerial perspective, providing an organizational chart, an analysis of management theory and practice, and recommendations for restructuring and/or alternative managerial practices to make the agency both more efficient and more effective. The report should add to the existing body of knowledge in the field of PublicAdministration and should have, at the same time, applications in the real-world practice of publicadministration.