Asymmetric transnational armed conflicts give rise to additional and unique challenges, which derive cumulatively from their being both asymmetric and transnational. The traditional under–regulation of such conflicts can result in a responsibility gap concerning non–state actors, which in turn generates a protection gap in relation to the civilian population. For instance, in traditional international armed conflicts, each state party is under obligation to take the maximum feasible precaution to protect its ‘own’ civilians from the consequences of warfare. In asymmetric transnational armed conflicts, however, the civilian population located in proximity to the operations of the non–state party is caught in a triple –bind: on the one hand, in practice it does not enjoy the full benefits derived from protection duties incumbent on territorial states; on the other hand, because of the nature of asymmetric transnational armed conflicts, it may suffer extensive harm caused by the reactions of states to non– state actors. Again, non–state actors might be incentivized to capitalize on civilian harm, in order to demonize their adversary in the eyes of the local and internationalpublic opinion.
n a basic level, digital data is composed of a complex succession of 1s and 0s. As I key in this very sentence, my software accurately processes the otherwise unreadable data into the words that I am composing. A printed copy of my software-processed data is of course a tangible object—we speak in terms of “hard” and “soft” copy to distinguish physical from virtual. Some of us from earlier generations, myself included, still prefer to move from soft to hard copy and back again, but it is impossible to function in a contempo- rary industrialized economy without recognizing the sheer ubiquity of digital data. Even that small minority of the population that does not own a smartphone or have any online presence in social media is still likely to use email, watch television, possess a debit or credit card for financial transac- tions, own a passport, visit a medical professional, use public services or fa- cilities, attend school, drive a motor vehicle, use public transport, use elec- tricity from a grid, use running water from a connected supply, or walk in a public space and be filmed on closed-circuit television. A twenty-first cen- tury human life isolated from electronic data is an increasing rarity.
tary reasons wished to attack were attacked. There was nothing more to it. If this argumentation is intended to imply that modern internationallaw played no part in the crisis, it should be refuted. Internationalhumanitarianlaw clearly influenced decision-makers in Kosovo. Moreover, Additional Pro- tocol I contributed to the role that law played in decision-making. During the conflict, as during the Gulf War, legal advice was sought and considered. In both cases it was extremely important, for political and public image reasons, to be seen as acting in conformity with internationallaw. The opposite would imply a political cost and setback that had to be avoided at a time when politi- cal support was essential. During the Gulf War General Schwarzkopf was ada- mant that “we didn’t want any war crimes on our hands.” 21 The same feeling
Humanitarian intervention has arisen as an area of contention with respect to the definition of the crime of aggression. As will be examined in further detail in Chapter III, 132 the question of humanitarian intervention was raised in the negotiations at Kampala. The US, in particular, although a non-State party, was anxious that the definition of the crime of aggression should not encompass humanitarian intervention. 133 Creegan has also expressed concern that the definition of the crime of aggression would encompass some situations of use of force, which although are prima facie unlawful, are nevertheless “good acts”, and do not appear to be protected. 134 Her premise is that if humanitarian intervention is considered as an act of aggression under the definition of the crime of aggression in the Kampala Amendments, there is a possibility that individuals, who planned, prepared, initiated or executed the intervention, may be prosecuted at the ICC. 135 Therefore, individuals who satisfy the leadership element pursuant to the definition of the crime do not appear to be protected from prosecution at the Court if the State they serve has committed a “good act” of aggression, which served the purposes of protecting human rights.
. 2 Without a legal guarantee that they will not be made the object of attack once they have laid down their weapons and submitted themselves to the authority of their enemy, there would be no incentive for those persons engaged in hostilities to surrender and fights to the death would invariably ensue, thereby prolonging armed conflict and fuelling unnecessary violence and suffering. Given the centrality of the rule of surrender to realising the humanitarian objective of internationalhumanitarianlaw, it is paramount that those involved in armed conflict are aware of what conduct constitutes an act of surrender under internationalhumanitarianlaw and thus when its attendant legal obligation to ceasefire is triggered. More specifically, questions arise as to what conduct signals an intention to surrender: for example, is the waiving of a white flag indicative of surrender? Is retreat tantamount to surrender? Another important question is whether combatants are required to offer vanquished forces the opportunity to surrender before direct targeting can commence? Also, must all offers of surrender be accepted or are there circumstances in which an offer of surrender can be permissibly refused?
10. There is little doubt that Hamas is, at a minimum, an organized armed group given that it is the elected authority in Gaza and possesses a structured military force. Whether Hamas is a political authority within the state of Palestine is obviously a more complex and controversial issue. Rather than grapple with this difficult question, this article will explore both possibilities - that Israel and Palestine were involved in an international armed conflict and, the alternative, that Israel and Hamas were engaged in a non-international armed conflict. This has the advantage of allowing for greater breadth of analysis, providing the opportunity to examine the status of online collectives such as Anonymous under internationalhumanitarianlaw when they become embroiled in armed conflicts of different legal classifications.
Internationalhumanitarianlaw (“IHL”), or the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”), is a branch of internationallaw designed to regulate the conduct of belligerent states during an armed conflict.  However, conflicts in the modern era are drastically different than the interstate hostilities envisioned at the time the bulk of IHL was developed. Contemporary conflicts, such as the 'War on Terror' between states and non-state actors, have resulted in new military tactics to address the complications inherent in these modern conflicts. The controversial use of targeted killing is amongst these new tactics. For the purposes of this discussion, targeted killing is the “intentional slaying of a specific alleged terrorist or group of alleged terrorists undertaken with explicit governmental approval where they cannot be arrested using reasonable means.”  The inability to arrest suspected terrorists reflects the transnational aspect to these conflicts as the victim state is unable to exert enforcement jurisdiction beyond its borders.  Until such time as new
Chapter 6 engages with the recent history of conflict and international intervention in South Sudan. South Sudan is a global site where international actors struggle with distinction in the context of an integrated UN mission with a robust Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate. Civilianness is shown to be a beleaguered concept in South Sudan, and internationalhumanitarian actors want to do everything they can to claim the highest degree of civilianness possible. As UN integration policies and structures encourage different kinds of international actors to work together towards a common goal of peace, many of the same dynamics explored in Part II arise. Additionally, humanitarian actors live and work inside displacement settings (‘PoC sites’) that are guarded by armed UN forces, and humanitarian actors must navigate daily decisions about military asset use. This chapter revisits previous discussions of humanitarian distinction practices, describing the specific form they take in the Kinetic realm. A key difference between the Pedagogical and Kinetic realms is that, in the operational context of the latter, the explicit appeal to law mostly slips away; international actors focus instead on the need to appease the ‘phantom local’. Humanitarian signs and symbols play a crucial role here, and this study highlights two relevant critiques from the scholarly literature. First, there are charges that humanitarian actors visually distinguish themselves primarily for marketing or branding purposes. Second, there are allegations that safeguarding humanitarian symbols overshadows the importance of assisting populations in need. These critiques resurface in the empirical findings from South Sudan, and it is often humanitarian actors, themselves, who express these misgivings.
In cases of failing to prevent, courts have been clear that information tending to put the superior on notice of the future risk of crimes triggers the requirement to investigate and prevent. This is consistent with the ICRC commentary’s guidance that knowledge of a subordinate’s lack of training on the law of war, for example, is instructive information for which the commander cannot plead ignorance, and is relevant in a command responsibility analysis. In other words, both previous unpunished misconduct and the failure to train soldiers adequately provide warning signs that future bad acts may occur. It is not the failure to rectify past misconduct itself that gives rise to liability under failure to prevent, but the superior’s knowledge of it and the fact that it makes future bad acts more likely. F. Culpability of Commanders Responsible