Other policies directly affecting agriculture
A range of policies, implemented at the national level can influence the economic environment for farm-firms in addition to those already discussed. Probably those with the greatest direct effect are those that govern the sale, rental or use of farmland. In all EU countries the quantity of land exchanged each year through sales is rather small (typically less than 2 percent of total agricultural land in the United Kingdom), and this includes nominal sales between different generations of the same family. Policies with respect to the leasing of land are of great significance, since this provides flexibility in matching individual demands for land with availability. This was a major element in the argument in the United Kingdom for preserving the traditional landlord-and-tenant system that accounted for almost 90 percent of farmed area in the early 1900s (now reduced to about 37 percent). Legislation on security of tenure for renters may, however, severely constrain the potential for leasing to assisting adjustment. For example, in the UK the legal framework of agricultural tenancy since the Second World War reflected the view that tenants had to be given great security if improvements in production and productivity were to be achieved. Basically, as long as a rent was paid (but with owners only having limited opportunities to raise this) the tenant had occupation for life, a situation made more extreme by subsequent extension of the right to three generations of tenant, though this law was later reversed. As might be expected, the legislation led to a reduction in the amount of land available to rent. A “grey” rental market developed, of questionable validity and generally only for tenancies of a single year. Subsequently legislation on “farm business tenancies” has allowed a system to operate that enables leases to be negotiated for a series of years that provides a degree of security and reasonable planning horizons for the tenant and yet which enables the owner to assume occupancy at a predetermined time.
There are several authors pointing to the tendency of AES in Germany to overcompensate farmers (apart from the permitted 20 % incentive surplus) (e.g., Ahrens et al. 2000). Yet, the general assumption of overcompensation is questioned by authors that draw a more differentiated picture. In marginal regions, for instance, those measures that aim at an extensification of production have an additional positive effect as they give farmers an incentive to keep the land under production, and thus, to maintain an open landscape. In areas with high quality soils, however, the extensification payments usually do not fully compensate the economic loss due to comparatively high opportunity costs (Deblitz 1999; Osterburg 2002). This means that very often the income losses that are actually experienced when measures are applied depend on the soil quality and on other local conditions that can be quite different even within a single Land. In this discussion, Osterburg (1999) argues for tolerating income effects of these schemes if the administrative (transaction) costs for premium differentiation, resulting perhaps in reduced premiums in some cases, are higher than the reduction (see also Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005). Furthermore, since agriculture is producing positive environmental effects that are not (completely) internalised by markets positive income effects are legitimate (Osterburg 1999). He also points to substantial methodological problems to sufficiently determine income effects of these schemes at all. Here, e.g., the often used proxi-indicator “scheme participation” would lead to false results since this indicator includes also farmers who do not (have/had to) change their farming practice when entering the scheme (Osterburg 1999).
Circulars from the Prime Minister dated 7 July 2008 and 31 December 2008 precisely define the new organisation of the département-level government services.
The Département Directorate for the Territories (DDT) will handle policies with a localised
impact on the base made up of the current département directorates for the infrastructure and agriculture (DDEA) and the prefectures’ “environment” services. It will also be the main
Often in countries in transition, inspectorates traditional focus on small irregular, wh ile serious cases of corruption remain unaddressed and unpunished , a phenomenon that is happening in Kosovo. Such cases are often the hidden part of the annual budget, as are secondary obligations , costs outside the budget and expenditure commitments us long but not limited to the systems weak tax administration, debt management, customs administration, are being privatisation equally resource -corruption and fraud. Fiscal transparency and accountability and audit systems in place are essential to combat corruption in these areas. As noted above public service management is a specific culture of the country and its administration. For modernization of public management in countries in transition, it is important to understand the cultural heritage of society commanded by which they flow. Command societies, the main functions of government were planning general organization and production of goods and services. In most of these countries, the most important document was the plan. Although many functions were to be performed by the state budget resources that flowed directly on this plan, the role of the state budget was less important than in market economies. There is very clear on what do deal basis for resource allocation decisions inline various categories are as production, investment, social payments and defense. It seems that such decisions are taken as a result of the power of the party leadership. Resource distribution system was not supported neither to vote nor in competition between firms decentralized state. In their place, he usually included political leaders inline negotiations for determining the state budget, which will protect the interests of the state and political negotiating position.
In the literature on growth, several empirical studies have focused on both the traditional and new channels through which different types of public spending can affect growth. 2 A direct effect relates to an increase in the economy’s capital stock (physical or human) reflecting higher flows of public funds, especially when they are complementary to those privately financed. Public investment can also contribute to growth indirectly by increasing the marginal productivity of both publicly and privately supplied production factors. For example, public expenditure on agriculture research and development (R&D) can promote higher productivity by improving the interaction between physical and human capital production inputs. Other components of public spending, related for instance to the enforcement of land property rights, can also exert a positive indirect effect on growth by contributing to better use of existing assets. There is also growing evidence suggesting that, in developing countries, externalities associated with infrastructure public spending may be more important than commonly thought by having a sizable impact on human capital as well. 3
Public goods can be found in any market economy. They are not necessarily provided only by the public sector, the private market being also involved for their insurance. When consumption of a good is non-rival, but allows excluding in the sense that there is a price that allows him access, the consumption of the public good can be considered ineffective. This is because the additional consumption generates consumer satisfaction, but that one for which must bear a price is generating dissatisfaction and even reduce utility. In this way, the public good provided by a private market does not allow to achieve the optimal level of production or consumption of that good.
SV: “Well, the difference there, I think early on in Prop 2, everyone thought it was about chickens. They didn’t understand that there was a threat to all of animal agriculture. And agriculture generally, now you have an outside group dictating to agriculture how you’re going to operate your farm. That’s the hindsight to that. We thought it was one little thing, but it’s really a much bigger thing. You have a group that’s intent on eliminating animal agriculture. And if you have a group that’s intent on doing that and they’re successful, what does that mean to other groups that might have intents on your production? And so that was a big threat. I don’t think that was recognized early on. With Prop 37, the change there was it was no longer just a producer issue. This was a major food issue. And as a result of that, a lot more money came into the campaign. So, money does drive behavior. Now you have some major corporations who understood the threat and wrote the check to push it back. And that was a little different than what you saw on Prop 2. Prop 2 was really an on the ground producer issue. They didn’t have the wherewithal financially to fight some of that. And there were no big corporate monies that come in behind it to help the producer. And so it was a money issue. And then, two, I think just the organization of it. Now, you get that much money, you get more people working to campaign against something, and you get that information in the hands of opinion leaders. Ultimately what happened on Prop 37, was every major newspaper in California said 'no.' That has strength, when you get that kind of endorsement.”
Third, my analysis suggests policy integration frames are influenced by a variety of different factors. Both ministries’ policy frames carry the signature of global and bilateral donors and partners, who through various projects and programmes codetermine policy frames and di- rections. Studies concentrating on policy integration generally stress the role of IGOs in placing integration on national agendas ( Tosun and Lang, 2017 ; Köhler, 2011 ). My findings underpin what has been argued before: certain policy initiatives, including in Kenya seem to be at least partly donor-driven ( Alila and Atieno, 2006 ; O’Brien and Ryan, 1999 ). Simultaneously policies are inspired by national development goals including its Economic Recovery Strategy and Vision 2030, as my re- sults indicate. However, overall the pattern of factors influencing on policy frames is somewhat muddled. Interviewees indicated that policy documents are frequently influenced by rather opaque processes, in- cluding personal networks and events, subcontracting policy develop- ment to consultants, and donor support. Faling and Biesbroek (2019) demonstrate that the development of the Kenya CSA Strategy was de- veloped through close involvement of various donors, international organizations and foreign government departments. Follow-up research would be valuable to identify how Strategic Plans and sectoral policies relate, and how policy development processes usually evolve. 6. Conclusion
By 1999, about 40% of agricultural land in seven CEECs was in large-scale, non-individual farms. In four coun- tries, including the Czech Republic, 90% of farming units are small household plots and family farms that control less than 10% of land, while the largest collective and corporate farms, the top 10%, control about 90% of land. In some countries, especially the Czech Republic and Hungary, new large-scale farms are profit-motivated cor- porations operating under hard budget constraints and managing labour according to normal business practices (Lerman 1999). Large-scale farms in the Czech Republic and Hungary were also observed to have the highest relative technical efficiency. Thus, where good gover- nance practices in terms of consolidation, downsizing, reform of business management, and the resolution of large farm debt have been followed, the basis for sustain- able profitability in agriculture seems well laid.
Table 1 provides some basic information for Poland and the Netherlands. Polish and Dutch farm structures show big differences with regard to the number of farms and the value of production (output) per farm. Yet, there are some similarities too, for instance on the composition of the agricultural production. In both countries the production of milk, pigs and potatoes is important. In the Netherlands, however, horticulture (especially in glasshouses) is in economic terms more important than arable farming. In Poland arable farming is largely in the production of cereals, a situation quite similar to the situation in other EU countries (for instance France and Germany). In the Netherlands, however, arable farmers are more specialised on potatoes (with a strong position of seed potatoes), sugar beet, onions and a mix of other crops, such as flower bulbs and vegetables. The Dutch hor- ticulture production (40% of total agricultural production) is using some 100 000 ha, which is only 5% of total agriculture area. Around 10 000 ha are 'under glass' (greenhouses using natural gas for heating). Excluding the horticulture sector would mean that Poland and the Netherlands have roughly speaking an equal value of agricultural production (some 10-12 billion euro). For this production however Poland has around ten times more land and at least 20 times more farms. Around 50% of the farms in Poland is not or only marginally producing for the market (subsistence farms). In the Netherlands such farms do not exist.
The basic assumption is that farmers are applying the land use practice that maximizes the private profit. In the absence of market failures private actors tendency to maximise their profit would maximise also the social profit and yield a Pareto efficient solution. Nevertheless, market failures, such as externalities, impact social welfare and create a need for climate policies. To attain the socially optimal solution for crop production, farmers should be motivated to take environmental effects into account in their decision making. Without government intervention, farmers are not willing to adapt climate mitigation practices (Smith et al. 2005). Economic incentives such as taxes, subsidies, marketable pollution permits and also technology support payment tools improve land owners environmental performance and minimize the total abatement costs by equating the marginal abatement costs across polluters. Incentive systems are somewhat different although their results are in theory similar; enhancing socially optimal decision making. Emission trading as a baseline and credit system on agriculture would allow farmers to gain emission credits by reducing emissions and sell them to buyers. Although emission trading system is already used for climate change mitigation in other industry sectors 1 , its administrative difficulties and uncertainties are suggested to be high especially in agriculture. Metcalf (2007) argues that emission tax would be more realistic policy for
It is already evident a fact that the analysis of political representation as a specific process is best achieved by analysing an electoral system, and the latter representing the most suitable platform in understanding political interaction, or more concretely the possibility of involvement of the governed in publicpolicies. This is due to the relevance of election for political representation, or as Heywood underlines: “elections are often thought to be the heart of the political process… where elections are viewed as not less than democracy in practice… and that for this notion, the main principle is the one of representation” 3 . Authors such as Schumpeter, qualify elections as a minimum
In many areas where village extension centres have been established, skill development measures were not accompanied by policies to address the broader challenges of rural development such as access to credit, lack of adequate infrastructure and persistent discrimination of women and lower castes. As a consequence, development is impaired. Simmons and Supri (1999) provide detailed evidence of village industries in Punjab, which already experienced large advances in agriculture. In Punjab, rural development is impaired by what the authors call a catch 22 situation: on the one hand, access to formal credit requires that applicants possess sufficient business skills and, as a consequence, banks only disburse credits, if applicants have a formal qualification. At the same time, however, access to formal training is very limited. There are no lifelong learning programmes in place in Punjab and access to training institutes is limited for those aged between 18 and 25. In addition, the courses offered are not geared towards local needs (especially lack of business training). A large number of young people entered informal apprenticeship schemes, which were traditionally offered in occupations that had undergone little technical change. As a consequence, skills acquisition was confined to narrow and specific tasks, involving low levels of technology and technology transfer. However, this was often the only possibility for young people to obtain the skills necessary to open up their own business after completion of the apprenticeship. In addition, discrimination against women and families from lower castes, as well as persistent corruption in banks and community administration were identified as important obstacles to rural development.
Mancur Olson (1965) stresses the importance of pres- sure groups (interest groups) in policy decisions. Pres- sure groups further the interests of their members, i.e. farm unions are expected to strive for favorable legisla- tion for farmers. Pressure groups emerge because of the existence of public goods. Favorable legislation for farm- ers is a public good, i.e. high agricultural prices are good for all farmers (non-rivalry) and no farmer can be exclud- ed from enjoying high prices (non-excludability). Olson (1965) considers the size of the group, homogeneity, and costs of communication among their potential members as crucial factors determining whether a pressure group (or broadly collective action) is formed. Small groups tend to be privileged if costs of providing public good are lower than benefits accruing to a single person or a compact coalition. Large (latent) groups can provide public goods only by enforcing members to act in a group-oriented way by selective private or social incen- tives. Interests of farmers are homogeneous. They all want high prices and subsidies. Communication costs are low and there is a series of selective instruments how to force farmers to contribute to creating pressure on pol- iticians. Provision of market information or legislation documents to members of the farmers union or agricul- tural chamber are some of the instruments. With econom- ic development, organizing costs for farmers decline while increase for consumers and taxpayers.
2 THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS AT THE FARM-LEVEL
While farm adjustment is most often described in terms of numbers of farms and size characteristics, it can take many other forms. In considering structural change it is important to understand the behaviour of the basic economic units engaged in farming. While a range of institutional types exist at the farm level, in the EU the majority are family-owned businesses 2 . Sometimes these adopt corporate form for taxation or inheritance reasons but such units can be treated, for most purposes, as if they were unincorporated. The predominant model to use when considering adjustment and the role of adjustment policy is thus that of the household-firm. This is a hybrid that combines the economic functions of production and consumption. These functions are not easily separated, for example when houses and vehicles are used for both and where there is a blurring of work-time and leisure. The consumption of own-produced goods presents a particular problem of identification and measurement. Where the household-firm engages in several forms of independent activity (self-employment in farming and in non- farming) no impermeable barrier exists between the two. The existence of income from other sources (wages, property, welfare transfers etc.) is also likely to impinge on the way that farming is carried out and how adjustment to economic change takes place. Nor should capital issues be forgotten. Though not reflected in conventional income measures used to monitor the industry for policy purposes, real capital gains constitute a form of income that has been influential in retaining farmers in agriculture even when current rewards have been low. Capital losses may shift the equity leverage and require changes in holdings, including sales of farmland. Large net worths imply high economic status and an ability to ignore income pressures, at least for a time. Thus a satisfactory explanation of the adjustment process in agriculture needs to take a broad view of the activities of the complete farm-household economic unit, not just its farming component, and to cover both income and capital.
This policy has the potential to aid the uptake of conservation agriculture by farmers in South Africa. Invasive alien plants cause important conservation and economic problems, such as changes in plant community composition, reduced productivity of agricultural lands, excessive water loss from watercourses and catchments, reduced regeneration rates of native species and alteration in landscape structures. While some species result in excessive loss of nutrients others like Acacia species actually elevate the levels of soil nitrogen and secrete allellopathic substances into the soil thereby discouraging the germination and establishment or even causing extinction of native indigenous species. The displacement of fynbos vegetation by populations of invasive Australian Acacia species has been attributed mainly to habitat modification by the Acacia species themselves. This includes the mineral enrichment of soils whereby levels of nitrogen are elevated beyond that which the nutrient poor soil adapted native fynbos can tolerate (Musil and Midgley, 1990 and Low, 1988) associated with an increased litter fall mass (Milton, 1981) and litter decomposition rate (Witkowski, 1991) under Acacia species, solar radiation attenuation by the overtopping Acacia plant canopy, and reduced soil water availability (Rutherford and Bosenberg, 1988). CA can help restore fertility in land that have been degraded by invasive and alien plants since it yields benefits of increased soil fertility and the organic content within the soils (Jat et al., 2014).
Cooperative activities are not difficult to manage since internal (members) demand for output/services is known and "marketing" secured. In addition, co-ops concentrate on a few highly standardized (mass) products with a stable market and profitability; all this assists financing, as advance funding of activities commissioned by members is commonly practiced, while producing universal commodities is more easily financed by public programs or commercial credit (Table 4). Furthermore, co-ops offer low-cost, long-term leasing of land (Figure 1). That is often coupled with simultaneous lease-out deals as a specific mode for cashing co-ops output or facilitating relations between landlord-private farms. The integral organization of critical "services" and inputs supply is broadly practiced (Table 2, Table 3). Output-based payment of labor is common, which restricts opportunism and minimizes internal transaction costs. Besides, cooperatives provide employment for members who otherwise would have no other job opportunities – housewives, pre- and retired persons. They are prefered employers since they offer higher job security, social payments, paid holidays, etc. Marketing risky output is governed by effective delivery contracts or integrated into own processing (Table 5). In a situation of "missing markets" in rural areas, the cooperative mode is also the single form for organizing certain transactions such as bakeries, retail trade, etc. Given the considerable transacting benefits, most of the coop members accept lower than market returns on their resources – lower wages, inferior or no rent for land and dividends for shares.
The questions we attempt to answer in this paper are the following: how are income poverty levels affected by changes to the scale of tax-benefit policies? Which are the most cost-effective policies in reducing poverty in seven diverse EU countries? With these questions in mind, we address two important limitations of the existing literature: first, while the literature mainly focuses on one type of policy (family benefits), our analysis compares across several types of policy instruments within as well as between countries. The policies considered are child benefits, social assistance benefits and income tax lower thresholds. In addition, to provide a benchmark against which to compare the effects of individual policy instruments, we consider what happens to poverty indicators if all monetary levels and thresholds in the tax-benefit system are altered. Second, while most of the literature concentrates on the poverty-reducing effectiveness of different policy designs, this research sheds light on the effectiveness of the scale of given policy designs; using microsimulation techniques, we explicitly measure the distributional implications of increasing or reducing the scale of each policy, holding constant its design and national context.