Tomlinson (1991) warns of the danger of such a simple “assertion of the manipulative and ideological power of the media” (p. 38). In former colonies, childhood memory seems to romanticize the postcolonial power working at a personal level. Conducting an ethnography in postcolonial India, Parameswaran (1999) observes that “nostalgic conversations about childhood reading [of the Western literature] were some of the most animated, lively, and loud debates, punctuated with many interruptions, screams, and laughter” (p. 89). Consistent with her observation, Japanese comics evoke from Korean adult audience groups a passionate nostalgia for their childhoods (Ahn, 2001). This is an interesting, somewhat self-contradictory, situation. Koreans have an antipathy towards Japan for its holding colonial power over Korea in the past, yet the Japanese texts conjure up memories of the good old days. Cultural imperialism,
Taking into consideration Foucault’s dissection of the concealed and overt operational dynamics of biopower provides clarity on how race (or more precisely the practices, methods, and techniques of racialization) becomes the cornerstone of any given society’s production of citizen-subjects. This is not to mention its production of values, vices, norms, forms of nationalism, culture, enemies, Others, and boundary-lines—aspects of the state and its population which are commensurately relational and co-constitutive. Similarly, thinking through biopower reveals how the state filters humans into categories of oft-arbitrary difference via processes of racialization, thereby levying upon each individual the responsibility of thinking of themselves, acting, and “knowing their place” as a particular type of (racial) subject who exists in a society of differing (hierarchized) classes. Classes determined and mediated by racial ideology and capitalist relations. What results is a social reality in which the life chances of some groups are enabled, whilst Others are foreclosed. Thus, for scholars focusing on the entanglements and interplay of race, borders, and migration, Foucault’s analyses of biopower and state racism are markedly germane when examining the classification, stratification, and (de)valuation of differing people and populations across contrasting sites and situations.
In South Africa from 1936 to 1960 the policies devised mainly in the 1920s succeeded in raising Afrikaner unskilled workers and English trade unionists above migrant blacks and South African coloreds (that is, mixed race or people of Indian origin) and blacks. Incomes of lower class Afrikaners did rise smartly, as they took jobs on the railways, and as their sons went to engineering school. Yet from 1975 until 1994, at the very height of a system supposed to enrich them, Afrikaner or English whites saw negligible growth in their real incomes (one would need to correct the price deflators in such calculations for the improvement in the quality of goods). And indeed South Africans as a whole, black and white and colored, saw
The collection also turns some attention to race in American sport - although it could have used more, particularly coverage of African-American athletes. The collection does include two linked essays that explore the narrative of Jackie Robinson and the desegregation of Major League Baseball. (MLB) In 'Integrating America: Jackie Robinson, critical events and baseball black and white', Jack Kelly argues that Robinson 'was called to the role of the lonely man, but as a martyr not for God but for an integrating nation' (p. 95). Along with scholars like Henry Yu, Kelly follows the work of Jules Tygiel's definitive Robinson biography in exploring the episode as a 'critical event' - that is, a religious or sociological 'experiment' that provided Americans a simplified narrative of racial integration, complete with a formulaic black-white binary, a clearly-defined 'color line', and a memorable, instantaneous moment of transformation. (2) As Kelly points out, this is certainly why millions of Americans and MLB are so invested in celebrating Robinson today. Yet his most interesting analysis comes in 'Exclusionary America: Jackie Robinson, Decolonization and Baseball not Black and White', where he presses beyond Tygiel and Yu by placing this unique story of American integration within baseball's global context. According to Kelly, the 'Jackie Robinsonization' of baseball history forced an unsuccessful search for the 'Japanese' and 'Latin American' Robinson. More importantly, by considering why Robinson's story cannot be extended to a 'new, global level of integration', Kelly shows how a celebrated, insular narrative of American desegregation helped eliminate the possibility for an alternative, more equitable history of world baseball. This would presumably be one in which MLB did not hinder or destroy foreign organisations by pilfering select Asian and Latin American players, much like it did the Negro Leagues before. (Perhaps, then, the problem is not too much emphasis on the Robinson story, but rather not telling it in its entirety.)
Had there been many more Haitis, that is, multilateral imperial adventures committed under the watch of the supposedly ‘unilateralist’ neoconservatives, the strategy of liberal silence might have become unsustainable: even with all the explanations for the inattention I have attempted to outline, there is a limit to the number of such global events that can go unremarked before the situation becomes embarrassing. Even had John McCain won the Presidential race, however, this would have been unlikely to become an issue: within Republican circles the Bellingerite wing of ‘soft’, even tentatively multilateral, neoconservatism was on the rise, and McCain, his spurious ‘maverick’ credentials neurotically asserted by supporters to distance him from Bush, would likely have claimed to be breaking from (heavily mythologized) neoconservatism back to ‘traditional’, less multilaterally disinclined conservatism.
medical opinion in Britain and its colonies, in line with anti-contagionism, moved towards leprosy being non- contagious and influential reports came out against segregation and isolation. Hansen's bacillus took many years to be accepted, and it was incorporated into a very complex aetiological and pathological picture. Leprosy was not highly contagious, hence the dominant metaphor in medicine for explaining and managing the disease was 'seed and soil': the disease required both the bacillus, in sufficient numbers and suitable virulence, and a vulnerable human constitution, which was dependent on general health, race, behaviour, inherited vulnerability, and many other factors. The Hansen bacillus was not associated with a definitive post-Koch, ontological account of the disease, that in turn defined necessary control measures. Rather, different groups within and without medicine gave it a variety of meanings; for example, some doctors argued for isolation to prevent the spread of the germ, while others maintained that the best way forward was to work for social and sanitary improvements to strengthen the human soil. Both views, and others, were legitimate deductions from available knowledge and debated as such. Which approach won the policy argument depended on a host of factors (power, interests, evidence, etc.) and then actual implementation might be shaped by other factors (economics, politics, logistics, etc.). Seen in this way, the different actions of governments and missionary agencies can be explained not as a conspiracy, but the result of negotiations at all levels. 'Constructs' were as much a part of medical discourse as political ideologies and cultural beliefs, indeed, the notion of separate spheres in unhelpful. Indeed, given the switch back to contagionism at the end of the nineteenth century, the government and missionary doctors who worked most closely with lepers, and had the greatest chance of catching the disease, often had the greatest investment in both of the leprosy Constructs identified.
Christianity was even said to be the prime catalyst for societal growth and development and it was also opined that Africa’s progress was being retarded because of its non-Christian mode of social organisation. According to the proponents of this scientifically puerile view, the West was radically transformed by the Judeo-Christian religion which taught man that he was created in the image of God; that man was the king of creation, and with an end superior to that of any other creature; and that man was free to determine and shape his own destiny. All these, in the words of Pierro Gheddo – one of those who effectively used religion to promote the interests of Western Imperialism – are basic ideas derived from biblical revelation upon which Western “civilization” rests (Offiong, 1980: 45).
that national cultures can defend their ways of life and, in some respects, even share their images with the rest of the world. Tracy (1988) states that traditionally culture weak Third World producers have now strengthened their national cultural industries to compete against dominant U.S. and European cultural power. Sparks (2007, 119) also points out, “in the place of a single, U.S.-based production center dominating the whole of the world trade in televi- sion programs, it was increasingly argued that technical and economic changes were render- ing the world a more complex place, in which there were multiple centers of production and exchanges flowing through many different channels”. Morley (2006) argues that cultural im- perialism has four significant issues and limitations, including 1) the complexities of flows in international communication; 2) the recent strategy of glocalization, 3) the effects of cultural protectionism, and 4) the impact of active audiences on media. What he emphasizes, how- ever, is that the international communication and media flows became more complex than in the past, and resulted in a new model of the cultural imperialism. Morley (2006, 36-40) con- sequently claims that the U.S. is still the most powerful media provider in the complex socie- ty.
this would actually be the outcome was not of course inevitable. But the struggle against it ultimately failed, as was shown most dramatically with the Second Socialist International's collapse as each national branch fell in line in support of its country in the 1914-18 war. The conse- quences were quite horrifying. A variety of nation-based and therefore racist bourgeois imperialisms evolved (British, French, Dutch, German, Italian). Industrially driven but non-bourgeois imperialisms also arose in Japan and Russia. They all espoused their own particular doctrines of racial superiority, given pseudo-scientific credibility by social Darwinism, and more often than not came to view themselves as organic entities locked in a struggle for survival with other nation-states. Racism, which had long lurked in the wings, now moved to the forefront of political thinking. This conveniently legitimized the turn to what in Chapter 4 I will call 'accumulation by dispossession' (of barbarians, savages, and inferior peoples who had failed to mix their labour properly with the land) and the extraction of tribute from the colonies in some of the most oppressive and violently exploitative forms of imperialism ever invented (the Belgian and Japanese forms being perhaps the most vicious of all). It is, as Arendt argues, also important to see Nazism and the Holocaust as something that is entirely comprehensible though by no means determined within this historical-geographical trajectory.
In fact, it is rather tempting to view Leyden and Duff as archetypes of either side of a pedagogic divide, respectively exemplifying the “Orientalist” and “Anglicist” camps in the clash over “native” Indian education. Such a perspective is of course dangerously reductive, yet both Scots do appear to lend themselves to that kind of caricature. Leyden, multifarious scholar, voracious consumer of “native” “knowledge,” and cultural cross-dresser “who loved acting a part,” can be moulded to fit the role of the quintessential, turn-of-the-century “Orientalist.” By the same token, Duff might be just as aptly typecast as the definitive evangelical “Anglicist” of a later incarnation of British imperialism, resolute in the righteousness of a moral, spiritual, and linguistic unisonance. Moreover, Duff and Leyden can also be reckoned to reflect a comparable contrast with regard to their own, specifically Scottish socio-cultural and linguistic contexts, personifying the gulf splintering the Highland and Lowland, and hinting at the fissures existing between and within languages in the nation.
Memory for faces plays an important role in our everyday social experiences, and it plays an especially critical role for witnesses of crime. Unfortunately, memory for faces in the eyewitness context is often poor, with memory for other-race faces being even poorer. Problematically, this leads to innocent suspects being falsely convicted, with a high number of these false convictions involving witnesses and suspects of differing races. According to the Innocence Project (2009), 53% of the first 239 DNA exonerations in the United States involved an innocent suspect of a different race from the person(s) who identified them, with the majority being African American. Additionally, not only does poor facial memory lead to false identifications, it may also lead to the release of guilty suspects, as lab-based research shows approximately 24% of witnesses falsely reject the lineup when the suspect is present (Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). Further, real eyewitnesses identify a known innocent lineup member (known as a filler or foil) approximately 20% of the time (Greene & Evelo, 2014). Although a variety of lineup procedures have been created and explored to help increase correct identification rates and decrease false identification rates, current procedures remain inadequate. The overall goal of this research was to create a new lineup procedure that would improve correct identification rates while also decreasing false identifications for both same- and other- race identifications.
industry and of its market for goods, but they do not explain the full range of imperial behavior. The long history of Western grand strategy toward Iran has been characterized not only by subordination and extraction of resources but also by marginalization and boycott, the opposite of an extractive determination. These instances of negative imperialism included the reluctance of the Russian and British governments to see a railroad in Qajar Iran and the Bush-Obama sanctions on Iran over the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. In these instances, Western companies were actually disadvantaged for the sake of imperial power interests. What I call “negative imperialism” is typically not the project of the multinational corporation but of politicians seeking to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon or to deprive another Great Power of an advantage. That is, Western imperialism in Iran cannot solely be understood as the quest for ways of benefiting national companies. Negative imperialism is under the sign of Nietzsche’s will to power rather than Lenin’s monopoly capital.
Where British imperialism is concerned, I am interested in evidence that shows how music has been used as a symbolic support for imperialism, in discovering whether the reception of that music confirms its efficacy in that capacity, and in knowing which sectors of society are most susceptible to its effects. I want to understand how a sense of imperialism is constructed and valorized by music. Why was it that a warm reception for imperialist ideas could be assumed as much in Glasgow (the ÔSecond City of EmpireÕ) as in London? 32 The easy answer is that Scottish soldiers did more than their fair share of fighting for the Empire. Imperialism was a theme that appealed across classes Ð however much it might be seen as counter to working-class interests Ð and it was thus suited to the increasing social mix of music halls in later nineteenth-century Britain.
The costs of suppressing the insurgency were high. The British lost 426 dead, 1,228 wounded and 615 missing or taken prisoner. There were around 8,000 casualties among the insurgents. What mattered more, though, in terms of securing the relative political stability which subsequently prevailed in Iraq through the 1920s and 1930s, was the British political response to the crisis. Here, the essence of the subsequent British strategy was to co-opt, as far as possible, the existing elites. Albeit that at the apex of the Iraqi political system the British imposed an alien monarch, in the shape of Feisal I, who brought with him his own retainers from the Hashemite Arab army, nevertheless, their goal was to establish under him a ‘national government’ that would attract genuine Iraqi support. Moreover, as Fieldhouse points out, once again illustrating the benefit of his wide knowledge of the workings of British imperialism elsewhere, ‘the key to the British approach to creating the Iraq constitution lies in the fact that, uniquely in British imperial history, it was intended to lead to early independence rather than extended imperial rule’ (p. 97).
Much has changed in the world since the ‘pioneers’ theories were published. The warring between advanced capitalist states, a feature of the first half of the twentieth century, has seemingly passed. Contemporary international politics is shaped by a single hegemonic power, which sits at the head of a hierarchy of advanced capitalist states; a different scenario from that which exercised the minds of the pioneers. Capitalism has changed in significant ways, too. Continuities, however, are evident as well. The capitalist accumulation process has broadened and deepened, but has not fundamentally altered. Processes of concentration and centralisation have continued with phases of mergers and acquisitions apparent, while capital export continues. Since the end of the Long Boom in the West, finance or financiers, and even finance capital, have assumed such a powerful position that states have been compelled to de-regulate. Moreover, in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, they effectively have been forced to prop up this sector in countries like the US, Britain and other European nations. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan by the US and a small supporting cast of subordinate states are a clear indication that militarism and war continue to be part of the agenda of rich and powerful countries, albeit directed at less powerful states rather than at each other. Many of the characteristics of the capitalist accumulation process and the rapacious and war-like nature of international relations highlighted as symptomatic of capitalist imperialism by the pioneers years ago have not disappeared. Therefore, the imperialism theories of the pioneers remain useful and can be said to have contemporary relevance.