Of course, these institutional developments are a small element of what would be a more ambitious view of a Europe of the Regions. The idea of a Europe of the Regions has been around for decades, though not necessarily in any coherent form. A Europe of the Regions has been seen as both a slogan (Loughlin 1996a: 150) and utopian vision for regionalists (Borras-Alomar et al, 1994: 2). The idea originated in the work of federalist writers such as Denis De Rougement (1966) and Guy Heraud (1974), who sought to promote European integration but also a role for regions in the political process. Heraud, for example, saw Europe as a federation of regions as opposed to a construction of artificial nation-states (Heraud, 1974). This idea had also been explored before this by committed regionalists such as the Bretons Maurice Duhamel (Dumhamel 1928) and Yann Fouere, with his idea of a Europe of a hundred flags (Fouere, 1968) as well as in Flanders by Maurits Van Haegendoren (1971). Such ideas provided some of the background to regionalist party thinking about European integration and these ideas, in addition to post-war consensus on the need for European co-operation to avoid military conflicts generated regionalist support for European unification (Lynch 1996). Besides a generally positive outlook towards Europe, regionalist parties found the Europe of the regions idea attractive because of hostility to centralised states but also to the perceived impact of European institutions in reducing the powers of the state upwards, whilst the regional level of government would reduce the powers of the state downwards: a regionalist version of the withering away of the nation-state.
good governance it is first and foremost indispensable optimize the use of existing sources of funding (structural funds and funds managed by the EC), improve the implementation of existing legislation and make better use of existing institutions. In essence, the EC reiterates and re-launches the so-called “rule of the three no”, mentioned above. 1 Furthermore, the report highlights the question of ownership of strategies and the role of the chairman of the macro-regional strategies, but also highlights the persistence of common challenges to all four macro-regional strategies, ie the presence or absence of efficient coordination and cooperation structures, the granting of powers to the main executives, the effective availability of adequate human and financial resources, the representation and commitment of all participating countries, the existence of the necessary skills and the continuity and stability of the management groups. Finally, the document outlines the prospects for the future and in this regard recognizes that, although some results have been achieved, much remains to be done in particular in the field of results orientation, funding, relations with third countries, part of the strategies and note of the effectiveness of governance systems. Under this last profile further efforts are needed to make progress through: -the regular evaluation by each strategy of the effectiveness of its governance system, in line with the 2014 Commission report on governance; (b) a greater commitment by the relevant ministries ratione materiae in pursuing the objectives of the macro-regional strategies also through a periodic rotation of the coordinators of the thematic areas; (c) close cooperation between the members of the steering groups and the program management authorities supported by the Structural and Investment Funds and European investment or other instruments; (d) strengthening, wherever possible and practicable, links between the various macro-regional strategies for exploiting synergies and mutual learning with the support of INTERACT. 2
analysis. Regional unemployment rates are affected by neighbourhood and contextual effects, that is by regional-level and national-level variables respectively. Consequently, working at a single level, estimating a macroeconomic equation based on macro data or a regional economic equation based on regional data, is likely to lead to a distorted representation of reality. A single-level model assumes that the data do not follow a hierarchical structure, that all the relevant variation is at one scale. A two-level model takes the hierarchical structure between regions and countries into account by modelling the variation at both levels, and allows all the regions that belong to a particular country to be more alike than a random sample. Moreover, within each country in the hierarchy, different relationships are allowed around the overall relationship for all regions in all countries.
Colonial governments were dominated by wealthier upper classes. Rebellions in the 1830s induced the British to establish a more broadly based regime in Up- per and Lower Canada. In 1840, both were brought together in the United Prov- ince of Canada. This was a power-sharing regime in which new measures had to be approved by concurrent majorities from Canada East and Canada West. This proved to be short-lived. By the 1860s, there were pressures to unite all British North America. Requiring concurrent majorities produced frequent deadlocks. Political forces in Upper Canada were becoming restive. Incipient industrializa- tion was underway and the population was growing, producing pressure for rep- resentation according to numbers (impossible under the equal representation clauses of the 1841 Act of Union). The Colonial Office in London wanted to unite the maritime provinces. Fears that the post Civil War United States might want to expand northward provided further impetus for a different form of gov- ernment. In 1864, the future fathers of Canadian confederation came together in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, to discuss the construction of a stronger federation to govern all of British North America. Confederation took place when the British House of Commons passed the British North America Act in 1867. Initially, only Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia joined, but the promise of a rail link persuaded British Columbia to enter in 1871. Prince Ed- ward Island followed in 1873, but Newfoundland remained independent until 1949. In between Ontario and British Columbia were territories, which became the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. 7
process the type of electoral system used, it was again a mix of semi- independent system. The electoral system used during the 2001 elections it was mixed dependent again, being repeated, with minor changes in 2005. It was the year 2009 when, after the approval by the Albanian parliament of the Law "On Gender Equality in Society " in July 2008 and in the same time the introduction of gender quotas in this law as well as in the Electoral Code, brought innovations in the electoral system. For the first time this year in the election process was implemented the regional proportional system with closed-list, which was repeated in the parliamentary elections of the year 2013. If we look at the above table of the parliament‟s compositions from one legislature to another one , we will notice that since 2009 when the electoral system changed from a mixed system, Majoritarian dominated to a proportional system with closed lists, the number of women in parliament increased by multiplying. 4 From 6% that it was in the year 2001 and 7% in
Questions of institutional balance are also at stake when it comes to the negotiation and signing of non-binding agreements, so-called Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). As the Treaty does not contain specific provisions in this regard, guidance must come from Articles 16 and 17 TEU. Here, the recent case about the financial contribution of Switzerland to the economic and social cohesion in an enlarged Union is illustrative. Following the respective enlargements of the EuropeanUnion in 2004 and 2007, Switzerland agreed to pay a lump sum to compensate for the fact that it now had access to a much broader internal market than before. The level of these payments was agreed with the EU through a MoU. In 2006 (for the then 10 new Member States) and in 2008 (for Bulgaria and Romania), such MoUs were signed for the EU by both the President of the Council and the Commission, respectively. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Commission insisted to sign the next MoU in 2013 (for Croatia) alone. The Council took issue with this new practice and challenged it before the Court as a breach of the inter-institutional balance under Article 13(2) TEU. Interestingly, though, the Council did not argue that it was empowered to grant co-signature to a representative of the Presidency. Instead, and more cautiously, it argued that the Commission signature should not have occurred without prior authorization of the Council. The Court agreed with this analysis, holding that the Commission’s powers of external representation under Article 17(1) TEU do not include the signature of a non-binding MoU. 29 Rather, the decision to
come from the variable measured (income, GDP levels) and from the character of the country or its regions, such as starting development levels, economic structure, policy development and redistribution policies. Methodological modalities, such as regional price diﬀ erences (ATEN, B., HESTON, A., 2003), play their role as well. There is no conclusive evidence that average GDP per capita has converged among OECD regions, as reported by the OECD (2009b). Its analysis carried out for the period 1980 and 2005 revealed that, in approximately one-third of the OECD countries, regional disparities of GDP per capita increased, in another third of countries the disparities decreased, and in the rest of the regions there was no clear trend. This study also stated that there was no overall convergence of the OECD regions.
Keywords: spatial accessibility, highway infrastructure, high-speed railways infrastructure,
regional economic development, EuropeanUnion
he economic and territorial cohesion represents a major scope of the durable development strategies of the EuropeanUnion and regional economic development constitutes an essential condition for achieving this cohesion . In this context, we will evaluate the contribution of space / territorial accessibility given by the highways and high- speed railways networks, as major impact factor for regional development. Our analysis highlights the determinant relationship between the interregional connection provided by the mentioned transport infrastructures and the level of regional economic development. The purpose of this paper is to issue a space model that would allow the identification of regions with infrastructural equipment deficit, for which improving the territorial interconnection superior level highways and high-speed railways would trigger regional economic development with effects in increasing economic and territorial conversion and cohesion.
In legal context, Republic of Serbia has made a significant advance towards conducting reforms necessary for using EU funds intended for regional development in the future. As it could be seen, the access to certain funds, as well as realisation of certain goals, is related to political and legal status of the state. As a potential candidate, Serbia could in a greater scale use the resources from pre-accession funds, such as IPA, above all through stronger cross-border cooperation with member states and candidate countries. Therefore, the creation of the new Euro-regions could have a great effect. The new statistical division of Serbia could in future use as a base for qualitative administrative and regional organisation of the country. However, it is essential to take into account real economic and social interests of inhabitants of the region, bearing in mind that the critics of new division have already appeared stating the arguments that the areas that are not similar or naturally connected are joined into one region. All stated programmes that Serbia has been the beneficiary so far are not intended to regional development, but to prepare the states for the candidacy for the EU membership, and therefore for the use of available funds. Achieving the status of the candidate country, Serbia would have the possibility to benefit even the resources intended for the regional, human capital and rural development. Thus, it would be prepared for the EU membership when it would have access to all funds for regional development, as well as other member states. Until then, it would have to be satisfied with limited access to the funds and achieving the limited number of fund objectives. Republic of Serbia candidacy for the EU membership encourages in this context, but long postponement of getting the status of a candidate country, and hereby becoming a member state would lead to great disproportions in the development between Serbia and its neighbours, new EU Member States. In the meantime, the Stabilization and Association agreement with Serbia has been ratified by six EU member states so far. 47
One of the crucial questions for Romania’s regional development in the perspective of accession to the EU will be the increase of its capacity to absorb the Structural Funds and to what extent it will be reflected by the amelioration of regional disparities not only in Romanian but also in European context. As many studies have already pointed out interregional disparities in Romania are neither bigger nor smaller than in many other European countries 6 . For example, the ration between GDP per capita in most developed Romanian region (Bucuresti – Ilfov) and that in the least developed one (North-East) is 2.87. But, if the ratio between the average GDP per capita in Romania and the EU-25 average is considered (0.27) as well as the ration between the GDP per capita in the most developed Romanian region and the EU-25 average (0.59) and the ratio between the least developed Romanian region and the EU-25 average (0.20) things appear to be completely different. This provides an important explanation for the very intense negotiations undertaken on the Chapter 21 – “Regional Policy and Co- ordination of Structural Instruments”: a EU of 27 is expected to record an initial 5% increase in GDP and an 18% drop of the average GDP per capita (Matusova, 2005). Under these circumstances the EU has had to ensure that the financial assistance provided to Romania will be effectively, rationally used and all institutions involved are fully committed to offer a promising response to the three new priorities of the economic and social cohesion policy, namely convergence, regional competitiveness and employment and European territorial co-operation.
Once fixed effects and time trend are accounted for, the estimated coefficient on infrastructure becomes much smaller, or loses its significance (Holtz-Eakin (1994), Garcia-Mil` a and McGuire (1992)). The sign and magnitude of this impact vary sig- nificantly with the estimation method used (estimating aggregate production func- tions where public infrastructure enters as an input, or by estimating cost function), and the disaggregation level of the data used. The effect of public infrastructure on output is usually larger in studies using data aggregated at a national level (As- chauer (1989b), Munnell (1992), Aschauer (1989a)) than at a more regional level (Picci (1999), Acconcia and Monte (1999), and Bronzini and Piselli (2006) for Italian regions, Cantos et al. (2002) and Bosc´ a et al. (2002) for Spanish regions, Martin and Rogers (1995), Martin (1998) and Basile et al. (2001) for a panel of European regions, and Holtz-Eakin (1994) for US states).
Vremenski podudaran sa poslednje tri godine trajanja IPA II programa i budžetom od 25 miliona evra, Program evropske podrške razvoju opština (eng. The European Support to Municipal Development Programme - EU PRO) je finansiran i podržan od strane EU i Republike Srbije. Program sprovodi Kancelarija Ujedinjenih nacija za projektne usluge (eng. United Nations Office for Project Services - UNOPS) u saradnji sa Vladom Republike Srbije. Sa periodom trajanja od početka 2018. do kraja 2020. godine, program je zasnovan na cilju doprinosa održivom razvoju na 99 jedinica lokalnih samouprava. U fokusu programa jeste proces restrukturiranja i regionalni razvoj. U Srbiji, EU PRO projekat se prostire na 17 okruga: Mačvanski, Kolubarski, Pomoravski, Šumadijski, Zlatiborski, Moravički, Raški, Rasinski, Braničevski, Podunavski, Borski, Zaječarski, Nišavski, Toplički, Pirotski, Jablanički i Pčinjski. Svrha projekta je: uvećanje konkurentnosti i socijalne kohezije kroz bolje tržišno pozicioniranje, konkuretnija mala i srednja preduzeća, razvitak poslovnih mogućnosti i socijalne infrastrukture. Regioni koje program obuhvata jesu Šumadija i zapadna Srbija, kao i Region južne i istočne Srbije. Grup isane aktivnosti EU PRO programa prikazane su u tabeli 13.
The theoretical literature has argued that a centralized and coordinated wage bar- gaining system may cause low regional wage differentiation and high regional unem- ployment differentials. Empirical evidence in this paper for EU regions for the period 1980-2000 suggests that, indeed, highly coordinated wage bargaining systems and low regional wage differentiation are linked: countries with less coordinated wage bargaining systems have higher regional wage differentials, after controlling for regional producti- vity and unemployment differences. The results are robust to estimation with fixed ef- fects and to estimation with instrumental variables, suggesting that it is the wage barga- ining system that influences regional wage differentiation rather than the other way aro- und. Furthermore, results from wage curves estimated for panels of regions in Germany and Italy suggest some links between the estimated elasticities and the level of coordina- tion in wage bargaining.
On 23 February, the same day when the HR delivered her second declaration on Libya, the President of the European Council also made a statement addressing the developments in Libya (European Council 2011a). Though the condemnations and demands for the stop of using violence against civilians was similar to the HR‟s declarations, President Van Rompuy seemed to suggest regime change and democratic transition with the help of the EU when the HR at the time still counted on the Libyan government to “meet its responsibility to protect it population”. On 11 March, the President convened an extraordinary European Council meeting to set the strategic direction for future EU policy and action to the situation in Libya. The leaders of EU member states agreed that the Gaddafi‟s regime had lost legitimacy while the NTC should be considered a “political interlocutor” (European Council 2011b). The Summit also agreed to examine “all necessary options” to protect civilians but failed to approve the enforcement of a no-fly zone proposed by British Prime Minister Cameron, with the joint support of French President Sarkozy. Both German Chancellor Merkel and the HR Ashton were strong opponents to military option with the former emphasizing the lack of a legal basis for a no-fly zone while the latter warning about the risk of “collateral damage” of civilian casualties (Traynor and Watt 2011). The HR, however, did not take a clear position on a military intervention at the beginning nor did she recognize or even publicly meet the NTC (Helwig 2013: 241). The lack of reference of a no-fly zone at the end of the Summit indicated a one-round victory of Ashton but the dispute itself reflected the vertical inconsistence of EU foreign policy over Libya.
Another set of more recent papers attempts to resolve these identification problems with a number of creative techniques. First, Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) examine changes in apportionment within U.S. states associated with the Supreme Court’s Baker v. Carr decision in 1962, which led to a significant flow of funds away from the previously over- represented counties. Horiuchi and Saito(2003) report an equalization in per capita transfers associated with a shift to more equal apportionment in the wake of the 1994 reapportion- ment in Japan. Hirano (2006) and Hirano and Ting (2008) use the deaths of legislators in the Japanese diet to demonstrate the impact of exogenous under-representation on the distribution of resources. Making use of the relatively equal representation of U.S. states in the House relative to the Senate, Knight (2008) and Hauk and Wacziarg (2007) contrast earmarks that originate in the Senate versus the House and find a greater tendency to target small states in the Senate. Elis et al (2009) make use of discontinuities in the apportionment formula for the U.S. House to demonstrate that when a state receives an extra representative as the result of reapportionment, it receives additional transfers. Finally, Aksoy and Rod- den (2009) show that the bias in favor of small, over-represented EU member states in the distribution of agricultural and structural transfers only shows up for new member states once they have had a chance to fully participate in the negotiation of a multi-year budget.
Howe v er, v arious barriers to the de v elopment of the sil v er economy at national and regional le v els can be obser v ed (Klimczuk 2011). For example, the small interest of market entities in these concepts in some regions, perception of the sil v er economy as goods for wealthy older people, unfa v ourable patterns of consumption by seniors and low attracti v eness of some regions for older migrants and tra v ellers. Another barrier may be the little interest of business entities in the de v elopment and implementation of the sil v er economy in some peripheral regions such as rural regions and borderline regions. Moreo v er, the focus of companies on goods and ser v ices only for the affluent older adults might also be an obstacle. The detrimental consumption patterns of some older adults might be an issue, too (e.g. the orientation on products that meet basic needs and health, distrust towards new solutions and technologies). In addition, some regions may guide the de v elopment of the sil v er economy in attracting older migrants and tourists, but this strategy may not bring the expected effects of the de v elopment due to, for example, their low attracti v eness in comparison with metropolitan areas or deficiencies in social infrastructure.
The dependent variable is the difference between the wage in a region and the wage in the whole country of this region, measured as the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of the wage in a region with the national wage (absolute values are taken because the estimation attempts to find the determinants of regional wage differentials regardless if they are positive or negative). The independent variables include: the lagged regional labor productivity differential compared with the labor productivity in the respective country, the lagged regional unemployment differential compared with the unemployment rate in the respective country (both measured the same way as the regional wage differential), and the OECD index of coordination of the wage bargaining system in each country (this is the same for each region within the same country). The regional productivity and unemployment differentials are included with one lag to address causality concerns.