the adoption of visible expressions of piety. However, at some point she found it difficult to live according to those “strict” pious norms which she had encouraged herself to live by. For instance, the sisters in her pious circle considered television “demonic” because the programs were not “Islamically appropriate.” Therefore, if they “sincerely” aimed to be pious, they should no longer watch television and even go as far as getting rid of their television sets. Hagar did not go that far and experienced pressure from her pious circle when her sisters saw a television in her living-room. Hagar felt ashamed and tried to defend herself by saying that she only looked at news channels and certainly not films, even though this was not true. Despite her protestations, this attitude caused tension in her pious circle. After she had felt the pressure, she began to reflect on her pious life. Nowadays she considers herself to have become more nuanced, realistic and more of a “reflexive religious being.” In Hagar’s eyes, piety is all about “being a good Muslim woman and, within your bounds of possibilities, striving for that what you think Allah desires from you.” Accordingly, Hagar places her every thought and action within her greater project of religious growth and self-improvement. She concentrates on her intention, niyya. As long as she has the right intentions, Allah will have mercy on her soul, even if the results might not be satisfactory to others. In the following conversation, she reflects in detail on this matter:
In practice, the title of kyai is also given to the chairperson of mass Muslim organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In the NU community, some leading figures such as Muchith Muzadi, are called kyai although they do not head pesantren. A similar tradition occurs in Muhammadiyah. Since its foundation in 1912, the chairpersons of Muhammadiyah were called kyai. To give example, Abdul Razak Fachruddin (chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1971 to 1985), and his successor, Azhar Basyir (chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1995 to 1998) are called kyai even though they did not lead the pesantren. This title, however, ended in the era of Azhar Basyir. After Basyir, Muhammadiyah was led by Muslim intellectuals: Amien Rais (from 1995 to 1998), Syafi’i Maarif (from 1998 to 2005), and Sirojuddin Syamsuddin (from 2005 to date). Rather than a representation of traditional kyais, these leaders are Muslim scholars who are graduated from American universities in social sciences; Rais is graduated in political sciences from the University of Chicago, Maarif is graduated in history of Political Islam from the University of Chicago, while Syamsudin is graduated in political Islam from University of California at Los Angeles. 9 They indeed hold good understanding of religion, because they went to Islamic education institution before their study abroad. Din Syamsuddin, for example, went to a famous modern pesantren, Darussalam, Gontor, East Java. Moreover, he graduated in comparative study of religions, at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN, now UIN) Jakarta. Thus, since the last decade, Muhammadiyah has been led by Muslim intellectuals, or
The recognition is closely related to the competitive religious field and the concept of orthodoxy. The recognition is to be gained, competed, and maintained. Here we find the never-ending struggles between the competitors, that is, the traditionalist, reformist/ modernist, the radicalist, and MUI. In the competition ‘newcomers’ like the reformist/ modernist in the early twentieth century and the radicalist in 1970s tried to promote and disseminate their orthodox characteristics and teachings in order to attract the following. Muhammadiyah in its early establishment until 1990s, for instance, was considered by majority as heterodox but now it has gained recognition from many segments of the Muslim society. It continues to increase its orthodox position through education, dakwah, and publication. In the beginning, the newcomers are considered as sect that tries to transform into the so-called denomination. A sect is recognized heterodox or heresy while denomination is orthodox. Such sects as Ahmadiyah and Islam Jamaah (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, LDII) have made various attempts to gain recognition as orthodox denomination but it is not obtained until today. Recognized as heterodox sects, they are often forced to leave them and, rather, to return to adhere to the legitimate orthodox denominations.
This indicates how actors and religious institutions digitalize Islamic learning by providing religious information that was originally performed via face-to-face interactions in the traditional–offline context on a daily basis. Negotiations performed by religious actors and institutions are marked by a collaboration between KH Ahmad Muzammil and his team in Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) in Situbondo, to serve the questions and answers featured on this website. As Pesantren is one of the religious institutions considered to be authoritative on religious matters in Indonesia, this site shows that actors and institutions can maintain and expand religiousauthority in an online context. In order to access this feature, users can use two methods: by filling out the online form provided or by email. Questions are generally categorized into two kind of problems. First, issues of worship practices related to fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), specifically those related to certain rituals or legal status and other related problems; Secondly, issues related to muamalah or how to implement Islam through daily social values. These features illustrate the interactions between religious figures and followers, as they are performed in traditional Islamic learning practice.
Each woman’s position on religiousauthority is based on the need for greater par- ticipation and representation of women in American Muslim institutions. Both Wadud and Mattson distance themselves from the terms of Western feminism because of its tainted colonial history and do not describe themselves using that term, lest it decrease the legitimacy of their voices in Muslim discourse. While recognizing the feminist movements around them, both Wadud and Mattson use only Islamic sources as their proof texts in advocating for women’s increased participation in religious leadership. Mattson relies on increased gender consciousness across Muslim communities which has resulted from attacks against Islam as a misogynistic religion, in order to further her goals for women to assume leadership roles; she points to the earliest Islamic history during which women were active participants in the Prophet’s new faith community. Wadud takes a textual approach to claims of leadership which is based on ethics of belief in God; ultimate belief in monotheism requires that there be no hierarchy among peoples, only a hierarchy with respect to God. Thus with men and women being equal, women’s leadership, including women’s imamat is a recognition of their full humanity. Wadud calls for a systematic, organized movement called the gender jihad. In her view it is already underway and as
However, there are many different ways in which Muslim groups in Indonesian define the position of ummat within the discourse of national unity. Muhammad Ali (2011) identifies four different views with regard the relationship between Islam and national identity in Indonesia. First, those who declare ‘Islamization yes, Indonesianization no’; Second, those who declare ‘Islam first, Indonesia second’; Third, those who declare ‘Formalistic Islam no, substantive Islam and Indonesia, yes’; and fourth, those who declare ‘Islamization yes, Indonesianization yes’ (pp. 2-8). The first category represents the view of transnational Islamic organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir, which consistently promote the re-establishment of global Islamic caliphate. The second category represents the view of Islamist political parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), which prefer to participate in a democratic political process to promote the formalisation of Islamic law in Indonesia. The third category represents the view of the so called ‘progressive’ Muslim groups such as Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), which promote the adoption of substantive Islamic values as part of the nation identity and reject the formalisation of Islamic law in Indonesia. The fourth category represents the view of ‘mainstream’ Islamic organisations in Indonesia such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama, which promote an integrated construction of Islamic identity and national identity as discussed earlier in this article (Ali, 2011). According to Pringle, the identification of Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912) and Nahdhatul Ulama (founded in 1926) as the representation of mainstream Islam in Indonesia is based on two notions:
clicktivism is used for an action that can be measured its success in terms of virtual (online) and real (offline). The offline social movement will be led to the assumption that Islamic social movements will potentially succeed if it brings up national interest issues and the diverse elements of society that participate in an action. Ultimately, the Islamic Defense Action is a new trend that is a consequence of dynamic contestation between Islamic identity and modern democratic values that seem vis a vis in the public sphere. This post-democratization religious contestation in Indonesia also raises a new religiousauthority that plays the role of Islamic social movements outside mainstream Islamic organizations in Indonesia. The new actors who emerged after the Islamic Defense Action became a source of Islamic propaganda in which their actions, direction and speech were considered the authority representing Islam entirely. The attitude of the new actors is then disseminated with cliktifism as a strategic step for the success of activism in the online world and offline. This Islamic activism will always color the contestation of identity in post-Islamism era, especially in the political moments in Indonesia.
Abstract. Teenagers, or today mostly known as millennial generation, is
transition phase from the child to the adult category. They look for identity through various activities such as Rohis community. This research focuses on how Rohis community of Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) in Medan city determines religiousauthority. The study also discusses how this spiritual community organized the group, built the network strategy, strengthened solidarity, and constructed an Islamic identity. The object of research is Muslim millennial generations who are member of Rohis of Madrasah Aliyah Negeri. Medan is one of the biggest city with large of population of millennial Islam as representation of Indonesia and Rohis is a powerful and influential religious of teenagers. Qualitative method is by interview, observation and group discussion. This study results in a fact that this group does not follow the conventional religiousauthority but populism. The culture of populism with gadget as part of the life style including social media applications has constructed the spiritual identity especially in choosing and sorting out religious teachings to practice. The religiousauthority shifted form conventional to a new determining power, such as to determine patterns, shapes, styles and ways of practicing Islamic teachings. Their religiosity suggests symbolic identities, such as dressing, religious rituals and Islamic jargon can recognize among teenagers in the public sphere. Referring to the revealed they can be identified as groups inclined to the "culture of Wahabism". Culture "New Wahabism" is appearing in a new form in strengthening the network of “da'wah” through social media.
Therefore, the response has a historical background in the past. It is also like body immunity through the establishment of Islam Nusantara as their software imaginatively in the current years. Besides, their background is mostly coming to the rural place geographically as the base of NU members, which is undoubtedly another factor to redefine their Islamic identity amidst the enforcement of the urbanization of Indonesia, while the Islamisation from the urban people challenges their Islamic identity. The first thing they should do is strengthening their website, mainly NU Online, by improving the various of the contents and visualizing the pictures with an impressive design. Instead of asking for the highest payment, most of them work voluntarily with the spirit of fighting against the Wahabi ideology, although in the beginning, they had no strength of capability. According to Hamzah Sahal, the founder of Alif.id, to establish and to maintain the NU Online relies on the same vision with the networks and their dedications. 36 After a few years of hard work,
contains 20 questions, out of which 10 questions are about religious wellness and 10 questions appraise the spiritual wellness. The scores for religious and spiritual wellness vary from 10 to 60. The higher the achieved score is, the better the religious and spiritual wellness will be. The total sum of these scores constitutes the spiritual health score, which varies from 20 to 120. The answer to each question was classified into six parts based on a Likert Scale (completely disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, agree, and completely agree). In statements with positive verbs, completely disagree was marked with 1, whereas completely agree was scored with 6 and in questions with a negative verb, completely disagree was marked with 6, whereas completely agree was scored with 1. Finally, spiritual health was divided into three levels: High (99–120), medium (41–100), and low (20–41). In the study conducted by Seyed Fatemi et al., the spiritual health questionnaire’s validity was specified through content validity and its reliability was determined by the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (0.82). 
soteriological efficacy of individual actions (karman) with respect to grace; who is a fit recipient for grace; and who are the agents of grace through which divine power is transmitted, or at least confirmed. The doctrinal debate between Abhinavagupta and the exegetes of the Śaiva Siddhānta on the causes of grace—the relative role of individual agency or other factors versus divine free will—echoes the writings of theologians and philosophers of various traditions throughout the ages. Western Christianity alone is marked by numerous controversies on the topic, often centered upon the relative potentiality of human choice and good works versus the exercise of God’s power and the notion of a divine plan for the elect. Within the Hindu fold, the idea of grace is already found in the late Upaniṣads and is developed further in the Bhagavadgītā, in the devotional (bhakti) and the Tantric traditions, as well as in contemporary Hindu sects. In the majority of Hindu traditions, philosophical views on grace inform those on devotion. These two concepts are often seen as linked by a relation of cause and effect, but the doctrines of the various traditions diverge with regard to the direction of such relation: Does devotion draw the Lord’s grace? Or is it itself the product of divine intervention? The same question could be posed in slightly different terms: Does devotion, both as an emotional state and as religious practice, have any soteriological efficacy? Or is liberation based on grace alone?
England I want to refer to a chapter by David Watson, the English evangelist who died early in 1984, on the subject of doubt (Watson: 1975 ). In his chapter "Why Doubt?” David Watson, acknowledging that Christians will doubt, offers the following causes of doubt: it is temptation, such as Jesus experienced in the wilderness; it is disobedience as, for example, through relating to the wrong people ("How can a Christian be a partner with one who doesn't believe?"); it is ignorance, as when people just don't understand that their sins are forgiven or have left "the rock of God's Word" or read the wrong religious books ("We must neither be choked by a surfeit of tough theological meat nor sickened by the souffles of spiritual experiences"); it is loneliness as when we fail to relate to or share problems with other Christians; it is inactivity, as when we have no constant outlets in loving service and active witness to others; it is confusion, due to the failure to seek guidance from others or due to unanswered prayer ("We may be much more aware of the darkness and silence and pain, but we have to accept by faith that 'in everything God works for good with those who love him'."); finally our doubt may be the consequence of ingratitude which "can rob a Christian of the experience of God's love almost more quickly than anything else ... Certainly the tonic of thanks giving is one of the greatest antidotes to doubt".
least 30 races and ethnics that uses more than 50 The spread of Islamic belief has accumulated plenty languages and not least than 80 dialects. The main ethnics of conflicts in Sabah’s history. The conflicts is not only are consists of: Kadazandusun (that is a third of the total the events that happen after independence but also what Sabah’s population) Murut, Paitan, dan Bajau. The other has happen before that especially during the colonization. native’s residents are including Bonggi, Iranun, Ida'an As this is the beginning of foreign influence in local and Brunei. In addition, the Chinese is the biggest non- political issue during that era, it is also a start of changes native community. With that, Sabah has plenty multiracial in the religious range in this state. The 18 century ethnics with their own cultural background. According to recorded the start of power interference from the colonizer the archeological artifacts, Sabah has been occupied by when the earliest merchant center established in the population at least since 28,000 years ago. Islam has Balambangan Island. In 1761,  Kudat is the starting approached Sabah by the end of tenth decade through point of “interference” thus inculcating the spirit of the Arab’s and India’s merchant and also as a result of defending the notion honor until affecting the spirit of the expansion of the Brunei Malay Sultanate regime . Islam sovereignty itself.
Also in the resistance against newly independent Indonesia, the ʻulama also came to the fore as its driving forces. We need only to mention the case of the DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia) in the early 1950s that was instigated by a group of ʻulama from dayah from all over Aceh. This, of course, without forgetting that one of the factors that caused the advent of the DI/TII resurrection in 1953 were the differences and the tensions between Acehnese leaders and religious figures with the Jakarta central government at the time the Acehnese people expected their region to be given special treatment as a province. In this case, Teungku Daud Beureuh turned into its main actor. On 21 September 1953, he decided to fight the Indonesian Government. Like the majority of PUSA ʻulama he declared to join S.M. Kartosuwiryo’s movement under the DI/TII banner and which had proclaimed the Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia) in West Java on 17 August 1949. 43
This research is a study of the analysis of legal transplant in the substance of the authority of the Religious Courts in Indonesia as normative legal research using several approaches such as the legislative approach, the conceptual approach and the comparative approach. The results of this study find that in the authority of religious courts in Indonesia, there is the application of Islamic Law systems as one part of the legal source in resolving Islamic civil disputes in addition to using other legal norms derived from positive law. Islamic Law System is one of legal system that is not separated from the influence of other legal systems. Mixing between these legal systems occurs through legal transplant, such as the law of Conventional Banking based on Law Number 10 of 1998, which became the basis and reference for the establishment of the Sharia Banking legal system in Indonesia. These legal transplants are only distinguished by the enactment of Sharia Principles in Sharia Banking in particular and the Sharia Economy in general. In the latest development in the civil sector, there are various legal rules that are affected and originating from the Anglo-Saxon legal system which are transplanted into positive law and enforced in Indonesia.
One the most difficult things to grasp about the emergence of the German religious constitution and Staatskirchenrecht is the manner in which the sheer historical gravity of this new cultural body altered the intellectual orbits and
trajectories of academic theology and philosophy. In the first place, by suspending the truth claims of the rival confessions — as the means of establishing their political and juridical parity — public law also adopted a neutral and relativistic view of their competing theologies and metaphysics, not least in order to prevent them infiltrating the constitution itself. In suspending and relativising theological and metaphysical doctrines, the deconfessionalised constitutional order would come to view theologies and philosophies as it did the religions from which they had emerged: namely, as engaged in permanent irreconcilable conflict in a space whose freedom had to be protected (and insulated) by a neutral legal and political frame. Second, this neutral and relativistic outlook was intersected and supported by a new kind of historical writing: the contextual-philological history of theology and philosophy that emerged during the seventeenth century. 43 This was a historiography that viewed theologies and philosophies as neither true nor false but as historical intellectual cultures or lifestyles, typically as pedagogical or psychagogical teachings in the service of particular religious or philosophical ‘schools’. It thereby suspended the idea that they might be revelatory of the human mind’s knowledge of itself or its relation to God or the world.
Many Sufis believe that the Prophet preceded his own human existence as the first creation of Allah and that creation actually came into existence for the sake of God’s ultimate beloved. This respect for the Prophet is manifested in intercessionary prayers. Devout Muslims will often take the opportunity to increase their love for the Prophet either individually or collectively by praising him or sending blessings to him. There is a vast body of popular poetry and songs that praise Muhammad and their lyrics are used in Sufi gatherings to increase their love for him. Any gathering of traditional Muslims, whether in the mosque on Friday or at regional, national or international conferences or gatherings will take the opportunity to lavish praise upon the Prophet of Islam. It is believed by Sufis that this demonstration of love for the Prophet will transform the appearance, personality, character and mannerisms of the murid (disciple). Without the spiritual presence of the Prophet in their practices and gatherings access to Allah would not be possible and Islam would have no inner path and Muslims would be left with the outer shell. It is not possible to be in the company of Sufis for very long before becoming aware of an enchanted world in which the Prophet not only intercedes on behalf of the pious, but also manifests in dreams and visions to transform lives and provide guidance. 33
Like physicians squabbling over the correct diagnosis and therefore best cure for their patient’s condition, all could agree on the desirability of religious unity and a lasting peace, but not on the means to achieve them. The Huguenots were frequently accused of infecting the body politic with heresy and bringing about its destruction through civil war. However, by the last stage of the wars, it was the Catholic League that was most readily portrayed as responsible for the disunity of the kingdom, as depicted in an illustration to the politique Satyre Ménippée of 1593, where the dismembered body could be understood as symbolising either the king or the realm and is perhaps deliberately (or naturally) ambiguous. 21 Earlier, this duality had posed a problem for the monarchomachs set on proving the divisibility of the king and his state justified by tyranny and prevarication. Its most vehement restatement, as a number of historians have pointed out, emerged under Henry IV, as in Guillaume Blaignan’s Pourtraict du très-chrestien et très-victorieux Henri IIII of 1604, with its emphasis on the mystical and metaphorical nature of the king’s body. 22 This
The second point, and in reference to the above exception, there was, however, one outlier statistic in the set of religiosity
questions. For the item “I try to carry religion into all aspects of my life,” the Introduction to Islam group dropped significantly from “somewhat true” (4.00) to “neutral” (3.11) whereas the Introduction to Buddhism group demonstrated a slight uptick from 2.44 to 2.66. So for this group of students, and this question, the course did seem to have a “negative” impact. One theory for this is that the Introduction to Islam classes did spend significant time on contemporary debates within Muslim circles on the nature and relationship of Islam with the secular state. My hypothesis is that students found more compelling the pro-secular state arguments (potentially as a means to protect religion as much to sideline it) and therefore when coming to the question of “carrying religion into all aspects of life,” students were more reserved at the end of the semester. This, however, is just one possible explanation. Another is that the course simply led to students having a greater sense self-realization of what they do/did by answering the more honestly the second time.
SMS Tauhiid is one of many examples cases of religious practice that was born as the implications of the development of information and com- munication technology. This SMS-based religious message services oper- ated by Pesantren Daarut Tauhiid Bandung, West Java and was initiated by KH Abdullah Gymnastiar or well-known as Aa Gym, the leader of the Pesantren and also one of most popular religious figures in Indonesia. As a product of technology, SMS Tauhiid has promises that people could access tausiah (religious messages) anytime and anywhere. SMS Tauhiid is a “lived religion” since it manifests in daily life and indicated by the in- volvement of aspects; first, holy book or other religious texts as a refer- ence about ideal life which acts as the content of SMS Tauhiid. Secondly, its contain activities in which people relate to religion symbolically. Third, its imply the involvement of numerous people to bound in the domain of religion.