The ‘offshore’ is a fine example of the way in which sovereignty’s ambiguities are exposed. Numerous instances of offshore oil and gas ‘discoveries’ highlight not only the proliferating reach of global extractive capital on the one hand but also the way in which they can be spatially mobilised in a discourse of resourcenationalism on the other. Put another way, the status of being ‘offshore’ is, from one perspective, an unbundling of sovereignty where ‘both the state system and an increasingly integrated market can live comfortably with each other’ (Hudson 1998: 933; Palan 2006). Thus, it is found that at the same time that capital is promised freedom and mobility in the offshore, it is simultaneously regulated and conditioned by resource nationalist policies that attempt to project political control over domestic fiscal and economic planning. The offshore exists not as an essentialist space for either the fluid modalities of spatial fix or for the counter-logic of state control promised by resourcenationalism but rather as one point in a connection with the onshore. Contemporarily, one example of this relation is the imposition of capital gains taxation as a means of resourcenationalism. Here, the state aims to capture tax on the gains made by international resource companies on ‘non-resident’ transactions where the value is derived from assets based within their jurisdiction. Witnessed in Mozambique (regarding offshore oil and gas), Uganda (in relation to oil) and India’s new finance bill that particularly targets structures with ‘no substantial commercial purpose’ (Government of India 2013: 13), the ‘offshore’ has emerged as a key battleground for the fiscal and discursive effects of resourcenationalism. Put another way, it is not only the case that the ‘offshore’ resources present a major disjuncture to the idea of a national economy in both conceptual and substantive ways. It is also, as a particular configuration of space, shaped and, mediated by state involvement inclusive of resource nationalist policies. The ‘offshore’ is still sanctioned by the state, the currencies used to trade in resources are often still ‘national’ and spatially it remains within the legally defined borders of the state. Thus, whilst remaining cognisant that the ‘offshore’ includes economies of ‘signs and space’ (Lash and Urry 1994), it is instructive to remember that it is still ‘embedded in the concept of national sovereignty over economic activity, however much they may be disengaged from the territory’ (Cameron and Palan 2003: 175).
While prevalent assessments of the trends in resourcenationalism seem to point to the cyclical nature of the phenomenon (following fluctuations in global commodity prices), the case of Kyrgyzstan calls for additional research into this topic. Regardless of whether the spring 2015 events represent a victory for resource nationalists, a success for the more moderate voices, or just a lull prior to the parliamentary elections, one thing is clear: among the most significant negative externalities of the dragged negotiations are the decline of the investors’ confidence in the country’s appeal as an investment destination. Stability and the status quo suddenly look preferable, and more lucrative.
The TNOCs has corporate responsibility to deliver to the society in which they operate. This may, in practice, also mitigate the risk of resourcenationalism. The TNOCs need to consider the social consequences of economic actions, particularly social, health and human rights issues, when making business decisions. In this regard, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is worth considering for the purpose of risk management and dispute avoidance. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a business opportunity as well as a business strategy rather than a business cost or burden (Porter and Kramer, 2006). The TNOCs should be willing to embrace its wider CSR initiatives through its contribution to local healthcare, education, and employment. With this aim in mind, the TNOCs can create a social fund from oil revenues so as to divert into poverty, education, environment, and economic projects. TNOCs’ meaningful engagement with the host society may provide an opportunity to develop much needed mutual trust and long-term co-operation between them (Sachs, 2007). These aspects could be factored into TNOC’s CSR programme, which could, in turn, be used as a risk management as well as dispute avoidance tool (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005). CSR is now the reality that facing TNOCs. CSR is more important than ever for the OICs’ survival and image. They need to embrace the principles of CSR. As Schwab (2008) puts it:
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is a theoretical exploration of three concepts that play a crucial role in the politics of the Kirchners: national sovereignty, populism and resourcenationalism. I have taken a step back to see the broader Latin American or global context of these concepts and I have assessed the conceptual debates that previous authors and renowned academics have exhibited. For instance, René Antonio Mayorga and Kurt Weyland have made enlightening contributions to the discussion about the role and development of (neo)populism in Latin America. I want to see how their vision and those of others are applicable to the political style of the Kirchners. The second chapter provides the Argentinian historical and political context starting after the Malvinas War in 1982. It describes the neoliberal administration of fellow Peronist Carlos Menem (1989- 1999) and his neoliberal successors, to contrast later with the interventionistic policies of the Kirchners. I elaborate on the political ideology of Kirchnerism, being a side-branch of
In the Russian case, establishing a direct relationship between resourcenationalism and levels of production is tricky. Production levels were highest under the Soviet Union, peaking in 1987. Thus, the decline in production began a few years before the end of the Soviet State, and might have contributed to the crisis of the latter. After the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, production declined rapidly until 1994, then stagnated until 1999: this just happens to be the period during which Yeltsin was president. Production again increased rapidly in the early years of the next decade and reached a new peak in 2007, slightly declining in 2008, which is when Putin left the presidency. A reading of oil production as a function of political leadership would obviously be simplistic, and in any case certainly does not corroborate linking oil sector openness with higher production and resourcenationalism with the opposite.
of the Church of England, a championing of the gentry and the power of the land, especially denouncing the land tax as a means of funding the war, and the pursuit of a blue water strategy that focussed on empire rather than the Whigs’ policy of continental intervention on the European mainland. Although Fletcher was clearly Whig, he did favour the blue water strategy largely on account of the fact that the navy could not pose as great a threat to internal liberty limited as it was to the sea and coast, unlike the army which could be deployed at home. xxv Whigs maintained that religious pluralism was more in line with national character, that war in the continent was necessary to safeguard English national interests and that future prosperity would be found not in land, but in manufacturing, trade and the City. While Fletcher broadly fits into this camp, he remained suspicious of the power of London to suck the economic life blood out of the surrounding environment and the corrupting influences of wealth and luxury brought about by trade. xxvi Also, like most Tories, he had great faith in the economic potential of land and agriculture. xxvii Underlying these opposing Whig and Tory views were opinions on the Revolution. At the one extreme were some Tories who believed that the Revolution replaced a bad king with a good one and that was that. At the other end of the spectrum were the Whigs who believed that the Revolution had ushered in profound political and constitutional change that had eradicated the previous system lock stock and barrel. xxviii Needless to say, the majority of views hovered between these two points and was complicated further by the fact that some such as Sunderland could change their views radically without a second thought and others such as Robert Harley who started out as a Whig but became more and more Tory. xxix English nationalism can be seen in Bills against Occasional Conformity designed to keep non-conformists out of official positions, Bills against immigrants and Jews and in the ways in which both Whigs and Tories chose to present Scotland as either full of Republican, non-conformist Whigs or Die-Hard Jacobite absolutists. xxx In short Scotland was a useful metaphor to portray the worse excess of the opposition.
acy or, to some extent, Bolshevism, have received a fair share of attention. Global history and the history of circulation of goods, people and ideas will no doubt keep pushing those intellectual fron- tiers. For earlier histories of Indian ‘connectedness’ with the world in the period under considera- tion, see for instance Nirode K. Barooah, India and Official Germany 1886-1914 (European univer- sity papers. Series 3, History, paleography and numismatics, 77), Frankfurt/M : Peter Lang, 1977. The focus in these studies is usually on individuals like ‘Chatto’ (see Nirode K. Barooah, Chatto, the life and times of an Indian anti-imperialist in Europe, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), Har Dayal (Emily C. Brown, Har Dayal: Hindu revolutionary and rationalist, Tucson: Uni- versity of Arizona Press, 1975.) etc. Other movements, especially outside the US, are not very well explored so far, though new research is under way. See Ramnath, Maia, Haj to Utopia - How The Ghadr Movement charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire, Berkeley et al: University of California Press, 2011. ‘Interrogating Provincial Politics: The Leftist Movement in British Punjab, c. 1914-1950’ [unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford, 2011]. For a similarly recent study see also Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the Interna- tional Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, New York et al: OUP, 2007 (see on the central tenet of this book, below). Earlier on, Tilak Raj Sareen published a number of annotated selections or sum- maries from pertinent documents, see for instance Sareen, Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad (1905-1921), New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979. There are a number of books regarding India and Japan, the INA, SC Bose etc. See below, last chp.
(Devine, 1999: 592-97). The effects of this restructuring and of neo-liberal policies in general were felt throughout Britain, in all of its constituent parts. However, it was the structure of the UK state, and Scotland’s autonomous position within it, that allowed discontent to be expressed in nationalist form, as a partial or total retreat from the British state. The years of economic restructuring also exacerbated the “North-South divide” in England, and the idea of a devolved assembly in the North-East was raised, as this region was, like Scotland, dependent on ship building and mining and was similarly effected. However, Scotland’s long experience of autonomy from Westminster was far more pronounced than that of Wales or the English regions, and permitted discontent to feed into Scotland’s pre-existing national consciousness. Guaranteeing this autonomy by establishing a Scottish assembly or through complete separation appeared to many as the solution to Scotland’s political and economic plight. Scottish nationalism was articulated as the defence of Scottish institutions of public life, that would in turn protect Scotland’s autonomy and thereby “Scottish culture”. In 1988, a Claim o f Right was issued, calling for the establishment of a Scottish assembly. The authors of the Claim of Right argued that ‘Either we advance to an Assembly, or we retreat to the point at which Scottish institutions are an empty shell and Scottish government is, in practice, indistinguishable from any other English region’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 3). In the same year the separatist Scottish National Party promised to ‘restore the Scottish dimension in politics, to restore Scottish influence in politics and to begin the drive towards independence’ (Scottish National Party, 1988: Introduction). Calls for constitutional reform became bound up with various types of Scottish nationalism, all of which aimed at some re-negotiation of Scotland’s relationship to the British state.
This study shows that cloaks covering for racism are often highly visible yet highly effective. This suggests that racism in participatory media spaces requires careful yet critical tracing rather than ideological unmasking. Key discursive moments, such as the counter-response on r/ImGoingToHellForThis to the public circulation and reception of the photograph of Alan Kurdi, provide generative contexts in which to trace the memes, references, and visual repertoires that circulate in online participatory discourse ecologies. As a subreddit with 516,036 subscribers, r/ImGoingToHellForThis offers a significant context where participatory media practices generating an extraordinary amount of racist nationalism are constantly being remixed and remediated anew. Traditional publishers, such as Condé Nast, which owns reddit, would not sanction publications expressly devoted to politically incorrect statements or rampant racism, even if cloaked in humor. However, user-generated content on participatory media can establish and promote racism and nationalism without requiring the sanction of an established publisher. In such cases, cloaks including humor and visual remediation can provide cover if not sanction for such discourses, frustrating critical unmasking precisely by foregrounding what might typically be repressed but repositioning it as humor. The racist nationalist postings on r/ImGoingToHellForThis rely on cloaks in order to capitalize on the power of participatory media to establish horizontal links among users, leveraging the creativity of remix culture to generate a network capable of producing and perpetuating racist nationalism.
The culture selected by the ruling elite in the case of Japan, was the now so- called “classic” Japanese culture, it revolved around books and artworks accurately chosen to represent a country that was trying to delete any trace of past Chinese influences, and create a canon to represent what was deemed as “pure” Japan. 25 The books chosen, such as “The Tale of Genji”, which still is the Japanese classic par excellence, and the artworks as well created a precise master narrative mainly referring to the Kyoto region, seen as the cradle of ‘classical Japan’, while all the other regions were seen as ‘local variations’ of the core culture. The same goes of course for Okinawa and its surroundings, which were constructed as a periphery to central Japan and its culture was strongly associated with the ethnicity of its inhabitants. As I explain later, this was the conclusion to which, although for different reasons, Yanagi Sōetsu came. The newly selected canon of culture is then promulgated and delivered to the population in several different ways, the most relevant being education, the control over mass-media and other entities, such as the museum. In general, the methods employed by the state to mould its official culture and the dynamics of cultural nationalism have been described with accuracy by Benedict Anderson (2006). In the case of Japan, Kristin Surak (2013), has brilliantly analysed, how the tea ceremony (chanoyu) was chosen and elevated as a symbol of national cohesion and external recognition. She stresses upon how, in some cases, this practice has been used as an expression of a Japanese national spirit, during the years before WWII, aiming at cultural governance. This has relevant outcomes both for the Japanese governmental
the obligations related to minority rights protection. In the case of Bosnia- Herzegovina 65 , the Committee was not satisfied that the will of the peoples within the republic had been assessed, and the opinion implied that an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina could not satisfy the aspirations or guarantee the protection of ethnic Serbs, noting the recent (un-monitored) plebiscite for independence held by Bosnian Serbs. With respect to Croatia, Opinion 5 notes similar concerns about the constitutional protections for ethnic minorities within its borders and indicated that Croatia was in need of supplementing its proposed constitution accordingly. Of the republics requesting recognition under the guidelines, only Slovenia and Macedonia were judged to have met fully the criteria for recognition in the guidelines, and the Committee was clearly impressed by and took pains to highlight the specificity and encyclopaedic nature of the minority rights protections promised by these two aspiring states. Given this, it is ironic that the EC elected to follow the German lead and recognize Croatia and, within a month, Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, while not recognizing Macedonia for a few years. 66 While the ‘early’ recognition of the more ethnically homogenous and virtually conflict-free Slovenia is more understandable, especially given that it was a situation in which the norms of uti possidetis juris and self-determination could be conjoined, the actions of the EC and the host of other states who followed them failed to provide either clarity or consistency to the application of the right of self-determination and the responses to emerging nationalism. An opportunity to establish workable and coherent norms was pursued and, as the Badinter Opinions indicate, the EC came close to producing normative mechanisms and approaches to the conflict that include many of the key components outlined in Part I, but the opportunity was squandered and the actual responses spoke more of the divisions within and between the ‘new Europe’ and the international community than about normative cohesion.
corporations to apply to the historian’s investigation into the specific, idiosyncratic processes of most social relations. One consequence of this recognition is Hirschi’s justified scepticism of ‘the macro-sociologist approach of most modernist theories’ of nationality (p. 13); and his criticism of Ernest Gellner’s (and for that matter Benedict Anderson’s) so very logical, functionalist, and materialist analysis of nationalism in chapter two, ‘The modernist paradigm: strengths and weaknesses’, is a tour de force. The manifest weaknesses of the modernist theories of nationality have been observed often enough, for example, by John A. Armstrong, Anthony Smith, Aviel Roshwald, and others, so that their criticisms and those by Hirschi need not be
Several analysts regard the television producers as leading New Arabism. Zayani believes that it is the Arab media who are ‘creating’ a pan-Arab public opinion that is becoming known as the ‘Arab street’. Khalil Rinnawi similarly believes that his new regional Arab nationalism is directed by elites, calling it an, “ ...upper middle class imagining.”531 This top-down conclusion is elaborated upon by Lawrence Pintak who uses Anthony Smith’s nationalist theories to explain why. Pintak expresses Smith’s belief that nationalist ideologies create ‘border guards’ who provide, “‘a new panoply of symbols and myths, memories and values, that set the included national states apart’ from those surrounding them.” For Pintak, “Arab journalists are the border guards - if not the architects - of this new imagined watan.” In contrast, many scholars subscribe to what Alderman has called, “Arabism from the ground up,” which sees the growth in Arabist television reflecting a genuine grass roots sense of national identity rather than leading it.533As the Washington Post claimed about Al-Jazeera they, “are being led by the masses, they don’t lead the masses.”534 Jeremy Tatham supports this point highlighting that such was popular feeling against the Iraq War of 2003 that any news station such as al-Jazeera would be committing commercial suicide were it to report in an impartial manner that did not reflect the audience’s outrage.535 This was seen by the relative failure and unpopularity of the American-sponsored Arabic news station, al-HurraP6
sense of mysticism that exists, grows, and processes in the souls of everyone without realizing it. The same opinion was stated by Ritzer & Smart  that nationalism is an aspect of "self", which is a form of emotion. Likewise Gray  and Davidov  view nationalism as a condition of the soul possessed by someone in the form of love, loyalty, pride, and respect. Based on the opinions above it can be concluded that nationalism is in the soul, related to emotions, in the form of love, pride, loyalty, and respect for the nation and state. Viewed from its form, nationalism is included in the domain of attitude, and attitude is always related to values. Therefore, related to the factors that influence nationalism, the same with factors that influence attitudes. There are many expert opinions that explain the factors that influence attitudes, including one's nationalism. Lee and Ugurlu  suggested factors that influence individual attitudes are; socio-cultural context, beliefs, economics, and religion. Learner  identifies two factors that determine the development of values, morals, and character, namely; individual and social context of the child. According to Learner, children's values, morals, and character will develop positively if the strength possessed by the child or someone such as self-control is supported by the strength of a conducive environment, such as family, peers, and the community. More specifically, Learner stated that extra-curricular activities in schools such as scouts had a contribution to the development of morals and character. This shows that organizational units in schools and higher education have a contribution to the inculcation of values, morals, and character, including the value of nationalism. In line with the two
To the persons adhering faith in the territorial concept of nation and nationalism as developed in the west the above mentioned spiritual basis of nationalism might not augur well and the charge of utopian philosophy might be easily leveled against it. But in India Aurobindo was the not the first philosopher who talked about spiritual nationalism. Prior to him since the time of Vedas adherence to spiritual nationalism was in vogue and in modern times Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Swami Dayanand Saraswati,Swami Vivekanand and some of his countemporaries like BalGangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai,Mrs. Annie Besant and several others were its chief exponents. Hence, Aurobindo was of the firm view that not only spiritual forces but also spiritual men were at work in their own way for the advancement of this spiritual nationalism. In fact, they had been working from much earlier times. Tukaram, Ramdas and the Sannyasis of the eighteenth century Sannyasi Rebellion in Bengal belonged to this line of spiritual workers for India‟s freedom. Many of those who were leading the national movement were disciples of Sri Rama Krishna, of yogi Bejoy Krishna Goswami or of some other Guru of the time. 11
However, it was universal values on which the Asianism in the movement was based, not something distinctively Asian which could serve as a differentiating marker between the West and Asia. Moreover, it was exclusively a political movement and there was no reference to historical or cultural elements in its advocacy of an Asian alliance. This suggests that the aim of Asianism in the movement was solely political and there was no indication of any sense of an Asian identity based on the notion of a distinctive Asian cultural community in the movement. Rather, their Asianism operated within the Social-Darwinist, Western-centred logic of civilisation which viewed the history of humanity as a linear progression from barbarism to civilisation and which placed the West at the highest stage of civilisation. That is to say, what these Asianists desired was to civilise Asia in Western ways in order to bring Asian people liberty and justice in the international community. The People’s Rights Movement dissolved after its main goals of the establishment of a national constitution and an elected assembly were realised and internal conflict shattered its unity. In consequence, the Asianism which developed within the movement lost its energy. This indicates the fragility of political nationalism and a pan-nationalism which are not backed up by cultural identities. It was toward the end of the 1880s that modern Japanese cultural nationalism became powerful and the concept of Japan as an ethnic nation became prominent. An important point is that this redefinition of Japan as an ethnic community, with its distinctive history and culture, was accompanied by the redefinition of Asia as a geocultural community to which Japan culturally belonged.25
interactions linking people and institutions across the boundaries of nation-states. As people move across the globe for various reasons, regional autonomy is no longer restricted to nation-states. New modes of communication have provided people with wider access to share their ideas. Techno trans-nationalism provokes a different debate about the nature of art practice on the internet and enables exchange to be seen in another context. Techno trans-nationalism highlights marco approaches or narratives that reveal mutiple sites of activity of group determination. Distribution and collaboration are essental factors occuring between artists working on the internet.
The idea of nationalism has spread across the world due to strong worldviews of people. Therefore, it is clear that the concept of nationalism is almost identical among nations, but what really differs them, is the way how different nations have used this nationalism as a tool for their unification. Moreover, it can also be said that there can be no nation without nationalism. Smith (1992) clearly describes the relationship between national and European identity in terms of compatibility, „however dominant the nation and its national identification, human beings retain a multiplicity of allegiances in the contemporary world‟ (with those that are perceived as helpful for survival). 9 In addition to this, V. Havel, the ex-