For El Salvador to reconcile with its past, it would be best, of course, if it pursued accountability domestically. But Spain’s willingness to exact the justice that San Salvador has thus far failed to deliver sends a powerful message to perpetrators of atrocities and upholds the rights of victims who have long demanded full reckoning. And at least this time, the U.S. has come down on the right side of history.
available at http://www.hrc.co.nz/home/hrc/newsandissues/commissioncallsforlegalrecognitionof victimsrights.php (last visited on Sept. 21, 2009) (discussing New Zealand Human Rights Commission submission to the Inquiry into the Place of Victims in the Criminal Justice System, which argued that the rights of victims would be improved if there was a more cohesive legislative framework dealing with victims’ rights; victims’ access to necessary services was ensured; there was a more equitable system for payment of compensation by the State and restitution by the individual, and restorative justice programs were promoted); New Zealand Human Rights Commission, Commission Supports VictimsRights to Speak before Parole Board (July 5, 2007), available at http://www.hrc.co.nz/home/hrc/ newsandissues/commissionsupportsvictimsrighttospeakbeforeparoleboard.php (last visited on Sept. 21, 2009) (reporting New Zealand Human Rights Commission recommendation that proposed law comply with a provision in the Commonwealth Best Practice Guidelines on the rights of victims stating that “[v]ictims must have the right to be heard in private at parole or similar hearings” ); Govt. “should pay victims of violence,” T IMARU H ERALD , Sept. 3, 2007, 2007 WLNR 17168502 (citing Human Rights Commission opinion that victims should get cash compensation from the government).
19 of political actors when the rights of victims and offenders are viewed in opposing categories. In this context, victims are not understood as a deserving group in their own right or in need of meaningful State-sponsored support. The potential for improvements to victims’ services becomes lost in the battle of offenders’ versus victims’ rights with neither group benefiting substantially, and indeed, in the wake of the conflict, the social status of prisoners becomes even more marginal. In Britain, prisoners and ex-prisoners become ‘others’, in not just rhetorical, but material, terms. Their criminal records that follow them out into society after release contribute significantly to their continued social exclusion and feelings of stigmatisation (Social Exclusion Unit 2002; Unlock 2009; Working Links 2010; Aresti, Eatough and Brooks-Gordon 2010; Nacro 2010; see also Pager (2007) in the US). Yet the denial of their voting rights in custody makes their continued exclusion even more likely and serves only to exacerbate their sense of detachment from active citizenship. Their construction as ‘expelled citizens’ (or rather reconstruction as ‘denizens’ or even ‘social outcasts’) are likely to retain much more salience than any sense of ‘social belonging’ or inclusiveness.
173 the Court of victim’s alleged suffering entails therefore the risk of never being heard by the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, participation during the criminal proceedings might, which has, however, not yet been proven, pave the way for a stronger position in the course of reparation proceedings. After all, as a result of their successful prior participation, victim’s allegations and claims have already been raised and thereby drew the Court’s attention to their individual harm suffered. Moreover, considering that Trial Chamber I ruled that it is not at all examining those requests for reparations which have been submitted to the Registry prior to this decision, it seems that waiting for the public debate which is held at local level constitutes an opportunity for victims to claim remedies which is a lot easier than applying for reparations prior to the local activities (section 5.4.3 Implementation). 639 As the localities should be those which have been mentioned by Trial Chamber I in the judgment and where the crimes for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo has been convicted were committed, the ICC and the potential benefit of reparation are brought close to the victims. 640 In particular for children, the closeness might constitute an opportunity to submit reparation claims which is far more realistic than trying to apply for reparation proceedings via the formalistic avenue and far away in The Hague.
This is mainly due to three reasons. The first reason is that states have been constituted into social and democratic States of Law where the criminal process is conceived as an instrument for safeguarding the recognised system of fundamental values, rights and freedoms. This process is intended to guarantee the rights of both people accused of committing a crime, and of the victims and of the rest of the population (Sanz Hermida, 2009, p. 25). For victims of human rights and humanitarian law violations, this means that they must be safeguarded and their rights must be protected. The second reason is that it is necessary to meet the demands for justice, truth, and compensation, as well as reparation to the victims for the psychological, physical, social, political, and other consequences that have been caused by the serious violations committed during and after armed conflicts. Some of these conflicts have been ethnic or religious, or been carried out by totalitarian regimes, etc. And, the third reason is the emergence of a new legal discipline, namely victimology, which has given the victims of crime an increasingly active role both in criminal law and in international human rights law. Victimology studies the victim from several perspectives: (a) bio-psycho-social; (b) criminological, and (c) legal, that is, the victim’s relationship with substantive law and with the criminal process, which is directly linked to the issue of reparation and justice. 3 This has resulted in the construction of a system of protection and victim's rights that states are obliged to comply with; otherwise they must repair the harm caused.
More than 50 years of confrontation have invaded the lives of Colombians with pain, brutality and bloodshed. The multiple dimensions of the war have created a heterogeneous universe of victims. The Law of Justice and Peace (Law 975), enacted in 2005 by the Colombian congress, defines the victim as: the person who has suffered individually or collectively direct harm such as temporary or permanent injuries that cause any type of physical, psychological and/or sensory disability (visual and/or auditory), emotional suffering, financial loss and detriment of their fundamental rights. These harms must have resulted from crimes committed by members of organized armed groups at the margins of the law. (Procuraduría 2007, 15) Although the law excludes those victimized by official state agents, (Garcia- Godos and Lid 2010, 501) it is crucial to distinguish that all participatory actors in the conflict, including the state (police and armed forces), have responsibility in the execution of crimes that violate human rights. In Colombia, crimes that range from murder and kidnappings to bombardments of public spaces construct the victimhood of the individual.
Inge Vanfraechem, Ph.D., is manager of the European FP7 ALTERNATIVE project and works at the KU Leuven, where she received her B.A., M.A. and Ph.D in criminology (2006) on the implementation of family group conferencing in Belgium, a path-breaking approach to the restorative justice field in Europe. She has worked as researcher and co-promoter on the Evaluation of Victim Policy in Belgium at the National Institute of Criminal Sciences and Criminology (NICC) at the Belgian Ministry of Justice during 2007-2010. Dr. Vanfraechem returned to the KU Leuven Institute of Criminology in 2011 to work as coordinator and co- promoter of several interdisciplinary and collaborative European projects for the European Forum for Restorative Justice (EFRJ) and Leuven Institute of Criminology (LINC), such as: Victims and restorative justice, Conferencing: a way forward for Europe, and Restorative Justice and Crime Prevention. She is editor of ‘Restorative Justice: an International Journal’, the only peer-reviewed, high standard, academic and international journal in the field of restorative justice. Dr. Vanfraechem is also a key member of the Working Group on Victimology of the European Society of Criminology (ESC).
remarkable for being the only existing regional statutory body (although it must be noted that the Basque Parliament Presidency has also organised exhibitions, erected monuments and organised commemorative events). 11 The Directorate replaced in 2002 the previous Office for Victims of Terrorism Assistance that had been set up in 1991 in order to provide closer and more personalised care to the victims. These tasks are presently conducted through written communication and, if required, individual meetings, where victims are informed of the existing programmes (Pérez, 2003). Staff members can also accompany them to their trials, which are generally carried out in Madrid. This is one of most positively received services (Varona, 2009). In addition, the Directorate facilitates the organisation of commemorative events and channels existing funds to local victims groups. Importantly the remit of this body included from the beginning efforts to assist citizens suffering from political persecution (violence by ETA support groups or individuals, extortion, blackmail and so on) thus effectively expanding the definition of victims of terrorism. As it will be shown below, this decision was adopted more than a decade before it became part of the national regime.
courts to apply international law such as sections 231, 232, and 232. This is holding that the Constitution should be interpreted “to comply with international law”. Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC), Para 97. Mlambo asserts that: “The Rome Statute gives effect to international human rights law and enables the prosecution of customary international law crimes. As such, its provisions enjoy pre-eminence in our constitutional regime. Moreover, it has been domestically enacted. Its binding status is clear”). National Commissioner of The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another (CCT 02/14)  ZACC 30. Article 2 of the Kenyan Constitution adopted in 2010 is much more explicit in this regard. J Osogo Ambani, ‘Navigating past the ‘dualist doctrine’: The case for progressive jurisprudence on the application of international human rights norms in Kenya’ in Magnus Killander ed, International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa, (Pretoria University Press, 2010) 25. Oppong argues that trends seem to be changing in favour of application of international law in domestic courts in Africa). Richard Oppong, ‘Re-imaging International Law: An examination of recent trends in the reception of international law into national legal systems in Africa’ (2006) 30 FordhamIntlLJ 296.
One of the world’s main concerns over the past decades has been the phenomenon of terrorism. It is evident that terrorism must be eradicated, especially considering the huge threat it poses to the basic values of democratic societies. However, it must be kept in mind that arbitrary governments also represent a huge threat to these same values and, therefore, safeguards must exist to guarantee that state authorities act within the framework of law. Unfortunately, some governments misuse the ‘state secrets privilege’ argument, created to protect their right to confidentiality in national security affairs, to prevent their gross violations of human rights from being assessed by the judiciary, violating victims’ rights and promoting impunity. This is particularly true in cases involving so-called ‘extraordinary renditions’ used to fight terrorism. This article defends the premise that as much as the existence of secrecy is essential for the protection of every nation, no secrecy can serve as an excuse for governments to violate human rights and disregard the rule of law. In order to ensure that state secrets privilege is not used as a way to promote impunity for serious human rights violations, it is very important that mechanisms are implemented in order to have the claim of secrecy in national security related issues closely scrutinised by an impartial judicial organ. It is in the interest of democracy and justice that a fair balance is struck between the interests of national security and the protection of human rights.
Although it is clear that many states understand article 19 of the Political Covenant as creating a positive obligation, a few states have explicitly stated that it does not. The United Kingdom, in its 1994 fourth periodic report, went even further and stated that measures ensuring open government “may assist freedom of opinion and expression but . . . they are not measures which are required to give effect to the rights conferred by article 19.” The report stated that the right to seek, receive, and impart information did not refer to “guaranteeing access to information owned by another.” UN HRC State Report of the United Kingdom, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/Add.3, ¶ 72 (Dec. 19, 1994). The 1997 Austrian report to the Human Rights Committee stated that decisions of the Austrian Constitutional Court understood a right of access to information only for publicly accessible information. The Austrian report gave an example of a recent case involving a customs officer who seized an individual’s periodical. According to the report, the court ruled that “while there is no obligation on the part of the state to ensure access to information or to provide information itself, an obstruction through the active intervention by state organs of the procurement of and search for publicly available information was only admissible if provided for by law.” UN HRC State Report of Austria, UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/Add.3, ¶ 204 (Oct. 15, 1997). The report stated that “[a]s far as particular cases are concerned, the question of how far the freedom to seek information extends is still not settled.” The report did explain that the Austrian Constitution provided a limited obligation on the part of the state to impart information about its activities, but that this obligation was not derived from the right to freedom of information. Id.
has consistently condemned trafficking-related human rights violations such as slavery, forced servitude, and violence against women through various accords, proclamations, and declarations. For example, in 1865 the U.S. officially banned slavery through adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery, which reads in part, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction" (U.S. Const., amend. XIII, 1865) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 that states in Article IV, “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms” (G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71, 1948). Additionally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966 ensures the right of self-determination (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007) and the International Covenant Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1975 criminalizes severe mental or physical suffering imposed on others by those in an official capacity (Human Rights, Web, 1997). Furthermore, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 reiterated the importance of empowering and protecting girls’ and
(Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Legal Aid Institute) which later became the YLBHI (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation). LBH was initiated in 1970 in Jakarta by lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution, with the support of other prominent lawyers such as Yap Thiam Hien, Loekman Wiriadinata, and Suardi Tasrief under the Peradin (Persatuan Advokat Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Advocates) (Culla, 2006: 132). Initially, LBH presented itself as part of the New Order project (Aspinall, 2005: 100). Political and financial support came from the Jakarta government under Governor Ali Sadikin and Soeharto‘s personal assistant Ali Moertopo. Soeharto gave his blessing to the establishment of the organisation (Aspinall, 2005: 101; Culla, 2006: 132-133). Its work initially focused on advocacy for those coming from lower class backgrounds, making it a pilot project for a larger movement to modernise the rule of law and to make law accessible to the disadvantaged (Aspinall, 2005: 104; Culla, 2006 :138). When the organisation started, it worked on purely legal matters; later on, during the keterbukaan period it expanded its focus to engage in advocacy for vulnerable groups in society, notably in four ‗structural‘ areas involving conflict with the state: civil and political rights, labour, land, and the environment (Aspinall, 2005: 104-105). Because of its work, LBH was widely known as the ―locomotive of democracy‖.
Other than basic material needs children need emotional and psychological care, which institutions usually cannot provide. As they are still in the phase of learning to differentiate between good and bad and are easily controllable they become easy target for labour force, trafficking, prostitution, etc. After bad experiences, - may that derive from the above mentioned, domestic or other type of abuse, - some children become over- sensitive, some insensitive after such bad experiences. There is an innate capacity of resilience in every child, but not to the same degree, however, it is something that can be learned with a good caregiver. Some children learn to master and see their experiences from another perspective, while others try to suppress their emotions. The factor for becoming a perpetrator seems to raise in the latter case. If the child is not able to communicate his/her problems verbally, might act it out physically, sometimes committing the same abuse as the one s/he had suffered. The severity of trauma is not necessarily in parallel with the gravity of abuse or other similar experiences.Orphans and abandoned children do not have a role model due to the lack of family, or even if they do it is often not a good one. Thus, caretakers should try to provide a role model too, through their behaviouran communication as well. "Eevidence and best practice clearly demonstrate that the better models of residential care offer small, “family-style” environments with qualified and consistent caregiving. Such care is a recognized option within the continuum of alternative care for children when family care is not available or possible. Enabling INGOs to monitor countries has the advantage of learning about children’s circumstances. For instance, Human Rights Watch has shed light on the circumstances of Russian orphanages, where more than 50% of orphanages are made up of disabled children.In these isolated places often, there is frequent "physical and psychological abuse of children. Staff frequently injected children with sedatives to punish them for not following the institution’s ‘routine.’"With such consequences as "a 7-year-old boy with an intellectual disability died in a Russian orphanage after a health worker used cloth diapers to tie him to his bed. A preliminary account stated that the boy may have choked on his own vomit and that beingtied down stopped him from rolling over to
of racial discrimination” and offers strategies to prevent discrimination within States’ criminal justice systems. 170 The Recommendation pinpoints several factual indicators of racial discrimination, designed to help States parties identify whatever racial discrimination may be present within their borders. The factual indicator of racial discrimination is the number and percentage of persons in groups that are traditionally discriminated against who are victims of aggression committed by law enforcement. 171 The National Police Misconduct Reporting Project and the Uniform Crime Reporting Program attempt to make a record of credible allegations against police officers and provide reliable statistics on crime in the United States, respectively, but the data is incomplete. First, neither report provides the demographics of the victims of such encounters with police. 172 Second, the FBI’s reporting system is on a voluntary basis. 173 Only 6,328 law enforcement entities out of 18,000 in the United States report to the Uniform Crime Report. 174 Moreover, the Uniform Crime Report provides only the number of “justifiable homicides” caused by firearms, without specifying how the other deaths are caused, classifying them as “other.” 175 What is more, the report does not include cases where the victim is not a suspected felon or in which the killing was deemed unjustified. 176 The Center for Disease Control has made an effort to collect and report this data. Unfortunately, the insufficiency of the information available on this subject make it difficult to assess the number of victims of police aggression.
Second, when an ideological plaintiff initiates a class action, no individual class member needs to come forward. Thus, there is no danger of stigmatization and possible retaliation by the defendant. 122 One should not forget that a class action is a complex event, not only because it deals with large-scale and sometimes well-publicized cases, but also because of the importance of the interests of the absent class members. These members have to rely on the class representative, who therefore has a burdensome task. 123 The complexity and psychological impact of a class action can easily scare off potential class representatives, or can hamper the procedure. This is particularly important in cases of discrimination or violations of constitutional or civil rights, where class members are in an inherently vulnerable position. Examples of vulnerable class members include employees, prisoners, members of a minority class, asylum seekers, minors, or victims of sexual abuse. 124 All these problems are largely avoided, or can be more easily dealt with, when the class representative is an ideological plaintiff.
A BSTRACT : A series of rulings by the Court of Justice, dating back to 2007, have seamlessly intro- duced an inequality between frontier workers and migrant workers within the EU, especially in terms of access to social advantages. This series of precedents culminated in December 2016, in two rulings in which the Court of Justice accepted the validity of Luxembourgish rules relying on tests based on the duration of work in that Member State in order to determine who, among fron- tier workers, could benefit from portable funding to help their children to pursue higher education abroad. The lack of justification for this development of the case law concerning frontier workers is made all the more surprising by the fact that it is clearly contra legem . Both previous case law and secondary law have always held that frontier workers are workers exercising their freedom of movement under Art. 45 TFEU, who should benefit from equal treatment. The potential scope of this new restriction to frontier workers’ rights under freedom of movement remains to be deter- mined. This Article argues that these rulings are not only contra legem but also that they are based on highly questionable lines of reasoning, and that the explanation for this development can be found in the influence of Member States’ gradual adaptation to rules granting equal treatment to certain economically inactive citizens, as well as in insufficient legislative intervention at EU level.
One of the important aims of our study was to identify factors that help or hinder the reintegration of victims of massive violence and the return to normality. On one hand, active participation in political and social move- ments increases the exposure to organised crime and political violence under a regime that represses any potential challenge to its power and resources [5,45]. Around 40% of victims in this study reported their affiliation with the Kosovo Liberation Army or militia while 25% of all families in the household survey reported such an affiliation . Associates or family members of Kosovo Liberation Army fighters tended to be targeted by the law enforcement agencies and para- militaries. On the other hand, political and social invol- vement may have brought some psychological benefits as has been mentioned in other studies [46,47], particu- larly among historically deprived citizens. Our study showed that individuals, who had taken part in demon- strations, strikes or human rights rallies against the authorities and who fought for and supported the self- determination of Kosovo, often scored better for emo- tional well-being. People who play an active role in the community develop a collective identity, and collective response to repression and violence can generate various mechanisms for resistance, survival, healing and restora- tion at individual and population level, which should never be underestimated . In addition, affiliation with a group could bring concrete benefits like better access to the job market, financial resources or humani- tarian aid.