For the last twenty years or so, New Zealand has been adrift in a dynamic strategic environment that is less predictable in the long term than during the Cold War. The general apathy of New Zealand in the new millennium, strategically viewed, is reminiscent of, as Colin S Gray notes of Europe, the peaceable era of the mid 1920s. But as is often the case, reference to history to frame an opinion is often dismissed as irrelevant, or worse, goes unrecognised. 1 The outcome is that there is a lack of support in New Zealand to sustain a perceived costly defence establishment and thus the economic aspects of security are paramount. 2 New Zealand is not particularly security minded, and probably less so militarily minded. The apathy of the general public of New Zealand may be evoked by a false sense of security in that it is their belief that the NZDF is on the job 24 hours a day, so everything must be being taken care of. This is nurtured through the NZDF having a high media profile. Current deployments, which have now become a repetitive routine, receive regular attention on prime-time news nonetheless. 3 The NZDF also have strategies to heighten their profile and thus build up the public’s perception of constant activity, such as sending a P-3 on a coastal patrol around New Zealand on public holidays in summer, and overflying popular beaches. 4 The public see this and seem to gain the impression that military assets are providing comprehensive cover of the country’s coastal and ocean assets. 5
purposeful for somebody or something. In order to achieve relevancy, there could be more than one approach. Periodical reports of companies and public service organisations, interviews with chief executives, technical reports on speciﬁ c issues, “white papers”, annual ministerial instructions, quadrennial reports, all could be useful sources of information for selection of research topics related to the questions of interest for real world organisations and companies. Also, direct questioning launched by research organisations towards real world organisations could be an eﬀ ective way of searching for relevant topics for scientiﬁ c research. Similar to the previous, there is a technique known as “mapping the needs”. In this case, a research organisation oﬃ cially asks a number of other organisations for their research proposals keeping in mind that every organisation will at least propose those problems which are identiﬁ ed as important and unresolved as well as very relevant for their business. Th is approach is used at the moment in the Section for DefenceStudies of the Strategic Research Institute and the response is very positive.
security in their successive national security strategy documents, with threat assessments increasingly including so-called non-traditional security challenges, such as terrorism, organized crime, and WMD proliferation. Furthermore, as with Western Europe’s major powers, this broadening of the definition of ‘security’ has gone hand in hand with the development of the so-called comprehensive approach, aimed at blending all instruments of national power (civilian and military), and at enhancing cooperation between government departments to tackle such challenges NATO (Coticchia 2018; Michta 2018; Arteaga 2018; Gürsoy 2018; Polyakov 2018). Important differences in emphasis nonetheless persist in the hierarchization of security challenges. In particular, in contrast to southern European states—which continue to perceive a diffuse threat environment and focus on challenges on NATO’s southern flank (for example, terrorism and migrant smuggling networks)—former Soviet or Soviet-controlled Central and East European medium powers have come to single out Russia as their first security concern, increasingly after Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008, but even more so since the 2010s (Onderco, 2018). Given its history of recurrently falling prey to rival major powers, Poland, for instance, has consistently put Russia at the top of its security concerns throughout the post-cold-war period (Michta 2018). Ukraine’s threat perception vis-à-vis Moscow, instead, has risen and fallen multiple times since the end of the cold war and its independence from the Soviet Union, leading to oscillations in Kyiv’s defence policy between NATO and Russia—until Moscow’s aggression in eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea have led Kyiv to move resolutely towards closer ties with (Polyakov 2018).
This is not a plea for wishful thinking, hoping the worst never happens. We cannot escape uncertainty and government must routinely think through long- as well as short-term risks and threats. But balance is required to allocate effectively scarce resources to long-term security needs—and to distinguish between necessary and optional military operations and capabilities.
consciousness, in an age where pockets of instability can move beyond borders to threaten entire regions. Amid this often-unpredictable landscape, the Canadian Forces find themselves in greater demand, both at home and abroad. They also face the task of transforming themselves to meet the challenges of the future. Managing in this environment requires informed and ongoing discussion, debate and analysis. Through the financial support of the Department of National Defence, the Security and Defence Forum (SDF) makes independ- ent and objective contributions to Canadians’ understanding of these issues. The SDF is a program of academic grants that benefits all Canadians. Comprised of 12 university-based Centres of Expertise and a Chair of Defence Management Studies, the SDF fosters a greater understanding of Canadian security and defence issues. This ensures Canada’s academic community can contribute to public policy debates and inform Canadians about questions that affect us all. The centres also contribute to greater public engagement through interviews and briefings to the media, by speaking at community events and high schools and through informative web sites.
Whilst understood for practical reasons and political expediency, the lofty language and complex arrangements which govern the management of the security- development nexus cannot hide two problems. On the one hand, to turn the policy statements about the intrinsic link between security, defence and development policies into tangible action requires a leap of faith which the pre-occupations of the Union institutions with their own powers renders exceedingly difficult for them to take. On the other hand, once this leap has been taken, the compromises which it entails and the vague language in which these are couched render the effectiveness of the agreed system of rules and procedures subject to the personality of the relevant post holders, and the willingness of the institutions to cooperate. Not only is such an arrangement hardly conducive to the certainty and stability required for any effective administration, but also the energy and time wasted in turf wars about the legal basis of external measures in other areas (such as trade and environment) bode ill for its success. 60 The following section will elaborate on this in relation to
Over the past decade, the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the National Agency for the prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) have all been involved in trans-border operations that extend all over West Africa. Nigeria also plays a prominent role in regional security policy through the regular meetings of the heads of the different security agencies of ECOWAS member states, including that of all Chiefs of Defence Staff, Chiefs of Police, Chiefs of Immigration, and Chiefs of Customs. These regular meetings have brought member states much closer together and they have been able to harmonize policies on a variety of issues including intelligence sharing and elaborate on operational cooperation in combating cross-border crimes towards achieving sub-regional peace and security. At its 29th Meeting of the Committee of Defence Chiefs, held on October 4, 2011, in Abuja, the body tried to design measures to check flows of weapons from the Libyan crisis into Niger, Mali and other parts of West Africa. It also deliberated on the right response to the growing general insecurity in the region.
Defence diplomacy is a broader concept than military diplomacy because it incorporates the objectives and tasks of the latter, extending them to issues related to building trust, preventing crises and conﬂ ict resolution, defence dialogue, developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation (within international organisations), and also the use of armed forces in international missions and operations. Contemporary understanding of the concept of defence diplomacy is therefore characterised by a multitude of meanings and related international activity, based on dialogue and cooperation, implemented by defence ministries. Its main goal is to shape and implement the state security policy, and the task, to create stable, long-term relations and cooperation that foster transparency in the ﬁ eld of defence, strengthen trust and achieve common goals. One of the most important instruments of defence diplomacy is to maintain a dialogue with partners as a communication tool and conﬁ dence-building measure.
Before considering how New Zealand’s approach to maritime security can be better focused, it is important to examine what comprises New Zealand’s maritime domain. This thesis initially seeks to clarify New Zealand’s maritime areas of interest; with Chapter One arguing that – despite the aforementioned ambivalence – New Zealand is indeed a maritime nation with a huge maritime domain the geographic boundaries of which can be difficult to define. On one hand, New Zealand has a maritime domain which is quite clearly circumscribed by various international covenants; most notably the UNCLOS III. However, there are also much more contestable parts of New Zealand’s maritime domain than the maritime territories embraced under that Convention; the Ross Sea Region in Antarctica being one example.
ture. Principally, the reference-object of security must be analyzed clearly. In that initial analyzes, securitystudies have progressed through two different schools, and through critiquing the first state-centered traditional school, some scholars of critical securitystudies give priority to humans thus for those scholars, the reference object of securitystudies are individuals (Jarvis & Holland, 2015: p. 105). However, that critique and hu- man-centered opening in securitystudies raises new questions and complexities. In this point the concept of identity came to theoretical agenda similarly with problems of state-centered tradition. As mentioned above, in state-centered approaches, each actor is regarded to have different view on security and perceptions of threat based on their identities. And also in humanitarian securitystudies, this problem remains unsolved. Which individuals are the objects of security and what do they demand as for produc- ing their security?
rigorous can the enforcement of this duty be. Its wording suggests that, rather than a mutual defence clause, the duty this provision sets out is one of mutual assistance. This is a significant distinction because, quite apart from the semantics of the clause, it suggests two points: on the one hand, military means constitute merely one option open to a Member State when it examines how best to comply with its duty; on the other hand, it suggests that there is a broader set of parameters within which national authorities are expected to make this assessment. Even with due regard to the States to which the above caveats refer, compliance with the mutual assistance clause cannot but depend on the subjective assessment of a Member State as to how best it may assist a State which is a victim of armed aggression on its territory. This assessment is subject to multifarious considerations, not least of a political and economic nature. Such inherently indeterminate criteria do not lend themselves to a rigorous mechanism of verification or control. It is interesting that, in their Decision on the Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of Lisbon, the Heads of State or Government Meeting within the European Council state that the CSDP ‘does not prejudice the security and defence policy of each Member State, including Ireland, or the obligations of any Member State’. 5
empowerment is the key to the world development. Now a day’s women’s are facing more troubles physically in countries like India. The main reason for this type of troubles is the lack of safety for women. Government has only provided some safety measures, but it is the duty of every woman to prevent them self. As we know that they are not physically stronger than men to defend themselves some additional equipment’s are needed for the women to protect themselves. The main aim of our project is to design a security system which is a wearable jacket. It has a control button that will be used by women’s to inform their parents and nearby police station when they are in distress. This jacket directly gets connected to the satellite through GPS when activated. Then the location is transferred through the GSM. It also contains a shock mechanism to produce a non-lethal electric shock in emergency situations to deter the attacker.
EU Battlegroups is one of the EU capability projects and one of the elements of the EU CSDP development process. In April 2004, the EU Military Committee adopted the establishment of EU Battlegroups. Basically, EU capability projects are necessary to deal with key threats and key directions of action for security of the EU. These directions are mentioned in the European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World 2003 (thereinafter – EU Strategy 2003) and in A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy - Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe 2016 (thereinafter – EU Strategy 2016 (EEAS 2016)). If we compare both documents, it can be seen that the situation of the creation of both documents is similar, because in 2003, the United States, along with coalition forces primarily from the United Kingdom, initiated the war on Iraq, and Russia initiated aggression in Ukraine in 2014. Both events were some sort of fracture points in the existing world order, and they created insecurity near EU borders.
The interest in how population studies and securitystudies are connected is increas- ing very fast in the last decades, drawing on a rich literature on this subject (Weiner & Russell, 2001; Bigo, 2002; Goldstone, 2002; Guild & van Selm, 2005; Adamson, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Bourbeau, 2011; Sciubba, 2011; Goldstone, Kaufmann, & Toft, 2012; Rodrigues, 2015). Also, demography-related risks can produce feedback effects due to strong interdependence among risks and threats, and so demography matters for na- tional and global security in different ways (Urdal, 2005; Black et al., 2011; Goldstone, Kaufmann, & Toft, 2012; Rodrigues, 2015). Migration can matter for national security in situations when migrants or refugees are opposed to home countries’ regime, when they are perceived as a security risk or a cultural threat in the home country, when immigrants cause social and economic pressure in host societies, or when the host society use immigrants as an instrument against the country of origin (Weiner, 1992, pp. 105 – 106). The securitization of migration tends to include four different axis: so- cioeconomic, due to unemployment, the rise of informal economy, welfare state crisis, and urban environment deterioration; securitarian, considering the loss of a control narrative that associates sovereignty, borders, and both internal and external security; identitarian, where migrants are considered as being a threat to the host societies ’ national identity and demographic equilibrium; and political, as a result of anti-immigrant, racist, and xenophobic discourses (Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002, p. 24). Therefore, since migration can impact in different areas as state sovereignty, the balance of power among states and the nature of conflicts in the international system, national security may also be affected (Adamson, 2006). Lastly, increasing human mobility has been associated with: urban clusters for migrants (Rodrigues, 2015, pp. 45–46), the capacity of states to control entry, primarily in terms of illegal entry (Mabee, 2009, pp. 123 – 124), and on asymmetries in ethnic and religious population composition (Tragaki, 2007, p. 105). If immigrants are not integrated into host communities, particularly if they come from a completely different cultural environment, the potential risk of religious and ethnic conflicts tends to be higher, demanding new governmental integration efforts of ethnic minorities into national communities (Savage, 2004).
M annose-binding lectin is an acute phase serum protein synthesised by the hepatocytes (Ezekowitz et al. 1988; Taylor et al. 1989; Sastry et al. 1989). The hum an form was first purified in 1983 from liver preparations (Wild et al. 1983) after its existence was predicted from studies aimed at purifying an a-D - m annosidase from the same source (Robinson et al. 1975). The protein was isolated from hum an serum in the same year (Kawasaki et al. 1983), after descriptions of similar proteins from rabbits (Kawasaki et al. 1978; Kozutsumi et al. 1980), rats (Mizuno et al. 1981; Townsend and Stahl, 1981; M aynard and Baenziger, 1982) and mice (Ihara et al. 1982). The existence of distinct and different liver (MBL-C) and serum (MBL-A) forms of the protein was first reported in rats (Drickamer et al. 1986) and has since been noted in old world monkeys (unpublished data cited in Sastry et al. (1995)), b u t there is no
59 integration process within the European Union aiming to improve defence and security, which was impulsed by the incorporation of Jean-Claude Juncker to the Commission and Federica Mogherini to the External Action Service and their personal ambitions to further the Euro-project (Pannier, Personal Communication, 2018). This laid the foundation for future defence policies. However, the rationale behind the release of the Global Strategy in 2016 corresponded to more critical factors, those of the crises unraveling in the northern (Brexit), southern (Arab spring and civil wars) and eastern (Ukraine) flanks of the European Union and their consequences in the domestic affairs of the Union. For example, crises in the southern neighbourhood of the European Union, such as those in North Africa and the Middle East, have not only sparked violence at the EU borders, but also distressed the bordering countries with migratory pressures, which in turn create instability and senses of insecurity in domestic politics. It thus does not come as surprising that some of the member states most invested in developing defence operations are the states from the south: Spain, Italy, France (Garcia, 2016, p. 219). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the EUGS began to be drafted in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, which took EU leaders by surprise and sparked fears in Central and Eastern Europe over their territorial integrity, and was published a few days after the Brexit referendum, which posed yet another challenge to European identity and its integration processes. Hence, if the internal processes of the Union had laid the foundation, these crises unleashed insecurities in national governments and anxiety at the Union’s institutional levels, which ultimately led to the realization that the EU needed a stronger and more capable defence and security system to address all of the strategic interests and threats facing the Union and its Member States (Pannier, Personal Communication, 2018; Howorth J. , Personal Communication, 2018).
Defence Industrialisation in the NICs Case Studies from Brazil & India Carol Vervain Evans Ph D International Relations London School of Economics and Political Science 1 ' ! / ' / ABSTRACT Accompanyi[.]
In general, programs in AKPOHAN exercise dual tracks. The first track is based on targets of fulfilling the need of the national short-term as underlined in six of the Gotong Royong Cabinet Policy; while the second track is devised to achieve excellence of National Defence Posture in global level. Both tracks are forming a unity and are referring to the White Book which was composed with the spirit of the Constitutions and TAP IV/MPR/1999 and Propenas. Main principles of defence ability is to carry out three roles, namely able to fight threat, to pledge national security, and to be active in keeping world's peace.