The COA said it hoped Canada would do even better in Salt Lake City than it did in Nagano. We got 15 medals in Japan 1988, good for 5 th place in a pretty big world. The COA said it hoped we’d finish third this time. If we want to win at these Games – and we do despite all the talk about just being happy to send someone and have them set a personal best, yada yada yada – we need to set some priorities. Find the things we are best at (there’s a cheap laugh there somewhere) and put the money into developing athletes in that sport. Take the things we are marginal at – and there are plenty of those – and flush. It’s an easy concept to understand, but the choices would be painful to make, as the COA is finding as it tries to steer its limited money – about 15million a year – to the sports in which we are most likely to hit paydirt. “That’s dead on what we’re trying to do. We don’t want to kill any sports, but we want to link access to the gas tank to the chances of success.” (Mike Chambers COA president). If Canada really means business we should skimp on summer sports and invest in the winter variety, this being a nation of ice and snow and all, at least until global warming turns all of North America into the everglades. …There’s a danger in cutting sports funding, of course. But it’s a tough world that demands tough choices. And we’d better start now if we want to have the Winter Games in Canada in 2010 and not embarrass ourselves in the medal standings the way we did in Calgary or Montreal. It’s either that or forever find Canada buried in the standings between Belarus and Argentina. 9
Alan Bairner, taking his cues from the Scottish political scientist James Kellas, has pointed out that sport is the most popular form of nationalist expression in most countries. 1 Indeed, sport has long been an indispensable tool for governments and nationalists, who have exploited sport‟s symbolism and popularity for political gain. For example, Barrie Houlihan, Richard Gruneau and David Whitson and others have pointed out the Canadian government‟s frequent promotion of ice hockey as a form of social glue in the pursuit of a distinctive Canadian national identity. Although hockey reflects and exacerbates several divisions in Canadian society, it has remained a remarkably durable institution throughout the twentieth century in large part because of its broad ranging appeal. Though excluding women, aboriginals, and other groups, over time hockey has historically cut across numerous social cleavages in Canada, the most important of which are region and, to a more limited extent, ethnicity. Hockey is played, watched, and obsessed over by fans in British Columbia, Newfoundland, and all points in between. Crucially for this dissertation, hockey has deep historical roots in Québec. As Gruneau and Whitson point out, no other cultural form has brought Canada‟s “two solitudes” together as frequently and effectively as hockey. 2
the ‘anti-societal’ (sometimes labelled ‘fascistic’) politics of ‘self-expression’ of bodies such as the RSS, Khaksars and Muslim National Guards, which he regards as an elaborate staging of symbolic meta-politics, a performance of abstract power, aimed at expressing nothing but an ‘inherent sense South Asian history, the most relevant here are the engagement with early literature for children and the student movement in Indian nationalism. There is much writing that has to do (at least peripher- ally) with with youth, from Alter's writing on akharas (see below) to scholarship on sport, physical culture (see the multitude of articles in the International Journal of the History of Sport which has a heavy South Asia/ Asia focus), on to literature (see the directly relevant article by Shobna Nijhawan, ‘Hindi Children's Journals and Nationalist Discourse (1910-1930)’, EPW, Vol. 39, No. 33, 2004, pp. 3723-3729), or law (directly concerned with the nexus of these two is for instance Ashwini Tambe, ‘The State as Surrogate Parent: Legislating Nonmarital Sex in Colonial India, 1911–1929’, Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2009, pp. 393-427.) There is a large amount of contemporaneous writing from around the time of independence (see below) and a corpus of soci- ological and anthropological studies on Indian youth from the 70s and 80s. On this topic Ram Chandra Gupta (ed.), Youth in Ferment, Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1968; Rajendra Pandey, India's Youth at the crossroads: a study of values and aspirations of college students, Varanasi: Vani Vihar, 1975; or N.Y. Reddy, Values and attitudes of Indian Youth: a psychological study of rural and urban students, Delhi: Light & Life Publishers, 1980. The bulk of studies are on the post-independent era when these were national/state concerns and many were underpinned by a sense of panic at ‘student indiscipline’ or the moral decline of a seemingly alienated youth or with the problem of ‘modern- ising’ rural youth and primary education. See, on student politics at this time especially Phillip Alt- bach, ‘Student Politics in the Third World’, Higher Education, Vol. 13, No. 6, 1984, pp. 635-55. and idem, ‘The International Student Movement’, Comparative Education Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1964, pp. 131-137 (which deals also with the World Federation of Youth in which the Seva Dal would be engaged in the post-independent period, but for which there is unfortunately no space here).
Yves Deloye draws our attention to the ‘ invisibility ’ of national reproduc- tion; Edensor stresses its unre ﬂ exive nature. Microsocial practices – inhabiting an environment with national styles of vernacular architecture, listening to characteristically national music, watching a national sport, consuming na- tional brands of automobile, matter more than participating in occasional bursts of state nationalism such as national days. Deloye speaks of the spread of national identity along ‘ various, ambiguous lines, based on largely uncon- scious processes … without easily identi ﬁ able actors. What is at stake here is the emergence of a national identi ﬁ cation that is on the whole an unintended result ’ (Deloye 2013: 617 – 8). When taken-for-granted circuits of habit and in- terpretation among, say, white Englishmen, are problematised by the arrival of immigrants who do not share their localised cultural practices and understand- ings, a feeling of dissonance may result. This produces ontological insecurity among the newly self-conscious majority group. Such crises may fuel the suc- cess of anti-immigration parties or street movements, whose fortunes cannot simply be ascribed to far right entrepreneurs but are rooted in the horizontal interactions that underpin contemporary national identity in advanced liberal democracies (Skey 2011). A parallel example of emergent organisation and identity, from the religio-political sphere, is the ‘ leaderless jihad ’ of movements such as Al Qaeda or ISIL (Bousquet 2012; Sageman 2008).
media. These two factors have the greatest total effect of 25.597%. Because of its great influence, it is called a primary factor. The factors included in secondary factors are cultural background and involvement in the organization. These two factors have the second biggest influence with an effect of 18.897%, and these factors are called secondary factors. While the factors included in the tertiary factors are; parental education, parental occupation, and involvement in religious groups. These three factors have the smallest effect compared to other factors, 5.66%. That is why this third group of factors is called tertiary factors. Regarding the effect of each of the 7 factors tested, based on the research findings it is known that the 7 factors tested showed an influence in different quantities. The factor which has the most influence on nationalism is the educational background with a loading factor of 0.899. This means that the more certain types of education that are followed (religious-based or non-religious-based education) by a person at the level of education available, the better the nationalism. In some research results show that religion-based education has a much broader role than non-religious education in shaping characters, including nationalism , . That is because in religious-based education, nationalism is taught integrated with religious values , and nationalism that is integrated into religious values will be more quickly accepted because it is dogmatic. In addition, religion by most people according to Lickona  is still considered to have a very important role in maintaining the morality of a nation, therefore it gets a higher trust. The second factor which has a big influence on nationalism is social media with a loading factor of 0.869. This means
Under British rule, Aurobindo played an important role in the Indian freedom movement from 1893 to 1910. His idea of nationalism follows from the gospel of Bunde Matram. For him, nation was not a geographical area, physical territory or mental idea. He worshipped India as the „Mother‟, the „Living Mother‟ and made it clear to his countryman that this mother power has sustained Indians for thousands of years. He accepted the notion put forward by many other writers that common language, similarity of manners and customs, mode of living and tradition, racial similarlity may be the factors for constituting a nation. But those are not the exclusive component. According to Aurobindo, “a geographical unity, a common past and powerful common interest” are important elements. “But a common enthusiasm coaleseing with common interest is the most powerful fosterer of nationality”. 2 His notion of common enthusiasm is similar to the views of Frnz Oppenheimer, who says that “the consciousness of nationality
interactions linking people and institutions across the boundaries of nation-states. As people move across the globe for various reasons, regional autonomy is no longer restricted to nation-states. New modes of communication have provided people with wider access to share their ideas. Techno trans-nationalism provokes a different debate about the nature of art practice on the internet and enables exchange to be seen in another context. Techno trans-nationalism highlights marco approaches or narratives that reveal mutiple sites of activity of group determination. Distribution and collaboration are essental factors occuring between artists working on the internet.
If Arabism has evolved beyond nationalism into a supra-nationalism, where does that leave state identity in the Arab world? When Old Arabism failed in the 1960s, those who highlighted its decline such as Fouad Ajami predicted that state identities, long restricted by the Arab nationalist discourse would assert themselves.119 Certainly state leaders during this period made a concerted effort to construct a more distinctive identity around the modem state. However, recent surveys in the Arab world suggest that these attempts have met with only limited success. In one survey, compiled by Shibley Telhami in 2006, only 39% of respondents in 6 Arab states, including Jordan, considering the state to be their primary loyalty.120 On the other hand, as Hinnebusch highlights, the state does seem to have emerged as the most popular of the many potential primary loyalties in the Arab world, with the same survey suggesting only 33% saw Islamic and 28% saw Arab identity as more important. In this sense, he claims, it is quite remarkable that state identity has remained durable, “in the face of powerful supra-state identities having no parallels elsewhere.”121 A second theme of this thesis will be to examine the interaction between state and Arab identity in its two case studies: Syria and Jordan. A key hypothesis will be that one of the reasons why New Arabism has widely disseminated is that it complements the national discourse of Arab states which have constructed and promoted Arab identity over a sustained period. Rather than Arab nationalism, this discourse might be termed national Arabism which shares New Arabism’s acceptance and entrenchment of the state system. The national discourses of both Syria and Jordan employ, to differing extents, Arab and religious identity to construct a state loyalty.
difference between sport associations and federations seems to arise when looking more closely at their dependence on the environment. Although sports organizations in the sense of associations are to be characterized as relatively weakly cou- pled to their environment (Emrich et al., 2001; Flatau, Pitsch, & Emrich, 2012; Gassmann, Emrich, & Pierdzioch, 2017; Thiel & Meier, 2004), it seems to be reasonable to assume that for NS- GBs sports the relationships to their environment are of high importance. Looking more closely at the stakeholders reveal, that these are organizations at national and international level as well (see Bayle & Madella’s, 2002 description of stakeholders’ expectations with respect to a NSGB). Thirdly, the institutional structure of sports systems leads to a lack of rights of interven- tion, and thus in turn to considerable discretionary powers and room for manoeuvre in the scope of the “production” of sport- ing success, whose organizational structure is hierarchical in concept. These result in the need for legitimization towards the lower levels, and the need to consider motivational problems (see fundamentally Daumann, 2015).
of the Church of England, a championing of the gentry and the power of the land, especially denouncing the land tax as a means of funding the war, and the pursuit of a blue water strategy that focussed on empire rather than the Whigs’ policy of continental intervention on the European mainland. Although Fletcher was clearly Whig, he did favour the blue water strategy largely on account of the fact that the navy could not pose as great a threat to internal liberty limited as it was to the sea and coast, unlike the army which could be deployed at home. xxv Whigs maintained that religious pluralism was more in line with national character, that war in the continent was necessary to safeguard English national interests and that future prosperity would be found not in land, but in manufacturing, trade and the City. While Fletcher broadly fits into this camp, he remained suspicious of the power of London to suck the economic life blood out of the surrounding environment and the corrupting influences of wealth and luxury brought about by trade. xxvi Also, like most Tories, he had great faith in the economic potential of land and agriculture. xxvii Underlying these opposing Whig and Tory views were opinions on the Revolution. At the one extreme were some Tories who believed that the Revolution replaced a bad king with a good one and that was that. At the other end of the spectrum were the Whigs who believed that the Revolution had ushered in profound political and constitutional change that had eradicated the previous system lock stock and barrel. xxviii Needless to say, the majority of views hovered between these two points and was complicated further by the fact that some such as Sunderland could change their views radically without a second thought and others such as Robert Harley who started out as a Whig but became more and more Tory. xxix English nationalism can be seen in Bills against Occasional Conformity designed to keep non-conformists out of official positions, Bills against immigrants and Jews and in the ways in which both Whigs and Tories chose to present Scotland as either full of Republican, non-conformist Whigs or Die-Hard Jacobite absolutists. xxx In short Scotland was a useful metaphor to portray the worse excess of the opposition.
(Devine, 1999: 592-97). The effects of this restructuring and of neo-liberal policies in general were felt throughout Britain, in all of its constituent parts. However, it was the structure of the UK state, and Scotland’s autonomous position within it, that allowed discontent to be expressed in nationalist form, as a partial or total retreat from the British state. The years of economic restructuring also exacerbated the “North-South divide” in England, and the idea of a devolved assembly in the North-East was raised, as this region was, like Scotland, dependent on ship building and mining and was similarly effected. However, Scotland’s long experience of autonomy from Westminster was far more pronounced than that of Wales or the English regions, and permitted discontent to feed into Scotland’s pre-existing national consciousness. Guaranteeing this autonomy by establishing a Scottish assembly or through complete separation appeared to many as the solution to Scotland’s political and economic plight. Scottish nationalism was articulated as the defence of Scottish institutions of public life, that would in turn protect Scotland’s autonomy and thereby “Scottish culture”. In 1988, a Claim o f Right was issued, calling for the establishment of a Scottish assembly. The authors of the Claim of Right argued that ‘Either we advance to an Assembly, or we retreat to the point at which Scottish institutions are an empty shell and Scottish government is, in practice, indistinguishable from any other English region’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 3). In the same year the separatist Scottish National Party promised to ‘restore the Scottish dimension in politics, to restore Scottish influence in politics and to begin the drive towards independence’ (Scottish National Party, 1988: Introduction). Calls for constitutional reform became bound up with various types of Scottish nationalism, all of which aimed at some re-negotiation of Scotland’s relationship to the British state.
Fourth, exposure to information at events about opportunities to undertake sport was found to be a statistically significant factor affecting inspiration; however, less than one in ten respondents across the ten events reported having received such information. This backs up the inference of the Ramchandani and Coleman (2012a) study and it would seem that major sports events provide an ideal platform for 'sign posting' those who are inspired by them to activities that they can avail of locally (e.g. local clubs). Fifth, historically the 'legacy' of the investment of public money in major sports events has been evaluated, for the most part, in terms of the economic impact that it generates for the host destination. This point is particularly true in the UK context (see Ramchandani and Coleman, 2012b; Davies, Coleman and Ramchandani, 2013). Greater attendance by non-local attendees is desirable for maximising the economic impact of an event. However, this research demonstrates that spectators who reside in close proximity to the event venue are statistically more likely to be strongly inspired (rather than not inspired). In other words, there is a trade-off between the economic impact of an event and its inspirational effect. Therefore, if the rationale for public investment in elite sport is to generate economic impact then agencies such as UK Sport should target events that will appeal more to non-local residents. Conversely, if the objective is to maximise the inspirational effect amongst audiences, then public investment is best directed at events that promote attendance by members of the local community.
182 etc.) (see Šugman, Bednarik and Kolarič, 2002:69-70). However, another very important source of revenue for sport financing is voluntary work. It is estimated that about 700,000 sport clubs in EU countries build on the work of roughly 10 million volunteers (see Arnaut, 2006:19). The value of the work of these volun- teers cannot be ignored. On the other hand, public support in sport can take many different forms, such as (European Commission, 2007:27): direct subsidies from public budgets, subsidies from fully or partly state-owned gambling operators, or direct revenues resulting from a licence to provide gambling services, special tax rates, loans with low interest rates, guarantees with low commissions, public fi- nancing of sports facilities, acquisition of public municipal facilities by a private club or an institution at a low price, renting of sports facilities by public entities at a low price, payment for the construction or renovation of sports facilities by the local council, public works in private sports facilities, public acquisition of adver- tising spaces in sports facilities, land sales or donations or an exchange of land for sports facilities. However, some sports organizations have considerably better ac- cess to resources from business operators than others. Therefore, in amateur and mass-scale sports, equal opportunities and open access to sporting activities can only be guaranteed through strong public involvement. Moreover, public financial support is often vital for sport but must be provided within the limits imposed by Community law, i.e. the laws of the European Union 5 , that is, the various treaties
and its value is greater, that is, the higher proportion of investment in high-tech sport industries, then, the value of x is going to be smaller, Or the frequency of the traditional sport industry occur is more lower, the value of 1 x is more greater, meanwhile, the frequency of the high-tech sport industry occur is higher. That's what we want to see. For this situation, The solution is that sport enterprises should accelerate the conversion of high-tech sport achievements, and intensify research and development of new and high technologies, and establish a innovational management system, and give full play to the potential of human capital.
Third, some try to equate nationalist populisms with certain new left, anti- capitalist agitations – reading the nationalist rise as a misrecognised critique of contemporary neoliberalism, a critique that otherwise sits more naturally within the supposedly equally prominent left-wing agitations. If only. This wilfully optimistic reading of the political spectrum bundles the newly emboldened, often youth-driven leftist movements’ desire for change with the actual change and brokerage of power already exercised by nationalist factions. Only one brand of politics and mobilisation has successfully claimed the mantle of power – democratic, media and otherwise. That brand is nationalism. Brexit belongs to the real. Occupy and Momentum to the hopeful. The Front National belongs to the general, the Nuit debout protests to the particular. The People’s party and the Progress party, both long-term Nordic stalwarts of xenophobic alarmism, are in government, not merely aspirants. (Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece represent powerful counter examples but remain exceptions that prove the rule and are also buffeted by historical and present circumstances that render both contexts substantially different to the broader northern Europe clustering, and the place of Britain in particular, that is of interest here). Theresa May does not secure her otherwise absent mandate as premier through an appeal to the virtues of class solidarity, scrutiny of capitalist precarity, and an end to boom- and-bust crisis cycles. No, rather more prosaically, May shores up her legitimacy through an unambiguously nationalist interpretation of Brexit as having constituted a straightforward proxy referendum on immigration. A proactively nationalist gamble that, according to Kenneth Clarke, the resident dissident of the Conservative party, would make even Enoch Powell blush. 6 This is therefore
17Note that I emphasise ethnie as primordialists understand it. Some modernists agree that ethnic groups are at least one of the raw materials out of which nations are created, but their conception of ‘ethnic groups’ and exposition of die transformation of these groups into nations are very different from the primordialist one. For primordialists, ethnic groups universally incorporate the same basic and quintessentially distinctive markers, which remain intact once the group is transformed into a nation. This transformation is thus regarded as being a transformation of a persistent structure qua structure, universally applied (see, e.g., Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 22-31, chs. 6-7 & passim). For modernists who accept the role of ethnicity in the formation of the nation, however, almost everything could serve as an ethnic marker. Accordingly, markers of and boundaries between ethnic groups are strongly contested, diverse, variable and normally cut across each other. There are no fixed and definite pre-national ethnic groups, then, only loose and fluid ones. Thus, the transformation of some of these groups into nations necessarily entails a break of structures rather than persistence, and the formation of new structures which, at the most, are presented as if they were persistent. In that sense, modernists argue that even when a nation is created out of a preexisting ethnic group its creation largely involves a simultaneous formation of a new ethnic group. See Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, ch. 1, esp. pp. 20-21 & passim.
However, it was universal values on which the Asianism in the movement was based, not something distinctively Asian which could serve as a differentiating marker between the West and Asia. Moreover, it was exclusively a political movement and there was no reference to historical or cultural elements in its advocacy of an Asian alliance. This suggests that the aim of Asianism in the movement was solely political and there was no indication of any sense of an Asian identity based on the notion of a distinctive Asian cultural community in the movement. Rather, their Asianism operated within the Social-Darwinist, Western-centred logic of civilisation which viewed the history of humanity as a linear progression from barbarism to civilisation and which placed the West at the highest stage of civilisation. That is to say, what these Asianists desired was to civilise Asia in Western ways in order to bring Asian people liberty and justice in the international community. The People’s Rights Movement dissolved after its main goals of the establishment of a national constitution and an elected assembly were realised and internal conflict shattered its unity. In consequence, the Asianism which developed within the movement lost its energy. This indicates the fragility of political nationalism and a pan-nationalism which are not backed up by cultural identities. It was toward the end of the 1880s that modern Japanese cultural nationalism became powerful and the concept of Japan as an ethnic nation became prominent. An important point is that this redefinition of Japan as an ethnic community, with its distinctive history and culture, was accompanied by the redefinition of Asia as a geocultural community to which Japan culturally belonged.25