this, they are seeking the substantiverepresentation of women (Piscopo 2014). Moreover, many caucuses are, like committees, formal, with written rules, well- defined structures, clear membership, ‘public allegiances identifiable’ to members and non-members, and official sanctions (Piscopo 2014, 7). Reasons for participation might very well be the same too (cf Piscopo 2014, 15). Nor do we assume a priori that committees are inherently more effective than caucuses at delivering substantiverepresentation. This is an empirical question, and likely to reflect criteria other than their formal designation (see Piscopo 2014). Harder’s (2017) analysis of the Danish
The main findings of the empirical research of this thesis have been presented in the empirical chapters and can be summarized as follows: politicization of ethnicity leads to decreased substantiverepresentation and marginalization of ethnic minorities. The evidence for this finding has been collected by an in-depth analysis of the party systems of Estonia and Latvia on the one hand, and of the decision-making process on citizenship and language legislation between 1991 and 2003 on the other. From the analysis of the electoral rules and party systems of both countries it has become clear that initially in both countries ethnicity was politicized and ethnic parties were active. However, in Estonia the ethnic parties were unsuccessful and disappeared. This changed the party competition in the party system and made it possible for non-ethnic parties to represent the ethnic minority. In other words, in Estonia the politicization of ethnicity quickly decreased and at the same time minority representation increased: citizenship and language legislation was liberalized. In Latvia the situation has almost remained unchanged since 1991 and the party system is still shaped by ethnic competition. This has resulted in ethnic outbidding in the party system and in the exclusion of the ethnic minority parties from the decision-making process on citizenship and language legislation.
A focus on conservatism and women’s substantiverepresentation can be simply an additive study; analysis of the representational claims and actions of relatively new actors present on the contemporary political scene. This has significant empirical value in and of itself. We can note, for example, the increased presence of conservative women representatives in our elected institutions, and acknowledge that this has given rise to an appreciation of greater ideological heterogeneity amongst women representatives. Empirical research has indeed established that whilst under specific conditions some conservative women representatives are found to act with, and like, their left/feminist colleagues, they sometimes articulate anti- feminist perspectives. In these interventions, conservative representatives may nevertheless make explicitly gendered claims; and claim to be speaking in the interests of women.
In their influential volume, Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo (2012) describe research on women’s substantiverepresentation as asking “whether women seek and are able to promote women’s issues once they are elected to political office . . . [and] whether women pursue alternative political objectives to those of men” (p. 8). One of the major challenges, then, in studying women’s and men’s substantiverepresentation first lies in defining and measuring the content of gender-specific interests, issues, and priorities. Gender and politics scholars commonly conduct this line of research by first specifying women’s interests a priori through issues that disproportionally affect women’s wel- fare, such as investments in maternal health and combating domestic vio- lence (Beckwith, 2014; Clayton et al., 2017) or issues related to women’s traditional roles, such as investments in child and family health (Miller, 2008; Swiss, Fallon, & Burgos, 2012). However, legislation (or other legislative work) that directly affects women’s welfare or social roles makes up a very small proportion of parliamentary work.
Given the wariness of New Zealand women in identifying as feminists for fear of backlash, it would be useful for future research to explore why and how female elected representatives have sublimated self- identification as women in concepts like subsidiarity and community instead of gender. Curtin (2008) suggests that for women in political leadership this ‘masking’ may be a necessity to advance women’s substantiverepresentation. Additionally, the expression of women’s difference and even superiority inherent in their descriptions of approaches to working as elected representatives, and their specific areas of policy interest, would be complementary and fertile areas of future research. The importance of partner approval or at least acquiescence before standing for election, and the degree of preparedness for office could usefully form the basis of future comparative research between male and female candidates for office, to identify gender similarities and differences. Additional inquiry into whether a growing role for party politics in local government will galvanise greater interest in increasing the diversity of candidates in Auckland would also be potentially instructive. While gender is the focus of this research, it is only one marker of diversity of representation and the low number of Māori is of continuing concern (Sullivan 2003). Gender equality is, though, the specific focus of this study and is both significant and symbolically powerful in the first nation state to give women the vote. It remains elusive in local government representation.
International research has already indicated the complexities involved in the political processes of representation. It is argued that women operate under highly gendered political contexts and their potential ability to effect change may be affected due to several factors related to gendered political institutions, including: parliament and political parties (Lovenduski, 2005; Jones et al. 2009), electoral methods that reinforce the politics of patronage (Goetz 2003; Sater, 2012), distinct priorities of women legislators as all women do not seek to represent women (Childs 2004), feminized style of politics that is little valued (Childs 2004a), male dominated culture of legislatures that influence on minority group (women) (Franceschet, 2010), formal and informal rules, procedures and norms that have gendered consequences (Rai, 2010), labelling and stigmatization of quota women (Childs and Krook, 2012) as well as the volatile political situation as noted in the case of Afghanistan (Larson, 2012). There has been considerable debate on women’s political representation and in particular quota adaption, implementation and effectiveness, as well as on the relationship between women’s numerical (descriptive) and substantiverepresentation, which I intend to explore in the context of Pakistan.
Notwithstanding the suggested changes in operations, NREGA did resurface the old unresolved debate about the feasibility of having a minimum wage across the country. Shankaran (2011) argues that NREGA has given us an occasion to rationalise wages. Despite this possibility, when available employment per household is less than 20 days per annum (Tomar, 2011), dependence on NREGA for livelihood becomes risky. On top of it, when the payments are delayed, credibility of the programme as secure livelihood avenue is further eroded. In the process, the employment opportunity in NREGA is thrown open to households who really do not need (ibid) employment 21 . These evidences do raise doubts on the capability of NREGA as an instrument of substantive discrimination that can positively influence caste hierarchy in India.
Interview and focus group guides were prepared for all stakeholder groups, and all interviews and the focus group were digitally recorded and fully transcribed. The majority of interviews and the focus group were conducted face-to-face, and three interviews were conducted via telephone. Evidence suggests that there is little substantive difference in data gathered by face- to-face and telephone interviewing (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). Interviews lasted approximately 45-60 minutes. A thematic analytical approach was adopted, guided by Braun and Clarke’s (2006, p. 47) ‘phases of thematic analysis’. Our initial coding included deductive (a priori) codes and inductive (empirical) codes (e.g., Miles et al., 2014, p. 81). The deductive codes were derived from themes, concepts, ideas from the literature, and topic areas in the focus group and interview guides. The inductive codes started to surface during the research process, and were finalised after reviewing the final transcripts. We then began to re-focus our analysis to identify broader themes. The findings from this analytical approach are reported below.
As a critic of the view that tort law enforces duties of repair and more generally of corrective justice theory, I am not prepared to ac- cept this critique. I have elsewhere set forth my reasons for rejecting corrective justice theory as an interpretive account of tort law, but it is worth reiterating the difficulties surrounding corrective justice theory and the substantive standing problem. Duties of repair, on my view (although not on the view of Ripstein or Weinrib), track foresee- able wrongful losses. While there is a great deal of overlap between the domain of people who have been wronged under the relevant tort and the domain of people who have foreseeable wrongful losses, the latter is both underinclusive and overinclusive relative to the former, and systematically so. There are plaintiffs who have no losses at all but have rights of action, and there are plaintiffs who have unfore- seeable losses and have rights of action because they have substan- tive standing. Conversely, there are many plaintiffs with foreseeable wrongful losses who have no right of action because substantive standing is lacking. So, among the many reasons I cannot accept the gracious peace offering of the corrective justice theorists is that I re- gard it as leaving me without a solution to the substantive standing problem with which I began.
I have addressed matters of content elsewhere (Neal 2012a and 2012b), but the purpose of the present enquiry is to continue the emerging discussion of the role in law of what I will refer to hereafter as the ‘dignity norm’: the requirement, which may be explicit or implicit, written or unwritten, that the equal dignity of all human beings must be respected. 11 Although it will be impossible not to touch upon matters of content in passing at various stages of the discussion, my primary purpose here is not to enquire about the norm’s meaning, but to establish its status. I will examine three claims about the dignity norm: first, that ‘respect for dignity’ is mere empty rhetoric, and has no distinctive normative content of its own; second, that the dignity norm denotes a right, in the sense of there being a specific ‘right to have one’s dignity respected’; and third, that the norm is best understood as a legal principle (which may be fairly described as the majority view among dignity scholars in the human rights field and – in some cases – beyond). I will conclude that the norm’s legal status is not captured adequately by any one of the above descriptions, and suggest that its role is better described as that of a ‘substantive basic norm’.
The Supreme Court exercised its discretionary power to review sixteen consumer finance cases in eight years, six in 2006, finding each contained important issues involving the interpretation of law. 516 All of them restrictively interpreted the lending laws; all of them found for the borrower. In 2003, when the Supreme Court held that guarantee fees paid to guarantee companies wholly owned by a lender shall be construed as interest charged by the lender, they were imposing substantive restraints rather than acknowledging legal forms separating ownership. 517 In 2004, when the Supreme Court held that Article 18 documents must be provided concurrently with or immediately after payment—not twenty days later, not ten days later, and not before—they imposed a substantive restraint on electronic transactions between the lender and borrower. 518 In 2005, when the Supreme Court interpreted “good faith” to require the lender disclose the borrower’s transaction records and imposed tort liability for failure to do so, they substantively regulated the relationship. 519 In 2006, when the Supreme Court refused to apply Article 43 where there is coercion in fact, where the borrower may have felt obliged to pay the excess interest charges to avoid
Reconciling Legal Process and Substantive Due Process SMU Law Review Volume 46 | Issue 3 Article 11 1993 Reconciling Legal Process and Substantive Due Process Follow this and additional works at https[.]
specific time and space between grand theory and micro-operational assumptions, but without ruling out the construction of the universal formal theory. However, the formal theory must be built on the basis of substantive theory, and the formal theory may be set up based on all kinds of relevant substantive theory only when the substantive theory is established on the basis of abundant data and materials, the reason of which lies in the consideration of grounded theory that knowledge is an accumulated process with the constant evolution from the facts to the substantive theory, and then to a formal theory (Li, 2007). Therefore the construction of formal theory requires a lot of information and data sources, and the intermediary as substantive theory. There are likely a lot of loopholes generated directly from a data source to a formal theory construction, which has a huge jump in the process. In addition, the formal theory does not have to a single constitution form, but can contain many different substantive theories, and integrate and concentrate many different concepts and ideas into an integral whole. This kind of intensive formal theory, which is more abundant in its implication than those with single formal theory, can provide definitions and explanations for a broader phenomenon field.
The essay is focused on the idea that the content considered to be intrinsic to the principle of presumption of guilt is the product of specific ideological choices, ranging between a higher sensitivity to social defence and individual guarantees. This is confirmed by the historical social debate in Italy, by the classical school up to the Republican Constitution, by the ideas of the positiv- ist school and those of the technical-juridical school. Then the work opens to a comparative perspective, by analyzing certain aspects of the presumption of guilt in some European state systems, both from a constitutional point of view and from the point of view of the disciplines specifically pertaining to the dif- ferent juridical cultures; they leave us doubts about the legitimacy of norma- tive and interpretation models, which seem to consider some elements of the cases in point as being implicit in the tangible fact or to be assessed by pre- sumptions, with a possible inversion of the burden of proof. After an excursus about the homogenizing role of the presumption of guilt within a suprana- tional perspective, the research focuses on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the European Court of Justice, highlighting some of its ambiguities and contradictions as regards the admission of “reasonable” waivers of the presumption of guilt as rule of evidence. The same critical ob- servations are made as regards the proposal of EU directive about the consol- idation of the idea of the presumption of guilt, which, instead, paradoxically seems to weaken its content of defence of civil rights. The research deals with some hypotheses undermining the principle by the help of the substantive penal law, such as the ideas of presumed danger or intention and guilt, under- lining, on the contrary, the necessity of an integrated vision of the penal sys- tem, imposing a model of trial being consistent with that of the substantive law defending civil rights. Conclusions are devoted to the risk, due to misun- derstood punishment efficiency, of a substantially new interpretation, from a probative point of view, of substantive penal guarantees showing how the case law and European norms in course of development can influence this. Finally they also deal with the critical points and ambiguities in the evaluation of the How to cite this paper: Caterini, M.
My thesis focuses on Nietzsche’s ethics. More precisely, its main objective is to explore Nietzsche’s substantive ethical framework in a comprehensive, detailed, and systematic manner. Furthermore, the thesis also attempts to examine the epistemological, non-ethical ground of the Nietzschean substantive ethics. Also, it deals with Nietzsche’s critique of conventional morality, and explains Nietzsche’s criticism of morality in terms of his substantive ethics. The central argument of the thesis is, very briefly, that Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole does have a distinctive, substantive ethical system. Its constitutive elements or contents, being coherently related, are rich, complicated, and concrete. The major category Nietzsche employs in his ethics is the notion of ‘value’ understood as merit or desirability; he is not much concerned with the right or obligatory. Nietzsche views some human qualities, abilities and states and a style of life as noble and desirable for us. Specifically, the creative way of life, creative capacity, self-discipline, the capacity for ‘self-commanding’, knowledge, health, strong affectivity, and vitality constitute the core of Nietzsche’s evaluative standard. Moreover, a variety of dispositions, such as honesty, solitude, courage, and magnanimity, position themselves within his theory of value and are posited as crucial virtues. Finally, my thesis aims at analysing these particular contents of Nietzsche’s substantive ethical system and to examine how the system as a whole works. As such, the thesis is fundamentally an exposition based upon Nietzsche’s own texts, especially, his later works including Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, and The Antichrist.
The annotation team comprised six law students in their fi- nal year of study. They were deliberately selected because of their general academic performance and, particularly, their work with Farina in a course on the federal regulatory process. However, none of the annotation team, nor anyone else involved in the project, had expertise in the substantive areas or regulatory programs involved in the guidance. After an initial three-week training period in which all stu- dents annotated the same comments and then discussed their selections as a group, they began annotation. Spo- radic follow-up discussion occurred throughout the anno- tation period about the meaning and/or scope of specific issues, with clarifying information then being circulated to the entire group. The students annotated comments accord- ing to the 39 fine-grained issues.