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Testing Structural Explanations for U S  Military Intervention: Do Support for the President and Conservatives in Congress Embolden the President?

Testing Structural Explanations for U S Military Intervention: Do Support for the President and Conservatives in Congress Embolden the President?

By contrast, another group suggests that congressional influence is limited. Perhaps the most famous collection of research representing this view is the two-presidencies thesis that Wildavsky (1966) first proffered. His contention was that Congress is not as active and plays only a subsidiary role in foreign policy. Consistent with Wildavsky’s proposition, Cohen (1991) finds that presidents are more able to control the agenda in foreign policy than in other issues areas. Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis (2008: pp. 4-5) find presidents in the modern era more knowledgable about foreign policy affairs—ranging from the relevant international players, to the status of negotiations, and to covert operations—than Congress. Others, using direct tests of the two-presidency thesis argue that congressional support for the president on key foreign policy roll calls tends to diminish over time (Sigelman, 1979). And, Fleisher et al. (2000) observe that the absolute level of support for minority party presidents’ foreign and defense pol- icy positions has declined since Ronald Reagan’s second term. 5 Debates within
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On Russia’s motives behind its military 
intervention in Syria

On Russia’s motives behind its military intervention in Syria

In the course of the Geneva Talks on Syria and when contacting the US representatives and their allies on other occasions in the years 01-01, the Russian partners in the negotiations agreed to “give Assad up” on certain conditions. Russian politicians may use the same tactic in Syria. The spread of military conflicts in the Near East in the wake of ISIS’ successes might result in an increase in the price of crude oil and earth gas, which might mitigate the crisis in Russia whose economy depends on these prices in the global market of hydrocarbon raw materials. Moreover, there are a lot of former Iraq’s Sunni officers among the ISIS military commanders, and quite a number of them were educated in Russia and speak Russian fluently. The Kremlin might use them as a “diplomatic leverage” mechanism in its contacts with ISIS or with any other group after a defeat of Assad’s regime. However, Russia’s retreat from such tactics of which it used to approve in post-Soviet states after their “coloured revolutions” is not so much a natural outcome of its open-hearted support for a loyal ally, provided on a constant basis, Bashir al-Assad, as some experts believe it to be. There seem to be other motives and reasons behind it.
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Australia's military intervention in East Timor, 1999

Australia's military intervention in East Timor, 1999

Following Suharto’s resignation, Alatas revived his earlier autonomy proposal. Habibie agreed to the change in policy, announcing in June that an autonomy package was being considered for East Timor. As discussed above, however, it quickly became obvious that unilaterally imposed autonomy would be unacceptable either to the East Timorese or, consequently, the international community. There are reports that the administration discussed the possibility of a referendum with East Timorese leaders as early as June 1998. 100 Nonetheless, Habibie’s cabinet was somewhat stunned when he announced on January 25 th 1999 that he had decided to allow an act of self-determination for East Timor. Technically labeled a ‘popular consultation’ rather than a referendum, the decision was made public on January 27 th 1999. Habibie also announced that he wanted the whole situation settled by the year 2000, rather than accepting a transition period stretching on for up to a decade. Habibie’s eventual support for East Timorese self-determination was seemingly incongruous with his past hard-line on independence, a position he repeated soon after he became president. 101 His shift on the issue has been described as ‘a kneejerk reaction by an erratic leader’ , 102 and ‘ad hoc policy making [which] was typical of Habibie – displaying muddled but highminded [sic] sentiments.’ 103 But Habibie’s fluctuating policy was actually an attempt to balance contradictory imperatives in a highly unstable political climate. It is clear that Habibie would rather have kept East Timor within the republic, if East Timorese dissent could be brought to a halt. This would have allowed him to satisfy demands for reform, while also presenting himself as defending the unity of the republic. But if no accommodation with the East
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International migration and military intervention in civil war

International migration and military intervention in civil war

According to data from the World Bank, the global number of migrants almost doubled between 1960 and 2000, rising from 92 million to 165 million. The UN (1998, p.6) defines a migrant as a person who changes country of usual residence (see also Beine, Docquier and ¨ Ozden, 2011). Ozden et al. ¨ (2011) show that migration from the South (developing countries) to the North (developed countries) increased from 14 million to 60 million between 1960 and 2000, mostly driven by movements to the US, Western Europe, and the Persian Gulf. Given the global dimension of this phenomenon, it is not surprising that scholars have been and continue examining the economic and political consequences of migration for both the destination state and the migrant’s country of origin. For instance, there is a well-established body of economic literature on the impact of migrants on wages, employment, or public spending (for an overview, see, e.g., Constant and Zimmermann, 2013; Zanfrini, 2016). Other studies focus on migrants’ efforts to democratize authoritarian regimes in their homeland (Shain, 1999), or their capacity to make resources available to support state or non-state actors in armed conflicts (Smith and Stares, 2007). More recent works focus on migrants’ influence on terrorism (Bove and B¨ ohmelt, 2016) and the likelihood of (civil) conflict in their target state (see, e.g., Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Kathman, 2011) or country of origin (Miller and Hencken-Ritter, 2014). Evidently, migrant communities are potentially powerful actors in international politics.
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Writing the Script? ECOWAS’ Military Intervention Mechanism

Writing the Script? ECOWAS’ Military Intervention Mechanism

Despite being vague regarding standards, the Protocol contains several policies to promote them. This is due to the fact that the document is mainly concerned with the ways and means available to ECOWAS when intervening in member states to mitigate violent conflicts. Under the heading Peace-Building and in order to ‘stem social and political upheavals, ECOWAS shall be involved in the preparation, organization and supervision of elections in Member States. ECOWAS shall also monitor and actively support the development of democratic institutions in Member States’ (Article 42-1). This is a rather general mandate, however, the article neither specifies which ECOWAS organ should become active nor which democratic institutions in member states should be particularly developed. According to Article 45, which deals with the restoration of political authority ‘in cases where the authority of government is absent or has been seriously eroded’, ECOWAS shall in the same vein be active in supporting ‘electoral processes, with the cooperation of relevant regional and international
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Coalitions of the willing? International backing and British public support for military action

Coalitions of the willing? International backing and British public support for military action

The last of these is our central focus in this article. There are several reasons why international support for a military intervention might translate into greater public support, and the relative importance of these depends on whether that international backing comes from supranational bodies or from one or more other single-actor states. A first possibility, suggested by Isernia and Everts (2004, 253), is ‘ that over the years people have internalised, as it were, the rules of international law ’ – which prohibit the use of force unless in self- defence or with the authorization of the UN Security Council. Few citizens are likely to know the precise legal position but many more will have grasped that unilateral action is less legitimate. Applying a “ domestic analogy” would lead to a similar conclusion, unilateral action failing to meet democratic criteria of deliberation and consent (Russett, 1993). These points apply particularly to the authorisation of force by international organisations but, even if this is lacking, support from other states – in ‘coalitions of the willing’ – can also boost public approval. In particular, this support serves as a heuristic for judging the extrinsic characteristics of a military intervention, notably its justifiability and effectiveness. Difficulties in attracting international support are likely to spark public doubt not only about the success of any military campaign but also about the worthiness of the cause.
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Military spousal/partner employment : identifying the barriers and support required

Military spousal/partner employment : identifying the barriers and support required

An online survey was undertaken to understand more about military spouses’ and partners’ experiences, expectations, barriers and enablers to employment, with the aim of finding out what can be done to support military spouses in employment. This approach enabled those cohorts, who may be considered difficult to reach (such as those outside of the labour market or living overseas), to be participate in the research. The Qualtrics platforms was used to create the online survey and manage the survey data. The survey comprised 33 questions and included a mixture of closed and open questions allowing respondents to explain their experiences in more detail. An initial question was used to determine eligibility to complete the survey to ensure the survey was targeted at the right people. Questions focused on: employment status; reasons for working or not; work satisfaction; career decisions and pathways; impact of being a member of the armed forces community, support with and challenges to finding, gaining and maintaining work; plus, whether and what support was needed or useful. Demographic information was also collected. The survey was made available for five weeks in March and April 2018.
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Civilian Casualties and Public Support for Military Action: Experimental Evidence

Civilian Casualties and Public Support for Military Action: Experimental Evidence

The key point about most of these reasons is that they explain a relative insensitivity to civilian casualties. Any absolute assumption – that the public is entirely insensitive to civilian deaths rather than simply less sensitive to them – is much stronger and more questionable. There are several theoretical reasons to suppose that the domestic public will be at least somewhat responsive to foreign civilian casualties. Once more, some of these are straightforwardly normative. Citizens may simply apply the same principle – that non-combatants are innocent bystanders and so military action that endangers them in large numbers cannot be justified – that increasingly drives international law (Shaw 2002; Bohrer and Osiel 2013). There may again be a reciprocity argument, too: “how would we like it if they attacked our civilians rather than our trained and armed forces?” Then there is the fact that outgroups can be humanized just as they can be infrahumanized. A newspaper story about a bride being among the civilians killed at a wedding (see Wafa and Burns 2008), facilitates the sympathy that is a main driver of casualty aversion. Finally, there are more instrumental reasons for the public to reject military ventures likely to result in many civilian casualties. Disregard for civilian lives tends both to weaken international backing for military action and to accentuate grievances in the target state (Condra and Shapiro 2012), in both cases making the war harder to win. Meanwhile, in ongoing conflicts, the public may read extensive civilian casualties – as it does military casualties (Gartner and Segura 1998) – as a signal that things are not going according to plan, which in turn will erode approval of action. This would be true almost by definition in a context in which the central motivation for action in the first place was to alleviate civilian suffering. Boettcher (2004) shows that the number of civilians under threat in humanitarian crises did have a weak positive impact on American (students’) willingness to intervene militarily on their behalf, from which we can infer at least some concern for civilians in support-for-war judgments.
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Contact Dilemma: The Malady of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troops

Contact Dilemma: The Malady of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troops

Soldiers have been accused of failing to perform their duties. Instead, when they come under the enemy fire they tend to run away. They do not want to brave the enemy fire. This has occasioned “contact dilemma” Scholars have not done any empirical research to give a theoretical analysis to the phenomenon. One respondent noticed that during the occasions when troops established contact with the militant groups, the troops were not coura- geous enough. Some of them had to run away. And in some defended localities when the bases were attacked, the soldiers opted to running away rather than fighting back. Failure to hold ground firm and battling Al Sha- baab resulted into unnecessary casualties. Even the developed nations find it hard sending their soldiers into these war-torn regions as seen in Somalia and Rwanda during 1994 Genocide [8]. It is in this regard that the study developed a theoretical tool (contact dilemma) to facilitate practical analysis of the phenomenon. In the UN operations in Rwanda and Bosnia, some skeptics, implicitly and explicitly, claimed that cowardice and un- assertiveness of Belgian and Dutch peacekeepers, respectively, were crucial factors in the ultimate dramas. Al- though the debacles in Rwanda and Bosnia were by no means a good yardstick for drawing conclusions about the moral and psychological preparedness of soldiers to fight in peace support operations—the mandates in Rwanda and Bosnia were different from the robust contemporary mandates for peacekeeping, weapons and numbers of troops in Rwanda and Bosnia were inadequate to provide the protection that was needed [9]. Prepa- redness to fight remains a complex phenomenon. During combat, soldiers get killed and other get maimed per- manently. In the third world countries, compensation takes too long or they do not even get paid at all. When US lost 18 soldiers in the marine raid in Mogadishu, they withdrew their soldiers from Somalia in 1995.
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The Right of Counterintervention

The Right of Counterintervention

categorization of the counterintervention in the form of providing military aid as " 'collective self-defense' in response to armed attack." Intervention by t[r]

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The effectiveness of NATO's humanitarian intervention in the cases of Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011)

The effectiveness of NATO's humanitarian intervention in the cases of Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011)

The qualitative debate around interventions circles around the concept of neo-imperialism and the need for a stricter approach to dealing with crises. As Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000) argue, the failure of previous interventions was due to inefficiency and incompletion of strategic objectives. Essentially, many would argue that interventions need a stronger military presence to ensure that new institutions were put in place that will create order in a post-convict zone. Others argue that the key to effective interventions lies in its accountability. Law (2006) points out that whichever country has had the lead in an intervention, it has not been able to make decisions in a transparent manner which makes it difficult to ensure accountability. In essence, this contributes to the need for a stricter approach to dealing with crises, however instead of promoting further intervention, Law (2006) points out the selective effort of interventions and calls for more accountability and transparency. With the increase in the transparency of the decision-making process, it is more likely for the responsible bodies to carry out operations with increased awareness of the consequences of failure. This is closely related to realistic planning prior to intervention, which is essential to avoid failure (Burg, 2004, p.188). Planning, according to Burg, should address the underlying causes of the conflict which are usually largely non-military in nature and include elements of nation building (2004, p.191). Thus, some degree of nation building is required to produce long-lasting peace. That entails economic and political infrastructure that can contribute to the overall well-being of citizens which can oftentimes lead down the path of ethnic, linguistic, or religious conflict. In return, this creates a necessary condition for reaching an effective intervention because it allows troops to be withdrawn without a resumption of civil conflict.
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The Post Syrian Civil War image of Hezbollah: The legitimization struggle after 2011

The Post Syrian Civil War image of Hezbollah: The legitimization struggle after 2011

former Lebanese president Michel Suleiman that called for the end of Hezbollah’s ability to unilaterally conduct these type of military interventions (Sullivan, 2014, 24). There have also been attacks in the zones controlled by Hezbollah as part of the response to this decision. During 2013, two rockets were launched to target Dahiyed a day after the speech in which the intervention was acknowledged. Two months later, a car bomb detonated in the same area and in August another one struck the neighborhood. The Iranian Embassy was targeted along with the Chatah district during the same year. In addition to these attacks, rockets have been fired from Syria to Hermel in Bekaa, for which the residents have retaliated with attacks against Arsal (Sullivan, 2014, 25). This has increased the sectarian tensions between the Shiite community that resides in Hermel and the Sunni majority that habits Arsal. Hezbollah referred to the material consequences as “sacrifices” that the resistance had to make in order to continue pursuing its goals (Nasrallah, 2013a). In the international arena, the European Union blacklisted the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 2013 (Kanter and Rudoren, 2013). By January 2012, the sectarian tension of the conflict began affecting the relation with the sunni-ally Hamas, which was evident when Hamas relocated its headquarters from Syria to the Sunni sheikhdom of Qatar, and later formally announced support for Sunni rebels (Ghaddar, 2013). In 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) classified Hezbollah as a terrorist organization because, as stated by the Secretary General Abdullatif al-Zayani, "the [Hezbollah] militia recruited young people [from the Gulf] for terrorist acts" (al Jazeera, 2016).
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Final_Masters_Paper_Gene_Garland2017.pdf

Final_Masters_Paper_Gene_Garland2017.pdf

randomized control trial. Between July 2012 and June 2014, thirty-six patients were selected across the six sites and participated in a maximum of three interviews lasting 30 minutes each. Thirty-one mental health providers were selected to participate by a qualitative study team and were interviewed about their experience providing mental health care in the military health care system. Last, seven case managers participated in two one-hour interviews to discuss their interactions with patients and health care providers. During the interviews, stakeholders raised several institutional attitudes and cultural issues in the military that were barriers to mental health care. Specifically, mental health care is subject to the “will of leadership”. Thirty-nine percent of the patients in the study indicated that leadership attitudes and perceptions about mental health care influence their decision to seek care. Similarly, 39% of health care providers in the study indicated that leadership attitudes and perceptions about mental health care influence their patient's decision to seek care. And last, 86% of case managers in the study indicated that leadership attitudes and perceptions about mental health care influence patient's decision to seek care. The authors conclude that the findings regarding the negative perception of leadership support for mental health care in the U. S. military is a serious concern and recommend that further examination regarding the role of leadership and how they can facilitate rather than impede those seeking mental health care in the military (Tanielian et al., 2016).
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Humanitarian Military Intervention and its Impasse: Its Legality and Legitimacy

Humanitarian Military Intervention and its Impasse: Its Legality and Legitimacy

and imposed military violence, which evoke in each individual strong opinions and emotional reactions to the question of its justice or injustice. This highly normative nature of HMI complicates the scholarly debate about the concept and keeps the international society short of any consensus on the most basic questions of its definition, legality or legitimacy. How should such a complicated concept be approached by the scholars? Is it possible to declare it illegal or illegitimate? Use of the HMI as a tool of last resort crisis management cannot be supported or condemned merely by an assessment of its legality. In such complicated cases, when the major ethical concerns question of a general justice, focusing plainly on evaluation of its legitimacy(Smith, 2006). Only after concluding whether such a concept is or is not legitimate, it is possible to confront its assessed legitimacy with its existing legal status, and to call for a potential revision of law in case of a discovered non-compliance of the legal interpretation with the carried out legitimacy judgment.
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DEVELOPING AN INFORMATICS MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE HEALTHCARE IN MILITARY HEALTH FACILITIES IN NIGERIA

DEVELOPING AN INFORMATICS MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE HEALTHCARE IN MILITARY HEALTH FACILITIES IN NIGERIA

Effective and efficient healthcare in developing countries remains a dream that must be realized. Nigeria, the world‟s most populous black nation is faced with health care delivery challenges which seem to have had no clear solution over the past two decades. This is against the backdrop of the clear provision of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999[as amended] which states thus: “the State shall direct policy towards ensuring that there are adequate medical and health facilities for all persons”. Therefore, this study appreciates the optimism that Nigeria and Nigerians have the requisite potential to influence its destiny. Thus, having considered the need for healthcare delivery in Nigeria, this study exploits the convergence of Computing and Information Communications Technology with Healthcare in remodeling the nation‟s healthcare system. Global Healthcare delivery systems have for over two decades embraced the application of various tools afforded to it by the continuously evolving technology of Computing and Information Technology, to effect significant positive changes in the scheme of medical and healthcare delivery. An area that has been widely embraced in developed countries is healthcare informatics (also called medical or clinical informatics in some parlance), a field that greatly integrates healthcare delivery with modern information technologies to enhance clinical information generation, patient management, information exchange, intelligence planning and decision support in healthcare delivery with a major aim of achieving satisfaction in patient care and support for clinical research.
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Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council. COM (2010) 600 final, 26 October 2010

Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council. COM (2010) 600 final, 26 October 2010

A consolidated Emergency Response Centre will also facilitate operational coordination with other EU actors. 18 This would involve sharing information and analysis with the geographic departments of the EEAS (including the Situation Centre where appropriate) and EU delegations. It would also concern co-operation with the EEAS crisis management structures when the use of EU civil and/or military assets is being considered as a part of the EU disaster response. The Centre should also be a point of liaison with relevant parts of the EEAS, including in view of CFSP or ESDP missions deployed in third countries. The Centre will also be linked to the situation awareness arrangements being developed as part of the Internal Security Strategy and will thus contribute to increase Europe's resilience towards disasters. No new overarching structures are suggested. The development of specialized hubs/platforms will be coupled with working arrangements that ensure the systematic exchange of information.
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Military governments and economic development : A case study of Nigeria from 1960 2000

Military governments and economic development : A case study of Nigeria from 1960 2000

national interest preservation, which appears to be corporate self-interest and preservation of the military and its officer corps. Few countries’ military so perfectly fit these replete circumstances as those of the Nigerian military. With its debatable first invitation to intervene, (Aguiyi-Ironsi, 1966; Richard Akinjide, 2000; Prince Nwafor Orizu 1997) in the face of what seemed an imminent national disintegration in 1966. Nigeria has known ten attempted and successful coups d’etat and counter-coups d’etat in its forty years of independence. Twice has the military organized coups d’etat against civil administrations, which it blamed for gross ineptitude, political intolerance, corruption and economic mismanagement. If its stated reasons for initial intervention are anything to go by, the number of coups d’etat and counter-coups d’etat the Nigerian military either attempted or successfully executed against itself seems patently unreasonable and unjustifiable. They can only be explained in purely selfish terms, and very insignificantly on national security interest reasons. Indeed some seem rather too obvious. Some were either due to an assumed “right” of succession (General Sani Abacha) coup in November, 1993 or to protect interests perceived to be threatened (General Ibrahim Babangida) coup in August, 1985.
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Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Community civil protection mechanism (recast). COM (2006) 29 final, 26 January 2006

Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Community civil protection mechanism (recast). COM (2006) 29 final, 26 January 2006

(15) With respect to civil protection assistance intervention outside the Community, a ⌦ the ⌫ mechanism could ⌦ should ⌫ be made use of as a tool for facilitating ⌦ facilitate ⌫ and supporting ⌦ support the ⌫ actions undertaken, within their respective competences, by the Community and the Member States. Assistance interventions ⌦ outside the Community can ⌫ would either be conducted autonomously or as a contribution to an operation led by an international organisation, for which case the Community should develop its relations with the relevant global and regional international organisations. The United Nations, where present, have an overall coordinating role for relief operations in third countries. The civil protection assistance provided under this mechanism should be coordinated with the United Nations and other relevant international actors to maximise the use of available resources and avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort. Enhanced coordination of civil protection assistance through the mechanism is a prerequisite to supporting the overall coordination effort and ensuring a comprehensive European contribution to the overall relief effort. In major emergencies where assistance is provided under both the mechanism and Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid 20 , the Commission should ensure the effectiveness, coherence and complementarity of the overall Community response.
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Nous sommes la France: France's foreign policy discourse and behaviour towards the Syrian civil war

Nous sommes la France: France's foreign policy discourse and behaviour towards the Syrian civil war

52 Significant is the amount of corresponding performances listed in table 4.9 compared to the previous table. Both parties are accused of committing atrocities including repression, violating human rights and massacres. Together with nuclear proliferation, terrorism endangers the international stability, and each of the Others are held responsible for one of them. Theoretically, this would mean that both the performances by al-Assad and by DAECH would be reason to military intervene. Hollande however, constructed a discourse in which DAECH is clearly perceived as a larger threat to the international security, not only because of its involvement in the Syrian war but also due to the threat it poses to other nations. “That is why the necessity to destroy DAECH has become an issue that concerns the entire international community.” 157 DAECH thus became a regional and international threat. However, to France, the pivotal moment was the November 2015 Paris attacks. The terrorist movement now became a threat to French domestic security. Hansen would argue that due to the terrorist attacks, the internal stability between proposed foreign policy and representations of identity becomes disturbed. 158 External constraints like attacks ask for a deliberation of the current identity as well as the dominant policy discourse. For example, a new discourse could be constructed, based on fear from terrorism. This does not agree with the proposed identity as reflected in Hollande’s foreign policy discourse. And so, Hollande had to work on his discourse to construct a reality in which France remains superior to the other.
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The effectiveness of psychosocial online interventions for cancer patients after initial treatment  A review of the literature

The effectiveness of psychosocial online interventions for cancer patients after initial treatment A review of the literature

these different stages vary. Shortly after diagnosis and in initial treatment the threat of the potentially life-threatening diagnosis itself provides anxious thoughts about possible death or future dysfunctions. Moreover, questions about the best treatment option and its possible adverse effects, characterize the stressors in this acute phase of the disease. After initial treatment these stressors seem to transform into fear of recurrence, financial difficulties, resulting from sick leave or high medical care costs or physical late or long-term effects of the disease, etc. (Stein, Syrjala & Andrykowski, 2008). The initial situation for the start of psychosocial treatment differs completely for cancer survivors from patients undergoing initial treatment, because they have survived the disease, for now, and they got the possibility to take up life again. In terms of the design of psychosocial online intervention, in the future, a careful separation of patients with respect to the disease trajectory is necessary. Thus, interventions for patients in treatment on the one hand, and interventions for survivors on the other hand.
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