2. The Center for TerrorismLaw continues to coordinate with the American Embassy Kuwait regarding the development of a university level (for academic credit) course at the American University Kuwait on legal and policy matters related to terrorism. The tentative date for the Kuwait based event is early 2009. Dr. Rawda Awwad, a professor at the American University of Kuwait, visited the Center for TerrorismLaw on 12-13 December 2008 and met with Center for TerrorismLaw research fellows and the Director to develop materials on the legal issues for the course.
Beyond merely witnessing the mis(application) of the law, there are several reasons that motivate the author of this paper to explore the applicability of the ATP. The first and the foremost one is, sheer nonexistence of academic works with regard to the implementation of the law. Although there are some works done discussing the constitutionality of the ATP, its sweeping approach of painting dissent in a broad brush, and how it ill-defined terrorism and potentially causing abuse 8 , however, so far, there is no academic study answering the question of how the ATP was/is implemented―aimed at weigh the vindication or disapproval of its the proponents or critics respectively. Hence, this work takes a new approach by studying Ethiopia’s anti-terrorismlaw from the practical point of view. For that end, the author studied one hundred twenty three separate court cases, which constitute nine hundred eighty five individuals/legal persons in the sixty six months period—stretched from September, 2011 to March 2017— and tries to shade a light on the law, its application as well as its implication on the future of dissent and counterterrorism in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia has expressly enshrined the principle of non- retroactivity in Article 22 of its Constitution, which provides that “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time when it was committed.” The Constitution goes on to guarantee “nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed on any person than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed.” Ethiopia has also agreed to be bound by the principle as set out in the African Charter and the ICCPR. The anti-terrorismlaw was enacted in 2009. To convict a defendant under the anti-terrorismlaw for acts committed prior to this date would contravene Article 22 of the Ethiopian Constitution, as well as Ethiopia’s obligations under the African Charter and the ICCPR. Assuming that the acts or omissions with which such a defendant is charged were not otherwise criminal according to general principles of international law, it would also violate Ethiopia’s obligations under the ICCPR. It would unlawfully expose the defendant to the particular consequences associated with terrorism offenses, including the severest of punishment, for conduct that was not proscribed as terrorism at the time of its commission.
Assistant General Attorney. Former Head Justice Bureau Head of Amhara Regional State, on 18 December 2009. Ato Mulugeta said that since the anti-terrorismlaw provides guidelines on the competence of prosecutors who can handle terrorism cases, capacity problems might be resolved accordingly. See also, Interview with Commander Muluwork Gebre, Federal Police Commission, Anti-Terrorism and Organized Crimes Directorate Director, on 31 December 2009, Commander Muluwork Gebre contends that the proclamation assists the Federal Police Commission in furthering its mandate to prevent and punish terrorism. See also, Interview with Ato Demoze Mammie, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, [the then] Deputy Chief Commissioner, on 21 December 2009. Ato Demoze said that though the Commission has done nothing so far, they have plans to create public awareness on the law. This might play a part in solving capacity and attitudinal problems.
Terrorism is real and has direct impacts of human rights issues
such as devastating the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of the
victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilize
governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security,
benefiting from them ( Additional Protocol, 1977, art 16 ), including terrorists, but under CTF,
there is a prohibition against providing all services to terrorists or terrorist organisations. The contradiction presents difficulties regarding both the lack of certainty that the consequences of acts are not predictable and in reference to violating human rights for not providing medical assistance to terrorists, if it is accepted under IHL. The point can be further illustrated in relation to Iran. Although Iran is alleged to be financing terrorist organisations, in terms of the re-imposition of the US sanctions by the withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) required that the US must remove any impediments arising from the re-imposition of sanctions affecting the free exportation to Iran of medicines and medical devices; foodstuffs and agricultural commodities, and parts, equipment and associated services necessary for the safety of civil aviation ( ICJ, 2018 ). However, the language of the UNSCR, the Financing Convention and the LCTF (2018) is too general and can cover all services at the expense of violation of human rights. It would be preferable if anti-terrorismlaw were to be confined to those funds which do not have any links with human rights.
and restricting the issuance of travel documents (by a travel ban). 27 The Resolution also encouraged a weapons embargo to ensure that terrorists did not have access to weapons. In addition, Resolution 1373 ensured that terrorist individuals, who are planning, supporting and committing terrorist acts, are denied safe heaven (safe haven ban). The Resolution also sought to ensure mutual assistance and cooperation among member states with regard to terrorism investigation activities (mutual assistance). Lastly, Resolution 1373 imposed a number of duties on states to suppress and prevent financing terrorism and to freeze ‘without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources’ of individuals who commit, finance and facilitate acts of terrorism together with individuals and entities associated with them. 28 In comparison to its predecessors, Resolutions 1267 and 1333, Resolution 1373 was much broader, since Resolutions 1267 and 1333 were limited to freezing the financial assets of Bin Laden, Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associated entities. Resolution 1373 extended the freeze to cover all terrorists and terrorist organisations by ordering member states to freeze without delay all assets of individuals and entities identified in the Security Council resolution. However, Resolution 1373 does not refer to its predecessor resolutions, which set up the responsibility to freeze the assets of named persons and entities, nor does it mention any list of such persons and entities established under its predecessor resolutions. Consequently, the general responsibility of freezing terrorist assets in accordance with the Resolution does not depend on the regime established under the earlier resolutions. 29 The general responsibility of freezing terrorist assets according to the Resolution is comparable to the ICSFT responsibility to take measures toward freezing funds that are set aside for terrorist activities. In fact, according to Article 8 of the Convention, each signatory party ‘shall take appropriate measures … for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose’ of committing acts of terrorism. 30 The Resolution and the Convention afford the states considerable latitude to ensure that there is appropriate freezing,
The September 11 attacks may have popularised the phrase ‘the war on terror’, but the international community has co-operated to address the threat of terrorism since at least 1937. In one of its aspects, co-operation has taken the form of a series of treaties requiring states to criminalise and suppress particular manifestations of transnational terrorism. This regime has developed in a piecemeal fashion, each treaty adopted in response to a specific act of ‘headline- grabbing’ terrorism committed by non-state actors (‘NSAs’), and with a view to ensuring there is no impunity for such type of terrorist conduct in the future. The scope of the treaty regime has also been shaped by the rights of NSAs (in particular the rights of peoples) to self-determination. As a result, the terrorism suppression regime is somewhat unique in that the focus of the treaties (the particular manifestation of terrorism which each addresses) is driven by the conduct of NSAs. While states decided to create a treaty regime to address the criminal law enforcement challenges inherent in transnational terrorism, the ‘terrorism suppression agenda’ was in fact set by the criminals themselves.
Due to the imbalance of the interests, the international states groups did not agree on a specific definition of terrorism (Jonathan, 2016). Therefore many definitions of terrorism had appeared. This controversy has contributed to the divergence of countries view of it. Which resulted in countries accusing others of terrorism, while others are subject to terrorism acts by its citizens to the point that such governments had imposed penalties on them. While other states are practicing terrorism against their individuals do not wish to be deprived of these means. Beside other people are struggling for their independence demanding the legitimacy of the armed struggle, and countries occupied the territory of other peoples prevent them from the right of self-determination and their demands for freedom from foreign occupation. The act of terrorism is committed intentionally by an individual, or a group of individuals, or an organization at home or abroad, with the aim of achieving gains or interests, or drawing attention to a cause, and its consequences create situations of fear, panic and fear (Ali, 2005). Were terrorism is a state of mind created by feelings of live threatening violence for self and others (Adonis, 1983).
Ultimately, the CFI’s judgment was that “the applicant’s interest in having a court hear his case on its merits is not enough to outweigh the essential public interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in the face of a threat clearly identified by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. The CFI saw the judicialisation of diplomatic protection as a way of compensating for the lack of sufficient remedies at international level 107 and turned to national courts to fill the lacuna of judicial protection left by its deference to the UNSC. In Kadi it pointed out that it is open to the persons concerned to bring an action for judicial review based on domestic law against any wrongful refusal by the national authorities to submit their case to the Sanctions Committee for reconsideration. 108 Subsequently, in Ayadi and Hassan, which were decided before the ECJ’s judgment in Kadi, it raised the standard by holding that the UNSC resolutions did not oppose to obligations stemming from general principles of EU law, pursuant to which the Member States must “ensure, so far as possible, that the interested persons are put in a position to put their point of view before the competent national authorities where they present a request for their case to be reviewed” 109 . Thus, rediscovering the spirit of Jégo-Quéré, 110 the CFI required Member States to provide for judicial review of a refusal by national authorities to take action with a view to guaranteeing the diplomatic protection of their nationals 111
states which have helped to commit an international terrorist act on US territory in US courts. This rule contradicts the norms of international law, according to which foreign states and their property have immunity in the courts of other states. According to the author, now with the refusal of the US to respect the immunity of other states, the US itself should not enjoy immunity in the courts of other states if it should commit an act of a terrorist character. But the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act does not touch state immunity, concerning the damage inflicted during military conflicts, and so US armed forces continue to enjoy this immunity. According to the author judgments that may be delivered according to this Act would be executed only on the US territory. It is improbable that such judgments would be executed by another states. In the author’s opinion, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act may violate the complex balance of international relations and only time can show — will it bring more benefits than harm to the US and their citizens. Refs 8.
Notwithstanding the sacrifices of troops employed against terrorists in Pakistan, it is extremely important to objectively review the LEAs’ demonstrated training skills and combat worthiness in the country’s ongoing counter terrorism campaign. This research focuses on appraising the existing infrastructure of Pakistan’s LEAs and their potential to combat the menace of terrorism. Since Pakistan is currently fighting terrorism with the Army in a lead role, this thesis will emphasize the importance of enhancing the capabilities of LEAs other than the military to forestall, prevent, and effectively counter terrorists. The thesis emphasizes that the LEAs of Pakistan are a linchpin in the maintenance of law and order in the country, and their restructuring, training and funding ought to be a priority for the Pakistani government. It also lays down a comprehensive set of requisite and pragmatic recommendations for the up gradation of LEAs, which can transform these law enforcing bodies into an invincible security mechanism against the looming threat of multifaceted terrorism in Pakistan.
Besides evident episodes of major international crimes the government of Kenya has suffered variant small and short term terrorist attacks. Such attacks usually present themselves in different forms. Most of them have been acts of crimes that can be dealt with by national criminal law other than international crimes of terror. Law courts have handled most of them according to the Kenyan penal code in force. However, the few cases of international terrorism that have been mentioned have been retaliation against the US Government and its strongholds.
Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, and Justine A
Rosenthal’s For-Profit Terrorism: The Rise of Armed Entrepreneurs.
With respect to the history of terrorism in general, Cindy Combs (1997) finds, in her book, Terrorism in The Twenty-First Century, that the terrorist phenomenon is more complex to conceptualize than it first appears. The ideological interpretations, coupled with the will to introduce a demonizing connotation when the term is used by states, blurs the tracks . 1 Further, Kegley (2003) states that it may be a fault to begin by recalling that the use of terror serves to terrorize historically, which, was the role of the organized force, at least when one considers a despotic regime. This is still the case in non- democratic countries. In others, in wartime, terror can be legitimate, including terrorist attacks against civilians . 2
The second legal conflation of piracy and terrorism came in April 2010, when President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13536 proclaiming that protracted violence, piracy and the arms trade in Somalia “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” The order continues to “declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.” 123 It paves the way for the seizure of property and financial assets of Somali pirates by grouping them with terrorists. The order blacklists eleven individuals as members of Shabaab, though two of the eleven—Abdullahi Abshir, also known as “Boyah,” and Garaad Mohammed— are pirate ringleaders, and not associates of Shabaab. Ransom payments to these pirates are thus banned. Shortland and Vothknecht say, “A policy of never negotiating with hostage takers is sub-optimal…and therefore unlikely to succeed.” 124 What more, such an order is ineffective; Mwangura dismisses the relevance of the US ransom rule because payments can still be made under US law to the thousands of unlisted pirates, given the cooperation among gangs. 125
Abstract: This paper scrutinizes and highlights imminent need to regulate cyber terrorism pheromone in line with principle of international law. In so doing, this paper intends to ascertain legal basis to regulate cyber terrorism at international level. It explains the normative conduct by drawing on adjustments of certain member states of European Union as well as from none-European member states. Particular attention will be given as to how Kosovo has addressed cyber terrorism within its legal framework of criminal acts. The paper also addresses practical consequences of cyber terrorism in context of cyber-attacks events in attempt to establish legal basis for its prevention and punishment of cyber criminals wherever it happens. The author articulates its arguments by examining the presumed threats as a result of cyber terrorism activities, as well as based on well-known cyber terrorist behaviors and constant literature that insinuate that cyber-attacks are imminent threats. Lastly, as there is neither a particular treaty nor State practices, the author considers of utmost importance to spell out different views and statistics alluding that the need to regulate cyber terrorism in line with principle of international criminal law is a necessity.
Any terror acts has obviously been harassing humanitarian values the dignity of the nation, and religious norms. Terror has shown in fact a human rights tragedy. Desdruktif impact caused escalation has or more touches multidimensional human life. Human identity, dignity as a civilized nation, and ideals can coexist with other nations in the noble mission of "universal peace" was defeated by terror. Because in so close this terror, terror finally shifted itself as "terrorism". That is, terrorism took part in the life of this nation to show other potentials of various types and kinds of crime, especially violent crime, organized crime, and crimes classified as extraordinary crime. 6 Their own internal policy of the National Police that gives full authority over the criminal acts of terrorism prosecution centrally through the Detachment 88 Anti- Terror, on the basis that this crime is a crime across the region, making regional units tend to be a support function. But the existence of these support functions became an important part because the extent of its competence in preventive action (cons radical) and post-action (deradical). One task of the unit area is served to fortify the society of the influence of radical ideology and host the return of the perpetrators of terrorism after serving his sentence, meaning that if not done deradicalised the potential to re-join the group is still very huge.
The magnitude of the terrorist attack on New York and Washington may perhaps warrant this broadening of the notion of self-defence. I shall leave here in abeyance the question of whether one can speak of ‘instant custom’, that is of the instantaneous formation of a customary rule widening the scope of self-defence as laid down in Article 51 of the UN Charter and in the corresponding rule of customary law. It is too early to take a stand on this difficult matter. Whether we are simply faced with an unsettling ‘precedent’ or with a conspicuous change in legal rules, the fact remains, however, that this new conception of self-defence poses very serious problems. Let me discuss the principal ones.