The Board of Directors continues to pay close attention to the shifting economic and financial context and the associated effects on the Group’s activities.
In the current economic climate, the Company’s key strengths include the following:
- Its strategic focus on the senior housing segment in Western Europe, combined with the diversification of its investments, both in the senior housing segment and in the apartment buildings segment in Belgium’s main cities, allows the Company to adapt to shifting market opportunities and economic conditions. Note that the rental income generated by furnished apartment buildings and hotels is more sensitive to economic fluctuations than other properties.
Under this framework, the Commission for Communications Regulations (ComReg) may designate operators as having Significant Market Power (SMP) in respect of specific markets, in which case ComReg may impose on such operators a range of ex ante obligations including, pursuant to Regulation 11 of the Access Regulations and Regulation 13 of the Access Regulations, a requirement for accounting separation and cost accounting respectively. RTÉ has been designated with SMP in the market for wholesale access to DTT multiplexing services and accordingly is subject to obligations of accounting separation and cost accounting in this market. This market is referred to and defined as Market B in ComReg Decision No. D11/13.
Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987 for a review of these arguments). Thus the dramatic outbreak of privatisation in the British economy during the 1980’s and 1990’s was accompanied by the emergence of a new breed of regulator: OFTEL, OFFER, OFGAS, OFWAT etc.. Regulation typically takes the form of price ceilings imposed by the regulator on the monopoly, a type of constraint which naturally generates a great deal of noisy complaint from the monopolist. However the regulator generally has sufficiently draconian penalties available to impose her will in the end. One would expect therefore that the rational, profit-maximising monopolist would respond to binding price control by changing other variables, in an attempt to shift the demand and cost curves in his favour. Obvious candidates for this role are (a) product quality and (b) the contractual terms on which the product is offered to the market; for example the terms of any warranty which the monopolist may provide along with the good.
Although we do not in the present case obtain truthful revelation of preferences, the equilibrum exhibited achieves something which comes rather close, given the assumption that types di ffer only slightly among firms. The intuition behind the result is rather straight- forward. The mechanism creates competition and gives the regulator the opportunity to use benchmarking. The benchmark gives the opportunity to compare performances and e ffi- ciency across firms. So in a market with asymmetric cost and increasing returns to scale technology, firms subject to benchmarking cannot credibly understate productivity and per- form against the expected. And in this market, the regulator will expect the ine fficient firm to produce less than the e fficient firm. Following the word of Tangerås (2003), one may say that “yardstick competition filters out industry-specific productivity and thus reduces firms’
As an alternative to the regulated monopoly, we then consider a case with two firms both engaged in production, a regulated duopoly. Since we have increasing returns to scale, a marginal cost equilibrium, where price equals marginal cost in each of the two firms, would entail negative profits in both firms, and negative profits in at least one firm if the regula- tor is free to redistribute profits between firms, thus, we cannot achieve a welfare optimum in a regulated duopoly. 1 Accepting this, the regulation must come so close to the welfare maximum as possible without subsidies, meaning that market revenue should equal total cost of production, possibly with an acceptable profit margin. We consider one such regulation, where the firms are receiving regulated incomes which allow for transfers of market profits from one firm to another but no overall subsidization. However, the regulation depends on the level of cost of the two firms, which is private information, and it is assumed that firms
In most cities taxi markets are subject to stringent regulations on entry and fares. NYC is no excep- tion. Under the current medallion system at most 13,520 yellow cabs can serve the market. A peculiarity of the regulation in NYC is the restriction that about 40% of all medallions have to be owned and op- erated by individuals. The remaining medallions are unrestricted and are all operated by mini fleets, the largest of which operates hundreds of taxis. There are interesting organizational consequences of these differences in medallion ownership. The management aspect of operating a taxi includes timing shift-transitions efficiently and finding replacement drivers for shifts not operated by the owner. We find sizable differences in the utilization rates across medallion types, and faster shift transition for cor- porate medallions. There are also regulations on fares, which interact with the search process of taxis and passengers. Since rates are essentially fixed during the day, variation in the relative demand and supply schedule leads to large variation in waiting time for passengers and taxis. Even though fares are regulated, drivers’ earnings and the number of active taxis vary during the day depending on how long drivers need to spend searching for their next passengers. The average search time that an active taxi incurs between dropping off a passenger and picking up the next one ranges between 5 minutes at 5PM to about 20 minutes in the early morning. Absent price adjustments, waiting time serves as the market clearing variable. This form of rationing is common in other markets, such as health care.
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More information concerning these projects was published in the Press Release of 22 May 2015 on the Board’s interim declaration concerning the 1 st quarter of 2015.
The future investments will be made in the context of the Company’s growth strategy. This strategy entails Care Property Invest expanding its activities and concentrating on investments in the wider healthcare real estate sector, (assisted-living residences, residential care centres, short-stay centres, properties for persons with a disability, etc.), within the European Economic Area, with Flanders as the particular area of focus. Therefore, the Company is actively investigating the following activities:
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166168169 Function (a) and (b) above are typically executed by an RTU, and function (c) by a dispatch workstation.
167169170 Real-time network communication with the IESO Control Center is typically via a MPLS communications network, but could also be via a site-to-site VPN connection over the Internet for medium performance sites. The MPLS network will be made available by the IESO to the market participant, or, in the case of a medium performance site where the VPN option is preferred, the market participant will provide access to the public internet. In some cases, where the size and the location of the market participant’s electrical plant warrants, a secondary communications system for increased reliability will also be made availableReal-time network communication with the IESO Control Center is via a Frame Relay communications network, except for dispatch messaging which will also use the Web as an alternative. This real-time network will be made available by the IESO to the market participant. In some cases, where the size and the location of the market participant’s electrical plant warrants, a secondary communications system for increased reliability will also be made available.
In relation to the impact of the reference price system, it seems to constrain generic entry. This result was not expected by policy makers because the reference price system was supposed to foster generics take-off. This finding highlights that the main advantage of generic drugs respect to brand-name drugs is their lower price. By contrast, brand-name drugs have the advantage to be known by physicians as much as by patients, both have previous experience prescribing and consuming them, and firms have built-up brand image by informing doctors and patients about the clinical properties of their brand. In Spain it is observed that when the reference price system is implemented in any active ingredient market, brand-name peg down their prices very close to that reference price that becomes the cap for reimbursement purposes within the NHS. This brand-name firm strategy causes generic drugs to lose their main advantage. Generic drug prices become very similar to brand drug prices (Puig-Junoy, 2004a, 2004b, and 2005; Merino-Castelló, 2003). Rudholm (2001) also includes a reference price system dummy to evaluate its effect on the generic entry. He finds that this variable has not effect on the generic entry in the Swedish market although, as the own author indicates, this result can be due to the fact that this variable groups the reference pricing implementation together with other reforms that made easier the registration of new generic drugs. These two reforms affect generic entry in opposite ways, probably cancelling each other in the estimation. Also for the Swedish market, Ekelund (2001) finds that the reference price system reduced the likelihood of generic entry. This author estimated a logit model, but the paper cannot identify the impact of reference pricing on the number and dynamics of entry.
Available online: https://edupediapublications.org/journals/index.php/IJR/ P a g e | 4116 negative financial performance in Raichur and Bagalkot markets and positive financial performance in Ranebennur and Gulbarga markets.
Hegde and Madhuri (2013) conducted a study on marketing infrastructure for fruits and vegetables using ex-post facto research design in selected Ratnagiri and Ramanagara districts from Maharashtra and Karnataka States, respectively. Results of the study revealed that Indian system of agricultural marketing suffered from a number of defects. As a consequence, Indian farmer was deprived of a fair price for his produce. The main defects of the agricultural marketing system were improper warehouses, lack of grading and standardization, inadequate transport facilities, presence of a large number of middlemen, malpractices in unregulated markets, inadequate market information and inadequate credit facilities.
Meanwhile, family reunification migrants, primarily associated with labour migrant and refugee flows, also present a unique form of migration flow. These forms of migrants are expected to find their own housing, but may have a diminished impact on the rental market as they are inherently less likely to have to attain their own housing, owing to the family links that have allowed them into Sweden. As a result, such migrants may often live at relatively higher densities than other migrants (Migrationsverket 2018), and therefore diminish the impacts that the wider foreign-born group may have on the housing market. Foreign-born labour migrants, meanwhile, are left to their own devices and impact the rental or housing markets in the traditional free market way, as do internal migrants. They may thus also have a stronger impact, owing to their relative willingness and ability to spend, though they are also more able to choose other, more expensive forms of housing. This may in turn limit their impact on relatively more affordable housing types such as rental housing. Hence, it is clear that broadly speaking, the impacts created by foreign-born and internal migrants may differ widely, owing to the wide heterogeneity between and within the two groups. This paper also aims to investigate this.
Information Systems, Inc., Greentree International Ltd., IPM Global Software, Microsoft Dynamics, NetSuite OpenAir, Oracle Corp., Planview, Inc., Sage (UK) Limited, SAP AG, Tenrox, and Unit4 N.V.
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No attempt has been made to obtain a counterpart for interim eﬃcient allocations as far as we are aware of.
The purpose of this paper is to provide characterizations of interim eﬃcient allo- cations by posterior sets for agents with BI-preferences and MEU-preferences. The key concept in our characterizations is the compatible prior set of an agent, which is deﬁned as the collection of all the probability distributions such that, for each piece of private information of the agent, the conditional probability distributions are in the correspond- ing posterior set of the agent. The compatible prior set of an agent coincides with the convex hull of all posteriors of the agent. The main results show the following: for agents with BI-preferences, an allocation is interim eﬃcient if and only if it is ex ante eﬃcient for agents possessing their compatible prior sets as their own prior sets; and for agents with MEU-preferences, an allocation is interim eﬃcient if the same condition holds, but not vice versa. Thus, ex ante eﬃciency with respect to the compatible prior sets is nec- essary and suﬃcient for interim eﬃciency for the former case, but it is suﬃcient only for
Because like other cancers, early prostate cancer can have no symptoms and not be
detected during a physical exam of the prostate, the development of the PSA screening test in the late 1980ʼs was greeted with enthusiasm as an additional tool to protect men from death by prostate cancer. Because it was a blood test, it was initially thought to predict cancer spread, beyond the prostate gland itself, into surrounding tissues, including the spine and the blood stream. It is now known, however, that cancerous prostate cells actually produce less PSA than normal prostate cells, so blood levels of PSA do not necessarily mirror tumor size or spread. A further complication of PSA screening is that many fast growing prostate cancers never lead to elevations in PSA levels. Moreover, chronic, low-grade infections, and the gradual increase in the size of the prostate gland that accompanies aging can also lead to elevated PSA in blood samples. The reason for this is unknown.
• A PSA-based approach to rate events will not be useful for all the events that happen at the plant (i.e. radiation exposure, waste production). Care must be taken when comparing the safety significance of all NPP events that have safety implications
The global movement toward recognizing the failure of drug prohibition is growing. This is partly due to the emergent understanding that drug prohibition is the dominant driver behind the creation of a illegal market that spawns significant health and social pathologies, harmfully engages our youth, and makes impure illegal drugs widely available. In Canada the concept of a regu- lated market has been proposed as an alternative to drug prohibition [1-3] and this reflects the growing interna- tional movement [4-6]. One of the next steps toward evi- dence-based drug policies is to develop specific models of drug control for each of the different classifications of drugs. These models should be able to demonstrate that their implementation would produce less harm than the current prohibitionist model. Different types of drugs will need different models of control due to their widely differ- ing pharmacological attributes. The smokeable and inject- able stimulants have a wide range of potential harms and therefore pose a considerable challenge to those propos- ing new, public health based models of drug control. The goal of this paper is to address this challenge and explore a specific model that could be used in a post-prohibition