Russia’s status as a major European power was already established by the dawn of the 19 th century. The foreign policy of France (another big European power) under Napoleon Bonaparte who ruled between 1799 and 1815 was dominated by warfare. In the Napoleonicwars, Napoleon at different times had to take on Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia who had formed coalitions against her. Russia’s refusal to join the Continental System, an economic warfare mechanism initiated by Napoleon in 1806 to weaken British power by destroying her trade, led to Napoleon’s attack against Russia in 1812. Due to a combination of military resilience and diplomatic cum strategic savvy on the part of Russia, Napoleon eventually lost the war, recording one of the costliest retreats in military history. Russia proceeded to play a pivotal role in the post-Napoleonicwars diplomatic and international cooperation arrangements hatched by the great powers after the fall of Napoleon. This paper is an evaluation of Russia’s role in European politics and diplomacy between 1803 and 1815 with particular respect to the Napoleonicwars of that period, and the post-war international diplomacy initiatives of the great powers. The paper concludes that the outcome of the Russian war of 1812 in favour of Russia coupled with her active participation in the Vienna congress of 1815 and subsequent conferences of that era strengthened Russia’s sense of its own greatness as a modern state and great power, and also set the stage for her epochal roles in European international relations during subsequent decades.
This year sees the bicentenary of the Battle of Waterloo, which is being marked by numerous exhibitions, conferences and re-enactments. Waterloo has a huge status historically, since this decisive battle on 18 June 1815 brought to a close over two decades of conflict. The French Revolutionary and NapoleonicWars were unprecedented in their scale and human cost, and in so many ways left an indelible mark on the modern world. It is likely, however, that the Waterloo bicentenary will be overshadowed by 2014’s commemoration of the outbreak of the
While the story of Chabert’s mistaken death and miraculous survival is fictional, his subsequent plight was more typical of Napoleonic war veterans in the decades following the fall of the Empire. At the end of the Napoleonicwars, an estimated 1.1 million soldiers were discharged from active service and returned to their homes. 321 These men occupied a liminal space in French society, for many found it difficult to reintegrate themselves into the communities from which they had been largely absent for fifteen years or more. Having long been accustomed to being fêted and favored by the imperial regime, veterans now found themselves vilified by the Restoration government as an embarrassing relic of the Napoleonic past and a threat to the royalist political order. Prospects remained bleak for both retired and active officers throughout the Restoration; the latter were poorly remunerated and not much better off than those on half-pay. There was little chance for advancement, and Old Regime noblemen were often promoted over commoners in blatant disregard for the 1818 law governing military recruitment and advancement. 322 Although iconic images of the tragic and poverty-stricken demi-solde desperately clinging to his memories of past grandeur may tend towards hyperbole at times, it is not difficult to imagine why Napoleonic war veterans in the Restoration era would feel nostalgic for the good old days of the Empire. Some scholars have cautioned
When in 1815 Napoleon Bonaparte was sent to the island of St. Helena (located 1,200 miles west of the South African coast), the great distance that separated him from Europe hardly dampened the enthusiasm with which artists and printmakers in Britain continued to produce images of the emperor. Between his first exile to Elba in 1814 and the return of his remains from St. Helena to Paris in 1840, Napoleonic imagery flourished in a variety of media, techniques, and styles. Developing from this phenomenon was the popularity of the three islands that featured prominently in Napoleon’s life – Corsica, Elba and St. Helena – as places where memories of him could be found. Popular depictions showed views of the islands, ports, and his residences, as well as the emperor standing on their shores. The little island of St. Helena where Napoleon was banished could hardly contain the imaginative power that his epic figure conjured up in nineteenth-century Britain. The aim of this thesis is to situate Napoleonic imagery within the nineteenth-century concerns for representing the past, focusing on the way that the memories of Napoleon were frozen in both actual island spaces and representations of islands. Using Pierre Nora’s framework of lieux de mémoire, 1 or the sites of memory, I approach the Napoleon imagery in Britain with particular sensitivity toward the embodiment of memory in space. While the impact of the NapoleonicWars touched most Western European countries, the concern
Code’s legislative technique, which according to the truly impressed Bandtkie elevated it above other European codes, confirmed the thoroughness of this work. In his opinion, the Code’s authors “out- matched with their succinct style all the earlier legislations, often hopelessly wordy.” 69 Bandtkie also praised “the amazing . . . con- nections and harmony between the detailed and the general” and added that: “there are no useless academic provisions [in the Code], only orders; it is always the voice of the legislator, not of the teacher. Unlike in the Prussian law, there is no mix-up of principles of gov- erning with various other objects of legislation.” 70 Certainly, the Na- poleonic Code stood out in comparison with the rambling, digres- sive, and moralizing Prussian Landrecht, which is its predecessor on the Polish territories. As exemplified by Bandtkie’s statement, the style of the Prussian codification and similar acts from the 18th cen- tury had already become defunct by the early 19th century, as op- posed to the technique of the French legislators of the Napoleonic era. This old fashion, Prussian, style arose the reservations of people such as Bandtkie, representatives of the more notable parts of the Polish legal elites. 71 Bandtkie noted that in confronting the French and Prussian legislations, he was inspired by the evaluations formu- lated by German scholars. He observed, referring especially to the work of Ernest Wilhelm Reibnitz, “that even the German them- selves, [though] sparing with praise, nowadays admit to the superi- ority of French legislation and will surely avail themselves of it.” 72 For all these reasons, this professor of law summed up his argument by asserting, “it would be haughty to assume that the French law, in its entirety or at least in its majority, is imperfect.” 73 In his opinion, the Civil Code did not deserve to be abrogated in full. 74
effective and that a lower real value of the dollar will threaten the ability of other countries to pursue export-led growth. However, this is probably not the entire reason: the anger, as well as recent the furore over currency wars is a symptom of the dissatisfaction with global imbalances, depicted in Figure 8 below and the policies that are believed to support them. In this section I discuss two separate issues. The first is the conflict between the United States and emerging market economies; the second is the conflict between the United States and the advanced economies that are running current account surpluses. I discuss how worried the Eurozone should be about these conflicts and what it can do.
Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars SMU Law Review Volume 63 | Issue 1 Article 8 2010 Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars Sung Hui Kim Follow this and additional works at https //s[.]
An outstanding feature of the analysis of civil wars is the information management and its effects locally 1 . The confrontation between enemy troops regularly proceeded by intelligence operations. With qualified informants to give details that reduce risks. Although information is a key to understanding life in a locality usually it is used to recognize important aspects of economic resources, contracts, and investment officials. The information has also served to find profiles of the population and characteristics of the positions of power in government, its scope and limits. In addiction conflict agents use information they can get to impose on the population norms, habits of conduct, threats, punishments, culminating in killings and massacres.
Towards the end of the Persian Wars at 2.30.15 Procopius goes into considerable detail about some measures taken by Mermeroz to strengthen Petra. This comes following Dagistheus’ withdrawal after his failed siege attempt; when we consider that the siege of Petra in Lazica is the last siege described in the Persian Wars, and only two other conflicts remain in the narrative, namely the Roman stand in the pass near the River Phasis and the Battle of the River Phasis itself, it seems a bit out of place. When we remember that most of the sieges involved the Persians assaulting a Roman fortress or city, this little digression perhaps should be read as a synopsis of Procopius’ precepts for withstanding a siege. Much like Buzes’ speech, besides the mention of issues that surfaced in Procopius’ description of sieges, many of the points raised in this discussion are also found in the military handbooks. The Persian defenders had been keen to avoid alerting the Romans of their low numbers (2.30.16). Maurice (Maurice Strat. 10.1) mentions similar concerns, though when discussing sieges he refers to the attackers and not the besieged; however, not alerting the enemy of one’s numbers is a common enough concern in his treatise (see, Maurice Strat. 7.B.3, 7, for example). With the walls in a bad state, and a lack of suitable provisions not present, Mermeroz gets his men to fill up gaps in the wall with the linen bags used to carry provisions with sand (2.30.19). Maurice (Maurice Strat. 1.2.42) refers to the satchels that Roman soldiers brought along on campaign to carry some of their supplies and, although Procopius is here describing Persian practice, there is no reason to believe that it is not relevant for the Romans.
you can lose Belgrade. Vienna has lost its mind.” Neither Russia nor its allied powers could allow the issue of a European war to be decided by Serbia (Dragnich i Todorović,1984, 103-4). A day later, the Ambassadorial Conference had stated that it would recognize the Albania's independence, but Serbia openly had expressed its territorial aspirations. Thus, the Belgrade newspaper “Politika” of that time wrote: Luckily, the Albanian issue has not yet been resolved. It is far from it, the main problem has not been recognition of the autonomy, but the establishment of the Albania's borders (Politika, 10. I.1913). In a very concise manner, in his book the "Albanians", regarding the precedent for splitting Albania in London, the American diplomat who had served in Montenegro and Greece, George Williams would say in his book:“The featherbrained European diplomacy, by taking the Albanian lands in the North, East and South, and giving them to their neighbours, will in fact cause daily wars to those states”(Williams, 1934, 37). The First Balkan War would end on 30 May, 1913, with signing of the First Protocol of London, between Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. With this protocol, the allies were obliged to recognize the new state of Albania, with today's borders, meaning that, they should withdraw their armies from Albania and determine their borders with the Ottoman Empire. This agreement would not clearly determine the borders of these states in the Macedonian area, which they had to negotiate with each other, like this leaving gaps, which would lead to new conflicts. In principle, the London Conference, had decided that Albania to the north be bordered with Montenegro, and in the south with Greece. This had hampered the Serbia's exit to the Adriatic, which was very important for both Albania and Italy and Austro- Hungary.
The modern bureaucracies of Greece and Italy have developed along the lines of the Napoleonic tradition, but they have also differed from this tradi- tion (Gunther, Diamandouros, & Sotiropoulos, 2006, p. 197; Ongaro & Valotti, 2008; Spanou, 2008). The larger Italian public sector had become important for the economy much earlier than the corresponding sector of Greece. Moreover, in the early 1970s Italy initiated its administrative decentralization, with the creation of 20 regional authorities. This process of decentralization clearly distinguishes Italy from the timid attempt of the Greece state to decentralize. The decentralization process has been accompanied by local concerns from the provinces and regions that they are being delegated new tasks from the center without adequate resources to carry them out (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 68). Even if Italy is in many respects a very advanced West European economy and polity, nonetheless its state bureaucracy remains Napoleonic, as well as Greece (Gunther et al., 2006, p. 229).
The high levels of violence and acts of barbarity that are part of the everyday course of intra- state conflicts no longer shock television viewers worldwide whose instant access to disturbing footage is one of the privileges of living in the technologically developed post- modern world. The instant information flows, however, are only one aspect of the close connectivity between the domains of peace and conflict. Intra-state wars are internationalized both formally and informally (Andreas (b), 30). On the one hand, peacemaking missions by international institutions, humanitarian aid and diplomatic initiatives purport to keep violence in check and channel conflicts towards peaceful resolution. On the other hand, illicit supplies of arms, military hardware and embargoed items, people smuggling and the provision of enforcement and security services by foreign mercenaries are perceived as factors that lead to the continuation of violence. The picture, however, is far more nuanced and a differentiation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ international influences would amount to an over-simplification. Indeed, a benevolent practice such as humanitarian aid has often assisted the warring sides and prolonged their conflict (Kaldor, 10; Schlichte, 33). Conversely, criminal activities, while condemned as greed-driven and self-serving, may generate positive effects such as improved access to much-needed supplies for the civilian population (Andreas (b), 33).
The civil wars discussed above from the American Civil War (1861-65) to the ongoing civil war in Syria corroborate the proposition that there is no theory of civil war because wars do not follow a particular pattern. Master Tzu, writing in classical Chinese, a halfway between poetry and prose, said: “War has no constant dynamic; Water has no constant form” (Tzu, 2002). In other words, a civil war proceeds suo motu, that is, it has its own momentum. The post-independence crisis of Congo was driven by ideology but not the two civil wars and the Kivo conflict which were driven by greed, the control of the vast mineral resources of the Congo or, in Clausewitzian terms, “the carry[ing] out of [commerce] by other means” (Clausewitz, 1968). The civil wars in Nigeria, Sudan, Kosovo and Mali were wars of secession while the Arab Spring and the civil wars in Libya, Tunisia and Syria were driven by Islamic fundamentalism: the quest for political power for the radical transformation of the whole society.