The following entities may be granted conditional eligibility to use MAMS contracts:
– Entities that are not part of the Victorian Government public sector (as defined in the Act), that are placing advertising solely as an agent of an entity that is a mandatory user of the MAMS contracts.
announcement returns is that the linear controls used in our models may not adequately account for differences between deals that include or do not include an escrow contract. An empirical approach to address this concern is to create a propensity score matched sample (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002)). Using the first model in Table 4, we predict the propensity score for each of the deals in our sample that use an escrow contract. We next match each deal with an escrow contract to a deal in our sample without an escrow contract. The match is based on (i) the two targets being in the same industry, (ii) the two deals occurring within two years of one another, (iii) the two targets not having a difference in value that is greater than 30 percent, and (iv) the propensity score being closest to the counterpart transaction but within 20 percent of the propensity score of the transaction with an escrow contract. Allowing for the repeated use of matched deals, this yields a sample of 292 observations (the subsample of acquisitions with escrow contracts has 491 observations). We use a t-test to test for differences in means for the discount in the price paid for an unlisted target between the sample of deals with an escrow contract and the matched sample and find that the mean values are statistically different at the 1% level and that the discount is 11.2% larger for the matched deals without an escrow contract. Similarly, we test for differences in bidder announcement returns between the two samples and find they differ at the 5% level and that they are 1.70% higher for transactions with an escrow contract as compared to those without.
This pilot study was conducted to find out more about the viability of using learning contracts for language learning. It also aimed to find out if the students’ ability to develop themselves as resourceful learners is reflected through the use of the contracts. Since the results of the study are based wholly on self-reports, the findings and interpretations should be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive. In comparing the student profiles in this study with some studies mentioned earlier, there appeared to be some similarities in the students’ responses regarding their experience in carrying out learner-directed activities. Two similarities emerged from the findings. First, the students in the present study felt positive about carrying out more learner-directed activities with the contracts. Similarly, other studies have shown that students generally supported the idea of taking more responsibility in their language learning (see Thang, 2004; Carter, 2005; Lai, 2007). Another finding from this study is that the students did not appear to be quite ready for autonomous learning. To put it simply, their beliefs and resulting actions with the contracts do not generate resourceful learning behaviours that are exhibited with learning autonomy.
While experts suggest that there are no overall best practices that guarantee success in this environment, they also insist that, executed correctly, outsourcing to those who have expertise in the area and do it broadly and consistently will save money and add value. From North Carolina government’s perspective, with data from this project, it is important to assess the cost effectiveness of outsourcing as compared to providing a service in house, using “live” examples captured during this project. Some of the project types that would lend themselves well to this analysis include functions such as Web Site Design which are short -term projects that “go away” upon completion, which is often considered the best use of contractors. However, some of the project types (Desktop Management, LAN Administration) are ongoing but not necessarily central to an agency’s core mission and may also be a good use of outsourcing. The team proposes to contact agencies who have had such contracts in place to develop case studies of why the decision was made to have the contracts, the full set of costs (including contract administration) of those contracts, and to compare them with agencies who provide those services provided internally. In addition, the new Seat Management Convenience Contract is an outsourced capability that state entities can elect to use. As this contract is implemented, it should be feasible to compare costs associated with this contract to the costs associated with providing the same service in-house. This assessment could provide useful insights for future outsourcing decisions. The results of follow up studies would be provided to the General Assembly.
The authors note that:
Certain projects lend themselves more readily to the use of lump sum contracting. Florida and Alaska DOT’s Lump Sum Project Guidelines recommend that lump sum contracts are best applied to relatively simple projects with a well-defined scope, a low risk of unforeseen conditions, and not likely to change in scope or provide less than the required quantities. Some examples of projects that fit these criteria are bridge painting, fencing or guardrail installation, intersection improvements where utilities are known, landscaping, lighting, minor road widening, simple milling or resurfacing, signage, traffic signals, and sidewalks. Florida and Alaska DOTs also identify projects that will not make good candidates for lump sum contracts. These include urban construction, major rehabilitation or repair, subsurface earthwork, concrete pavement repairs, and similar projects where quantities are unknown or difficult to estimate, or may change significantly during construction.
portion of the ¯rm's workforce with tenure less than two years and between two and ¯ve years (tenure longer than ¯ve years being the omitted category) reveal an interesting pattern. Firms with a larger share of low-tenured workers, presumably those with a larger share of employees with ¯xed-term contracts, are the ones that convert ¯xed-term contracts to permanent ones less frequently. This may simply indicate that ¯rms wait until the maximum legal duration of ¯xed-term contracts to convert them into open-ended contracts. But, this result can also indicate that, for some ¯rms at least, churning may be a structural component of their sta±ng policies. The estimates obtained for the set of industry dummies also indicate that such use of ¯xed-term contracts may have a precisely de¯ned sectoral scope. The two industries identi¯ed above as the most intensive users of ¯xed-term contracts - construction and wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels - are also the ones that o®er fewer permanent contracts to their temporary workforce.
In this article we take a different approach to the same problem. We pose four questions to which we offer clear evidence obtained from one longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset. These questions are: (i) which employers use tem- porary contracts?; (ii) which employees are hired with temporary contracts?; (iii) which employers convert temporary contracts to permanent?; (iv) which employees get promoted from temporary to permanent positions? By looking simultaneously at the employer and the employee sides and at the hiring and promotion stages, we will be able to produce evidence that answers these four questions and sheds light on how and why employers use fixed-term contracts. Our interest is in how human capital intensity, in terms of the skill-structure of the workforce and firm- provided training, shapes the employer decision vis-`a-vis temporary contracts. Direct evidence on vacancies and replacement hires will also be considered. From the employee-side, educational attainment and labor market experience are the main focus of our attention. The timing of contract conversion is also of interest. We also depart from previous studies of the same issue by using a different type of data. Whereas previous studies use employee data obtained from domestic Labor Force Surveys, we use matched employer-employee data. Our data is for Portugal.
Managers operate in an environment characterised by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. This paper focuses on uncertainty and demonstrates how managers are mitigating supply-side uncertainty through the use of temporary employment contracts. These temporary employment contracts are being used as real options where uncertainty is reduced by reducing irreversibility and by increasing flexibility. The empirical work comprised in-depth interviews with employees and employers in the academic sector, a sector that has a tradition of employing people on temporary contracts. The key findings are: temporary employment contracts provide the organization with a low-risk mechanism for reducing uncertainty in supply; temporary employment contracts increase flexibility and reduce irreversibility for the organization and shift risk from the institution to the employee. However, there is a cost to the organization in the form of demotivation, holding back and early exit of desirable employees. It can also lead to an organizational division between staff employed on temporary contracts and those on permanent contracts. The paper has relevance to managers and decision makers who operate in sectors or levels where human resource abilities are initially opaque but are revealed over time.
Although there is a large literature on the change in US hog industry structure, there is very little theoretical or empirical evidence to explain the role of marketing contracts in the production-processing stage of the pork value chain. By and large, research has focused on the risk-shifting attributes of contracts and idiosyncratic preferences of hog producers, using production contracts made between hog growers and hog production firms or pork packers for the production and exchange of baby pigs or slaughter hogs, respectively. Johnson and Foster (1994) and Kliebenstein and Lawrence (1995) argue the primary reason for contractual agreements in the hog industry is risk-reduction. Zheng, et al., (2008) examine the role of risk aversion in contract choice and find that growers choosing to produce under production contracts have higher measures of risk-aversion than those producing for the cash market or under marketing contracts, but they fail to distinguish between those who use spot markets and marketing contracts. Gillespie and Eidman (1998) and Davis and Gillespie (2007) find risk aversion as well as growers’ preferences for autonomy are important in hog producers’ choice of business arrangements. However, these studies do not specifically focus on the producer- packer interface, nor do they consider packers’ motivations for contracting.
(a) Evidence of payment of municipal realty taxes, business taxes, local improvement and assessment rates, hydro-electric charges, water rates, charges under maintenance or other contracts with respect to the operation of the building and all such other items as the parties hereto may mutually agree upon. All such matters shall be adjusted proportionately and allowed to the Possession Date, the day itself to be to the Buyer’s account both as to income and expense. Fire and other insurance shall not be transferred or adjusted without the written consent of the Buyer.
Drawing upon the experiences of many practitioners and jurisdictions, the Association has collected some samples of clauses intended to meet various situations confronted in real estate practice in the hope that members will find them of use. When in doubt on any issue, members are advised to seek the advice of their broker, sales manager, etc., and if necessary, a lawyer. A slight delay or extra expense at an early stage may help to prepare an enforceable contract. This care may prevent the loss of a sale (and of commission) and reduce the chance of misunderstanding and litigation.
differentiates between structures and practices which may, or may not, be effective. For example, business unit involvement in decision making has significant, negative implications when the CV unit seeks to contribute to strategic value. Essentially, if a firm wishes its corporate venturing arm to add value to overall strategic effectiveness, it is incumbent on the head office to ensure that the actions of the CV unit are not confounded by an interfering business unit. Yet, if the goal of the corporation is to use the CV unit for a primarily financial contribution, the involvement of the business unit ceases to be significant. Additionally, the research supports the assertions that CV units need autonomy from the parent organisation. However, this finding is qualified as autonomy does not serve to improve the strategic value model, merely the financial performance model.
Tolle Resist Nothing
easier to detect dysfunctional states as they arise in you in, of course, in the present moment. So first thing then, as I just mentioned, you may detect that very often you may be engaged in doing something and yet there’s something in the background that would rather not be doing it, or there could be a complaining voice in your head in the background that says something about this situation that you are involved in that you’d rather-- because it might involve other people and they are not doing their best, and “What am I doing here?”-- all kinds of self-talk can come into.
The experimental setup for V-STIRAP  can be adapted to perform our vacuum measurement (Fig.2).
We use a cavity with a long storage time to reduce leak- age and decoherence. We also introduce preparation and readout zones for the atom. The motion of the atom is reversed in the case of measuring the atom in | g i in or- der to replace a subtracted photon. There are several experimental challenges, mainly the lifetime of the field compared to the time required to implement the mea- surement. The cavity field must last long enough for the atom to be adiabatically transported, measured, and re- turned. The damping rate of the cavity and atom-cavity coupling are both highly dependent upon the effective mode volume of the cavity and balancing these factors will be system dependent. To give an indication of the performance of the protocol under non-ideal condition, we have simulated the measurement of a lossy cavity with finite sweep times, the results displayed in Fig.3.
Thus, if one of the subject fails to know some cornerstone p (and the other does not) then the subjects must differ in respect of one or more of (i)-(iv). 65
On this conception, all of the factors which determine that a subject knows are, in the relevant sense, for free. Beyond forming a belief via a I-II-II argument, the subject does not have to do any investigation or make any cognitive effort for these factors to obtain: truth is supplied for free by the environment; the additional external component which takes care of Gettier cases is also supplied for free by the environment; and the entitlement to believe is supplied merely in virtue of the belief being a cornerstone belief, so that comes for free too. The upshot is that just as there can be warrant for nothing, there can indeed be knowledge for nothing too.
That doesn’t seem fair does it? But that’s the way the universe works.
Unfortunately, those who work the hardest usually have the least because they haven’t learned the leverage of aligning their energy. They are going about creating their lives the hard way. They are trying to use their actions to create what they want. We have also been programmed that in order to have what we desire we must work hard. How many times have you heard , “No pain, no gain?” The implication is that if you want to make something of yourself, you must work hard. The message is clear: If you are not hurting or struggling, you are not moving forward.