I believe that it makes no sense that a Jewish soldier has to fight to death in protecting Arab citizens, while the latter are relaxing on their beds without a worry. I believe that Israeli Arabs must serve in the Israeli army, or alter- natively provide a civil service to the Israeli community as a whole, being an integral part of it, or at least to their Arab communities. If Israeli Arabs want Israel to protect them in times of war, then they better first protect them- selves. In a country where military service is mandatory, it must be mandatory for all [38,39]. It is a matter of loy- alty that citizenship requires. This should be the case for Israeli Arabs, but also for Israeli orthodox Jews, who are exempted from military service because they study the Bible and pray to God. If we become all orthodox Jews and if we become all Arabs, then it will come as no sur- prise if the State is shortly defeated. But here a note shall be made: Is Israel really willing to absorb Israeli Arabs in the army!?
It will be helpful here to see how a reflective atheist might respond to arguments which some atheists typically take to be conclusive, if our thesis is correct. Consider the evidential problem of evil. This argument, very simply, claims that the existence of gratuitous suffering has a much higher probability on atheism than it does on theism. And since there really does seem to be gratuitous suffering, we should – it is said – conclude that atheism is more probably true than theism. However, there are also a multitude of theodicies which purport to show why this is not the case. What if Jim, after reading both William Rowe (1979) and Eleonore Stump (2010) finds himself equally persuaded by both sides? One response is that Jim’s reaction to the problem of evil can be recast as a passion rather than an inference. Suppose Jim has heard a lot about the suffering in the world. War, famine, poverty, disease, and so on, all stir a deep emotional response in him. Jim views the world as a cruel, violent, and hopeless place. All this happens without much reflection on theism or atheism. Jim learns that some people believe that there exists an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient God. Moreover, this belief in the existence of God is foundational for much of their moral beliefs and behaviours. Then one day, Jim finds himself in a Jamesian situation. He encounters various arguments for and against the existence of God but none seems to settle the question. And yet, his decision is forced. So, what does Jim have to go on? His passional response to the gratuitous suffering he has observed in the world inclines him to atheism. He does not believe that atheism is better supported by the evidence, but nevertheless he is still morally justified in acting upon his belief that atheism is true.
14 Note that the three other complements do not offer as minimal a comparison as Disjunction, because they involve ‘which of X . . . ’ with wonder but ‘that one of X . . . ’ with believe. This could have affected the results in two ways. First, it opens the possibility of a specific reading with believe if ‘one’ somehow gets wide scope. When designing the experiment, we tried to block this reading as much as possible by making clear that Sue doesn’t know which of her daughters will arrive first, but the fact that true controls received a slightly lower rating with believe than with wonder could indicate that some participants still had the specific reading. Second, it may be that which activates domain alternatives in a way that one does not. This could lead to stronger DIIs with ‘wonders which of’ than with ‘believes that one of’.
When we find out that the anonymous anti-expert is us, we will (if we’re rational) revise the anti-expert’s opinions – we will distance our new opinions from our old, discredited ones. We will then cease to be anti-experts. When we find out that the anonymous anti-expert is someone else, the situation is different. When I discover that Fred’s current beliefs about some subject matter are systematically mistaken, my revision will distance my new opinions from Fred’s old, discredited ones. But my revision won’t put any distance between Fred’s new opinions and his old ones. In general, it will be reasonable for me to expect that Fred has retained his discredited beliefs. And so it will be reasonable for me to believe that Fred is an anti-expert. There is no asymmetry in the degree to which the subject’s current views are undermined by evidence of anti-expertise. In both cases, the recipient of the news should distance their beliefs from those that the subject held at the time the news was received. The asymmetry springs from the fact that, in the first-person case, doing this distancing will cure the subject’s anti-expertise, while in the third-person case it will not.
How likely is it that future defenses of Conciliationism against the SUP will overcome the problem I’ve identified for existing defenses? This is a bit speculative—we are now considering defenses of Conciliationism that do not exist yet!—but it seems to me that the answer is: not very likely. Think about what such a defense would have to be like. It would need to establish that conciliationists can rationally believe Conciliationism in the face of disagreement from excellent philosophers by appealing to, and presupposing, all and only claims that are not themselves the subject of disagreement among excellent philosophers. This is a tall order. After all, the SUP is a fairly obvious problem for Conciliationism. If the solution to it were easy and straightforward, it probably would have been noticed by now, given the number of excellent philosophers invested in the peer disagreement literature. But it hasn’t. Thus, any future defense of Conciliationism against the SUP will likely require some fancy philosophical footwork. That is, it will likely appeal to, or presuppose, philosophical claims that are not obviously true. And non-obvious philosophical claims will likely be the subject of controversy among excellent philosophers. We know that (near)
If one author claims Mumbai is the largest city in the world, and another claims it is Seoul, who do we believe? One or both authors could be inten- tionally lying, honestly mistaken or, alternatively, of different viewpoints of what constitutes a “city” (the city proper? The metropolitan area?) Truth is not objective: there may be many valid definitions of “city”, but we should believe the claim that ac- cords with our user’s viewpoint. Note that the user may be another computational system rather than a human (e.g. building a knowledge base of city sizes for question answering), and often neither the user’s nor the information source’s perspective will be explicit (e.g. an author will not fully elabo- rate “the largest city by metropolitan area bounded by...”) but will instead be implied (e.g. a user’s statement that “I already know the population of city A is X, city B is Y...” implies that his defini- tion of a city accords with these figures).
I did something totally uncharacteristic of myself. First of all, [I] left the house without any of my Saints attire. Secondly, I went to a different location than I normally watch the game. Suddenly, the score is 24-3 and we are losing. My girlfriend said it was because I did not wear my Saints jersey, hat, jacket, Saints Reeboks or bring my Saints football. At one point I started to believe her and damn near left at half time to gear up. Then it registered this is not [the] Saints team of the past. We will finish this game with a victory. I told her to relax and get ready for a comeback. Some Colts fan was in my ear screaming wildcat and talking bad about the Saints. I got so agitated I told him shut the hell up talking to me or I would slap the hell out of him. Then it dawned on me [to] just chill. This is a complete Saints team. So I told the guy hey sit down and enjoy a show in the second half. I guess what I am getting at is this. I have been a Saints fan my entire life and for once I actually have FAITH in our team on both sides of the ball that they will finish games. When I looked at the Saints bench not one player had their head hung down. None was pointing fingers. This was a great sign and suddenly Brees scores before halftime. New ball game. Saints go on to win. So come on Saints nation let’s stop being fair weather fans. I know we have been let down in the past, but I think this team is destined to finish in the Super Bowl.
The perpetrator of the Naval Yard shooting, who killed 12 people in September 2013, spent up to 16 hours a day playing violent video games (eg, “ Call of Duty ” ). CNN asked Dr Bushman to write an OpEd piece about the possible role of violent video games in violence. 1 In response to that OpEd, over 1400 people made comments denying any harmful effects of violent video games. Indeed, in the US Supreme Court ’ s 2011 decision on video games ( Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Associa- tion et al , No. 08-1448), Justice Scalia compared violent video games like “ Call of Duty ” to Grimm ’ s Fairy Tales and Homer ’ s Odyssey . A Super Bowl ad costs ∼ $4 million for 30 seconds. Clearly, advertisers believe that a mere 30 seconds will lead consumers to buy their products. However, the media industry claims that the programming surrounding the ads has no impact on viewers. This is a paradox. How is it possible for the media to have no effect on children and ado- lescents when they spend an average of . 7 hours/day with media ( . 11 hours/day if they have bedroom media) 2 consuming it? Thousands of studies now exist, and the literature is increasingly clear about the potential impact of media on a variety of health issues (Table 1). 3,4 Part of the problem may be that the general public, and even some academics, don ’ t know how to interpret this vast litera- ture. The studies are epidemiologic in nature, meaning that predicting the greater impact of media on any given child is meaningless. Other factors may trump media, such as socioeconomic status, parents ’ education status, personality traits, etc (although many studies con- trol for such variables). In addition, as the American Academy of Pediatrics has stated numerous times in policy statements, the media are not the leading cause of any particular health concerns. Again, epidemiologically speaking, they may contribute 10% to 20% to any given problem 3 ; but that is a considerable amount given that we potentially have more control over media than other risk factors (eg, poverty, low IQ, mental illness). In addition, human behavior is com- plex and is determined by multiple factors, often acting together. Listed below are some possible reasons people deny media effects.
Moving on to users enacting make-believe actors, one can name at least six different desirable effects. The first is self-efficacy through vicarious experience (see Liebermann 2006, for a survey): By playing the make-believe “nano-bot” character ROXXI shooting down cancer cells in the first-person shooter game Re-Mission, teen cancer patients increased their beliefs in their own capacity to change reality (self-efficacy), specifically that they were able to fight their own cancer through medication (Kato et al. 2008). A related potentially desirable outcome is the so- called Proteus effect (Yee and Bailenson 2007): people’s behaviour conforms to their (digital) self-representation, even after they stopped interacting through it. That is, users who act through a highly attractive avatar will later act as if they themselves were more attractive. Third, role-playing can allow users to enact their desired ideal selves, an experience that generates positive affect and intrinsic motivation (Przybylski et al. 2012). Fourth, creating and customizing one’s make-believe avatar is a self-expressive activity that offers motivating autonomy experiences (Turkay and Adinolf 2015). Fifth, like scripting and ruling, role-playing can give participants an alibi and rationale to explore new identities, experiences and behaviours they wouldn’t otherwise (Turkle 1995). Sixth and finally, playing the role of another person or group of people can be a visceral form of perspective-taking, increasing empathy and understanding for the embodied person or group (Bachen et al. 2012). Given this rich tapestry of desirable effects, it is all the more saddening that role- playing is rarely discussed in gameful and playful design. Instead, the literature has chiefly focused avatars as sensory representations of social actors (see above). Now representational props (“this strange business of masks and disguises”, Huizinga 1949, p. 13) are indeed a crucial tool for role-playing: masks, costumes (Fron et al. 2007), and avatars allow a user to dissociate from their social identities and take on new ones. Yet the avatars discussed in gameful design are mainly representations of users’ everyday selves, and deployed for the informational purposes of displaying (presumed-engaging) progress feedback and status markers to the avatar owner and (presumed trust and coordination-facilitating) reputation information to other users (Reeves and Read 2009).
Plaintiffs’ lawyers will surely make that argument, which the Court encouraged by remanding the case for further consideration in light of allegations that a lawyer had raised questions about the heightened legal risk associated with one of Omnicare’s contracts. To be sure, that evidence would be damning if it undermined the argument that Omnicare genuinely believed it was in compliance, but that is not the question here. Rather, would a reasonable investor take the “we believe” statement as effectively saying that there are no serious doubts about that assessment, even if the issuer’s confidence is real? The result of the Court’s holding and the remand is a new sort of balancing test, which increases the pressure on corporate fiduciaries to try to assure a sound basis for statements of belief.
In the title of this paper, we pose the question: ‘Do you believe in genera?’ In 1943, Bisby & Ainsworth stated that ‘Nature may make species, but man has made the genera’. Before the incor- poration of DNA sequence-based phylogenies, the Saccardoian system based on spore septation deﬁned numerous artiﬁcial boundaries in the Mycosphaerellaceae (Crous et al. 2003b). Mycosphaerella has until now been used as a convenient receptacle concept to incorporate numerous morphologically diverse anamorphs. A startling fact is that so many solitary lineages and anamorph morphology types remain unresolved in the present phylogeny. This shows that a concerted effort is needed to make collections that will ultimately provide a more robust representation of various morphology types, common ancestors and sister taxa. We now have the ability to use DNA phylogenies to reflect evolutionary history. By integrating the phylogenetic species concept with morphology, we can now
Superstitious belief is defined as an irrational belief that specific events happened in a way that cannot be explained by a scientific reason (Huque & Chowdhury, 2007). Lakshmikanth and Hema (2016) noted that superstition is a belief in something uncritically without substantiation and proof. When individuals habitually have a robust superstitious beliefs about a phenomenon they can explain exactly what happened, but they cannot rationally elucidate the occurrence of the incidents (Kashiha, 2015). Psychologists described that superstition is a form of magical thinking, which Freud labels in the annual stage of psychosexual stage theory (Vijay, Tripathi,& Vijay, 2017). Generally, superstitions can be distinguished into two types, which are superstitions that are considered good for individuals, if they follow it will bring them good lucks; and superstitions that are considered bad for individuals, which need to escape in orderto prevent bad lucks. In addition, superstitious beliefs are sometimes considered as a negative mechanism affecting on social well-being of individuals in society when they are tied to financial risk-taking and gambling behaviors (Chinchanachokchai, Pusaksrikit, & Pongsakornrungsilp, 2016). However, in Thai society, there is a favorite phrase regarding superstitionsthat people usually said as quoted“if you don’t believe it, don’t disrespect it.” This statement truly reflects a blind belief of Thais. Vijay, Tripathi, and Vijay (2017) said that superstition is a universal phenomenon. People in different cultures and societies believe in distinguished superstitions. According to this assumption, this present study attempted to examine whether Thais who are from different origins (Bangkok and upcountry) would have a difference in superstitious beliefs. Thus, the research hypothesis was proposed as “was there a statistically significant difference in superstitious beliefs between people with different origins?”
To assign a function to an object is a necessary, though not sufficient condition to turn it into an institution. In order to become an institution, we have to accept it collectively and to behave accordingly. The institution of money is our collective behaviour towards money: the fact that I believe that you believe that we all believe that these pieces of paper are worth 20 Euro. As long as there is a collective acceptance or recognition of the
So, first, are the phenomena such as, if there is a God, it is probable that he would bring them about? If there is a God, he will seek to bring about good things. It is good that there should be a beautiful universe. Beauty arises from order of some kind—the orderly interactions and movements of objects in accord with natural laws is beautiful indeed, and even more beautiful are the plants and animals which evolved on Earth. Animals have sensations, beliefs, and desires, and that is clearly a great good. Humans have the power to reason and understand the universe, and that is an even greater good. But all these kinds of goodness are kinds of goodness which God himself possesses. God is beautiful and has beliefs and desires (and in my view, also sensations), and the power to reason and understand. But there is one kind of great goodness which God himself does not possess: the power bring about good or evil. God can only bring about good. Yet it would be very good indeed that there should be persons who have the free will to make this all–important difference to the world, the power to benefit or harm themselves, each other, and other creatures. So, if there is a God, we have very good reason to suppose that there will be persons who have, as I believe humans have, that freedom. 3 but clearly there is a bad aspect
Keeping in mind a concept of visual poetry, some doubt and the desire to broaden my painting experience, I embarked on my graduate studies at the University of New Orleans. Driving from Spokane to New Orleans made me believe that I had physically transferred to a different place. When I met with the faculty and fellow graduate students, I realized that I was in a different art world. Immediately I found myself surrounded by a sea of new information about artists, aesthetics and criticism. The difference between the language of criticism that we used at Eastern Washington University, where I received my BFA degree, and what we used at UNO was especially noticeable. At Eastern we talked about fi nding a subjective and personal language of expression; at UNO we discussed the freedom of an artist to choose a style and that “integrity” was the ability to maintain this freedom of choice.
Similar trends were seen with income. As with educa- tion level, Chandra et al. also determined that infertility treatment was more prevalent for those with a house- hold income above the poverty level (21 %) compared to below the poverty level (13 %) . Even in a state with mandated IVF and infertility coverage, over 60 % had a household income of > $100,000 . There are no stud- ies evaluating the association between income level and IVF success. We found that those at a lower income level were more likely to incorrectly believe that certain dietary factors (alcohol, fat or carbohydrate composition) influenced IVF success, when they were not strongly supported in the literature.