136. For the purposes of this article, the most important exception is the imposition of countervailing duties to offset the effect of an illegal subsidy. See GATT 1994, supra note 40, art. XVI; see also SCM, supra note 41, arts. 1-3 (setting forth the requirements of an illegal subsidy). There are also other exceptions, most notably the general exceptions provision in GATT 1994, art. XX, a very important provision, but a discussion of Art. XX is beyond the scope of this article. 137. This rule can be gleaned from the structure of the GATT. Article II:1(a)-(b) set ceilings on the import tariff while other provisions of the GATT and its related agreements, authorized additional tariffs in the form of tradesanctions only if certain strict conditions are met. For example, Article I of the WTO Antidumping Agreement states: “An anti-dumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.”
The most utilized tradesanctions can be categorized into two groups: First, export restrictions and embargoes, which mean a total suspension or block of exports to a country, and second, import or customs restrictions and boycotts, which are a total suspension or block of imports from the addressed country. These measures can have different objectives and content. They can be general, referring to all the goods imported or exported, thus targeting the State as a whole, or they can address single commodities (oil, fuel, diamonds, and timber, for instance) or specific items like arms, services, or equipment. Their objectives can be to coerce, to produce behavioral change from groups and individuals, to constrain by undermining a target’s capacities to achieve their objectives; or to signal disapproval of certain actions. 12
4 TRADESANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
CISADA amended the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) which authorised the President to sanction non-US companies that invested significantly in the Iranian petroleum industry (although reportedly no sanctions were ever imposed under that legislation). It also extends the menu of sanctions under the Act of 1996 which may be imposed on behalf of the President and which now includes the refusal of loans over US$10 million in any one year, the freezing of assets within the US and prohibitions on entering into foreign exchange transactions within the US in which the targeted person has an interest. Furthermore, contravention of the US rules will be made public, which could result in reputational damage.
Rapid unforeseen changes in the climate are driving us towards a new era of environmental protection. With the consequences of global pollution growing more evident in recent years, the link between trade and environment is drawing greater attention from environmentalists, governments, and the private sector alike. More eyes are turning to the WTO with the vision of a global enforcement of environmental standards. Indeed, recent rounds have devoted greater attention to the environment. One particular issue under debate has been the potential use of traditional WTO rights to dispute trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). This has lead to suggestions to authorize tradesanctions against non- signatories, thereby granting economic integration only upon the adoption of tougher standards. 1 Are such tariffs justified, and if so, how do they affect the location of firms and
As two of the world’s largest GHG emitters (in general and from agricultural sources), the US and China are critical players in this game and their actions so far are consistent with the result of a prisoner’s dilemma game without an enforcement mechanism, i.e., they do not mitigate their emissions. Hence it seems relevant to assess the potential viability of tradesanctions as an enforcement mechanism capable of inducing, in particular, the US and China to cooperate in curbing emissions from agricultural and forestry. Tradesanctions are an effective enforcement tool as long as they fulfill two conditions: credibility and effectiveness of sanction threats. A threat is credible if and only if the punisher is better off applying the punishment to the
Enemy Act. For decades after the enactment of that statute, the United States, under the guise of protecting its own and other countries’ national security, has imposed a series of trading restrictions through various legislative initiatives. Over time, European countries simply ignored some of these U.S. legislative efforts or at least did not actively oppose them. However, when the United States exerted its international punch with respect to Cuban trade restrictions from the late 1950s on, and tried to impose sanctions upon European-based companies, the nations of Europe began their revolt in various ways that ebbed and flowed during the subsequent years of the twentieth century.
Another infl uential factor aff ecting foreign trade is various restrictions put in place against engagement of a country in foreign trade. One of the most crucial examples of these limitations is sanctions. Diff erent penalties or stringent limited barriers generate an unstable situation overwhelmingly aff ecting and the trade system of a country [Jabalameli, Rasoulinezhad, 2012]. A brief glimpse at some sanctions cases reveals that they can push a country to decrease its exports and imports or make unfavourable restrictions prohibiting trade with other nations. However, the type of sanctions determines the restriction power on trade. According to the United Nations defi nition, there are six types of sanctions, which can be imposed by a country, a group of nations or an international organization against a targeted nation. Th ese sanctions consist of diplomatic sanctions, economic sanc- tions (include all varieties of tradesanctions, banking and fi nancial sanctions), communi- cation sanctions, cultural sanctions, science & technology sanction and military sanctions [Laptev, 2012, p. 21]. All defi ned types of sanctions have a depressing impact on a target country. However, in regards to trade many scholars insist that the economic sanction has the most devastating implications for trade than others [Pavlov, 2013].
Another case worthy of mention is Ministry of Defence of Iran (“MoD”) v. Cubic Defence Systems Inc. Cubic, a US company, and the Ministry of Defence of Iran had agreed on the sale and servicing by the former to the latter of an Air Combat Manoeuvring Range. After the Iranian revolution, Cubic sold the equipment to Canada since the contract with Iran could not be performed because of the US sanctions against Iran then in force, however it was agreed that Cubic would reimburse Iran for the amounts it had already paid. The Ministry of Defence of Iran brought the case before an ICC Arbitral Tribunal which issued an award in favour of the Ministry of Defence of Iran. In the meantime, the US and other States and international organizations had imposed or further expanded various financial and tradesanctions on Iran. Cubic refused to pay the amounts due to the Ministry of Defence of Iran, invoking only the very broad US sanctions regime - probably because the US sanctions regime more clearly covered the payment that was due to the Ministry of Defence of Iran than the UN sanctions regime, which targeted more specifically Iran’s nuclear activities. 57 In a 2011 decision, the US Court of Appeals denied the claim by Cubic that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the US because of the sanctions the US had imposed on Iran. 58 The sanctions regime however required Cubic to obtain from the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control a specific license to pay the ICC award. The Court, backed by an amicus curiae from the US Department of Treasury and US Department of State, considered that the sanctions regime does not in fact prohibit payments, since such a license can be obtained, and that as a consequence recognition (‘confirmation’) of the arbitral award was not contrary to the sanctions regime, nor to the public policy of the US. 59
As a result of these designations, which brings the total number of designated persons under the European Union’s Ukraine sanctions regulations to 70, absent an applicable exception or a license, it is unlawful for any person from an EU Member State to deal with the funds or economic resources belonging to or owned, held or controlled by a designated person, and there is a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a designated person. Individual Member States apply implementing legislation to the European Union’s Regulations to impose penalties for violations of the EU sanctions; in the UK, criminal penalties may be applied for a violation of the regulations. 13 Annex B provides a list of individuals that, as of the date of this publication, have been designated by the European Union in connection with the situation in Ukraine. 14 Of the 70 designated individuals, 29 overlap with the 45 individuals designated by the United States, while 16 of the U.S.- designated persons are not designated by the European Union, and 41 are designated by the European Union but not the United States. To date, no entities have been designated under the EU measures. HMT’s implementing notice for the March 21 sanctions (which is referred to in the latest HMT implementing notice for April 28 sanctions) provides a checklist of recommended actions to comply with the sanctions and a reminder that “failure to comply with financial sanctions legislation or to seek to circumvent its provisions is a criminal offence.” 15
In the Baseline, but not in the Sanction treatment, the more positive the emotions when contributing in the previous period, the more the high contributors increase (or rather the less they decrease since on average the change is negative) their contribution in the current period. The sanctions received, the SCR magnitude, and the valence of emotions when being informed of the quantity of sanctions received are strong predictors of changes in behavior in the Sanction treatment. Receiving sanctions motivates the low contributors to increase their contribution, whereas the high contributors adjust it downward in response. Controlling for this direct effect of sanctions, the more physiologically aroused the low contributors were when informed about how much they have been punished, the greater the upward adjustment of contribution in the next period. The valence of emotions exerts no significant influence. While SCR level does not predict the high contributors’ decisions, the less negative their self-reported feelings when being informed about the sanctions they receive, the lower the upward adjustment of their contribution. Individuals dislike being punished and they adjust their behavior accordingly.
Sebastian, Dan, Rilla, and Lennart  explains that the idea of using game design elements in non-game contexts to motivate and increase user activity and retention has rapidly gained traction. Several applications now incorporate as a software service layer of reward and repu- tation systems with points, badges, levels and leader boards. We used the idea of game design elements to see how the security related behavior of user is affected by sanctions. According to Sebastian, Dan, Rilla, and Lennart  an interactive computer-based platform agnostic game designed for one or multiple players and has been developed with the intention to be more than entertainment is defined as serious games. In our study, game play is piggybacked to collect security related behavioral data of users, hence our game can be considered as serious game.
Whether in raising a surcharge, imposing special measures or naming a serial avoider there would need to be appropriate safeguards. Any new regime would need to include procedural safeguards and rights of appeal to ensure that it catches and sanctions only its intended, narrow target. The power to name would require especially careful handling, as it would be harder to demonstrate that any perceived reputational damage could be effectively undone.
The European Union used multiple restrictive measures against Russia as a result of Ukrainian crisis. The sanctions were used in April, May, July and September in 2014 and even extended few times in 2015 (Veebel 2015). The EU imposed asset freezes and travel bans for different people and organizations. In addition, the access of state-owned financial banks of Russia on financial markets was limited and EU citizens were banned from investing in financial instruments of these institutions. Moreover, restrictions against specific sectors were imposed. For example import and export of military equipment as well as dual-use goods for military end-use were banned. Therefore, all the products going to Russian army were prohibited. The sanctions included also some specific products used in Arctic, deep water and shale oil projects. European Union limited also technical assistance and brokering services. (Ministry of Finance 2014.)
Understanding how cooperation in groups arises is a longstanding focus of research in the social sciences. A number of scholars have argued that the existence of punishment opportunities aids in creating and sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1990; Elster, 1998; Bowles and Gintis, 2001). Behavioral experiments have supported this proposition (Yamagishi, 2006; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, 2002). While costly sanctions have a detrimental direct effect on overall welfare because they waste resources (Houser et al., 2008; Milinski et al., 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008), in the long run the availability of costly punishment increases surplus through its strong positive effect on cooperation (Gaechter et al., 2008). This is especially the case when punishment can operate in conjunction with reputation in a setting in which the same players interact repeatedly (Milinski et al., 2006; Rand et al., 2009).
(l) Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the decision is that it seems to give undue precedence to resource considerations. Justice, time and resources should be held in balance. While the principles laid down include dealing with the application justly, the effective requirements that will govern the great majority of applications are whether the breach was trivial and whether there was a good reason for the default. The way these have been defined 90 means that very few applications will succeed. That may be a good thing from a court management point of view. Combined with points (a) to (c) above, unless they are addressed, the danger is that a large number of meritorious claims will be struck out or hamstrung through sanctions dealing with evidence for technical defaults. Also of concern is that procedural defaults will be treated more harshly than errors that look like errors of procedure but which are governed by statutory provisions. Examples are the discretionary powers to allow claims to proceed despite not meeting the primary limitation period 91 , and
Counsel must write and produce a training video in which Counsel, or another partner in Counsel’s firm, appears and explains the holding and rationale of this opinion, and provides specific steps lawyers must take to comply with its rationale in future depositions in any federal and state court. The video must specifically address the impropriety of unspecified “form” objections, witness coaching, and excessive interruptions. The lawyer appearing in the video may mention the few jurisdictions that actually require only unspecified “form” objections and may suggest that such objections are proper in only those jurisdictions. The lawyer in the video must state that the video is being produced and distributed pursuant to a federal court’s sanction order regarding a partner in the firm, but the lawyer need not state the name of the partner, the case the sanctions arose under, or the court issuing this order. Upon completing the video, Counsel must file it with this court, under seal, for my review and approval. If and when I approve the video, Counsel must (1) notify certain lawyers at Counsel’s firm about the video via e-mail and (2) provide those lawyers with access to the video. The lawyers who must receive this notice and access include each lawyer at Counsel’s firm . . . who engages in federal or state litigation or who works in any practice group in which at least two of the lawyers have filed an appearance in any state or federal case in the United States. 237