Met behulp van het internet kunnen niet-gouvernementele organisatie (NGO’s) snel met elkaar communiceren. Hierdoor zijn organisaties in staat om veel informatie over een issue te delen en te verspreiden. Door het delen en verspreiden van informatie vormen verschillende actoren (organisaties) zogeheten transnationaladvocacynetworks (TAN’s). Deze TAN’s worden gevormd door organisaties die op het internet functioneren als een groep, waarbij gedeelde normen en waarden en het uitwisselen van informatie over een specifiek issue centraal staat (Rogers, 2012). In de literatuur worden TAN’s omschreven als: “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange that includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 89).
bureaucratic and institutionalised for the term, network, to be inappropriate. In the past, the costs of communications were high enough that INGOs were not formed unless the need was felt for several areas of co-operation. Now that communications are so much cheaper, much looser networks without any institutional structure can be created. The simplest form is an information network, using an e-mail list server and/or a website to enable its participants to communicate about social, cultural, professional, scientific, economic or political issues. Administration of such networks may be undertaken by a separate, independent NGO, created solely for the purpose of information-sharing, or it may be located within a specific, national NGO or an INGO. Usually, it maintains its reputation for reliability by not being politically active and not applying for consultative status. The focus of the literature in Sociology overwhelmingly has been on transnationaladvocacynetworks that are defined in terms of the commitment of the members to campaigning, as a diverse coalition, sharing and promoting some common values. Issue caucuses are similar, except each of them operates solely within a specific global intergovernmental organisation (IGO) and they exist temporarily, for the duration of the relevant meetings. The NGO participants usually do not maintain any network between sessions and the composition of each caucus varies from one session to the next. 12 Finally, there are governance networks that are designed to facilitate and expand NGO participation in policy-making processes. They will be defined, below, as networks that do not attempt to influence political decision-making, except on the narrow question of participation rights for all NGOs. Although they share with issue caucuses the characteristic of being linked to a specific IGO, governance networks differ in having some continuity and in not having any common political goals. 13
The third chapter will address the transnational dimension of advocacy for the Western Sahara right to self-determination. Consequently, this chapter will deal with actors emerging from other spaces beyond The Netherlands. It will be guided by the literature on information, leverage and accountability politics, by Keck and Sikkink (1998), representing the forms in which transnationaladvocacynetworks act. The forms of transnational collective action, based on the contribution of Khagram et al. (2002), will present the EUCOCO (European Coordinating Conference of Support to the Sahrawi People) as a transnational initiative, fulfilling concepts and tasks that differ from and complement the domestic dimension presented previously. Its activities will be linked to the impact of the transnational experience, concerning its role in influencing towards norm implementation through lobby, campaigns, and contact with parliamentarians. Regarding the information about EUCOCO origin and activities, primary sources were used (minutes and documents issued by the organization) as well as information gathered through interviews with Boris Fronteddu (Secretary of the Belgian Solidarity Committee with Western Sahara – Comité Belge de Soutien au Peuple Sahraoui) and Pierre Galand (President of the Belgian Solidarity Committee with Western Sahara – Comité Belge de Soutien au People Sahraoui – and President of EUCOCO).
To understand the complex diffusion of policies in the international society, the work of Keck and Sikkink (1998) on advocacynetworks in international politics will serve as the foundation of this thesis. Building on world polity research, Keck and Sikkink (1998) exhibit that despite academics previously acknowledging the crucial role of nongovernmental organisations as ‘vehicles of diffusion’ of global norms, the processes via which this happens are not described. World polity documents the emergence of international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organisations (IOs), yet merely presents them as ‘enactors’ of norms. To the contrary, according to Keck and Sikkink ‘different transnational actors have profoundly divergent purposes and goals’ (1998, 230). Despite Western rights norms often providing the ‘defining framework’ for networks, their articulation and local application varies depending on network activity (Ibid., 231). Hence, in order to trace world policy change, it is crucial to examine the logic and modus operandi of transnationaladvocacynetworks.
the power of ideas because so few material interests are at stake. The fact that we have seen as much convergence as we have offers pretty strong evidence for the assertion that ideas and persuasive argumentation, in and of themselves, can be quite powerful. Because the instrumental tactics used by transnationaladvocacynetworks when dealing with developing countries are not available to them when the target states are advanced industrial industries, individual country’s willingness to participate in transnational society and learn from policymakers outside of their borders becomes increasingly important. This study has tried to incorporate this idea of ‘willingness’ into its explanation in a concrete manner; in most studies it is mentioned in an impressionistic way. Indeed the findings here seem to confirm what these impressions convey. The US is simply not as willing to learn from other countries or adopt new norms being promoted by transnational NGOs or international organizations. This appears to be every bit as true for the recognition of the rights of sexual minorities as it does for security and defense policy. Some reasons for this such as the fact that the US is the lone surviving
From this perspective, the theory of transnationaladvocacynetworks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) is very useful to understand the structure and functioning of the transnational network for the protection of HRDs. Nonetheless, Keck and Sikkink's exclusive focus on advocacy as the only purpose served by TANs is inconsistent with the use that human rights NGOs make of such networks in practice. Indeed, the observation of the daily work of an NGO focusing on the security of human rights defenders – Justice and Peace Netherlands – has revealed that advocacy is not the only way to achieve positive results for HRDs at risk. It is one tactic among others, which can have a crucial role in setting the issue of HRD security as part of the global human rights agenda, but which can also have adverse consequences when it comes to the effective protection of HRDs on the ground. As has been demonstrated, there are many ways in which international NGOs can provide direct support to local HRDs without resorting to states, and with a more significant impact on their security in the long term. The 'Shelter City Initiative' and 'The Hague Training Course' project both set up by Justice and Peace are only two examples of how international NGOs can respond to the practical needs of HRDs at risk.
Transnationaladvocacynetworks encompass a range of non-governmental organizations and activists with shared beliefs. These networks seek to shape the climate of public debate and influence global policy agendas and are much less integrated into policy-making than GPPNs. They are bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and services, and a shared discourse. They are called advocacynetworks because ‘advocates plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition’. TANs give ‘normative resonance’ to cause groups by pulling together the symbols, language and ‘cognitive frames’ that portray ‘morally compelling’ issues in a concrete manner to which the public can respond. Participants in advocacynetworks can sometimes lack the status of recognized professional judgment of ‘experts’. However, these networks have been prominent in ‘value-laden debates over human rights, the environment, women, infant health and indigenous peoples, where large numbers of differently situated individuals have become acquainted over a considerable period and have developed similar world views’ (Keck & Sikkink, 1998: 8-9). These networks cohere around ‘principled beliefs’ – normative ideas which provide criteria to distinguish right from wrong – unlike epistemic communities (below) which form around ‘causal beliefs’ or professional understandings of cause and effect relationships. Consequently, transnationaladvocacynetworks (TANs) are more effective in valuing ‘grass roots’, traditional and non-scientific knowledge.
lawyers in the top firms are amongst the elite of the elite, moving in the same circles as top bankers. Large law firms like Shearmans are complex places in terms of hierarchies of status and competition between partners. In organizational terms, the firms are divided up into distinct practice areas and the fees paid to the firm reflect both the prestige of the practice group and the lawyers within it. Generally it is the lawyers within the M+A or corporate finance practice group who generate the highest fees and are the most valuable for the company. They stand closest to the centers of capital and the advice which they give is, in theory, highly customized, suited to the specific circumstances of the case. Their advice is partly technical (i.e. what the law allows etc.) but it also has a strong social aspect. It accesses for the client networks of information, reputation and legitimacy. In general, in professional services firms, the more standardized the problem, the lower the fees. Standardization makes competition easier and more transparent. It allows firms to substitute junior employees for partners and thus enables partners to spread their time across more clients (Morgan and Quack 2005).
As democratic institutions appear to be increasingly challenged by the resurgence of authoritarianism in the twenty-first century, the space for transnational mobilization has been increasingly constrained (Heiss and Kelley 2017). The previous opening up of opportunities for transnational movements that accompanied the end of the Cold War appears to have reversed over the course of the twenty-first century, as governments have expanded their provisions for monitoring and control of associational life, while at the same time increasing their limitations on freedom of movement across national borders. The prospects and possibilities for transnational movements to address these constraints demands further attention.
4 With his research Lee (2013) focused on the larger cities (the smallest city in the analysis was Freiburg with 220,000 inhabitants) in the world. This resulted in the conclusion that hub cities, connected in the world economy, play an influential role in a membership of a TMN. What the research does not take into account are the smaller cities. As almost 50% of the world population still live in cities smaller than 500,000 inhabitants (United Nations, 2015, p. 17), this is a significant group. Without knowledge about how these smaller entities in local politics act, a large part of the worldwide population could be unaccounted for. As Lee already states in his article small municipalities are members of TMNs, but Lee does not deal with the issue of what the key variables are for small municipalities to join a TMN. Failing to deal with this leaves a gap in the literature. This thesis will focus on this gap and attempt to quantify the variables that are important for smaller municipalities to join a TMN. This is also the reason this study focuses on the municipalities in the Netherlands as there is a wide variety of municipalities in the Netherlands that have a low population (<500,000 inhabitants). To be able to study this issue, the following research question is used: Which municipalities join Transnational Municipal Networks focused on climate change?
‘Transnational policy communities’ are broader constituencies than the traditional constellation of ‘international civil servants’ who work for international organisations. Today, these civil servants are complemented on the one hand, by ‘internationalised public sector officials’ who often interact via transnational executive networks of judges, regulators and other government officials who need to collaborate with their overseas counterparts (Slaughter, 2004). On the other hand, there is a diverse but growing assemblage of consultants, foundation officers, business leaders, scientific experts, and NGO executives who proffer their services on the international stage (Stone, 2013). Think tank pundits are but one set of actors here. These transnational policy professionals hold power as a result of their (semi-)official position; their control of information and other organisational resources; their technical expertise or epistemic authority; or their often lengthy international experience as career officials and consultants. The geographical dispersion of transnational policy communities means that policy actors meet irregularly, are highly reliant on information technology, and travel frequently. In other words, the values guiding the behaviour of bureaucrats are increasingly shaped by the imperatives of the global economy and a professional awareness of the constraints on sovereign control of policy that prompt new modes of collaboration.
Based on the analysis of public events held by Protestant religious associations officially registered in the studied region, studying the activity of virtual religious associations of Protestants in various popular social networks, as well as the frequency and content of published records in these virtual communities, it can be concluded that in the Northern Caspian region officially registered are 20 registered Protestant associations of various denominations. It is not possible to specify the total number of parishioners due to the fact that the pastors of the communities themselves are not always aware of the number of parishioners of their churches, as well as the absence of a fixed number of subscribers of the virtual communities of these churches.
The following African Cancer Advocates Consortium (ACAC) leadership team members are acknowledged for their effort in developing the best practices for cancer advocacy: Kamal Eldein Hamed (Sudan), Iman Ewais (Egypt), Lindiwe Tsabedze (Swaziland), Rose Kiwanuka (Uganda), Bakarou Kamate (Mali), Bangary Traore (Guinea), Kathene Mbithi (Kenya), Muheeza A. Durosimi (Nigeria), Faosat Bangbose (Nigeria) and Yahya Tfeil (Mauritania). In addition, we would like to acknowledge the support of the ACAC advisory board members who presented during the cancer advocacy workshop: Anthony “ Tony ” Hill Sr, Olufemi Ogunbiyi, Tim Rebbeck and Scott Williams. Finally, we would like to thank the reviewers of this article for their constructive feedback.
mobilisation in countries such as India. The Indian national context is characterised by a strong civil society and decades of social mobilisation in a democratic system. India also has a long history of social movement organising (see Ray & Katzenstein. 2005) from the independence movement in the early 1900s to more recent farmers’ rights struggles and anti-corporate movements (Banerjee, 2011a; 2011b). These include social movements against multinational agricultural giants Cargill and Monsanto (Herring, 2005; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), protests against CocaCola in Kerala (Raman, 2010), to the current protests against mining and metal multinationals like Vedanta and the Pohang Steel Company from South Korea. National level networks and social movement organisations such as the National Alliance of People’s Movements or the National Campaign against Big Dams are examples of the very active national advocacynetworks that pose a ‘serious challenge to the dominant ideology of meaning and patterns of development’ in the country (Swain, 2010: 49).
Nurses have an ethical duty to advocate for their patients, and it is an expected competency for practicing nurses. The research regarding advo- cacy has shown that advocacy includes actions to help protect patients in the healthcare setting by speaking for and acting for the patient. Studies have also indicated the workplace can be both a positive and negative influence on the nurse’s ability to advocate. This is not always an easy or simple role for a nurse. Acting as an advocate can result in negative con- sequences. However, with the use of effective communication skills and working to improve advocacy skills, we can provide effective advocacy and remain focused on the patient’s best interest. The use of effective advocacy skills will ultimately improve patient safety in all of our healthcare settings. Make the critical connection between advocacy and safety work for your practice and for your patients! Be the best advocate possible, and help patients to achieve their optimal outcomes.
Thus the findings provide some support for previous research, which has highlighted the benefits of a more diversified mix of strong and weak-ties (Davidsson and Honig, 2003) and emphasised the importance of human capital to successful enterprise development (Marger, 2001). However, the study has also identified the limitations of the strong/weak ties thesis when applied to cultures with extended family networks and a more collectivist value system. With such groups strong family ties can exist across a wider family grouping and transcend national boundaries. Where an entrepreneur’s ‘strong – ties’ are situated in a completely different country and culture they can provide access to a wider range of ideas and information that may benefit the business and encourage innovation. The entrepreneur may also be able to draw on additional expertise or ‘human capital’ from within his/her family network and this may help compensate for his or her own limited knowledge or contacts. This suggests that in such situations it is necessary to look at the nature of the social and human capital within the extended family rather than just those of the individual entrepreneur.
In this section the independent variable proximity and the dependent variable transnational learning will be further elaborated upon. In order to understand the relationship between the variables it is crucial to gather data on both the dependent and independent variables. The choice was made for a single case study in which mixes of both qualitative and quantitative data have been used. The research question set out in this thesis: “to what extent does geographical, institutional, cognitive and organizational proximity affect knowledge transfer between partners of the URMA network?” will be answered by comparing partners on proximity and on learning. Hence the independent variable will be compared to the dependent variable (see figure 8). Because partners are compared to one another they may be regarded as subcases within this single case study. By comparing project partners it may be seen in how far proximity has influenced learning. Proximity levels between partners (regions) will be measured and ranked according to quantitative data. I.e. regional data will be gathered in order to investigate the proximity between employees working in different regional administrations. Transnational learning will be explored by doing qualitative research; by means of interviews with project partners learning processes will be examined. These learning processes will later be categorized according to the SECI model.
precise terms but as general benchmarks based on local conditions, it might be possible to arrive at some deeper consensus about what kinds of minimal living wages should be paid, what kinds of safe working conditions are necessary in a humane society, and so forth. For example, in the area of occupational health and safety it should be possible to identify certain minimal safety standards and exposure levels that can be enforced through some kind of international channels. Similarly, it should be possible to define a socially appropriate minimum wage, such as a wage sufficient to feed, house, clothe, and educate oneself and one’s family, under existing national economic conditions. These locally tailored benchmarks could then become the minimum standard that a transnational trade organization would enforce. The local benchmark approach advocated here is similar to the concept of the poverty line that was developed in the United States in the 1960s. Such an approach, with its focus in social and cultural as well as economic aspects of human existence and interaction, proposes specific labor standards rather than abstract labor rights. Yet they are locally appropriate standards rather than Western standards set to deprive workers in DCs of jobs.
Three principles –secrecy, compartmentality and verticality– rule PC3 networks. Secrecy guarantees the existence of its members, giving them “protection towards the outside, making its location unknown to the enemy, but allowing their ideas and claims to be known” (FARC-EP, n.d.d, p.18). Compartmentality is an internal measure that contributes to the secrecy of the organization. “It is the fractioned truth, known to individuals only according to their participation in the conduction of their tasks.” (FARC-EP, n.d.d, p.18) Verticality explains the direction of the organization, its hierarchy. Processes follow a top-down logic, not a bottom-up initiative. “Different organisms are directed from the top to the bottom. They work separately from others, and only those responsible establish contacts with staff under their command and with their superiors.” (FARC-EP, n.d.d., p.19) In that sense PC3 networks are directed and do not follow an emergence logic that is typical of complexity. The PC3 is defined by the insurgents as the “most elevated expression of ideological, political and organizational unity of the working class and of all Colombian workers. It is the superior form of organization and its part of the vanguard of the revolutionary and insurrectional struggle for political power and the construction of socialism. (…) It is inspired by the revolutionary thought of El Libertador Simon Bolivar, [and his principles of] anti-imperialism, Latin American unity and people’s welfare.” (FARC-EP, n.d.e) It has also been defined as an “orthodox communist party, of clandestine and compartmented character. It is a pillar for FARC’s strategic plan and the urbanization of conflict.” 52