The Impossibility of performance of the contract as an exemption from liability, arising from the breach of contract, is an issue which is discussed in the salecontracts. InternationalSale of Goods which is enacted in 1980, discusses the matter in its Article 79. The CISG abstains to use such terms as Frustration and Force majeure which are used in national legal systems. This prevention of using such terms thought to be the way that CISG keeps itself independence from national legal systems. As a result the CISG ordains its specific terms and conditions to set up the exemption for damages arising from the breach of contract by the person who has faced impediments and breached the contract. This research studies different aspects of the impossibility of performance of contract in The Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, therefore not only it presents the concept and bases of occurrence of the Force majeure, it discusses applicable examples such as sanctions and changes in regulations as Force majeure.
How then can general principles be elaborated? Such a question can only be answered if the purpose for such elaboration is known. If it is for the purpose of a doctrinal analysis of general principle then the solution is a comparison of national and international systems of contract law that is comparative law. These principles therefore need only be understood in a broad sense. If the purpose is to discover general principles within the CISG such an analysis must be rejected due to the mandate of article 7(1). However this does not change the understanding of principles. They still must be understood in a broad rather than technical sense as they contain “rules” as well as “principles”. 35
Abstract: This paper attempts to show that the greatest impediment to a reduction in the transaction cost consists of two factors. First, the problem of the choice of laws makes contracting a hazardous enterprise for those who have an information disadvantage. Second, the reluctance of the legal profession to embrace and familiarise themselves with uniform international laws does not enhance a client’s expectation to be able to access the ‘best’ law. It is argued that the inclusion of international uniform laws such as the UnitedNationsConvention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods (CISG, 1980) will reduce the transactions costs either at trial or when a problem arises as both parties operate in essence under the same law and, hence, a negotiated settlement is more likely. The paper specifically addresses the problem which can emerge when a contract is silent as to which law will govern the legal relationship. Close attention is given to a possibility of overcoming choice of laws problems by applying the CISG, instead of explicitly excluding the CISG. This paper also investigates the inclusions of soft laws into contracts and the ability of such an inclusion to reduce transaction costs. The conclusion is that the inclusion of uniform laws reduces uncertainty and is, furthermore, merely recognition of a development which is gathering speed.
3. Professor Michael Gordon, at the University of Florida, conducted an earlier study of attitudes towards the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles among members of the Florida bar, judiciary and academia a decade ago, which was one of the first attempts to assess and document the use of these instruments in this country. M.W. Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contracts Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges, 46 A M . J. C OMP . L. 361 (1998). Other papers which touch upon the U.S. experience with these instruments include W.S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. L EGAL E DUC . 72, 74-78 (2000); M.F. Koehler & G. Yujun, The Acceptance of the Unified Sales Law (CISG) in Different Legal Systems—An International Comparison of Three Surveys on the Exclusion of the CISG’s Application Conducted in the United States, Germany, and China, 20 P ACE I NT ’ L L. R EV . (forthcoming 2008); G. Philippopoulos, Awareness of the CISG Among American Attorneys, 40 UCC L.J. 357 (2008); C.S. Sukurs, Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: a Comparison of the United States, Canada, and the UnitedNationsConvention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 34 V AND . J. T RANSNAT ’ L L. 1481, 1511-15 (2001); and J. Ziegel, The Scope of the Convention: Reaching Out to Article One and Beyond, 25 J.L. & C OM . 59, 67-71 (2005).
38. Nigeria is not party to any bilateral or multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments. The enforcement of foreign judgments in Nigeria is therefore governed by two statutes. That is to say, the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance 1958 and the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act Cap. C. 35 LFN 2004 <www,uubo.org/media/…/enforcement-of-foreign-judgments-under- nigerian-law-pdf> visited on 01/06/2018. Same is applicable, for while the United States has been a signatory of the 1958 UnitedNationsConvention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) since 1970, it is not currently party to any international treaty for the recognition of foreign courts judgments; see Yuliya Zeynalova,The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BerkeleyJ. Int'lLaw. 150 (2013). < https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer&httpsredir= 1&article=1435&context=bjil>.Unlike foreign arbitral awards, which are governed by the New York Convention, no treaty outlines the circumstances under which U.S courts may recognize foreign awards and vice versa. Transnational litigants are therefore more likely to encounter difficulties enforcing their foreign courts awards than parties seeking to enforce their foreign arbitral awards. This disparity is particularly clear because of the almost universal agreement that recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention ‘works’ and the absence of a comparably reliable mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of foreign courts awards. In the United States for instance, while the principle of Comity of Nations, the common law and individual states’ laws do allow American courts to recognize and enforce foreign judgments, foreign courts may not necessarily reciprocate. Enforcing U.S courts judgments abroad can prove especially difficult in light of divergent rules on jurisdiction, requirements for special service of process, reciprocity and some foreign countries’ public policy concerns over enforcing American jury awards carrying hefty punitive damages. <https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1435& context=bjil > visited on 01/06/2018.
It appears that the Dutch court unlike the ICC arbitrator did not read article 74 correctly. Article 74 allows for damages due to a breach of the contract including loss of profit. Set-off therefore - as long as it pertains to damages due to a breach of contract or loss of profits - is within the scope of the CISG. A set-off due to other reasons, such as punitive damages not contained within the contract is outside the scope of the Convention. Domestic law, subject to article 7(2) must fill the gap. Some courts have misinterpreted article 4 as defining all those matters, which are not included in the CISG. These questions should be solved pursuant to article 7(2). Careful attention must be given to set-off provisions if they are in breach of a domestic law, which could make them invalid. In such a case article 4 could be used to implement domestic law. However, in the cases described above the set-off was not a question of a breach of domestic laws but rather a misinterpretation of article 4. A Swiss decision explains the issue well. The court of Freiburg stated that the only question in issue was the amount of set-off. The right of set-off was based on General Terms and Conditions and the question was whether these terms formed part of the sales contract. The court correctly noted that the question was one of validity and pursuant to article 4 was not governed by the CISG. Domestic law and in this case German law had to be applied. Under German law the set-off was not excluded. The interesting part of the decision was the fact that in making its interpretation the court looked beyond one article and tried to solve the issue within the context of the CISG generally. Article 8 was consulted and it was found that if the statement made by the parties in relation to set-off corresponds with the intent of the parties then the CISG was applicable. "If the interpretation of statements made by both parties does not lead to a congruent result, the intent of the parties has to be elicited in accordance with the principles of domestic law."
This approach, it is argued, would operate to drive small and medium firms out of business since such firms, as a result of their size, would not be able to enter into contracts with large firms that preferred to leave the price term open in such a manner. Secondly, this approach did not take the reality of the world of commerce into account, wherein contracts with open price terms that empower one party to set the price are frequently entered into and performed without dispute. Moreover, such an approach gives primacy to concerns of protection of the weaker party, over and above concerns of efficiency. Economic efficiency is undermined since a court would invalidate a contract due to the possibility of arbitrariness in setting of the price, even though no such arbitrariness is found in fact. Such an approach, it is argued, operates to allow parties to act opportunistically, since they may have a contract set aside whenever they find a better deal elsewhere. Various commentators therefore argued that rather than invalidating the contract, which seems to be
Today’s pirates may seem more like terrorists, and their effect can be felt on a variety of sectors within society, most notably international commerce. The shipping industry deals with the threat of pirate attacks on a regular basis. In order to prevent a profit loss from those attacks, the industry has sought insurance coverage. The difficulty arises within these insurance policies as to the definition of “piracy,” and whether acts that more closely resemble terroristic activities as opposed to the traditional notion of piracy are covered. This Student Note evaluates the evolving definition of piracy, both within the United States’ court system and in international law. The lack of a consistent definition raises the argument that policy coverage varies too significantly to effectively protect the economic loss associated with a pirate attack. The Note concludes by noting that regardless of how piracy is defined, the threat of attacks still exists. Additionally, due to liability under the UnitedNationsConvention for the InternationalSale of Goods (CISG), insurance coverage within the shipping industry will still be sought.
In relation to their scope of applicability, the UPICC does not apply to domestic contracts rather it is intended to operate globally, which are broader in scope and more detailed in provisions than the CISG (Bonell, 2002). Similarly, while the Ethiopian civil code, UCC & PECL are of a narrower geographic focus than CISG & UPICC, they covers a wider area of law. The PECL is applicable to contracts entered into by parties who belong to Member States of the European Union whereas the UPICC and the CISG are applicable universally. The civil code too apply to domestic contracts unless the parties choose for its international applicability. UCC is also ap- plicable for contracts of sale of goods made between two or more traders of US state except Louisiana or for in- ternational contract via choices of contracting party.
The picture is therefore ambivalent: without the ILO or the UN there would be no international standards pertaining to migrant workers. However, even among the organisations that are tasked with promoting and monitoring these legal instruments there are deep political disagreements on how to apprehend migration and on the emphasis that should be put on human rights. This lack of political support is a major obstacle to increased acceptance of the ICMW and cannot be addressed without a better recognition of the political dimension of the Convention. Overall, the UN and other international organisations tend to downplay the political sensitivity of migration-related issues by, for example, arguing that it can be addressed in a way that is beneficial for all or that helping migrants is merely a humanitarian issue disconnected from economic and labour market forces. This has of course to do with the intergovernmental setting in which international organisations work, which makes it difficult to openly address political and sensitive topics. Furthermore, such depolitisation makes it impossible to recognise that migration policy is marked by core political (or even moral) issues that cannot be left unaddressed. 52
This Comment conducts a comprehensive examination of every case decided under Part XV to date. Section II briefly reviews the development of international maritime law in the modern era. It argues that the law has attempted to balance the interests of both coastal states and shipping nations over the course of time, but that the current rules have swung in favor of coastal states. Section III presents an overview of the Convention as it exists today. It summarizes the cases decided under Part XV and evaluates various theories on how states shop for the best forums against the record of cases that has accumulated over the past two decades. It finds that the forum selection process that the framers of the Convention designed has little effect on actual practice. Instead, international legal tribunals have gained subject-matter expertise in narrow areas of law that are frequently litigated, while all other subject areas usually default to arbitration. Section IV identifies the most notable trend in the system’s recent past: forum rejection. Several major military powers have refused to participate in legal proceedings under Part XV, rejecting the jurisdiction of any forum over certain issues. This trend creates a serious problem and is likely to lead to less reliance on binding dispute resolution, leaving disputes to linger and incentivizing powerful states to intimidate their weaker neighbors to achieve their goals. In light of continued American opposition to international legal dispute resolution mechanisms, this trend may continue unabated.
The CISG has acquired undeniable importance in a number of respects. Indeed, the Convention has become the most important legal basis of today’s globalised trade. The CISG has been accepted by many states, and what counts more in this respect, by many economically important states. Thus far, 76 States from all continents have ratified it, among them almost all major trading nations. The CISG now governs most of the world’s trade (unless the parties have excluded the application of the CISG). 9 It is estimated that at least three-quarters of global trade automatically falls within the scope of the CISG. 10 Also in practice, the CISG has made its way: It is often applied and dealt with by international case law–both by state courts and arbitration tribunals. By now, there are several thousand decisions published in English 11 from all over the world resolving most if not all interpretation problems of the Convention. 12 Furthermore, the CISG has strongly influenced legislation in many states. The Convention has become the most influential source for legislation in the field of private law–both on the national and international level. Particularly those states that reformed their legal systems after the political change in the beginning of the 1990s used the CISG as a model either for their sales law or the general law of obligations. 13 Most amazingly, even the European Directive on Consumer Sales of 1999, 14 which aims at consumer protection, owes a lot to the CISG. Despite the