In these circumstances especially, there is little reason to suspect any partisan aim behind the legislation. Part III uses the conclusions of Part II to assess the importance and the relevance of the ―Democracy Canon‖ in different election law contexts. Hasen relies on the Democracy Canon to justify his approach to the Murkowski and Emanuel cases—regarding Murkowski, let the voter intent standard govern; in the latter case, let Rahm Emanuel run. But in both cases, this Article suggests that the correct reading of the statute was a much closer call. There are credible arguments that the statutes, plainly read, supported a narrower interpretation: throw out the misspelled ballots, and keep Emanuel from running. But even if they did not support this narrower interpretation, and the statutes were ambiguous, there is a good reason not to read them expansively: the statutes were drafted behind a veil of ignorance and have a good claim to being neutral ―rules of the game.‖ This, in turn, moves me to qualify the Democracy Canon: there are some cases of ambiguous statutes where the canon should not be used, and something like the opposite of the Democracy Canon should be our guiding principle. The Democracy Canon, in other words, need not be our ―default‖ setting when it comes to interpreting election law rules.
Our experiment explores the relationship between social preferences and Rawls’di¤er- ence principle that economists have formalized by maximin preferences. In his book "A Theory of Justice" (1971) the philosopher John Rawls coined the term "veil of ignorance" for the following thought experiment: Behind the veil of ignorance, nobody knows which future position in society he (as well as other individuals) will be as- signed when deciding how to distribute resources across di¤erent positions. According to Rawls society would agree behind the veil of ignorance that the di¤erence principle should constitute the basis of the social contract. The di¤erence principle states that society should maximize the utility of the individual that is worst o¤. Utilitarians have asserted that being in favor of the di¤erence principle is only strictly optimal for in…nitely risk averse individuals and thus, have dismissed the di¤erence principle and maximin preferences as unrealistic. However, the Utilitarian’s argument assumes that everybody is only interested in his own material payo¤. In contrast, theories on social preferences assume that people are self-interested to some degree, but also care about (the payo¤s of) others. 3 In this paper, we argue that if people have social preferences,
John Rawls argues that the Difference Principle (also known as the Max- imin Equity Criterion) would be chosen by parties trying to advance their individual interests behind the Veil of Ignorance. Behind this veil, the parties do not know who they are and they are unable to assign or estimate probabilities to their turning out to be any particular person in society. Much discussion of Rawls’s argument concerns whether he can plausibly rule out the parties’ having access to probabilities about who they are. Nevertheless, I argue that, even if the parties lacked access to probabilities about who they are in society, they would still reject the Difference Principle. I argue that there are cases where it is still clear to the parties that it is not in any of their individual interests that the Difference Principle be adopted.
moral beings are di↵erent to individuals assumed in Harsanyi’s work, since the former adopts the moral preference even under normal circumstances (not only behind a veil of ignorance). Another direction in the generalisation of Harsanyi’s work has been to technically reduce its strict requirement by restricting the domain in which impartial observer prefer- ences are defined. In Harsanyi’s original work, an observer is required to order all possible extended lotteries, which is quite demanding. Karni and Weymark (1998) restricted the domain from all possible extended lotteries to only impartial extended lotteries, a smaller domain considering only extended lotteries with an equal chance of being any individual in society. It was noted that situations in which di↵erent individuals might face di↵erent social alternative lotteries were allowed. Karni and Weymark (1998, p.327, Assumption A.5) further strengthened the acceptance principle and showed that an analogous result to Harsanyi’s theorem could be obtained.
more, it seems very unlikely that, until now, state legislatures had given a great deal of thought to the interaction of state election codes and the Electoral Count Act, including its safe harbor provision. Given the abbreviated time period for any contest of a presidential election, states should consider revising their laws to allow for expe- dited procedures. Not only will moving quickly on these issues allow state institutions to act behind a partial veil of ignorance and thus avoid the temptation to advance the cause of particular candidates, it will also make clear to all who plan to run for office what the rules of the game will be so that they can plan their strategies accordingly. Modern campaigning is sufficiently sophisticated that changes in election laws are taken into account when allocating financial and human resources.
Authority, Ignorance, and the Guilty Mind SMU Law Review Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 9 2014 Authority, Ignorance, and the Guilty Mind Stephen P Garvey Cornell Law School, spg3@cornell edu Follow this[.]
Recent science-studies literature has shown that research is “shot through” with significant value judgments (see e.g., Douglas 2009; Elliott 2011; Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie 2007). Some of these are fairly well recognized, such as the three crucial judgments mentioned by Kitcher. Others are less obvious. For example, scholars have shown that decisions about how to frame scientific phenomena (including choices about scientific terms and categories) are ethically significant insofar as they can influence the future course of scientific research, alter public attention to a phenomenon, and even affect public policy making (see e.g., Elliott 2009; Elliott 2011; Larson 2011). Others have shown that choices about the metrics and standards used for measuring phenomena are also highly significant (Lampland and Star 2009). For example, when technology assessments focus only on a narrow range of variables (e.g., mortality rates or economic costs and benefits), they can miss important “soft” effects on people’s quality of life or their worldviews (Boenink 2011). The next section identifies a number of crucial judgments highlighted by a recent review of contemporary agricultural research. The goal is to gain a better understanding of the range of factors that can steer research down some pathways while subtly promoting ignorance about other socially important forms of information.
Present research paper is focused on the piercing of the corporate veil in the European Union (EU) company law (CL) and Albanian CL. Considering the importance of corporate activity in our days, it is of a specific significance to discuss the applied standards whether the corporate veil should be pierced or not. The corporate veil doctrine presents one of the issues most studied in CL; the doctrine itself is closely related to two legal concepts such as legal personality of the corporate and limited liability of the people behind the corporate. Although limited liability of the corporate is defined by the CL and even in the statute of the corporate, it is not uncontroverted. Along with that, courts examine different factors and conditions while decide to pierce the corporate veil. Company term is given in article (art.) 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as an art. which refers the constitution of the companies under specified legislation. In addition, the corporate is one of the most common business organisation that provides for its shareholders limited liability to the amount they have subscribed. Besides the theories and attempts form a comprehensive framework for piercing of the corporate veil, the decision is up to the court’s discretion.The interpretation will be mainly based on the EU primary and secondary law, the doctrine for piercing the corporate veil, case laws and different articles; additionally one has to bear in mind that despite the metaphoric meaning, the veil dividing the corporate and people behind it may be set aside for the protection of higher interests.
Lifting the veil on disrespect and abuse in facility based child birth care findings from South West Nigeria RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access Lifting the veil on disrespect and abuse in facility based chi[.]
If we compare ignorance of the use of big data with the denial that can be observed with regard to climate change, we can see a similarity at work in the way these two forms of closing our eyes deal with the idea of progress. People in the developed world are afraid to admit that the belief in development that underlies modern capitalism is in fact something that cannot last forever. People are also afraid to face the prospect that climate change might actually lead to a decline in economic growth, and that any government intervention in the market through various mechanisms of controlling carbon dioxide emissions and introducing penalties for corporations might also imply loss of the idea of freedom, which for many people is related to the idea of the free market. Even those who are aware of the warnings that scientists are issuing as to climate change often have various strategies enabling them to believe that these warnings do not affect them per se. People often deny both that climate change means that they themselves need to do something and that society needs to change its course as regards what it perceives as development.
Carter has a different solution. It is to assess liberty ‘in terms of the foreseeable consequences of given possible (or actual) actions, rather than in terms of what would actually happen’. 26 This answer is simple and intuitive. However, in the absence of other epistemic conditions, Carter’s introduction of one to solve this problem is ad hoc. Why should ignorance about the consequences of one’s actions render one unfree to bring about those consequences, when ignorance in general does not contribute to unfreedom? By not counting lack of knowledge as necessarily constraining, Carter is unable to explain why liberty should be assessed only in terms of foreseeable consequences.
knowledge, only a handful of papers embed rationally ignorant voters in a political agency setting. Hortala-Vallve et al. (2013) show that restriction on politicians’ scope of authority meant to limit policy swings that are harmful for poor voters might be counterproductive when voters face a high cost of attention. Svolik (2013) examines the probability that democ- racy stabilizes when politicians are potentially corrupt and it is costly for voters to observe politicians’ actions. Matejka and Tabellini (2015) introduce rational inattention in a proba- bilistic voting model to study the relationship between ideology and information, as well as the resulting electoral incentives for public good and targeted spending. Prato and Wolton (2015a) study how rational ignorance tends to exacerbate or mitigate electoral imbalances (defined as asymmetries in voters’ opinions of party labels and candidates). In a companion paper (Prato and Wolton, 2015b), we focus on voter’s behavior and show that voter’s lack of attention cannot be conflated with a lack of interest for politics. 5 The present manuscript
Here we see how closely the two kinds of epistemic injustice are related: testimonial injustice can create or sustain hermeneutical marginalisation by blocking the flow of reports, ideas and perspectives that would help generate richer and more diversified shared hermeneutical resources that all can draw on in their social understandings, whether of their own or of others’ experiences. The refore the broad patterns of testimonial injustice — most likely patterns created by the operation of negative identity prejudices, inasmuch as these are the chief systematic prejudices — will tend to reproduce themselves as patterns of hermeneutical marginalisation, and it is these that give rise to systematic hermeneutical injustices. Thus we can see how the preservation of hearer-ignorance that is the likely effect of any instance of testimonial injustice can contribute directly to the hermeneutically marginalised position of the speaker. And a hermeneutically marginalised speaker is vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice. Charles Mills has noted this close connection between the two kinds of epistemic injustice in respect of race:
How does knowledge affect judgment and decision- making? While much judgment research has considered the role of expertise, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) have made the startling claim that, under certain circum- stances, ignorance can benefit judges attempting to make inferences from their knowledge. For example, Gold- stein and Gigerenzer (2002) asked both American and German students which is the bigger city: San Anto- nio or San Diego? Sixty-two percent of the Americans correctly named San Diego—but 100% of the German students were correct. All of the German students had heard of San Diego but only about half had heard of San Antonio. Half of the German students would therefore be able to apply a recognition heuristic—if you recog- nise one and not the other, pick the city you recognise. As people usually hear about the bigger cities of foreign countries before the smaller ones—i.e., recognition cor- relates with the criterion being predicted—this cue will have some validity. Because the American students had heard of both cities they couldn’t utilise this cue and had to rely on other, apparently less valid, cues. In terms of accuracy, it seems that, when it comes to using knowl- edge to make inferences, less can sometimes mean more.
limitation and a serious one, not seen as part of traditional veil piercing law. It is also evident that a creditor will face difficulties of proof respecting issues of purpose and intent. Veil piercing should not depend on proof and findings of evil purpose, or intent on the part of its targeted defendants. Historic veil piercing tests, lists of factors, and mainstream judicial decisions do not go that far. The policy behind the granting of the privilege of limited liability is well served by looking at what the facts show about whether it is fair to leave certain creditors holding the bag on certain debts. Additionally, the phrase “direct personal benefit” is not without ambiguity, and poses a further unfamiliar obstacle to veil piercing.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the efficacy of post-exercise treatment with “Cool Veil Serum (CVS)” developed by Madre:X Co. Ltd. (Shibuya, Tokyo) to prevent exercise-induced muscle swelling. Calf circumferences and mus- cle stiffness of both legs were measured in 10 healthy female. The measurements were made on before 5-minute exercise, after the exercise, and after 10-minute recovery care with CVS and 5-minute rest. The recovery care was applied only on right leg of the subjects. Then, multiple comparisons of calf circumference and muscle s t i f f n e s s o n e a c h l e g a m o n g p r e - e x e r - cise, post-exercise, and final measurements were carried out. Exercise caused a significant increase in calf circumference and muscle stiff- ness. The recovery care with CVS rapidly re- duced post-exercise calf circumference to pre-exercise level. Relationship between reduc- ing muscle swelling after exercise and prevent- ing sport injury should be explored in further studies.
Regulatory Confusion, Ignorance of Law, and Deference to Agencies General Electric Co v EPA SMU Law Review Volume 49 | Issue 5 Article 6 1996 Regulatory Confusion, Ignorance of Law, and Deference to A[.]