Opium is arguably a core ingredient of the conflict in Afghanistan: it ensures its sustainability. The production of opium has been at the heart of a wareconomy for several decades and in a variety of political settings. Any peace-building and state- building attempt has to integrate a comprehensive strategy to transform this wareconomy. The emerging state and peace have to be as gainful as the wareconomy to numerous stakeholders in order to be accepted and in order to persist. This paper set out to understand the extent to which the European Union can help tackle the problem of opium in Afghanistan. Exploring the idea of drug crops shaping economic and political structures in Afghanistan, it showed that a comprehensive, poverty-oriented approach is necessary to initiate a sustainable change in behaviour and to succeed in counter-narcotics policies. The EU’s general strategies and specific policies represent a strong basis for such actions, making it a particularly relevant partner for Afghanistan.
Western sanctions have inadvertently also contributed to the development of the wareconomy. Sanctions against state entities and prominent investors have forced the authorities to seek intermediaries for their international transactions, giving new individuals the opportunity to enrich themselves. The government will award a contract to one of these intermediaries, who will set up a company in Syria registered under a name that is not blacklisted or establish a front company in Lebanon. To further blur the details of the transactions, this company will then use a broker that will contract directly with the suppliers and a letter of credit to pay for the import will then be issued generally from a bank based outside Syria. At every one of these stages, fees are levied and new margins generated, leading to hefty profits for the middlemen and to an increase in the overall cost of the products. The sanctions are thereby enabling regime cronies to enrich themselves at the expense of state institutions, while increasing the price of basic commodities for the population. In other words, the sanctions are strengthening elements of the Syrian regime at the expenses of the state and its citizens.
Scholars continue to draw attention to the link between the wareconomy and post-war crime. The majority of these studies are about cases of civil war that ended with peace agreements. Sri Lanka’s civil war ended with a military victory for the state armed forces; thus, it can help shed new light on the above link. Situated in the wareconomy perspective, this article investigates the dominant types of crimes reported from post-war Sri Lanka and the mechanisms linking them with the wareconomy. The culture of impunity, continued militarisation and enduring corruption are identified as key mechanisms through which the wareconomy and post-war bodily and material crime are linked. It suggests, although the ‘victors’ peace’ achieved by state armed forces was able to successfully dismantle the extra-legal wareconomy run by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, it was responsible for promoting criminality in the post-war period. Overall, this points to the urgency of breaking away from legacies of the state wareconomy in the post-war period, before introducing programs of longer term political and economic reform.
3 The construction of “corporative economy” was presented as an alternative to socialism and as a model for overcoming both “liberal economics” and the “Marxist class struggle”. “Corporative economy” would have been implemented through a self-government of the representatives of economic categories of different trade and industrial sectors (Fascist corporations), which should be established as organs of the government, without abolishing private companies but regulating and planning the economic activities. Most historiographers agree that Corporatism was essentially a sound theoretical construction, but totally unrealized: the Charter of Work (issued on April 30th, 1927) – i.e. the Economic Constitution of Fascism that outlined the basis of the Fascist corporative system - was considered by eminent jurists to be a presentation of principles that lacked mandatory effects. One evidence of the distance between corporative principles and the practice of government action is the fact per se that corporative institutes were created later and had no further power of enforcement: the 1926 decrees issued to create Fascist corporations and the relevant ministry remained inoperative, only in 1930 a National Council of Corporations was founded, while fascist corporations were not created until 1934 (Cassese, 1974; De Felice, 2001: p. 11).
at a nu mbe r of compa nie s a nd ve ntu re s n ame d by th e UN exp er ts bec au se of th eir in vo lve men t in th e colta n tra de i.e. Co ge com, Cog ear , S og em, Ma si ngi ro, Finmini ng , Finc on cor d, Ra remet a nd Ea gl e Wing s Res our ce s. Th ey are a ll par ti all y in co rpora te d i n Eur ope an co unt rie s and /or ma nag ed by Eu ro pea n n at ion als . The co lt an tra de wa s sin gle d out be ca use of i ts lin k to an ob jec t th at ha s b ec ome so i mpo rta nt in th e eve ryd ay li ve s o f s o man y Eur ope an s, i.e . the mo bi le ph on e. In Ju ne 200 1, a coa li tio n o f 18 Bel gi an NGOs la unc he d a ca mp aig n wit h t he sl oga n No bl oo d o n my mob ile ! Sto p t he pl und er ing of Co ng o! to d ema nd th at mea su res be t ake n t o en su re tha t the tr ad e i n Con gol ese miner al s be ne fit s t he pe opl e of Con go in ste ad of fu el lin g a wa r tha t d est ro ys the ir li vel ih ood s. Th is rep or t i s in te nde d a s a c ont ri buti on to war ds th is go al. Th e aim of t his re po rt is to as ses s the re sp ons ibi li ty of th e c omp an ies un de r s cru ti ny in
In a survey carried out by Gallup in the fall of 1943, the question, “Did you or your family pack homemade food this year?” was raised , an impressive 75% of the answers were “Yes”.
In addition, about 135 billion dollars were sold through war bonds, the largest share of which went to banks, insurance companies and some companies. Individuals acquired about 36 billion dollars in the bond purchase chain. Children alone bought more than $ 1 billion of defense stamps and small-value bonds. The awareness campaigns utilizing posters and other media unified the majority of the American people and kept them committed to the practices and the measurements of wareconomy.
targeting—rules which themselves have changed, not least in 1977 Geneva Pro- tocol I. This is a momentous development in the history of war, yet its effects, es- pecially as regards operations against terrorists, should not be exaggerated, as it cannot guarantee either success or no deaths of innocents. Precision-guided weapons are generally better at hitting fixed objects, such as buildings, than mov- ing objects that can be concealed, such as people and tanks. Civilian deaths will still occur, whether because certain dual-use targets are attacked, because of the close proximity of military targets to civilians, or because of faulty intelligence and human or mechanical errors. In addition, malevolence and callousness can still lead to attacks on the wrong places or people. A further problem with the new type of US bombing campaign is that, in the eyes of third parties, it can easily look as if the United States puts a lower value on the lives of Iraqis or Serbs or Af- ghans than it does on its own almost-invulnerable aircrews: a perception which can feed those hostile views of the United States that help to provide a back- ground against which terrorism can flourish.
That the war was wicked, horrific and inhuman is memorialized, in part, by some cold historical statistics but also by the poetry of men like Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon. Ferguson asserts that more British soldiers were killed in the first day of the Battle of the Somme than Americans in the Vietnam War and that the total British fatalities in that single battle—some 420,000—exceeds the entire American fatalities for both World Wars. And yet, he concludes that while the war itself was a disastrous folly, the great majority of men who fought it did so with enthusiasm (24). This ties in squarely with Owen’s critique against war and war-mongers. Wilfred Owen’s poetry is a scathing revelation of the horrors of war with the harrowing experiences of soldiers in the warfront. This is what in the poem “Strange Meeting” he calls “The pity of war, the pity war distilled” (line 25), which pity is the direct consequence of “the truth untold” (line 24) namely that in a war situation, “foreheads of men have bled where no wounds were” (line 39) referring to the physical and mental torture and traumas of soldiers in combat. A number of his poems reveal the horror and dehumanisation caused by war. ‘Futility’, ‘The Dead Beat’, ‘Dulce et Decorum Est’, “Mental Cases” and ‘Anthem for Doomed Youth’ are just some of the poems that reveal Owen’s distrust of war and all traditional ideologies that have kept soldiers fighting. Owen informs that mistrust with a passion of personal engagement, with the direct experience of pain and other sophisticated horrors of warfare which cannot be conveyed by the conventional literary language. The poem “Futility”, as its title clearly indicates, brings out both the notion of the futility of war and questions the raison d’être of creation. Arthur E. Lane (1972) asserts that in the poem, there is “a poetic transformation of death... into death as the absurd and ultimate denial of the value of life” (59). The poem describes the death of the soldier while “asleep”, the actual fact of his dying, as well as the fact of his death. According to Owen, war violates nature and the natural processes of birth. The soldier in the poem cannot be awoken by the sun, the giver of life, which once awoke him up to go and cultivate unsown fields. The sun “wakes the seeds” as well as “a cold star” yet it cannot wake the soldier in question though he is “full-nerved” that is, robust and muscular. The rhetorical questions of the last stanza point to the futility of existence;
The US invaded Iraq in 2003 as the former claimed that the latter possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and liberalizes Iraqis from the tyranny regime of Saddam Hussein (Mockaitis, 2012). Since then, controversy appears within academia on whether Iraq War in 2003 should be regarded as “A Just War” or “Just a War” (Lecamwasam, 2013). Some scholars embraced the idea of “Pacifism” and argued Iraq war or regardless any kind of warfare is characteris- tically unjust as monstrous killing is erroneous (Rae, 2009; Cady, 2010; Burkholder & Cramer, 2012). In contrast, other scholars, like Amstutz (2005), Williams (2012) and Welch (2013) drew the inference that Iraq war can be justi- fied as it served the state interest by utilizing the idea of political realism. There- fore, the following paper adopted Just war theory (jus bellum iustum) to analysis How to cite this paper: Ngai, T. C. (2019).
Today in many countries of the world arrangement are held, forums at which about horrors of that war are spoken. Children, grandchildren of the participants of this war participants, on the basis of historical photographs, public archives, albums, Souvenirs, new documentary information fill the pictures of those times, the history of the fate of the war and postwar life, and specify the place of the graves of the victims. The General public is informed that most people participated in this brutal war not of their own volition, but on someone's orders. One of the painful questions of the war years is the question of prisoners of war. When studying the life history of the Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners of war, it turned out that this issue is poorly studied on a global scale, has no scientifically sound principles of analysis. As for the history of the prisoners of war who were in the Ferghana valley, this is not mentioned in any book on history, despite the fact that their number here reached up to ten thousands. They lived and worked in five counties of the Fergana valley for 7-8 years, until returning their Homeland.
Saids’ framework of Orientalism relates to this thesis’ main research question: “To what extent does a neo-Orientalist framing of ‘Palestinian terrorists’ occur in the journal Terrorism and Political Violence?”. The key aspect of this framework, is that a Western, intellectually-rooted, understanding of a violent, irrational, antimodernist and usually Muslim/Oriental counterpart, seems to coincide with the present-day portrayal of terrorists (Said 2003: 45, Jackson 2005: 47). In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Twin Towers attack, president G.W. Bush in his War On Terror, for example, claimed that America was targeted as a result of “irrationality, ingratitude, a clash of civilizations and a hatred for ‘our way of life’” (Silberstein 2002: XII). From this perspective, it seems that his war against the concept of terror takes after Samuel Huntington’s idea of a civilizational- clash where the civilized us, that is ‘the West’, faces threats from an uncivilized ‘Rest’, typically meaning Muslims (Huntington 1996, Jackson 2005: 47, Esposito in Malik 2002: 14/15). Hence, corresponding with Saids’ impute of imperial European civil servants who relied on academic- engrained prejudice to sketch a mystic, sensual yet barbaric Oriental, this thesis investigates if and subsequently how neo-Orientalist tenets appear in the scientific representation of terrorists. Do terrorism representors such as Freilich (2015), Silber (2010) and Frisch (2005) alienate/Other their subjects, that is Palestinian terrorists?
The title to this conference—”Drug War Madness: Policies, Borders, and Corruption”—brings to mind many images, few of them positive. Although Mexico is not mentioned in the conference title, much of the live symposium at which this paper was originally presented discussed “drug war madness” in connection with the United States and Mexico. My contribution to the discussion will focus on the movement of people from Mexico to the United States, which is a major component of the modern intercourse between the two nations. My approach to the general topic may seem out of place here. The thrust of my remarks is that the drug trade, generally speaking, has little to do with immigration and immigrants. The same is generally true for the “war on terror,” another metaphorical war often connected with immigration. I will be not be saying anything particularly sensational. Drug lords, narcoterrorists, sex trafficking, and Islamic terrorists will not play much of a role in my presentation.
The main question that arises in this case is what should it be and what should be done if the system does not function normally? The problem with the current regime is its instability. It is very easy to choose a connection with a currency that is stable, but when the financial system starts to stumble, then the place that has chosen it start to be rocked too. That is the reason why the countries try to avoid it. There are two main reasons why China is reacting in this way against the dollar. The first is its close relationship with the dollar. The second is related with the volatility of the exchange rate by which has been suffering in recent years. Being the most developed economy in the world, the model of floating exchange rates gives to the USA the opportunity to use the monetary policies in the national interest by ignoring the responsibilities that it has as the international monetary power, and without considering the interests of economies that may be affected by the undertaking of these policies. The so-called "Triffin Dilemma", which means "laying the currency in local markets”, is the biggest concern of global markets. The massive injection of currency by Federal Reserve can cause inflation in other world markets and would lead to underestimation of the dollar. By considering this fact, international cooperation is needed, which essentially means negotiating the status of the dollar as the international currency. Concerns about the dollar dysfunction go beyond the use of currency because it will also affect the economic growth model which in recent decades has been led by the United States. Already economic model based on innovation and free competition is in question.
But a second set of questions must also arise, I think, if we are coming at it from a JWT angle: can cyberwar itself be justified as a form of war? And relatedly, if it can, then how might the terms of the jus ad bellum (JAB) apply? Are they likely to be more permissive of cyber-attacks than of kinetic measures? Should they be? These questions along with the first are likely to have practical relevance more particularly in cases where conflict involves a cross-domain dimension, those where kinetic force is augmented by cyber-attacks and in which, therefore, cyber becomes an important element in increas- ingly hybrid forms of war. And this leads to a third question: How might the occurrence of specifically cyber components in armed, conventional conflict be reflected in JWT? So, for instance, as regards the JAB, can the deflection or prevention of cyber- attack or similar form part of a wider just cause? And, if so, might it contribute to a case for the ‘proportionality’ of kinetic war? Proportionality requires that decision-makers weigh relevant benefits of the successful prosecution of war against relevant costs. Both are widely seen in JWT as restricted to certain kinds of value: gains certainly include the protection of (innocent) lives from wrongful threats and probably include things like national security in a wider sense against territorial incursion and violations of sovereignty; costs are usually calculated in terms of harms to at least the most basic human interests (paradigmatically life and bodily integrity). If defence against cyber threats is seen as part of the case for claiming ‘just cause’ for war, then it would imply that diminishing such threats is a relevant gain and can offset relevant costs such as the loss of innocent lives through collateral harms. So this would place cyber security, as it were, on the ‘plus’ side of the balance sheet that the proportionality require- ment demands we review before resorting to war. But it might also then have a place too on the ‘minus’ side. If the relevant gains are measured partly in terms of innocent human lives or the defence of national sovereignty against interna- tional aggression, then to what extent could the sort of damage that cyber-attacks launched by one’s enemies in such a war count against them? At what point might the costs of such measures in our war rise to such a level as to render it disproportionate, in spite of the fact that it aimed at securing human lives from lethal, kinetic threats or over sovereign independence from the aggression of foreign powers? In the absence of a common denominator between (some) cyber- attacks and armed attacks by conventional means, it is not clear how such trade- offs would be made—or, indeed, whether it is even possible to imagine ways to think them through.
supervised and allowed belligerents to ignore their treaty obligations without fear of serious censure. Just as in Korea, ‘reciprocity’ has had little appreciable effect on belligerent behaviour. Indeed, one of the key characteristics of armed conflict since 1945 has been the denial of reciprocity; whether in the ‘bush- fire’ wars of decolonisation, the inter-state conflicts along the political fault lines in South Asia or the Gulf, or the more recent episodes in the ‘global war on terror’, with tragic results for those detained by their enemies. Moreover, it was not merely in the contraction of the humanitarian space where the
But a second set of questions must also arise, I think, if we are coming at it from a JWT angle: can cyberwar itself be justified as a form of war? And relatedly, if it can, then how might the terms of the jus ad bellum (JAB) apply? Are they likely to be more permissive of cyber-attacks than of kinetic measures? Should they be? These questions along with the first are likely to have practical relevance more particularly in cases where conflict involves a cross-domain dimension, those where kinetic force is augmented by cyber-attacks and in which, therefore, cyber becomes an important element in increas- ingly hybrid forms of war. And this leads to a third question: How might the occurrence of specifically cyber components in armed, conventional conflict be reflected in JWT? So, for instance, as regards the JAB, can the deflection or prevention of cyber- attack or similar form part of a wider just cause? And, if so, might it contribute to a case for the ‘proportionality’ of kinetic war? Proportionality requires that decision-makers weigh relevant benefits of the successful prosecution of war against relevant costs. Both are widely seen in JWT as restricted to certain kinds of value: gains certainly include the protection of (innocent) lives from wrongful threats and probably include things like national security in a wider sense against territorial incursion and violations of sovereignty; costs are usually calculated in terms of harms to at least the most basic human interests (paradigmatically life and bodily integrity). If defence against cyber threats is seen as part of the case for claiming ‘just cause’ for war, then it would imply that diminishing such threats is a relevant gain and can offset relevant costs such as the loss of innocent lives through collateral harms. So this would place cyber security, as it were, on the ‘ plus ’ side of the balance sheet that the proportionality require- ment demands we review before resorting to war. But it might also then have a place too on the ‘ minus ’ side. If the relevant gains are measured partly in terms of innocent human lives or the defence of national sovereignty against interna- tional aggression, then to what extent could the sort of damage that cyber-attacks launched by one’s enemies in such a war count against them? At what point might the costs of such measures in our war rise to such a level as to render it disproportionate, in spite of the fact that it aimed at securing human lives from lethal, kinetic threats or over sovereign independence from the aggression of foreign powers? In the absence of a common denominator between (some) cyber- attacks and armed attacks by conventional means, it is not clear how such trade- offs would be made—or, indeed, whether it is even possible to imagine ways to think them through.
Narrowly focusing on people incarcerated in state and federal prison for marijuana offenses diverts the lens of analysis from the real target: low-level marijuana users. These persons have disproportionately been targeted by the war on drugs in the 1990s. Increased arrests and fre- quent use of probation and suspended sentences may give the appearance that the correctional system has been cali- brated properly to only incarcerate the most severe offenders, but a discussion of resource allocation demands that we also consider the growth of persons with an arrest and felony conviction record as a result of this policy. Such persons face many of the same challenges and obstacles as people who have been incarcerated. These include a denial of federal financial aid for higher education, lack of access to federal aid such as food stamps, denial of entry to public housing, and a prohibi- tion on the right to vote, in some states for life. In addition to the institutional hurdles, there remain informal barri- ers for persons with a felony conviction, such as the diffi- culty to compete for employment with a criminal record. All of these critical issues are a cost of the drug war and exist equally whether one spends time in prison or serves a sentence in the community.
solution of any problem but it cannot be effective in the long- run. The play ultimately comes to the impact of war on women in particular and the society and humanity in general. Human relationship is the first thing which gets befuddled by wars and risings. Love is its prime prey, and women and children, the love incarnate are its victims. The significant women characters such as Nora, Bessie and Mrs Gogan; their importance is due to their dislike for war. The female consciousness is more interested in productivity and continuity than in killings and revolution. The idea of moving on is very close to the heart of woman. She has deep faith in marital and familial life which is crumbled by socio political and eco political divisions, mishaps and wars. It is woman’s ingenuity in compelling and restoring what history tears apart... They, unswervingly or circuitously, refute the claims and beliefs of men. The actions of Men bring in violence and instability whereas women work for non-violence and stability, for culture and spirit. Women are the inconspicuous energy of the society. Men systematically destroy this basic, elemental energy and try to invent an illusionary world of energy of their own in their war machine. This war machine forcibly weans away men from their women and thereby destroys its own inventor. Woman intuitively knows this basic truth of life. Man feels it and wants to lose himself in sharing this creative energy with his woman but his cerebral part or element is so strong that it arouses his ego to go apart in order to enjoy his own creation – the illusionary world of destructive energy of war machine and get destroyed. Mrs. Gogan understands that the world of man is the world of death (The Plough 141). The dialogue between Fluther and Mrs. Gogan is symbolic. Fluther feels “It’s only a little cold I have” (The Plough 141). He does not feel that something is seriously wrong with him; man underplays the reality of his world of death. So arrogant is he of his man’s power. Only a woman understands where the reality lies. She makes man aware of the danger staring in his face but he will not take care of it as Fluther states saying: “A man in th’ pink o’ health should have a holy horror of allowin’ thoughts o’ death to be festerin’ in his mind” (The Plough 141). The man might be faint and coughing but he cannot think of death – he must keep it at afar distance from himself. This is his ego speaking. The reality bursts out from the mouth of the woman who knows that the world of man is the world of death.