In chapter one, the Czech historian Pavel Soukup seeks to analyze both sides of the violence in the Hussite Wars of the 15th century. Soukup remarks that the royalists and the Hussites used religious language to justify their cause; importantly, both sides classified their campaigns as holy wars – demonstrating aptly the multifaceted nature of the conflicts and the self-perception of each battling camp (p. 19). Soukup’s chapter is ultimately a collection of observations meant to encourage further research on this topic. However, he does argue clearly that ‘when seen as a conflict of two opposing Christian groups, each with its own theology and fully developed ideology of holy war, the Hussite wars stand much closer to early modern Wars of Religion than any previous religious warfare’ (p. 44). The author’s plea is simply to consider the Hussite Wars as an initial example of the religious wars to come, rather than lump it in with the period of religious crusades. Additionally, Soukup’s work provides concise and well-researched context to the Hussite Wars that is sometimes difficult to find in English historiography. The only shortcoming in this chapter is Soukup’s scant detail on the exact ‘religious programme’ of the Hussites – a concept he mentions with no explanation (p. 35). Certainly this would help the uninitiated reader follow his argument more completely.
Two school shootings took place in Finland in 2007–2008, in which 20 people lost their lives. After the shoot- ings, foreign journalists used the violent culture of Finnish men as an explanation for the tragedies. 1 Of the old EU countries, the highest rate of capital crimes is found in Finland. The country has for a long time debated where the violence comes from. One explanation is that the historical culture in Finland glorifies war. The wars that were fought against the Soviet Union (1939–1944) have been elevated in Finland to become key elements of the national psyche, manifested in celebrations, anniversaries and through family narratives. According to this explanation, a Finn already learns as a child to accept violence which is considered to be legitimate and to behave in accordance with warlike ideals. This article examines the warlike historical culture in Finland and clar- ifies why war has remained a popular theme of Finnish historical culture. Further, it discusses the impact that a warlike historical culture has on the attitudes of young people.
Admittedly, this differentiation is a broad stroke. However, the coding rests on assumptions widely shared in the literature. The first assumption is that ad-hoc mercenary groups were more dominant than PMSCs in civil wars during the Cold War. This is indicated by Kevin O’Brian, who claims that the “overwhelming majority of all … private military operations in Africa was characterized by ad-hoc groupings of former soldiers” (O'Brian, 2000:48). Anthony Mockler’s, and Burchett’s and Roebuck’s analysis of the mercenary phenomenon in the 1960s and 70s support this claim indirectly. Both studies corroborate the presence of mercenaries in civil wars, yet neither analysis mentions any corporations providing combat services (Burchett and Roebuck 1977, Mockler, 1985). This is not to say that PMSCs were not in business during the Cold War. Already during the 1960s and 1970s a tiny PMSC industry existed, dominated by British firms (O'Brian 2000:46). However, while these firms provided security-related services, military and security consultancy, training, commercial investigations and risk assessment, they did not (or rarely did) engage in combat (Kinsey 2006:47,51). The U.K. parliament’s Green paper provides further support for this perspective. Indeed, prior to 1989 PMSC and mercenary were involved in twelve conflicts. However, only mercenaries were reported to have participated directly in combat (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002:28-38).
Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review of such studies.
Location of conflicts address to some other important topics that attract more attention in the current study of intrastate wars, such as civilian casualties, refugees, genocides, disease spread, and post-war recovery, etc. Armed conflicts and these issues are spatially correlated. The number of civilians killed or wounded is expected to be higher than other places in the country at war. War brings disasters to local population. People who live in or near the battlefield would bear the largest impact of war. Refugees and interally displaced persons (IDPs) is another salient issue. A recent example is the North Kivu Province in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is the main battlefield of the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and the Kivu Conflict (2004-present). Laurent Nkunda, the recently-arrested rebel leader of DRC, led an offensive in the North Kivu region in 2008 and caused 250,000 refugees to flee from the area, and the number of IDPs in the province has reached 850,000 (“DR Congo seeks Nkunda extradition”). Kalyvas (2006) studies genocide in civil wars using the Greek Civil War (1946-49) data recorded at the village level. He argues that warring groups’ local control is the key variable to explain political violence/killings. Thus, identification of major battlefields is essential to micro-level research on political killings. Melander and Oberg (2007) also report that forced migration in civil wars is determined by the geographical size of war rather than the battle-deaths-based measure of intensity.
that his attempt to offer an answer to this problem “should be seen as only a first step that will undoubtedly need further theoretical and methodological refinement” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 5). It is hoped that the above points of critique provide helpful insights for such refinement; their offering, is not intended to suggest that Flyvbjerg has been unsuccessful with his aim. Indeed, his provocative argument will capture the interest of academics and students alike and, Phronetic Social Science is likely to help generate interesting and valuable research in the future. However, the tensions and paradoxes in Flyvbjerg’s arguments need to be careful scrutinized before it can be said that phronetic social science actually offers a way out of the science (or any other paradigmatically oriented) wars.
effective and that a lower real value of the dollar will threaten the ability of other countries to pursue export-led growth. However, this is probably not the entire reason: the anger, as well as recent the furore over currency wars is a symptom of the dissatisfaction with global imbalances, depicted in Figure 8 below and the policies that are believed to support them. In this section I discuss two separate issues. The first is the conflict between the United States and emerging market economies; the second is the conflict between the United States and the advanced economies that are running current account surpluses. I discuss how worried the Eurozone should be about these conflicts and what it can do.
give the Persians victory, and in this Khusro is certainly right, but the Antiochenes do not realize this, and that is where he deceives. In the last comment Khusro says that the citizens are the cause of the horrors that Khusro has unleashed and again he is being deceptive. Yes, the Antiochenes are the cause of the troubles which befall them, but it is not, strictly speaking, for the reason that Khusro states, and is in fact, as we the readers now know, due to the wrath of God at their immoral actions. 110 If we jump ahead to chapter 10 we find Procopius’ extensive intervention about the calamity that struck Antioch. Taken alone, and out of context, it suggests that, just as Procopius claims, he (Procopius) does not understand why God raised a man or place and then brought it down for no apparent reason. 111 But we have just seen Procopius provide us with all the interpretive tools that we need to understand what might not be openly apparent to us, the audience. 112 After all, in the preface he does tell us that he decided to write the Wars, at least in part, in order to provide some insight for those future readers who find themselves in a similar predicament. 113 Although it might seem
Violent conflicts can also inflict environmental damage in the long run in several indirect ways. For example, Sudan has experienced over two decades of civil war on its territory. One result of that war has been over 5 million internally displaced per- sons. This massive displacement of population has led to significant environmental damage, particularly around larger camps. In addition, it is feared that following the cessation of civil war, the large scale return of the displaced population to their homeland would engender a further wave of environmental degradation in some of the more fragile return areas. Exploitation of environmental resources to fund conflict as in the case of Liberia is another indirect environmental consequence of conflict. The fourteen year long civil war in Liberia was primarily funded by exporting “con- flict diamonds” and “conflict timber” by Charles Taylor’s administration. A similar illegal trade of diamonds and other precious metals helped in financing wars in An- gola, Congo, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe. In addition to perpetuating resource extraction based environmental damage, violent conflicts often destroy a state’s political and economic infrastructure which might be directed to ensuring sus- tainable use of environmental resources. Violent conflicts also make it difficult for any international conservation task force or scientific groups to gather data and conduct research to protect the environment in the region.
Call well noted that, in general, small wars are wars against time and nature rather than hostile armies: time, in that the European force usually had to locate and engage the enemy force and recover before either its own supplies ran out or the cost of maintaining the army in the field outweighed any advantages that might accrue from its success; and nature, in that many of the small wars were fought in harsh climatic or monsoonal conditions, which limited the effectiveness of European armies.48 AB a consequence, armies in small wars were required to be more self-sufficient, usmg wagon trains and pack animals rather than the system of standing magazines which were a feature of continental warfare: 'It is not a question of pushing forward the men, or the horse, or the gun, that has to be taken into account, so much as that of the provision of the necessaries of life for the troops when they have been pushed forward.' Callwell concludes by suggesting that this had two major ramifications for logistics: in small wars armies tended to be reduced 'to the lowest possible strength consistent with safety', and they stayed away from their base of supply for the shortest time possible.49
But disagreements in and around feminism provided only one strand of what soon became known as the Culture Wars, with conservative scholars and media voices denouncing the new radicals for all manner of social harms: undermining the prestige and privileges of traditional domestic arrangements, encouraging the ‘dependency’ cultures of welfare, offering false dreams of equality and prosperity for all. In the 1990s a new row came to the fore around the authority of science. Seen as the motor of a ‘knowledge-driven economy’, more money than ever was pouring into scientific research from governments and industry. Yet some of its leading spokesmen insisted that science was not being treated with proper respect - due to a self-serving, anti-Enlightenment cultural elite said to be dominating the universities.
Free Speech Wars SMU Law Review Volume 48 | Issue 1 Article 9 1995 Free Speech Wars Kathleen M Sullivan Follow this and additional works at https //scholar smu edu/smulr This Article is brought to you[.]
We test the predictions of the model with a laboratory experiment. This exercise is espe- cially relevant for our topic because turf wars are difficult to observe directly in the field. 8 In particular, lack of sharing and collaboration might be hard to observe and the incentives to do so might be hard to quantify, which makes a direct test of the model difficult to perform. The experiment focuses on some of the more interesting implications of our model. Namely, the potential non-monotonic effect of the competitive prize on sharing and joint production. Our results provide strong support for the predicted behavior of the model. We find that increas- ing the prize initially increases production as it provides an incentive to both agents to exert effort. Further increases, however, clearly result in suboptimal jurisdiction decisions and a considerable reduction in joint production when the originator is of intermediate productivity. Our basic setup, despite its simplicity, is sufficient to obtain our core results. However, we also develop three extensions to the basic model in order to explore the robustness of its results. The first considers a constant prize rather than one that increases in joint production. The second examines the substitutability or complementarity of agents’ efforts and allows for more than two agents. The final extension introduces incomplete information about both agents’ productivity levels. By and large, the predictions from the three extensions are consistent with the basic model in that the most productive originators share when there are production synergies and increasing the prize can have a non-monotonic effect on overall output.