Top PDF Banking Regulation and Supervision within the European Union after the Financial Crisis

Banking Regulation and Supervision within the European Union after the Financial Crisis

Banking Regulation and Supervision within the European Union after the Financial Crisis

43 dohledu nad mezinárodními finančními institucemi, nedostatečná kooperace či výměna informací. (Jurošková, 2012) Nové institucionální uspořádání schválené Evropskou komisí a existující od ledna 2011 spočívá na dvou pilířích, jejichţ cílem je posílit dohled nad finančním systémem jako celkem (macro-prudential supervision) a dohled nad jednotlivými finančními institucemi (micro-prudential supervision). K dosaţení cíle prvního pilíře byla v lednu 2011 vytvořena Evropská rada pro systémové riziko (European Systemic Risk Council). Druhý pilíř tvoří Evropský systém finančního dohledu (European systém of Financial Supervision) skládající se ze tří nově vzniklých evropských orgánů pro dohled nad jednotlivými segmenty finančního trhu, tedy bankovnictvím, pojišťovnictvím a kapitálovým trhem. Vytváří se Evropský orgán pro bankovnictví (European Banking Authority), Evropský orgán pro pojišťovnictví a zaměstnanecké penzijní pojištění (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) a Evropský orgán pro cenné papíry a trhy (European Securities and Markets Authority). 50 Zmíněné evropské orgány nahradily výbory (Evropský výbor orgánů bankovního dohledu, Evropský výbor orgánů dozoru nad pojišťovacím trhem a zaměstnaneckým penzijním pojištěním, Evropský výbor regulátorů trhu s cennými) vytvořené na základě Lamfalussyho konceptu. (Jurošková, 2012)
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Bank regulation, supervision and efficiency during the global financial crisis

Bank regulation, supervision and efficiency during the global financial crisis

Comparing responses between the aforesaid BRSS surveys and attributing the changes observed to the crisis can be debatable as we cannot be sure that the changes observed were indeed caused because of the crisis. However to probe the changes that were directly related to the crisis, the BRSS 2012 survey includes questions that explicitly request regulators to identify reforms introduced in response to the crisis. To determine whether there are significant differences in banking regulation and supervision in crisis versus non-crisis countries and during the crisis period, we conduct a series of mean t-tests on responses to distinct survey questions in BRSS. We perform multivariate regression analyses to understand the banking sector outcomes and regulation/supervision employing a wide range of bank regulation/supervision indicators. First, we use ordinary least squares regressions to observe the relationships between bank outcomes and bank regulation and supervision. In these regressions, we regress each of the two outcome variables (after-tax return on equity for the commercial banking system, and percent of the commercial banking system's total gross income that was in the form of non-interest income) on various supervisory and regulatory indicators. As La Porta et al., (1998) observe that legal origin helps account for cross-country differences in financial
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Banking regulation and supervision in Nigeria : an analysis of the effects of banking reforms on bank performance and financial stability

Banking regulation and supervision in Nigeria : an analysis of the effects of banking reforms on bank performance and financial stability

In like manner, Afribank, Bank PHB and Unity Bank were efficient in 2007 in window 7 but are not efficient for the same period in window 8. The 2007 efficiency scores of this window cast doubt on the notion that the efficiency frontier of this window is less superior to that of window 7. However, it is pertinent to state that the DEA window technique calculates efficiency scores of each window without considering the efficiency scores of other windows. Therefore, the make-up of the inputs and outputs of the efficiency frontier could alter the composition of the DMUs on the efficiency frontier. Afribank, Bank PHB and Unity Bank were also bailed out in 2009. Unity Bank was not on the efficiency frontier in the entire window, thus confirming the opinion above that the bailout out strategy did not immediately change the fortunes of distressed banks. On the other hand, the bailout positively impacted on the performance of Afribank and Bank PHB as both DMBs posted 100% efficiency scores in 2009, although Bank PHB had a 100% efficiency score in 2008. In sum, the efficiency scores of this window show that the bailout strategy of Nigerian regulators affected DMBs in different ways. Most of the bailed out DMBs did not become efficient immediately after the capital injection, while some instantly stretched their efficiency levels to 100%. For instance, Oceanic Bank was only efficient in this window in 2009 after it received the bailout funds. In continuation, Fidelity Bank and FCMB are only efficient in 2008 within this window. Both DMBs did not carry on their 2008 efficiency levels into 2009 which could be as a result of the effect of the global financial crisis. Access Bank, First Bank, GTB, and Zenith Bank are efficient in 2008 and 2009 within this window. All four DMBs are classified as large Nigerian DMBs with international operations, and in line with the requirements of the 2009 banking reforms, they all increased their regulatory capital to N100 billion. On that account, the perfect efficiency scores of these four DMBs could be anchored on the capital base of the DMBs, the large size of the DMBs, the 2009 banking reforms in general, or the ability of the banks to actually manage inputs that generate maximum outputs. Furthermore, UBA another large DMB is only efficient in 2009 in this window. And the reason for the efficiency of the DMB in 2009 could likely be due to the same reasons the four large DMBs above are efficient in 2009.
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Financial Crisis, Regulation and Competition: The Romanian Banking Experience

Financial Crisis, Regulation and Competition: The Romanian Banking Experience

The old regulations that governed banking activity were removed and new competition rules were introduced. The potential negative impact of competition in banking was checked with prudential regulation like capital requirements Vo, 2010. The introduction of disclosure requirements for banks in order to improve transparency and market discipline was another measure to check the risk taking Vives, 2010. Allen et al. 2001 highlight that modern banking regulation was based on: prudential supervision, deposit insurance and rules for competition among banks. The global crisis revealed a lot of issue regarding the regulatory framework of banking and financial activity. Llewellyn, 2010 noted that a common feature of banking crises is that they followed after a period of deregulation and increased competition.
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Financial governace of banking supervision

Financial governace of banking supervision

This paper makes an initial attempt to verify whether the empirical evidence favours the second view. Our findings show that the financing rule of banking supervision is related to the type of supervisory authority: if the supervisor is a central bank, public funding is more likely. Furthermore, the country’s financial structure seems to be a significant factor. We find that private financing by supervised entities is more likely in countries that have market as compared to bank structures. Third, European banking supervisors are more likely to be privately funded as compared to supervisors in other countries. This may be a response to developments in the financial sector in European countries, it may be related to the development towards the European Monetary Union, and it may be a result of peer group pressure.
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This is a repository copy of The European Union, Financial Regulation, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union and the UK - Working Paper SPERI.

This is a repository copy of The European Union, Financial Regulation, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union and the UK - Working Paper SPERI.

al. 2016). British policy-makers were pace-setters on CMU, at least compared to other mem- ber states. First, a British national, Jonathan Hill, was chosen to lead the CMU pro- ject at the European Commission and was appointed as Commissioner ‘for Finan- cial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union’, one of the few examples in European Union history where a Commissioner’s job title matched that of a spe- ciic project. Second, UK policy-makers and stakeholders engaged extensively in the agenda-setting process. For example, almost a quarter of the Commission’s responses to consultation were from the UK, 16% from Belgium (EU-level inancial associations are located in Brussels), 13% each from France and Germany, and 4% each from Italy and the Netherlands. The House of Lords (2015) produced a timely report on CMU, urging the ‘the UK, where capital markets are better established than in other Member States, to take the lead in spearheading this Capital Markets Union’. Third, the areas prioritised for action, namely securitisation (banking), Sol- vency II (insurance) and Prospectus (securities markets), were those that would beneit the UK the most and indeed were indicated by the UK government as the three top priorities for action on CMU (UK response to Green Paper 2015). The call for evidence on an EU regulatory framework for inancial services also chimed well with British concerns about the EU’s over-regulation following the international i- nancial crisis. Furthermore, the strong UK government opposition to further cen- tralisation helps to explain the absence of institutional measures in both the Febru- ary 2015 Green Paper and the September 2015 Action Plan (Véron, 2015).
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The European Central Bank as a Policy Entrepreneur within Banking Union

The European Central Bank as a Policy Entrepreneur within Banking Union

simultaneously, with a clause insisting that only signatories of the TSCG would be eligible for financial assistance through the ESM. The TSCG, now signed by all EU member states save the UK, Croatia and the Czech Republic, commits governments to balance their budgets in perpetuity, and to build down their debt levels. This severely limits the capacity of national governments to fulfil the lender of last resort function, regardless of escape clauses in the treaty allowing extra borrowing in time of crisis. The ESM provides financial assistance to countries that have exhausted their capacity to borrow on private capital markets, but in ways that increase the strain on the broader European banking sector as a result of the terms and conditions it attaches to disbursing aid. In the public sector, governments must engage in budget retrenchment, structural reforms and internal devaluation in return for the release of financial assistance from the ESM. In the private sector, which means for the purpose of funding insolvent banks, the terms and conditions of financial assistance include a cap of 60 billion euros for the entire euro zone, meaning heavy reliance on bank closures, resolutions and the extensive use of bail-ins for investors and uninsured depositors. Many of those investors are other banks that then may experience difficulties of their own, and whose public authorities may or may not have the capacity to support them if the strain becomes too great. The scenario of such a domino effect loomed briefly during the resolution of Laiki Bank in Cyprus in 2013, when the head of the euro group stated that depositors would also lose their insured savings, opening up prospects that depositors across southern Europe would flee to safer havens in the north (Salmon 2013). Although the German finance minister ensured quickly that depositors and market knew that the ESM would not attach such destabilizing conditions to the provision of aid through the ESM, he also underlined that the ESM was designed for emergencies only, and not designed to significantly enhance the deployment of public backstops. Those capacities remain at the national level, and unevenly distributed, with the consequence that the EU’s financially weaker governments will remain sources of enhanced instability risk. Although the Single Resolution Fund can borrow limited amounts on financial markets, a systemic event is likely to require direct liquidity creation by the ECB (Chang and Leblond 2014, Leblond 2014).
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Financial Supervision and Banking Competition in European Union

Financial Supervision and Banking Competition in European Union

achieve a balance between crisis prevention supervisory measures and crisis management involving the rescue or resolution of financial firms and a better balance needs to be struck to achieve financial stability objectives. Cervellati and Fioriti (2007) describe the three main theoretical supervisory models proposed in the literature: vertical, horizontal, centralized and considering the actual supervisory systems are the result of the different legal frameworks of the member States and of the way in which their financial systems developed, they conclude and underline that differences that still exist among the EU systems make more difficult to achieve a real European integration in financial supervision. Also, Herring and Carmassi (2008) affirms that the most influential reorganization in financial supervision during the last decade took place in the United Kingdom, due to its role as a major international financial center. Damaestri and Guerrero (2005) concludes that in the case of the Scandinavian countries, the decisions to fully integrate financial regulation in a single institution were part of an evolutionary process, while in the recent cases the reform was implemented after holding a debate on the main advantages and costs of integration. Quaglia (2007) considers that intergovernmental dynamics largely account for the decision-making stage in which the national governments, especially the finance ministers of UK and Germany, were in the driving seat and had a major bearing on the outcome. He also underlines that different theories considered assign different influence to factors and actors at the global, EU and national levels, a combination of various approaches, helps to explain the multilevel governance of the financial services sector in the EU.
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A proposal of a new approach to financial supervision after the 2007-2008 financial crisis

A proposal of a new approach to financial supervision after the 2007-2008 financial crisis

149 This new regulatory regime should be carefully elaborated: the need to limit moral hazard should not produce an over-regulation and cause undue competitive disadvantages for SRFIs. As for the identification of SRFIs, also the creation of a specific regulatory framework is a complex task: which issues should regulation address? How might regulatory arbitrage risks be prevented and managed? How should the “price” for systemic status – and for the consequent implicit commitment of governments and authorities - be calculated? At any rate, SRFIs appear to be the new special financial institutions and consequently a specific and stricter regulation seems desirable, just as it happened with commercial banks. This research suggests that regulation of SRFIs could focus on some aspects which turned out to have played a crucial role in the subprime crisis, such as capital and leverage ratios and off-balance sheet vehicles. Moreover, the shift to a systemic approach to financial supervision and regulation should not be limited to the national level and should assume a global scale: a European and a global supervisor of SRFIs might contribute to solve – at least for SRFIs - the current misalignment between the national dimension of supervisors and the international nature of financial business. These authorities might be participated by national central banks, since in the proposed model the latter would be in charge of supervising national SRFIs. The current allocation of supervisory tasks between home and host country authorities might exacerbate asymmetric information and the risks of negative externalities: host supervisors may be significantly exposed to the risks of distress of systemically relevant branches of foreign banks without disposing of adequate oversight functions. An alternative to a mere improvement of information sharing could be an ex-ante mechanism of internalization by the home country of costs stemming from faltering systemically relevant branches in host countries.
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The Regulation on the Provision of Emergency Support Within the Union: Humanitarian Assistance and Financial Solidarity in the Refugee Crisis

The Regulation on the Provision of Emergency Support Within the Union: Humanitarian Assistance and Financial Solidarity in the Refugee Crisis

Art. 3, para. 3, of the Regulation mandates respect for humanitarian principles. It echoes Art. 214, para. 2, TFEU, concerning the operations in the field of humanitarian aid conducted by the EU in third countries. Together with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination, the Regulation also mentions the principle of independence, which was omitted by the drafters of Art. 214, para. 2, TFEU. Conversely, the latter prescribes “compliance with the principles of international law”, not explicitly mentioned by the Regulation. However, as any other EU secondary law act, the implementing measures will still have to comply with the international agreements to which the EU is a party and with customary international law. Additionally, they will have to be consistent with EU primary law, including, obviously, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter).
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European football; financial crisis; regulation; competition

European football; financial crisis; regulation; competition

The possibility of contagion is a special problem for a system of sporting competi- tion not shared by many other types of commercial activity. In most industries, the financial failure of one company is likely to benefit its rivals, because the disappear- ance of one competitor will increase the demand for the products of the others and will tend to increase their profitability and hence their financial stability. Banking is an exception to this rule, because banks tend to be depend indirectly on one another through the credit system: The liabilities of one bank are often the assets of another, and hence the failure of a bank because of an inability to meet its liabilities also implies a reduction in the assets of other banks. In sports, the interdependence arises through the process of sporting competition: One team cannot play without the cooperation of another. If clubs fail, they may be unable to complete their fix- ture lists, undermining the value of the competition as a whole. If clubs with limited followings fail and are replaced by clubs with stronger followings, it can still be the case that the remaining clubs gain, but if popular clubs fail, the quality of the competition and the finances of all clubs may deteriorate.
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Three essays on banking regulation, financial crisis and sovereign debt

Three essays on banking regulation, financial crisis and sovereign debt

An interesting pattern emerges in the third phase between the Lehman Brothers bank- ruptcy and Greek bailout. Panel C shows that the correlation statistics have notably dropped to a range of [0:5; 0:7]. Furthermore, the correlation between Greek, Portugal banks and other sovereigns appear smaller in general, with some negative signs. This finding sug- gests that there exists a risk transfer between the troubled banks and sovereigns. European banks were largely exposed to the financial risk associated with the deteriorating value of MBS. The presumption that the European authorities would bailout the banks has pushed the sovereign CDS spreads to a high level. The nationalization of Anglo Irish in January 2009 has served as a even stronger positive signal that the government was ready to provide guarantee to troubling banks. For a short period of time, the market sentiment has driven the bank CDS spreads down moderately at the expense of a rising sovereign CDS spread. Acharya et. al (2013) also find that the average changes in bank CDS and sovereign CDS spreads during the bailout period had opposite signs from September 26, 2008 to October 21, 2008. For most countries, bank CDS spreads have significantly decreased while sov- ereign CDS spreads significantly increased. In the extreme case of Ireland, the average bank CDS spreads decreased by 150 basis points accompanied by a 50 bps rise in Irish sovereign spreads. Similar patterns are found in other countries. This finding suggests that bank guarantees have led to a notable reduction in banks’ credit risk at the cost of their corresponding sovereigns.
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The Effects Of Regulation And Supervision On European Banking Profitability And Risk: A Panel Data Investigation

The Effects Of Regulation And Supervision On European Banking Profitability And Risk: A Panel Data Investigation

contagious phenomenon appeared to affect several banking systems because of their excessive risk position and their involvement with different subprime products and derivatives. In order to save the banking systems, governments and policymakers put forward several programs, but the latter were not enough and the banking crisis was more severe and rapid than previously expected. Consequently, many banks lost money and some of them went bankrupt. Financial analysts consider that delayed reactions, the status of the central banks and the absence of a centralized banking policy and financial regulations made the interventions less efficient and the crisis more severe. In addition, the decentralized government actions gave rise to more serious debt crises, particularly for European countries, involving serious sovereign risk (Barth et al., 2013). Accordingly, reforming the banking system, and improving financial regulations and supervision were considered more important than ever to protect banks and the economy from future shocks (Aglietta, 2009). Therefore, the central theme in European government agendas became financial regulation and supervision, with the focus on how to promote banking profitability and stability.
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Averting Future Crisis: The European Banking Union s Single Supervisory Mechanism

Averting Future Crisis: The European Banking Union s Single Supervisory Mechanism

Further, the SRM’s fund will not be established immediately but will be built up over a span of years during which time banks will gradually contribute via levies. 45 Two clear questions arise: 1) will the SRM have sufficient funds to deal with a potential financial crisis?; and 2) will the SRM funds be built up quickly enough? 46

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An assessment of UK banking liquidity regulation and supervision

An assessment of UK banking liquidity regulation and supervision

This thesis makes a number of contributions to the theoretical and empirical literature. First, I review the history of financial regulation and point out that financial deregulation or ‘non-regulation’ would not help to build up a healthy financial system and boost the real economy in the long term. Learning from the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, I find out that: the collapse of an illiquid bank might be eventually followed by a large number of other liquid banks since banks are susceptible to the domino model of contagion and the difficulties in the financial system would greatly harm the real economy; it is easy for banks to mislead customers and regulators or even commit frauds with their informational advantages; it may be impossible for individual consumers to monitor the fiduciary role of financial institutions, especially for long term investment products; without financial regulation, market confidence might easily disappear since consumers would worry that no one cares about their benefits; without restraining risky actions, the potential ‘Grid Lock’ problems could be caused by the herd behavior of banks who are chasing short- term profits without concern for the stability of financial markets and social welfare. I also explain that building up banking liquidity regulation and supervision is a crucial part of improving modern financial regulation frameworks since banks have extended market shares and secured higher returns by increasing dependence on higher levels of debt and over funding from short-term wholesale markets in the last decade.
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Australian Prudential Regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis

Australian Prudential Regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis

The Inquiry’s analysis reflected to some degree the discussion of risk outlined in sections two and three above that emphasised the nature of financial promises and their degree of intensity (Financial System Inquiry 1997, p.190). This intensity was defined for a financial product in terms of its degree of capital certainty, the ease with which investors can assess its underlying risk, and the consequences of default. It argued that regulatory impositions should focus on the most intense financial promises which were, in order of importance, transactions balances, other traditional bank deposits and capital-guaranteed investments. It recommended that prudential regulation be imposed on “…institutions licensed to conduct the general business of deposit taking from the public, or offering capital backed life products, general insurance products or superannuation investments” (Financial System Inquiry 1997, p.306), implying that the scope of prudential supervision be increased to cover non-deposit taking institutions which should be done by a single regulator separate from the RBA. A single regulator with powers over all business types that make up financial conglomerates was the best way to ensure that regulation was competitively neutral, cost effective and sufficiently flexible across institutions that risks from banking and non-banking interaction could be given appropriate regulatory attention (Financial System Inquiry 1997, p.347). It was careful to argue, however, that this did not necessarily imply identical regulation for each type of institution or their products. Differences would be appropriate where the intensity of promise varied. For example, the intensity of promise by a bank to a depositor is greater than the promise by the issuer of a mortgage-backed security (that has been rated by an international ratings agency) to an investor. Thus the new arrangements would not be neutral between bank lending for housing (which is subject to a capital requirement) and lending by a loan originator that has been funded by mortgage-backed securities.
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Soft Budget Constraints, European Central Banking and the Financial Crisis

Soft Budget Constraints, European Central Banking and the Financial Crisis

We discuss the literature on soft budget constraints (SBCs) and on the European financial crisis and examine the effect of the ECB’s rescue policies on the sovereign debt levels of Eurozone governments. According to Kornai (1979, 1986), a soft budget constraint is present when a supporting organization (S-organization) is ready to rescue an entity with a budget constraint (BC-organization). So far, there has been a limited number of papers focusing on SBCs in currency unions. There are also conflicting views as to what effect currency unions have on the softness of budget constraints. Jahjah (2000) argues that a currency union can help harden the budget constraints, but, if member countries are fiscally weak and the central bank is not perfectly credible, rules and sanctions are needed to ensure fiscal discipline. Baskaran and Hessami (2013) suggest that Eurozone members nurtured bailout expectations after joining the currency union because they assumed other member countries could not afford their default for either political reasons or the fear of contagion. They show that after the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was violated with impunity by France and Germany, other Eurozone members returned to their traditionally high debt levels thinking they would be bailed out if their debt became unsustainable.
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Financial Market Regulation and Supervision

Financial Market Regulation and Supervision

banking sector, the measures under this Action Plan mainly address the capital markets. The institutional structure of European financial regulation and supervision has been one of increasing integration, and in that development, various milestones can be dis- cerned. But these steps have – at least until now – never proven to be fully adequate to keep pace with the integration at a practical level. Where the Lamfalussy process, for instance, introduced the possibility to sidestep “cumbersome” parliamentary involvement, the set-up that followed from the De Larosière report resulted in the possibility to minimize “cumber- some” EU Commission involvement by means of RTSs and ITSs. In parallel, the European legislator introduced ever more statutory instruments in areas that were left unregulated before, while areas in which Directives of minimum harmonization existed, these were re- placed by maximum harmonization Directives and Regulations replaced Directives. This has not been changed since the financial crisis. 53 As a great unknown, it remains to be seen
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Capital adequacy regulation of financial conglomerates in the European Union

Capital adequacy regulation of financial conglomerates in the European Union

trading platform, IT departments) to achieve cost and revenue synergies across business lines. 27 The combination of sectorally different financial services allows cross-marketing and cross-selling of products and services. It offers opportunities to broaden an institution’s traditional product range and customer base while fostering a higher level of innovation in product and service. 28 A source of higher operational efficiency can be seen in information advantages, which allow financial conglomerates to offer a broader set of information-relevant services to their clients by reusing relevant client information in different business sectors. 29 Consumers of today expect from a financial institution such as their house bank to take care of most, if not all, of their financial needs and are willing to pay more for one-stop shopping. Induced by this demand in the market, financial institutions are more than eager to become “financial supermarkets”, offering banking, investment and insurance products altogether. 30 Conglomeration enables to gather a wide array of products and to offer great convenience to consumers. It is an important strategic aspect in strengthening customer loyalty. 31 Additionally, conglomeration generally results in the increase in size and in market capitalisation which allows financial institutions to secure their market position and discourage unsolicited take-over attempts.
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Regulation-supervision: the post-crisis outlook

Regulation-supervision: the post-crisis outlook

It would be desirable for Europe to play a pioneering role in this area. This is necessary in order to strengthen the area’s monetary union at a time when its economies are diverging. Europe is less coordinated and less responsive than the United States and therefore cannot take the additional risk of importing rules and standards without drawing appropriate conclusions. Since this importing has already taken place, it is forcing a more complex coordination in a European alliance that remains divided, but which is all the more necessary for precisely this reason. The second risk is that capital requirements could accumulate, at a time when markets will not respond satisfactorily to demand from the fi nancial sector. This accumulation is foreseeable since we are concomitantly witnessing the strengthening of capital requirements related to market activities, another related to the loan portfolio deterioration and a third subsequent to the detection of a fl awed remuneration system for market operators, which is considered responsible for encouraging excessive risk-taking. Not to mention an additional requirement related to liquidity risk management or the possibility of the leverage ratio being taken into account. In addition to this are the consequences in terms of regulatory capital under Pillar 2 in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of course, it is not certain that all of these mechanisms will be set up and implemented concomitantly, but their number alone indicates that an impact study of their combined effects is necessary. The safety desired by all market players should not end up stifl ing the system.
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