While the global environment waits for the world to reach some form of agreement on climatepolicy, developing countries such as India are entering a phase of higher economic growth. The decisions on investment in energy systems that will be made in India in coming years will have an important impact on global climatechange over the coming century. This paper explores how action could be undertaken in India today, in a way that commits India to longer run goals for greenhouse emissions but does not raise the short run cost to the development process in India. The approach proposed is a modification of the McKibbin- Wilcoxen Blueprint for climatepolicy which relies on establishing property rights and markets in both short term and long term emission permits. The goal is to encourage long term investment decisions to move towards less carbon intensive activities. This approach could be unilaterally implemented in India. If successful it would not only reduce Indian carbon emissions but it would be an example for the entire developing world to follow and it might remove a key obstacle preventing the United States from implementing policies based on the argument that developing countries are not committed to taking action to reduce greenhouse emission.
Working closely with the Ministry of Planning, other government departments and the private sector, the Office of the Prime Minister was also involved in efforts geared towards carbon financing and trading under Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Given the apical positioning of the Office of the Prime Minister in Kenya’s former governance structure, the energy debate continues to receive considerable attention. This situation gives credence to the postulation in the policy process framework by Keeley and Scoones (2003) that some voices are heard over others when making policy decisions, and in terms of how resources to implement the decisions are allocated. Yet it remains unclear whether the Kenyan government renewable energy strategy leaves space for, and is responsive to the needs and priorities of, smallholder farmers. In fairness, Kenya appears to be making efforts to ensure greater inclusivity. For instance, it established a geo-thermal energy initiative in July 2012, which is part of the Nairobi-Paris Initiative for Electricity, and which the Kenyan government is hoping can be funded. The justification for the initiative, according to one senior government official is that it can attempt to bridge the “difference between access to electricity and connectivity”, which arises when people who can access electricity do not connect, principally for reasons of poverty.
In my opinion the contents of the ClimateChangePolicy do not match with what a climatepolicy should be. The current policy is mainly focusing on GHG emissions and has specific guidelines for the utilities sector. It has concrete conditions and considerations and it thereby focuses on several aspects of climatechange. Instead, I believe a more abstract and high-level statement about climatechange should be developed and implemented. This statement should cover all aspects of climatechange and state that ING is addressing these topics into their business on many several ways, for instance: like “ING is actively addressing climatechange into their business by making business decisions that support the move towards a low-carbon economy, by investing in renewable energy and energy efficiency, by offering sustainable products and …”. The idea and goal of this abstract statement should be incorporated in the business of the different sectors and departments (think of utilities, real estate etc.). Since there are already some ESR policies, specific guidelines could be included in those. For instance, the natural resources sector-specific policy could include restrictions for business dealings that deal with peat and tar sands. The main idea is to have on overarching climatechangepolicy with below it several policies that include guidelines and restrictions that address climatechange. The current ClimateChangePolicy could be one of those policies, as long as it names changes in for instance the Emission policy. By having a clear statement that ING is addressing climatechange, and more concrete and sector specific guidelines to actually do so, I think ING will fight climatechange more effectively. Also I think this approach will raise less resistance, since specific guidelines are developed that suit each department as best as possible and feasible. Since development and implementation of ESR policies is the job of the ESR team, they should address this need for an abstract climate statement with the board of ING. Also they should implement specific climatechange related guidelines into the already existing policies and in the policies that will be developed. Recommendation 3: Focus on what ING wants to do, instead of what it does not want to do
to be pursued. This strand can build on existing work carried out in this area, for instance, study by Leiserowitz and Thaker 2011 reveal key themes captured in a survey carried out to understand public perceptions of climatechange: (a) observations of local environmental change (e.g. if there were changes to rainfall patterns in local area and how it might affect the local economy); (b) climate vulnerability and resilience (e.g. impact of severe drought or floods on people’s livelihoods); (c) global warming awareness and beliefs (e.g. role of human action in altering the climate system); (d) trusts in different messengers (e.g. who were trusted with knowledge on climatechange); (e) support for climate and energy policies (e.g. what did people think the government should do).
Live Earth is a worldwide, 24-hour concert series which will take place on 7 July 2007. The initiative will consist of nine concerts across seven continents, bringing together over two billion people to “trigger a global movement to solve the climate crisis”. There has so far been little media coverage of the project other than an initial press release pointing people towards the website. The lack of media coverage has been suggested by some to be a result of the lack of tangible benefits from initiative; i.e. no exciting story or clear paths of actions to follow from the event. There are also concerns that people are only attending because it’s a concert, rather than because they care about climatechange. Live Earth marks the beginning of a large, long-term campaign on climate action led by the Alliance for Climate Protection, The Climate Group and other organisations. These groups are taking a joined-up approach to engaging with governments, corporations and individuals on taking action to halt the climate crisis. Exact plans are being closely guarded, and the potential long-term impacts of the process remain unclear. It is too early at the time of writing to make any judgments on Live Earth’s ability to have an impact on either policy or public behaviour. However, unfavourable comparisons with Make Poverty History have already been drawn, with Live Earth being criticised for focusing too much on a single event and not doing enough to raise mass awareness about either the project or the cause.
For many of the poor people in Ethiopia, land, water, forests and other natural resources are important for their livelihoods. Lack of access to land and other natural resources may be a key constraint to improved livelihood opportunities. Environmental quality and sustainable management of natural resources play important roles for the people of Ethiopia and the country’s prospects to reduce poverty, enhance welfare and sustain economic growth. The key poverty-environment linkages in Ethiopia are mainly related to natural disasters (e.g. drought), lack of secure tenure of land and other natural resources, deforestation and decreasing resilience of ecosystems, unreliable access to food and water, and climatechange. Research indicates that climatechange impacts will increase the challenges faced by poor women and men in Ethiopia whose livelihoods depend on the environment. Deforestation, loss of soil resources, and loss of water access are weakening the resilience of the men and women who are most dependent on these resources. Effects of climatechange e.g. changed rainfall patterns and also extreme weather events such as droughts negatively affect agricultural production and food security. In Ethiopia, food insecurity is widespread due to chronic drought and flooding. 22 Moreover, climate variability and change affects women disproportionality as it makes fuel wood and water difficult to access forcing . This forces particularly rural women, to walk longer distances to fetch water and collect fuel wood. 23 Women’s status is generally low and women are at a disproportionate at risk from environmental degradation, conflicts, and natural disasters, due to gender roles, and historic, cultural and socio-economic reasons. Despite legislation to protect their land rights women often have insecure access to land and their land ownership is secondary (through their relationships to men). Traditionally, land is transferred to men, but land certification in both
Beyond (2010) 3 NUJS Law Review 159, 160. See also, ibid 8 - “Rising fossil fuel burning and land use changes have emitted, and are continuing to emit, increasing quantities of greenhouse gases into the Earth’s atmosphere. These greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and a rise in these gases has caused a rise in the amount of heat from the sun withheld in the Earth’s atmosphere, heat that would normally be radiated back into space. This increase in heat has led to the greenhouse effect, resulting in climatechange. The main characteristics of climatechange are increases in average global temperature (global warming); changes in cloud cover and precipitation particularly over land; melting of ice caps and glaciers and reduced snow cover; and increases in ocean temperatures and ocean acidity – due to seawater absorbing heat and carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.”
5. Strategies must be evolved for long-, medium- and short-term policies needed for substantial involvement of women not only in terms of beneficiaries but also in their say in decision making. Climatechange strategy needs to focus on supporting design of policies and action plans, promoting early adaptation as well as long-term strategies like directing investment towards low carbon technologies and practices and finally integrating climatechange broadly into development assistance at the global, regional and
It is well known that climatechange has several adverse effects on natural eco- systems and humankind, manifested through declining rainfall and rising tem- peratures. Besides, severity of extreme climates (drought/flood) that threaten food production and livelihood in a country has emerged as a major fallout of climate changes (IPCC 2012). Crop production in developing and transition countries still relies heavily on the carrying capacity of the surrounding ecosystems for adequacy of water, soil quality, climate regulations, and other attributes associated with a cleaner atmosphere. Despite technological advances in crop production and irriga- tion systems, local weather and general climate continue to play decisive roles. In fact, the climatic variations affect the supply side (crop production) directly by changes in the agro-ecological conditions. The demand side, on the other hand, is affected via growth and distribution of incomes (Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007), which too are related to human adaptations of climatechange. The response to climate-induced market contraction, therefore, seems to impart serious socioeco- nomic consequences, particularly for those in agriculture. Recently, Tirado et al. (2010) offer a vivid analysis of a countrywide impact of climatechange on food production and nutrition of people, identifying two major challenges threatening current as well as future food production. These are (i) climatechange and the consequent loss of ecosystems and (ii) the growing use of biofuel-based crops that adversely affect land and soil fertility.
Data availability. Most figures can be reproduced on the KNMI Climate Explorer (climexp.knmi.nl), albeit sometimes with newer versions of the datasets (please contact the authors if that changes the results substantially; they should be robust against improved data quality). Daily ERA-Interim data can be down- loaded from http://apps.ecmwf.int/datasets/data/interim-full-daily/ levtype=sfc/. Daily TX and TN are computed from 6-hourly maximum/minimum temperatures in the KNMI Climate Ex- plorer and are available at https://climexp.knmi.nl/select.cgi?field= erai_tmax_daily and https://climexp.knmi.nl/select.cgi?field=erai_ tmin_daily. Maximum daily wet bulb temperature is similarly computed from TX, dew point temperature and surface pres- sure and is available at https://climexp.knmi.nl/select.cgi?field= erai_twet_daily. The ECMWF operational analyses are not pub- lic but the relevant ones can be provided by the authors on request. The new ERA5 reanalysis (http://apps.ecmwf.int/ data-catalogues/era5/?class=ea) should give very similar results. For ERSST v4 (https://doi.org/10.7289/V5KD1VVF), we accessed the data through https://climexp.knmi.nl/select.cgi?field=ersstv4. The IMD temperature analyses are not publicly accessible but are available at a charge for research purposes only, through http: //www.imdpune.gov.in/library/Data_Sale.html. For the GHCN-D dataset (https://doi.org/10.7289/V5D21VHZ), we accessed the data through the KNMI Climate Explorer at https://climexp.knmi.nl/ selectdailyseries.cgi on 11 October 2017. It currently holds an up- dated version. The GEV fitting routine is publicly accessible at the KNMI Climate Explorer, and the code is open source. The MACC reanalysis AOD data are available from http://apps.ecmwf.int/ datasets/data/macc-reanalysis/levtype=sfc/. The CMIP5 TXx data are available from CCCMA at http://climate-modelling.canada.ca/ climatemodeldata/climdex/climdex.shtml and were used via the KNMI Climate Explorer at https://climexp.knmi.nl/selectfield_ cmip5_annual.cgi. The weather@home HadRM3P data are avail- able from https://www.climateprediction.net as batches 367 (ac- tual), 370 (natural), 387 and 449 (climatologies actual and natural). The data used for Fig. 11 are also available on the KNMI Climate Explorer under “attribution runs”.
density of population is high and their dependence on sea for livelihood activities. If a one-meter sea level rise were to take place today, it would displace 7 million persons in India (ADB, 1995). In future many more may be displaced. 35% of the land in Bangladesh would be submerged by a one-meter rise. These countries will not be able to pay for protective measures, tens of millions of people will be displaced in Bangladesh and many of them could spill over into India. Increased occurrence of extreme events due to climatechange will also affect the poor most. In the cyclone in Andhra Pradesh in India in 1996, more than 1,000 people died and there was huge property loss. Cyclones of similar intensity in advanced countries like the U.S. may not lead to any deaths and much hardship, due to stable and durable housing and other infrastructure and extended safety net available to the people in distress. Severe storms due to climatechange will cause damage to infrastructure and livelihood. The changed timings of the monsoon rain will make the production of food and other agricultural products uncertain.
According to Jock Whittlesey, President Obama would like to see the Waxman-Markey Bill pass before COP15 takes place in December. Now that the bill is with the US Senate, President Obama is exerting pressure to finalise it in time for the global negotiations. This will undoubtedly be a welcome development, although there are concerns that the Senate will water the bill down even more, bowing to pressure from the remaining parties that are yet to sign the agreement. It is the opinion of some stakeholder groups that it may even be better to enter negotiations at Copenhagen with a bill that is almost, but not quite, ‘signed and sealed’, to encourage a better, more challenging international dynamic at the conference. Jock Whittlesey also explained that it is the priority of Obama’s climatechange team to get the cap-and-trade scheme up and running as soon as possible, rather than finalise the finer points of its outcomes (such as short-term targets). Issues that the US Senate will be discussing at length prior to the final decision include economics, the cost of the bill to the US economy, and industry and job creation. One issue that Keith Allott raised is that although these are all valid points, the US Senate should also be considering the positive impact that the bill will have on the rest of the world’s climatechange negotiations, as well as the domestic issues.
proposed policy. If all negotiating countries are carbon constrained, the number of rounds necessary to reach an equilibrium is small, and the IPCC has no significant effect on the speed of the agreement or on the policy agreed. However, if only some countries are carbon constrained, then the interests of the negotiating parties are not compatible. In other words, carbon constrained countries prefer lower and later abatements while non-abating countries prefer higher and sooner abatements. Under this specification, negotiations take longer to converge to an equilibrium. In the case of USA/EU abatement with trade in emission permits, the equilibrium policy and voting coalition is not unique. The solution of the MB institution in such situation depends on the country making the proposal being in the abating coalition or not. Under these circumstances, inclusion of the IPCC leads to faster agreements.
measures has been part of the justification for those opposed to the EU tax proposals, but the opposition lies deeper. In presenting its March 1993 budget the UK government signalled fundamental opposition, in declaring that it would not accept taxes ‘imposed by Brussels’ and announcing a very different package involving VAT on domestic energy, and steadily rising vehicle-fuel excise duties. Indeed, by the time the Commission presented its five-part package, the winds of Unification had turned 180 degrees to re-emphasize the role of national- level policy-making (subsidiarity), and there was a general decline in the priority accorded to environmental concerns as Europe sank into recession. Climatepolicy was one of the earliest victims of these changes. Of the Commission's five-part strategy: 10
Dietz et al. (2016) have recently investigated quantitatively the physical impact of climatechange on the financial system. They use a standard Integrated Assessment model (IAM) and the climate value at risk (VAR) framework. Assuming that climatechange can reduce the dividend payments of firms and, hence, the price of financial assets, they provide various estimates about the climate- induced loss in the value of financial assets. Our study moves beyond their analysis in three different ways. First, by relying on the stock-flow consistent approach, we portray explicitly the balance sheets and the financial flows in the financial sector. This allows us to model the climate- induced fragility that can be caused in the financial structures of firms and banks, a feature which is absent in Dietz et al. (2016). Second, we utilise a multiple financial asset portfolio choice framework which permits an explicit analysis of the climate-induced effects on the demand of financial assets in a world of fundamental uncertainty. This allows us to capture the implications of a fire sale of certain financial assets. These implications are not explicitly considered in the model of Dietz et al. (2016) where climate damages do not have diversified effects on different financial assets. Third, the financial system in our model has a non-neutral impact on economic activity: credit availability and the price of financial assets affect economic growth and employment. Accordingly, the interactions between economic performance and financial (in)stability are explicitly taken into account. This is crucial since the feedback economic effects of bank losses and asset price deflation can exacerbate climate-induced financial instability (see Batten et al., 2016). On the contrary, Dietz et al. (2016) utilise a neoclassical growth framework where long-run growth is independent of the financial structure of firms and banks. This leaves little room for the analysis of the macroeconomic implications of climate-induced financial problems.
The Coalition’s endeavour to distance itself from its erstwhile support of a carbon market continued in the 2013 election. Their climate catchphrase became “axe the tax”, and the repeal of the carbon pricing legislation became one of their central election platforms (Readfearn 2013). So fundamental was the marginalisation of the carbon market discourse to the Liberal Party campaign that in the week before the 2013 election Abbott equated the vote to a ‘referendum on the carbon tax’ (Hull 2013). Furthermore, their official climatepolicy media release also sought to marginalise the carbon market discourse by stating that a ‘vote for Labor or the Greens will mean ever increasing financial pain for no environmental gain,’ but did little to promote alternatives other than stating that ‘the environment will have an important place on the agenda’ (G. Hunt 2013). Traditional economic discourses remained the cornerstone of Abbott’s campaign, insinuating that ‘we’ll build a stronger economy [by] scrapping the carbon tax’ (Abbott 2013), and end ‘unnecessary’ climatechange-related administrative bodies (S. Clarke and Greene 2013). Labor took a much broader approach, and sought to increase the salience of the ethical and social impact fields by reminding the populace that ‘the serious reality of climatechange and its impacts on our environment is one [sic] of the key challenges facing Australia’ and that ‘we [Australians] have a responsibility to reduce our pollution output’ and should ‘join countries like Germany, France, the UK [United Kingdom]… China, South Korea and parts of the United States’ in an international ETS (Butler 2013). Rudd promoted ‘a clean energy future’ and promoted sustainable economic perceptions, renewable energy discourses and emissions reductions targets (Rudd 2013).
Using stock returns as an indicator for corporate financial performance, we examine the aver- age stock performance of portfolios that differ with respect to the corporate environmental performance, i.e. corporate responses to climatechange. In contrast to corresponding econo- metric analyses at the firm level (e.g., Filbeck and Gorman, 2004, Ziegler et al., 2007a) or even short-run event studies (e.g., Konar and Cohen, 1997, Khanna et al., 1998, Dasgupta et al., 2001, Gupta and Goldar, 2005), the portfolio analysis approach weakens possible influ- ences of firm-specific variances on the estimation results. Our portfolio analysis implies an investor perspective and especially considers whether a trading strategy, which buys stocks of corporations with a higher level of responses to climatechange and sells stocks of corpora- tions with a lower level, leads to positive or negative abnormal returns. In order to estimate these risk-adjusted returns, portfolio analyses have to incorporate asset pricing models. In this respect, we apply the four-factor model according to Carhart (1997) besides the restricted one-factor model based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). While the correspond- ing factors for this flexible model are publicly available for the US and some other stock mar- kets, they have to be calculated for the entire European stock market. This seems to be an im- portant reason why multifactor models have not often been applied for this region yet.
This Chapter has used the case of England to explore how climatechangepolicy is being conceptualised and operated and has focussed on a national level analysis. Within this important influences from the European Union have been demonstrated, from within government but outside of the transport sector and from outside government in the form of external bodies and the role of the private sector in delivering and influencing technological change. The difficulties in adopting an effective long-term strategy under the uncertainty of the future pace of climatechange and technological progress and the complex actor networks that define the implementation field are not unique to England. The analytical framework presented here reinforces the importance of understanding the evolution of climatechangepolicy in the broader context of the norms, practices and traditions of area of study and should inform future cross-comparative work. It also suggests that a broad range of analytical tools may be required to fully understand why policy changes.
Neo-Keynesians address climatechange and GHG emissions with the goal of reducing social and environmental inequities. In doing so, their focus is less market dependent than that of the other three doctrines. They give little thought to the question of how firms should respond to the need for reducing GHG emissions. Rather, the job of government is to tell them to do it. And for emerging industries like renewables, government should provide subsidies to enable them to compete with lower cost carbon-based fuels. In their view, cap and trade is really about the regulated cap on emissions, with the trading component as a side benefit. They also seek to cap emissions with direct regulation to increase the use of current alternative energy sources or energy-efficiency products, as with renewable portfolio standards, fuel economy standards, and energy-efficiency standards for buildings and industry. Finally, neo-Keynesians view direct subsidization of renewable energy as a means of reducing the cost penalty it now faces in the marketplace. These measures include feed-in tariffs, electric vehicle tax credits, and financial tools and incentives, like “green banks,” revolving loan funds and “cash for caulkers,” which seek to increase renewable energy adoption and induce energy efficiency. This policy toolbox reinforces neo-Keynesian focus on demand-driven growth because mandating the use of or subsidizing the supply of alternative energy will induce demand, which will subsequently and automatically further drive supply. Neo-Keynesian proponents include many environmentalists like James G. Speth, environmental lawyer and founder of the World Resources Institute, ecological economists Herman Daly and Juliet Schor, Joe Romm of Center for American Progress and ClimateProgress.org blog, Manik “Nikki” Roy of the Pew Center on Global Climate, journalist Lisa Margonelli, and organizations and think- tanks like Blue Green Alliance, New America Foundation, New Economics Institute, and the Levy Economics Institute. 77 78 79 80
value at risk (VAR) framework. Assuming that climatechange can reduce the dividend payments of firms and, hence, the price of financial assets, they provide various estimates about the climate- induced loss in the value of financial assets. Our study moves beyond their analysis in three different ways. First, by relying on the stock-flow consistent approach, we portray explicitly the balance sheets and the financial flows in the financial sector. This allows us to model the climate- induced fragility that can be caused in the financial structures of firms and banks, a feature which is absent in Dietz et al. (2016). Second, we utilise a multiple financial asset portfolio choice framework which permits an explicit analysis of the climate-induced effects on the demand of financial assets in a world of fundamental uncertainty. This allows us to capture the implications of a fire sale of certain financial assets. These implications are not explicitly considered in the model of Dietz et al. (2016) where climate damages do not have diversified effects on different financial assets. Third, the financial system in our model has a non-neutral impact on economic activity: credit availability and the price of financial assets affect economic growth and employment. Accordingly, the interactions between economic performance and financial (in)stability are explicitly taken into account. This is crucial since the feedback economic effects of bank losses and asset price deflation can exacerbate climate-induced financial instability (see Batten et al., 2016). On the contrary, Dietz et al. (2016) utilise a neoclassical growth framework where long-run growth is independent of the financial structure of firms and banks. This leaves little room for the analysis of the macroeconomic implications of climate-induced financial problems.