As fossil fuels are non-renewable resources, there are important dynamic properties of the market that our static analysis does not capture. A fossilfuel producer’s optimization behaviour implies finding an extraction path that maximizes the present value of the resource, which depends on the expected, future price path (Hotelling, 1931). If they expect a gradual tightening of climatepolicies, they may accelerate their extraction; see Sinn (2008) for a discussion of this “green paradox”. Thus, leaving out dynamic considerations may have implications for the results. On the other hand, Venables (2011) shows that although decreasing prices may speed up production on existing fields, it is offset by their postponing effect on field openings; see also Österle (2012) for a similar study. Furthermore, the government can control the available cumulative production through their production licencing. Hoel (2013) considers supplysidepolicies and argues that conserving the marginal, most costly resources reduces both total and immediate resource extraction. These studies show the relevance of analyzing fossilfuelpolicies in a static framework as ours even if some intertemporal redistribution is ignored.
ample due to intensified competition from companies located in other countries, emissions fall. This is the composition effect. On a global basis, however, if one country produces fewer emissions-intensive goods as a result of trade opening, then if demand doesn’t fall, other countries are likely to produce more of these goods. Composition effects therefore have a tendency to cancel each other out. If trade opening results in one countryproducing less steel due to price competition, for example, this shortfall is likely to be balanced by increased steel production elsewhere by those firms that have proved more competitive. Trade opening can also increase emissions by making emis- sions-intensive industries more vulnerable to price competition from countries with weak climatepolicies, leading them to relocate to these countries. If these migrant industries expand production as a consequence, net global emissions will increase. If steel producers relocate, the laxer regulation may permit them to produce steel at a lower price and thereby enable them to sell more, so that their emissions are higher than if they stayed in their home country.
Experience with existing MEAs 29 shows that trade measures agreed to within the MEAs themselves may not necessarily lead to a dispute between parties. On the contrary, there is a great chance that disputes may arise from national measures undertaken to fulfil those obligations under the MEAs. The CITES, for example, explicitly allows its Parties to take stricter national measures than the trade measures multilaterally agreed to, although the Parties to the CITES have not formally complained to the Conference of the Parties concerning stricter measures. This possibility of conflict may well arise in implementing the Kyoto Protocol. As discussed in the paper, policy responses to meet the Kyoto emissions targets will require a fundamental change in the way that energy is produced and the way it is used, and thus will essentially centre on the greenhouse gas emitted by energy-using PPMs. This raises concern about trade implications of the whole PPMs controversy. Moreover, it is highly likely that Annex 1 governments with differentiated legal and political systems might pursue these policies in such a way as to unfairly favour domestic producers over foreign ones. Consequently, these domestic climatepolicies might have the potential to bring countries into conflict with their WTO obligations. In many cases, however, such conflicts are not so intractable as to threaten the integrity of either the Kyoto Protocol or the WTO. Provided that WTO rules are carefully scrutinised at the time Annex 1 governments take measures to achieve the required reductions in emissions, these conflicts can be avoided or at least minimized.
This paper explores a multi-model scenario ensemble to assess the impacts of idealized and non-idealized climate change stabilization policies on fossilfuel markets. Under idealized conditions climatepolicies significantly reduce coal use in the short- and long-term. Reductions in oil and gas use are much smaller, particularly until 2030, but revenues decrease much more because oil and gas prices are higher than coal prices. A first deviation from optimal transition pathways is delayed action that relaxes global emission targets until 2030 in accordance with the Copenhagen pledges. Fossilfuel markets revert back to the no-policy case: though coal use increases strongest, revenue gains are higher for oil and gas. To balance the carbon budget over the 21st century, the long-term reallocation of fossil fuels is significantly larger —twice and more— than the short-term distortion. This amplifying effect results from coal lock-in and inter-fuel substitution effects to balance the full-century carbon budget. The second deviation from the optimal transition pathway relaxes the global participation assumption. The result here is less clear-cut across models, as we find carbon leakage effects ranging from positive to negative because trade and substitution patterns of coal, oil, and gas differ across models. In summary, distortions of fossilfuel markets resulting from relaxed short-term global emission targets are more important and less uncertain than the issue of carbon leakage from early mover action.
Economic analyses of climate change policies frequently focus on reductions of energy- related carbon dioxide emissions via market-based, economywide policies. The current course of environment and energy policy debate in the United States, however, suggests an alternative outcome: inefficiently designed and/or sector-based policies. This paper uses a collection of specialized, sector-based models in conjunction with a computable general equilibrium model of the economy to examine and compare these policies at an aggregate level. We examine the relative cost of different policies designed to achieve the same quantity of emissions reductions. We find that excluding a limited number of sectors from an economywide policy does not significantly raise costs. Focusing policy solely on the electricity and transportation sectors doubles costs, however, and using nonmarket policies can raise costs by a factor of 10. These results are driven in part by, and are sensitive to, our modeling of preexisting tax distortions.
In Poland, the concept is relatively new. Until 2014, very few local governments had started to work on strategies for adapting to climate change. National agree- ment on climate change policies was promoted after the Kyoto Protocol in 2003 in the Polish Climate Policy (2003). Nonetheless, only recent years have seen large-scale support for specifi c undertakings to foster an economy based on low emissions and renewable energy. Since the beginning of the 2014–2020 period, all municipalities desiring to receive fi nancial support for climatepolicies have been required to have local plans for low-emissions economy. All the same, voices questioning the climate change paradigm (macro-uncertainty, in the terminology of Osberghaus, Danneberg and Mennel, 2010) are still relatively common, also among central-level politicians. Not surprisingly, a 2014 survey of local governments in the two countries showed that Polish local government oﬃ cials and politicians held far more climate-sceptical att itudes than the case in Norway (Swianiewicz and Szmigiel-Rawska, 2015).
Supply-sideclimatepolicies cover, inter alia, extraction taxes, subsidy reform, moratoria or quotas, or a reduced extraction from public lands (Green and Dennis, 2018). The economic theory informing much supply-side policy discourse suggests that coun- tries cooperating to cut emissions can enhance their effectiveness by cutting production as well as demand for fossil fuels (ibid 2018). Without such steps, free riders in terms of mitigation effort will bene ﬁ t from cheaper fossil fuels, as market price adjusts to a lowering of overall demand, causing cross-border ‘ carbon leakage ’ . Moreover, producers would likely accelerate extraction to secure rents before demand falls signi ﬁ cantly (the ‘ green paradox ’ ). While national governments guard their right to govern fossilfuel development and any related transition, international institutions can nevertheless, at least in principle, in ﬂ uence behaviour, constrain activity, and shape expectations in potentially helpful ways (Van Asselt, 2014). By fostering greater transparency and learning, for example, some of the lock-ins noted above could be loosened, particularly related to subsidies. International in- stitutions may be able to ease geo-political tensions provoked by radical supply-side interventions.
The growth of renewable energy is very rapid but far less than the development of fossilfuel energy to meet national energy demand. It is estimated that if the proportion of renewable energy is higher than fossil energy it will cost savings several times, the cost of air pollution as an energy externality. Energy development needs to consider water scarcity and food security. Utilization of water as a heat transfer medium reduces the energy consumption and agricultural land use development of renewable energy. Basically, all three depend on each other. And long-term oriented renewable energy policies and product purchasing obligations from power plants. If India's renewable energy development is in line with the REmap program, then the country will have the fourth largest generating capacity after China, Germany or the United States. The prospect of developing renewable energy such as solar energy in India creates huge jobs and sources of energy supply become diverse.
However, there could be a weakness of reasoning in the differentiation since, unlike weight, size is only indirectly proportionate to energy required. One of the primary reasons for introducing attribute-based standards is to lessen the inequality among manufacturers of the burden of complying with such standards, with the hope of making it politically easier to set more stringent standards. In order to lessen inequality, the attribute should be proportionate to energy required. In addition, classes divided by an attribute that is not proportionate to energy required could provide a loophole in the entire system. There is no reason why a large footprint which does not necessarily have to require large energy by the laws of motion, for example, should have a less stringent requirement. An example of vehicle shapes with similar fuel efficiencies and different footprints is shown in Figure 11. The two different shaped vehicles have different footprints but could have similar weights, aero dynamic drag and technologies – and therefore have similar fuel efficiencies. Distinguishing between them without clear technical reasons for doing so might hinder the achievement of overall fuel efficiency improvements by inducing vehicle shifts to classes with less stringent requirements (in this case, manufacturers could increase production of flat shaped and less fuel efficient vehicles). In the US, the standard for the light truck class has been less stringent than that for the passenger car, which could have contributed to the increase of less fuel efficient light trucks, resulting in the decrease of average fuel efficiency of overall fleet (passenger cars plus light trucks).
Inclusive entrepreneurship policies aim to offer all people an equal opportunity to create a sustainable business, whatever their social group. This is an important requirement for achieving the goal of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth set out in the Europe 2020 strategy. It is also a means to respond to new economic challenges, to create jobs and to fight social and financial exclusion. Among the key targets of inclusive entrepreneurship policies and programmes are women, youth, older people, the unemployed, migrants and people with disabilities, who all continue to face challenges in the labour market and are under-represented or disadvantaged in entrepreneurship activities. ‘The Missing Entrepreneurs’ series of publications of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union discuss how public policies and programmes can support inclusive entrepreneurship. This includes refining regulatory and welfare institutions, facilitating access to finance, building entrepreneurship skills through training, coaching and mentoring, strengthening entrepreneurial culture and networks for target groups, and putting strategies and actions together for inclusive entrepreneurship in a co-ordinated and targeted way. Governments are increasingly recognising the challenge of inclusive entrepreneurship, but there is still much to do to spread good practice.
supplier receives an early soft-order with a deterministic due date, however, soft- order revisions are allowed at regular intervals, with a final firm-order issued with a deterministic lead-time. We formulate optimal production-scheduling models for the supplier under these two scenarios using stochastic dynamic programming. Hausman (1969) has provided justification for using a dynamic program framework in a problem of this setting. This problem involves sequential decision- making (deciding on production release quantity at the beginning of each period), which has a property that later decision (release of next period) may be influenced not only by the previous decisions (previous release), but also by observable stochastic parameters (such as inventory positions based on actual production and (soft) order). We also compare the two scenarios through extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Key managerial insights offered by this analysis pertain to the impact of sharing early soft-orders on suppliers cost as a function of soft-order accuracy, volatility, timing, production capacity, capacity uncertainty, and costs (overage, underage, holding). We further quantify the benefit of this information sharing on the buyer through calculation of order fill- rates. We also look into scenarios where buyers intentionally inflate demand while issuing soft-order forecasts and study the consequences for both parties involved.
Using a dataset that comprises countries with various income levels and from different regions of the world, I analyze how economic policies on investment climate affect the variation in export performances of countries. I focus on six indicators each representing a different aspect of investment climate. These indicators are regulatory quality, trade facilitation, entry regulations, access to finance, infrastructure, and property rights. Although there are a number of studies that analyze how some of these indicators affect export performance, none of them have looked at the interaction of these indicators with the restrictiveness of foreign market access. I show that a favorable investment climate not only improves export performance, but also reduces the distortions caused by restrictive foreign market access policies. This finding puts the reforms in investment climate at a high place in reform agenda of countries with lagging trade performance in order to be able to catch up with the trade performances of more open countries.
ABSTRACT: Congestion Relief Management (CRM) plays a significant role in Power Systems Operation under deregulated environment. In the literature, only real Power constrains are considered, whereas in this reactive power as well as complex power constraints are also considered. In the proposed method, Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solution is also considered to obtain Congestion Relief Charge (CRC) in terms of SupplySide Management and DemandSide Management. Expressions are derived, algorithm is developed and software has been developed. The results are compared with a sample test system, with real, reactive, and complex powers.
Moser (1995) concluded concurrent fiscal and monetary policies as major factors affecting inflation in Nigeria. Cottarelli, Griffiths, and Moghadam (1998) explained fiscal deficits, relative price changes, central bank independence, exchange rate regime and degree of price liberalization as having significant effect on inflation in industrial and transition economies. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) investigated political instability and political polarization in explaining cross country differences in inflation in case of developing countries. Catao and Terrones (2005) showed a strong positive association between deficits and inflation among high inflation and developing country groups but not among low inflation advanced economies. Kandil and Morsy (2011) ) studied oil revenues as having inflationary pressure through higher growth of credit and aggregate spending in oil? rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
For most poor countries of today, using agriculture for development is widely recognized as a promising strategy. Yet, in these countries, investment in agriculture has mostly been lagging relative to international norms and recommendations. Current wisdom on how to use agriculture for development is that it requires asset building for smallholder farmers, productivity growth in staple foods, an agricultural transformation (diversification of farming systems toward high value crops), and a rural transformation (value addition through rural non-farm activities linked to agriculture). This sequence has too often been hampered by extensive market and government failures. We outline a theory of change where the removal of market and government failures to use this Agriculture for Development strategy can be addressed through two contrasted and complementary approaches. One is from the “supply-side” where public and social agents (governments, international and bilateral development agencies, NGOs, donors) intervene to help farmers overcome the major constraints to adoption: liquidity, risk, information, and access to markets. The other is from the “demand-side” where private agents (entrepreneurs, producer organizations) create incentives for smallholder farmers to modernize through contracting and vertical coordination in value chains. We review the extensive literature that has explored ways of using Agriculture for Development through these two approaches. We conclude by noting that the supply-side approach has benefited from extensive research but met with limited success. The demand-side approach has promise, but received insufficient attention and is in need of additional rigorous research which we outline.
This study comprises a quantitative and qualitative approach to the status of financial inclusion in Ethiopia based on micro-data from surveys and macro data from secondary sources. Questionnaire was collected from 996 respondents for households living in four regional states and one administrative city. Secondary data was collected from National Bank of Ethiopia, World Bank Data Set, MixMarket, and from reports of formal financial institutions. Formal financial institutions significantly contributed to the development of financial inclusion in Ethiopia. The status of financial services from the perspective of adults with savings, credit, proportion of account holders, and insurance policy holders are very low even in comparison with developing economies. Based on Sarma (2008)[ 1 ] model estimation the recent comprehensive financial inclusion index for Ethiopia indicates that 0.1136 which is under the category of low financial inclusion. The figure is very near to financial exclusion (0.00). By understanding the weak level of financial inclusion designing policies that promote more inclusive financial systems is a key for individuals in contributing for their country’s economy.
Through this research, it is evident that the FDA outlines important regulations to regulate prescription drugs and that each regulation is in place for a reason, mitigating risks regarding the safety of patients and product quality. States have adopted some regulations in line with FDA regulations, but states have also introduced many additional areas of policy. These new policies mitigate additional risks, particularly in areas that are of high social concern such as increased drug use and youth use. For example, states with additional laws limiting advertising to minors and distancing medical marijuana facilities or dispensaries from schools are taking action to reduce the issue of increased youth use. Medical marijuana is a complex social issue. States can integrate potential solutions to social issues into medical marijuana policies. While states are creating policies for safety reasons and to maintain product quality, they have the opportunity to also integrate policies that address the broader social context, which is something the FDA currently does not do. It is in this respect that policy innovation can really happen at the state level.