[PDF] Top 20 Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms
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Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms
... with asymmetric post-merger market structures and coordinated effects are associated with symmetric post-merger market structures (see Ivaldi et ...or collusion is never sustainable at any price, so only ... See full document
46
Imperfect competition and market structure with asymmetric information : the Italian banking sector
... Do firms prefer to have many links with their rivals or do they avoid each other? In one case they might find it profitable to establish many contacts, as this would facilitate collusion and make any form ... See full document
126
Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited
... of firms to collude explicitly when they can alternatively collude ...and firms never directly observe their rivals’ prices and sales, so firms have the potential to make secret price ...Tacit ... See full document
43
Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of environmental quality
... of monitoring error characteristic of how well farmers are informed but constant, then we can distinguish three cases of interest, farmers have an unbiased estimate of environmental ...Private monitoring ... See full document
33
Uncertainty, information acquisition and economic equilibria
... conditions under which the outcomes of the sequential equilibria differ from those of the equivalent one stage game even when the cost of information becomes very ... See full document
108
Pricing behavior of firms when consumers have an Imperfect Recall
... neutral firms, E and F, selling one homogeneous good whose cost of production is zero ...(assumed). Firms announce their market prices simultaneously, pE by firm E and pF by firm ... See full document
6
Collusion Sustainability with Multimarket Contacts: Revisiting HHI Tests
... and collusion sustainability in the frame- work of multimarket contacts literature (in ...that collusion transfers can be made from a market to another when some firms are ac- tive in both considered ... See full document
9
What next? Cartel strategy after getting caught
... colluding firms that they will lose the race to be first to apply for leniency, because these programs allow them to obtain discounts even if they are not ...of firms to apply for leniency, dampening the ... See full document
28
Collusion under risk aversion and fixed costs
... OF COLLUSION under demand uncertainty, Rotem- berg and Saloner [1986] show that when demand is independently and identically distributed over time, and firms observe demand before taking actions, ... See full document
38
The Maastricht Convergence Criteria and Monetary Regimes for the EMU Accession Countries
... Finally, we control whether these results are dependent on how open the domestic economy is. In Figures (14) and (15) in Appendix B we present variances of the Maastricht variables and consumption gap as a function of ... See full document
45
Ownership Concentration, 'Private Benefits of Control' and Debt Financing
... In our model, the extent of the crowding out effect directly depends on the costs of expropriation of minority shareholders, the later being determined by legal and competitive environment in a particular country ... See full document
33
Environmental Policy Competition and Differential Tax Treatment: A Case for Tighter Coordination? ENEPRI Working Paper No. 42, February 2006
... operating firms. We consider two different cases. First, if firms are (assumed to be) immobile, governments choose to tax firms more than ...the firms’ energy consumption is for production of ... See full document
26
A note on the adverse effect of competition on consumers
... Considering an industry with asymmetric cost firms, we show that a rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms makes the consumers worse-off in the presence of a welfare maximizing[r] ... See full document
12
Exchange rate stabilization under imperfect credibility
... This paper develops a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model that accounts for the following stylized facts: i when the program is implemented, there is an increase in consumption of tr[r] ... See full document
35
Trade bloc formation under imperfect competition
... We examine the endogenous formation of trade blocs when markets are char- acterized by imperfect competition and governments use import tari¤s and export subsidies to alter the strategic interaction between ... See full document
34
Algorithmic Mechanisms for Reliable Crowdsourcing Computation under Collusion
... worker collusion is that, in order to guarantee a unique equilibrium for any parameter values, all groups, colluding or singletons, must decide whether to cheat or not ... See full document
22
Indicators and incidents of potential collusion among main contracting firms in municipal road network projects : the Saudi Arabian context
... by collusion (Huschelrath, ...of collusion on the market (Asker, 2010), which consequently increases standard market costs to the monopoly level and creates a non-competitive bidding environment ... See full document
11
Efficiency in large markets with firm heterogeneity
... with imperfect competition and provide welfare gains (Krugman ...across firms, misallocation varies with firm productivity, which may be difficult to elicit, especially if how policy treats a firm varies ... See full document
24
Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Regulation of Firms Under the Threat of Revolution
... The notion of a “revolution constraint” on autocratic leaders is not new (Grossman, 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), but the idea that dicta- tors are political agents has only recently been introduced. We follow ... See full document
37
Under the radar : the effects of monitoring firms on tax compliance
... some firms from ...productivity firms, which report larger tax bases and hence incur lower resource ...Although firms monitored by the LTU are worse off because they pay more taxes, this income is a ... See full document
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