While nonfinancial and mixed institutions in developed countries have been widely researched and reported upon in the literature (Carlon, Loftus and Miller, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Combes- Thuelin, Henneron and Touron, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), only a few studies have focused on financial institutions in developed countries (Solomon, Solomon and Norton, 2000; Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 2006; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011a; Maffei et al., 2014) and no investigations have been conducted on financial institutions in developing markets (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elmir 2013; Al-Shammeri, 2014; Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland, 2015). Therefore, this is the only study that investigates financial institutions in developing economies, particularly SaudiArabia. Also none of the above studies have examined the demographic attributes of top management teams nor have they employed upper echelons theory in examining the nature and determinates of riskdisclosure. Therefore, this is the only study that examines the demographic traits of the top boards in developing countries. This is a response to the call for more research into the relationship between the demographic characteristics and riskdisclosure made by Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland (2015). Based on the developing and appropriate preceding literature on disclosure and riskdisclosure in relation to corporategovernance, a number of corporategovernance attributes will be presented along with their potential impact on riskdisclosure practices. This paper’s hypotheses will thus be formulated.
Audit committee characteristics affect the firm performance in terms of risk management, earning management and financial decision (Klein, 2002). According to Chan and Li (2008), a high level of expertise and independence on audit committee improves firm value. Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara, and Nagel (2012) investigate the impact of audit committee on the firms’ performance during times of global financial crises. The sample includes all listed companies in Australian stock exchange (ASX300) for years 2008 and 2009. The empirical results indicate that the size and independence of the audit committee are associated with higher company performance. A similar result is also found in a study done by Wild (1996) which shows that the performance of firms with audit committees is better than the performance of those without. However, a study done by Brown and Caylor (2006) reveals that there is no relationship between audit committee and firm performance. Despite the importance of the audit committee roles, there is a paucity of research on the effect of audit committee on financial performance especially in banking sectors.
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of internal and external corporategovernance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure in SaudiArabia. The sample consists of 87 companies from the Saudi Stock Market. The data are collected from the annual reports for the available financial years 2006 and 2007. It is found that corporategovernance mechanisms play a vital role in providing quality reporting. Most corporategovernance mechanisms, especially non-executive directors, board size, CEO duality, audit quality, and government ownership, have a significant contribution in providing quality voluntary disclosure. The findings of this study provide evidence on the effectiveness of corporategovernance as a mechanism of monitoring power to provide users with adequate and sufficient information. The findings of this study have important implications for authority regulators, policy makers, shareholders and other users of reports who have an interest in best practices of corporategovernance.
corporategovernance mechanisms as determinacies of CSED. In order to carry out this investigation corporate social responsibility (CSR), and CSED needs to be explored. To do so a look back in the history of corporation is needed. From a classical point of view, Friedman (1962) argues that companies should only pay attention to shareholders and invests in increasing company’s value which implies that managers are not allowed to spend on CSR. In a similar point of view, Arrow (1973) stated that by generating profits witch is considered as contribution to the society its operating in, company is considered to be socially responsible. This idea has been presented by the classical economy theory; the only social concern that company should take into account is maximising shareholders’ wealth in an ethical way by following rules and regulations(Carroll, 1999). However, Companies have been criticised in the past for creating various social and environmental problems throughout their economic operation (e.g. child labour, quality and safety issues of products, employees’ health and safety issues, environmental pollution, waste of resources) (Gray et al., 1987b; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Reverte, 2009). As a result of these problems, companies have been put under pressure to consider social and environmental issues while they are operating as the public awareness of CSR has increased. Considering social and environmental aspects as well as different stakeholder groups in companies’ operations have become a vital issue, and this is what CSR concerns.
impact upon the value of the firm, was conducted. The method used to study the relationship between firm value and voluntary riskdisclosure levels in all listed Saudi banks was the ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis. The results of the regression are presented in Table 5. This study’s model used a market based measure; market to book value at year-end at the end as the dependent variable, total riskdisclosure score as its endogenous variable and a mixture of corporategovernance, demographic attributes and firm- specific characteristics as control variables (see Table 2). As can be observed from the model summary in Table 5 that the model is significant at the (0.000) level with an F value of (6.651) and with an adjusted R square of 0.672 percent. Therefore, the explanatory power of the independent and control variables on firm value are fairly high. However, based on this model the regression analysis Table indicates that there is an insignificant relationship between firm value and the level of voluntary riskdisclosure in Saudi listed banks. Therefore, this study’s hypothesis is rejected in this model. The results are consistent with previous studies, such as Uyar and Kilic (2012) and Hassan et al., (2009). This investigation’s outcome based on the market based measure (MTBV) is inconsistent with the signalling theory, which indicates that when a firm’s performance is good, directors will signal their firm’s performance to their investors and the rest of the market by reporting more information voluntarily, whilst directors of firms that are performing badly will not do so. The purpose of such disclosure is to obtain a good market reputation and increase firm value since investors and the rest of the market may misinterpret a firm keeping silent as it is withholding the worst possible information (Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). This research model finding is attributed to the deep-rooted tendency of the Saudi capital market to be opaque (Kamla and Roberts, 2010) and explained by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, where SaudiArabia scored zero on the secrecy vs. transparency measure.
Efficiency in the market is a significant aspect for all investors which can build a healthy environment for competitors and protects the rights of all investors. Despite this, the Efficient Market Hypothesis has received criticism when alternative evidence has been measured against the hypothesis. Jensen (1978: p95) stated that “we seem to be entering a stage where widely scattered and as yet incohesive evidence is arising which seems to be inconsistent with the theory” and “it is evidence which we will not be able to ignore”. Shleifer (2000: p2) reported that “in the last twenty years, both the theoretical foundations of the EMH and the empirical evidence purporting to support it have been challenged”. For example, the influence of a small firm was proved to work against the general context of the EMH. Banz (1981) studied the long term returns of U.S. stocks and concluded with that those firms with small caps resorted to offering higher returns more often than those firms with larger caps. Thus, there was a long term, clear trend that continued to distort the general context of EMH. In addition, the calendar effect indicates that share returns can be regularly higher or lower on specific days of the week, in the month or in a specific month of the year. These implied profit opportunities proved market inefficiency and stood against the semi strong form of the EMH. Cross (1973) investigated U.S. stocks from 1953 to 1970 and found that the raise rate on Friday was significantly higher than the raise rate on Monday. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) researched the shares in the U.S. from 1904 to 1974 and reported that an average return was 3.48% in January, contrasting with 0.42% in other months.
Guan, Y., Sheu, D., & Chu, Y. (2007). Ownership Structure, Board Of Directors, And Information Disclosure: Empirical EvidenceFrom Taiwan IC Design Companies. Journal Of American Academy Of Business, 11(2), 182-190. Harabi, N. (2007). State Of CorporateGovernance In Arab Countries: An Overview. Haw, I. M., Hu, B., Hwang, L. S., & Wu, W. (2004). Ultimate Ownership, Income
Plaintiffs’ lawyers will surely make that argument, which the Court encouraged by remanding the case for further consideration in light of allegations that a lawyer had raised questions about the heightened legal risk associated with one of Omnicare’s contracts. To be sure, that evidence would be damning if it undermined the argument that Omnicare genuinely believed it was in compliance, but that is not the question here. Rather, would a reasonable investor take the “we believe” statement as effectively saying that there are no serious doubts about that assessment, even if the issuer’s confidence is real? The result of the Court’s holding and the remand is a new sort of balancing test, which increases the pressure on corporate fiduciaries to try to assure a sound basis for statements of belief.
Fifth, Saudi firms are exposed to further different types of risks. For example, Saudi companies face the risk of Saudization where they are asked by the government (Ministry of Labour) to employ Saudi citizens. Saudi workers are much more costly on firms than foreign labor. Therefore, firms are at risk of harsh penalties if they do not employ Saudi workers at a minimum percentage of total labor. The minimum percentage varies among industries. Also, Saudi firms depend more on direct and indirect governmental subsidies. There are several forms of governmental support for firms including, but not limited to: lending huge loans with no interest, providing oil derivatives with an extremely low level of prices, offering very low energy prices, paying part of Saudi workers` salaries, in addition to keeping the absence of corporate taxes system. Therefore, Saudi companies are at risk of losing some of the governmental supports if they do not comply with governmental demands. Additionally, SaudiArabia suffers from terrorism. Terrorism can have a significant direct and indirect impact on Saudi firms. Several Saudi firms have been attacked by terrorists. Some foreign workers have been kidnapped or killed. As a result, Saudi companies are at risk of terrorism. Furthermore, SaudiArabia is engaging in a war on the southern border. Since there are many listed firms located near the war area, they are at risk of the continuation of the war. This risk can apply to all other firms in SaudiArabia since the geopolitical instability is a substantial danger. Given the above discussion, Saudi Arabian listed firms exhibit different types of risks which thereby might have an impact on the disclosure practices of risk-related information.
Furthermore, the positive coefficients on BSZ, AFZ and CGC indicate that H4, H5, and H6, respectively, are supported. The positive relationship between BSZ and SCGI is in line with the evidence of previous studies (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, & Thomas, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, 2013b; Rouf, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012). Similarly, the evidence that AFZ impacts positively on voluntary CG disclosure is consistent with the findings of previous studies (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Eng & Mak, 2003; Han et al., 2012; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), whereas the positive effect of CGC on SCGI offers new empirical support for the findings of Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, and Thomas (2012), Ntim et al. (2013), and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a, 2013b). The positive CGC–SCGI nexus is also in line with the univariate (see Table 4) and bivariate (see Table 5) evidence, which suggests that establishing a CG committee to specifically monitor compliance and disclo- sure of CG practices can contribute positively toward enhancing CG standards. With respect to board size, theoretically, increased managerial monitoring associ- ated with larger boards can have a positive influence on corporate disclosures, including CG ones and performance (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In a similar vein, and with respect to audit firm, larger audit firms have greater finan- cial strength, knowledge, and independence, which can affect positively on volun- tary CG disclosure (DeAngelo, 1981; Eng & Mak, 2003; Han et al., 2012; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Economically, the implications of these findings can be quantified as, a one standard deviation change (increase) in BSZ, AFZ, and CGC may be associated with about 0.40% (1.76 × 0.231), 12.45% (49% × 0.254) and 9.66% (30% × 0.322) change (increase) in the level of the SCGI, respectively.
include the need to provide quality education and healthcare to the public, in addition to meeting many other societal obligations. In developing countries these challenges are so numerous and costly that governments are largely unable to shoulder them on their own without engaging the private sector, hence the need for public-private sector collaboration. In developed countries such as in Europe and North America, the abdication of public services and welfare by the state has made private CSR a fertile area for profitable corporate activity. While ideally firms seek to profit from their CSR activities, whether directly (e.g. state sector subcontracting) or indirectly via improved brand image and increased customer loyalty, but in accounting terms they typically represent a loss. However, any business that ignores the reality of the need to be perceived as caring and community-orientated is taking a great risk in terms of its long-term survival (Solomon and Solomon, 2002).
Second, to explore the link between each of the voluntary CG disclosure mechanisms, the main equation of the study is re-estimated by substituting GINDX with the right of shareholders’ rights (SHAR), board of directors (BDIR), internal control and risk management (INCR), and disclosure and transparency (DTRA) sub-indices. The outcomes of the equations are reported in the Columns 3 to 6 of Table V, respectively, with the results remaining essentially as those reported for the main GINDX. Third and although treated as control variables (not the main focus of this study), the findings from Table V suggest that audit firm size, board size, government ownership, institutional ownership and the presence of a CG committee are positively associated with the level of voluntary CG disclosure, whilst block ownership is negatively associated with the extent of voluntary CG disclosure, and thereby extending the findings of prior studies that were specifically conducted within the Saudicorporate context, such as Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008), Alshehri and Solomon (2012), Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), Piesse et al. (2012) and Albassam et al. (2015), which reported similar results.
In 2013, Bank Negara Malaysia has provided “Financial Reporting Standard”. It mainly consists of four parts. First, the guideline provides an overview which consists of the applicability, legal provision, level of application and interpretation. Second, it presents the regulatory requirement for the banks such as compliance with Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS), specific requirements on the application of the MFRS, the use of fair value option for financial instruments and the minimum disclosure requirement. Third, the standard covers on the regulatory process and submission requirements, for instance declaration and payment of dividends, annual financial statements and interim financial reports. The last part of the standard presents the annual financial statements and the interim financial reports. This standard requires the banks to comply with the key principles on disclosure of information, for instance, timely and up-to-date information disclosure in order to avoid undue delays in disclosure. The standard recommends for timely information disclosure because if there is any delay in disclosing the information, it might impair the relevancy of the information. In addition, there should be adequate information disclosure on uncertain events or situations to reduce risk to the investors. The disclosure should emphasize on key accounting estimates, assumptions and the probabilities of the occurrence of various scenarios. Comparative accounting information should be disclosed whereever necessary to provide more comprehensive information to be useful for all the involved parties.
Hypothesis 3, which expected CEO duality to be negatively related to CSR disclosure, is not supported. To the contrary, in line with findings by Bear et al. (2010), our results consistently suggest a statistically significant positive relationship between CEO duality and CSR disclosure. One possible explanation might be that more powerful CEOs promote CSR and CSR disclosure in order to become more successful and to increase their pay or tenure prospects, to appease personal moral concerns, or to reduce the supervision and control exerted by financial or goods markets, the board of directors or regulators (Barnea and Rubin 2010). For example, Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) suggest that CEOs view CSR opportunistically to gain media coverage and enhance their own reputation. Using CEO pay as a measure for CEO power, their research suggests that, unless CEOs are already firmly entrenched, more powerful CEOs are likely to engage more actively in CSR. Moreover, as previously discussed, particularly in the context of banks, powerful CEOs might have an incentive to limit their firm’s risk exposure against the interests of short-term oriented shareholders (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Barry, Lepetit and Tarazi, 2011) in order to improve their job security and to protect their human capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pathan, 2009). As banks’ risk exposure can not only be reduced via finance and investment strategies (Pathan, 2009), but also via CSR activities aimed at engaging key stakeholders (Gill, 2008; Scholtens, 2008; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Ghoul et al., 2011; Salama et al., 2011), powerful CEOs might have an interest to increase the bank’s CSR activities and reporting.
CorporateGovernance in Islamic Banking CG in banking has its own uniqueness compared to other sectors. CG mechanism is not only intended to align the interests of management and shareholders to protect the interests of minority owners of the majority owner alone. In banking, the manager served to protect the funds entrusted by the various parties in the bank, including by depositors. Banking has a high level of risk because of high levels of leverage in its capital structure. Banks also have a wider range of stakeholders, as well as play an important role in the economy. Systemic risk in the banking shown by the problems in one bank can
Among board members, conflicts of interest are situations in which the neutrality of board decisions is compromised by considerations of personal interests, whether material or moral, of board members, their relatives and friends. 331 Conflicts of interest are present when opportunities for formal exploitation to serve private interests arise. 332 It must be noted that, for a conflict of interest to materialise, the board and members need take no overt action; the very opportunity for personal interest to clash with corporate interest is sufficient. At this point, compliant board members should refrain from participating in deciding the matter or otherwise acting on it. The CL specified the meaning of conflicts of interest, and these provisions were adopted in the CGR without modification. 333 The most commonly conceived conflict of interest scenario is board members profiting from a transaction involving the use or disposition of company properties. This is the overt face of conflict of interest. However, there are more subtle situations that should, if they do not already, constitute conflicts of interest involving board members. For instance, non-executive members of the board are often considered the element that creates balance in board decisions because of the relative disinterest of outsiders to the organisational hierarchy. However, non-executive members are likely to have shareholdings not only in the corporation on whose board they sit but also in potentially competing companies. Non-executive members may even have a greater interest in other companies, even non-competitors, whose interests are contrary to those of the organisation. For example, board members could covertly be pre-empting possible lucrative contracts in their favour or in favour of their more lucrative
Many previous researchers examined the relationship between corporategovernance and banks’ performance. Choi and Hasan (2005) examined the effect of ownership and corporategovernance on Korean bank’s performance. They found that the existence of one foreign director on the board improves bank performance significantly, but multiple foreign directors on the board do not improve bank’s performance. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) investigated the role of boards and CEOs in the performance of the Ghanaian banking sector. They concluded that the more independent the board is, the worse the profitability of a bank, also they showed a positive relationship between the board size and ROA. Tandelilin et al. (2007) examined the correlation among corporategovernance, risk management and bank performance in the Indonesian Banking Sector. They found that there is a relationship between corporategovernance and risk management and a relationship between corporategovernance and bank performance which are sensitive to the type of bank ownership. Furthermore, risk management has a significant effect on bank performance and vice versa.
Corporategovernance plays an important function for the present multifaceted and vigorous corporate setting particularly after the economic outrages around the world and the present downfall of the main corporate banks/institutions in the USA, Europe and South East Asia that have established the need for the preparation of virtuous corporategovernance (Marai et al., 2017). Corporategovernance aims at minimizing economic risks and foster public and investor confidence in the financial market provides a proper risk management structures and procedures in financial organizations, and improve financial risk administration and financial performance (Ruparelia and Njuguna, 2016). Furthermore, Corporategovernance serves as mechanisms through which companies solve their conflict between companies‟ stakeholders by giving a solid and operative monitoring on company‟s administrators that can safeguard the financial report organised by the administrators is reliable and trustworthy (Husseinali et al., 2016). Still, on the significance of corporategovernance, Alkhtani (2010) opines that due to the adoption of corporategovernance principles in the listed corporations in SaudiArabia as well as banks have increased intensely, particularly in addressing the economic crisis of 2006.
In our course of work we have selected the pharmaceutical sector of Pakistan stock exchange. There are 9 pharmaceutical corporation working in the pharmaceutical sector. We have analyzed the annual reports of all these corporations for the last five years starting from 2011 to 2015. The financial performance of these firms has been measured through return on equity (ROE). As corporategovernance we use three variables i.e. (i) board size (ii) duality of CEO and chairman, and (iii) No. of women in board. So ROE is the dependent variable and the corporategovernance components are the independent variables.It is notable that due to small number of firms, we have not applied sampling technique to remove the possibility of errors. Following research hypothesis are developed to check the effectiveness of corporategovernance against profitability.
material and identified boundary aspects (G4-17 to G4-23), stakeholder relations (G4-24 to G4-27), report profiles (G4-28 to G4-33), governance ( G4-34 to G4-55) and ethics and integrity (G4-56 to G4-58). Score 1 if item is disclosed and 0 if item not disclosed. CSR score = (total CSR score / 58) x 100%; (2) CG, is the performance assessment of the Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors (BOARD), Audit Committee (AC), and Internal Audit (AI); (3) Size, is the size of the company calculated by using natural logarithm of total assets; (4) Leverage, is a financing activity that comes from debt that has an important role and usually the lender asks for a more complete disclosure to the borrowing company (Leftwich 1981) and it is considered important in the disclosure of corporate social responsibility. Leverage is calculated by: long term debt divided by total assets; (5) Liquidity, calculated by: number share traded / total outstanding share; and (6) ROA, calculated by: profit before tax divided by total assets.